POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Q & A (1-5)

F, was on his way home after some rounds of drinks with friends at night, while on board a taxi, was stopped at a checkpoint, established by the COMELEC and the PNP along Espana, Manila to implement the gun ban law during the campaign period. Found inside his attaché case was a gram of shabu and some pornographic DVD materials. At the police station where he was brought, upon questioning by some media reporters, he admitted the ownership of both the shabu and the pornographic DVD materials.

Were the gram of shabu and some pornographic DVD materials be admissible in evidence?

The things found are not admissible as evidence.

Checkpoints are only limited to visual search of the moving vehicles. The search of his attaché case, amounts to an illegal search, thus the results are said to be “fruits of the poisonous tree”.

Was his confession before media men at the police station be admissible in evidence?

Yes, such admissions are admissible in evidence.

Confessions given in response to a question of the media men, not police men are admissible.

Where the suspect gave spontaneous answers to questions of the media men, such answers are deemed to be voluntary and admissible. (People vs. Andan)

The SC further ruled that appellant’s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence.

What is a “stop-and-frisk” search?

In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons.

Were a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

Apprehended for carrying a caliber .38 pistol tucked in his waist at a checkpoint established by the PNP elements to implement the gun ban law during the campaign period, Serafin was brought to the police station. While at the police station, when queried by the news reporters present, he admitted ownership of the firearm and showed his license to carry firearm duly issued by the Firearms and Explosive Unit. Charged and prosecuted for violation of the gun ban law, during the trial, his counsel was objecting to the introduction in evidence of the testimony of the news reporters who interviewed him at the police station wherein he admitted ownership of the firearm contending that he was not represented by counsel then.

Was the arrest of Serafin valid? Explain.

The arrest was valid, for it was the result of a warrantless search, such as inflagrante delicto and also searches in checkpoints.

The law provides that the COMELEC can impose checkpoint so as to implement the gun ban law.

Is the caliber .38 pistol seized from Serafin at the checkpoint admissible in evidence? Clarify.

Yes. Warrantless search are allowed in checkpoints.

Therefore the results of such search will be admissible evidence as against the person possessing such.

Was the establishment of checkpoint to implement the gun ban law justified? Explain

The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.

A pre-taped program of the INC upon review by the MTRCB was found to be attacking another religious group and was correspondingly classified as “Rated X”. In a petition before the court, the INC contended that its religious freedom is per se beyond review by the MTRCB and that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTRCB to classify its pre-taped program as “Rated X” simply because it attacked another religion.

Rule on the 2 contentions of the INC

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

1^st contention

The INC's postulate that its religious freedom is per se beyond review by the MTRCB should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our society today. "For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still." (Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. CA)

2^nd Contention:

The MTRCB may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by the INC but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-à-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, the MTRCB cannot squelch the speech of the INC simply because it attacks another religion. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth. (Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. CA)

Is there a constitutional right to privacy? Explain. What are the zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws.

Yes. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” In the 1965 case of Griswold vs. Connecticut, the US SC gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. We adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy.

The SC clarified that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights. Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Sections. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17. (Ople vs. Torres).

The zones of privacy recognized and protected in our laws.

The Civil Code provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons” and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.

The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200), the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. 8293).

The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information (Section 24, Rule 130[c], Revised Rules on Evidence). (Ople vs. Torres)

In his petition to post bail, the judge conditioned the grant of bail to P on his arraignment ratiocinating that if he is granted bail without having been arraigned first, he might jump bail and therefore, trial in absentia may not proceed. What constitutional rights of P will be violated by such condition imposed by the judge on the grant of bail to him? Explain.

To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (Lavides vs. CA)

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