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This case presents an exception to the rule that appeals of this nature are limited to questions of law. In this petition for review, the Court finds that the uniform conclusion made by the CA and the RTC is manifestly mistaken, thus warranting the re-evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties.

The cornerstone of all criminal prosecutions is the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This places the burden upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused on the strength of its own evidence, without regard to the weakness of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge this burden, the accused need not even offer evidence; as flowing from this presumption, acquittal must ensue as a matter of course.

Preliminarily, it is important to address the variance between the cause of the victim's death as stated in the Death Certificate prepared by Dr. Cuevas and the statement of Dr. Parado, the Municipal Health Officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim.

The Death Certificate was presented as a common exhibit for both parties. It was admitted by the Court as evidence not on the basis of the testimony of Dr. Parado, but as documentary evidence which, of itself, is the best evidence of its contents. It is therefore inconsequential that the certificate was not affirmed by Dr. Cuevas who prepared the same, and was presented on the occasion of the testimony of Dr. Parado, who offered a different opinion as to the victim's cause of death.

The Death Certificate is a public document. As such, it is admissible in evidence even without proof of its due execution and genuineness. The entries found therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise. Consequently, in this case, the certificate of death was admissible to prove the victim's cause of death even if Dr. Cuevas did not testify in court. Such certificate is given evidentiary weight as prima facie evidence of its contents.

Notwithstanding, such evidence must be weighed in relation to the autopsy report which contradicted the cause of death. While both indicated respiratory arrest as the immediate cause of the victim's death, the Death Certificate indicated that it is a complication of other illness; on the other hand, the autopsy report as affirmed by Dr. Parado in his testimony stated that it is a result of the injury sustained by the victim in the occipital area. This leaves the evidence in equipoise that warrants the petitioner's acquittal.

Under the equipoise rule, as applied in criminal cases, when there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the accused must be acquitted as the quantum of proof is not met. Similarly, when the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one consistent with innocence and another with guilt, the evidence is regarded not to have met the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Applied in this case, considering that there is a possibility that the victim died of natural causes and not of the injury he sustained, the prosecution was not able to meet the quantum of proof necessary to implicate the petitioner in the crime of homicide.

Moreover, it is undisputed in this case that there is no eyewitness to the crime and the only basis of the petitioner's conviction are the accounts of the prosecution witnesses, based on what was narrated to them by the victim, that it was the petitioner who inflicted his injuries.

The Court finds the testimony of the prosecution witnesses inadmissible for being hearsay. In this regard, considering that the case for the prosecution, particularly in identifying the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, is anchored heavily upon these testimonies, their exclusion in this case should similarly result in the petitioner's acquittal.

As a rule, witnesses can only testify as to matters based on their personal knowledge or derived from their own perception. However, among the recognized exceptions to this prohibition against hearsay testimony are accounts made in open court of a dying man's declaration and statements which form part of res gestae.

The admissibility of a dying declaration demands the existence of four (4) requisites: a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; b) at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death; c) the declarant is competent as a witness; and d) the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.

Of the foregoing, the second element is wanting in the present case. The rule is that in order for a declaration to be admitted, the same must be uttered under the consciousness or fixed belief that death is inevitable and imminent. A dying declaration is considered as evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence as it is viewed that no person aware of his or her impending death would make a careless and false accusation.

Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

The victim in this case cannot be viewed to be under the consciousness of an impending death. In contrast, his actions indicate no sense of urgency, and his words identifying the petitioner as the one who inflicted his injuries were uttered only in a casual manner. From the narration of the prosecution witnesses, De Guzman and Cruz, the statements of the victim relating to his injuries were uttered during a drinking session; that on the same occasion, they had suggested that the victim seek medical attention but the latter declined and instead continued drinking for about thirty (30) minutes. For sure, these acts are not from a person driven by the thought that he was in a dying condition. There was simply no sense of urgency or intense emotion that could be implied from the victim's actions that typically characterizes someone who has lost all hope for recovery. The conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the victim died two (2) days after he sustained the injuries.

The respondent suggests that granting the victim's statement identifying the petitioner as the one who caused his injuries cannot be considered as a dying declaration, it may nonetheless be considered as part of res gestae, another exception to the prohibition against hearsay.

For a statement to form part of res gestae the following elements must concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The main consideration in the admissibility of spontaneous statements as part of res gestae is "whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony." The statement must be made at the time of or immediately after the startling occurrence, at a time when the exciting influence thereof still continued in the mind of the declarant such that there is no opportunity to contrive and the utterance is made only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

The essence of res gestae is the element of spontaneity, which is determined in relation to the following factors:

(1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.

A review of the attendant circumstances led the Court to conclude that the victim's declaration cannot also be considered as part of res gestae. For one, as aptly pointed out by the petitioner, at least two (2) hours has already passed from the time the victim sustained injuries and when the latter started drinking with De Guzman. Significantly, the victim's conflicting answers to De Guzman's inquiry pertaining to his injuries negate spontaneity:

Q Mister witness, do you know the person Anthony Nerida?

A Yes, sir.

Q Sometime on February 20, 2008 around 7:30 that evening, do you remember if you had a chance to talk to him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And where was the place where you talked with this Anthony Nerida?

A In front of the house of JR our friend, sir.

Q And when you saw this Anthony Nerida, what was your observation if any?

A His nose was bleeding, sir.

Q What more have you observed?

A That's all, sir. After that, we went to have a drink.

Q And aside from having observed him with a nose bleed, were you able to talk to him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what did you discuss if any?

A I asked him what happened to his nose but he said none, sir.

Q And aside from asking about is nose, what more did you talk about if any?

A When we were already drinking we talked about a wound on his head, sir.

Q What did you know about the wound on his head?

A It was hit by Benjie Lagao he said, sir. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Jorolan, the Court held that there must be no intervening circumstance between the startling occurrence and the statement of such nature "as to divert the mind of the declarant, and thus restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation." The statement or declaration must be instinctive and void of any period for reflection.

Herein, at the time the declaration was made, the victim was not at or near the place where he sustained the injuries. De Guzman first met the victim in front of the house of their friend "JR" and then they proceeded to have a drink at a sari-sari store. Also, while the injuries sustained by the victim were yet to be treated at the time he made the declaration, he was nevertheless able to converse and interact properly with prosecution witnesses De Guzman, Cruz, and Nerida, Sr. In fact, the victim was able to proceed from place to place, and was even the one who procured the alcoholic beverage he shared with De Guzman. In view of the intervening events between the occurrence and the declaration, it cannot be said that the victim "had no time to deliberate and fabricate" the identification of the petitioner as his assailant. In the same way, the declaration cannot be regarded to be inspired by the shock or excitement caused by the startling occurrence as to be viewed deliberately intertwined thereto.

It is elementary that the burden rests upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed and to establish the identity of the offender. In the discharge of this duty, the prosecution must stand on its own merits and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Failing in this regard, as in this controversy, acquittal must ensue as a matter of right.