Political Law Part XIV: Article XVI – General Provisions
POLITICAL LAW PART XIV
ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Sections 1-12
Exec. Order No. 264
a. Consent is either Express or Implied
b. Express
1. general law
aa. C.A. 327
bb. Act 3083, Sec. 1
cc. Art. 2180 par. 6, New Civil Code (R.A. 386)
dd. PD 1807, January 16, 1981
2. Special law
Read: MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT, 34 Phil. 311
c. Implied
1. When the government institutes a suit;
State immunity from suit; when government officers initiate a suit against a private party, it descends to the level of a private individual susceptible to counterclaims
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and ROBERTO BENEDICTO, 484 SCRA 119
Garcia, J.
When the State through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint against a private individual before the Sandiganbayan and thereafter, enters into a compromise agreement , it cannot later on invoke immunity from suit.
Where the State itself is no less than the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be invoked because when a state, through its duly authorized officers takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and pursuant to a constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right of the other party to the agreement.
2. When the government engages in business or enters into a contract; and
3. Read:
aa. MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA bb. U.S. VS. RUIZ, 136 SCRA
cc. TORIO VS. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599
dd. COMMISSIONER VS. SAN DIEGO, 31 SCRA 616
ee. USA vs. JUDGE QUINTO, et al., February 26, 1990 and the cases cited therein
ff. Republic of the Philippines vs. Judge Sandoval, March 19, 1993
gg. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357
hh. Veteans vs. CA, 214 SCRA 286
Immunity from suit; effect of a void contract with the government; unjust enrichment
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH VS. C.V. CANCHELA, et al., 475 SCRA 218
Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
The DOH entered into three owner –consultant agreements with the private respondents covering infrastructure projects for the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC), the Batangas Regional Hospital and the Corazon L. Montelibano Memorial regional Hospital in Bacolod City.
The agreements for the three (3) projects are almost identical. This requires the private respondents to prepare: detailed architectural and engineering design plans; technical specifications and detailed estimates of cost of construction of the hospital, including the preparation of bid documents and requirements; and construction supervision until completion of hand-over and issuance of final certificate.
While the Agreements were witnessed by the respective Chief Accountants of the hospitals and were duly approved by the Department of Health, the former did not issue corresponding certificates of availability of funds to cover the professional or consultancy fees.
The DOH through is authorized representative, wrote separate letters to the respective chiefs of hospitals confirming the acceptance of private respondents’ complete Contract or Bid Documents for each project and RECOMMENDED THE PAYMENT OF 7.5% OF THE PROJECT ALLOCATION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS CONSULTANCY FEES.
During the construction of the projects, various deficiencies in the performance of the agreed scope of private respondents’ work were allegedly discovered which were not communicated to the private respondents. Due to such alleged deficiencies, petitioner withheld payment of the consultancy fees due to private respondent. Neither did petitioner return the documents, plans, specifications and estimates submitted by private respondents.
Considering the refusal of the DOH to pay said fees despite repeated demands, the private respondents submitted the dispute to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
After the presentation of evidence by both parties, the Arbitrator issued his decision dated March 30, 1999 sentencing the DOH to pay the private respondents to pay P3,492,713.00 for services performed and completed for and accepted by DOH. The said amount shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of the award until the decision becomes final. Thereafter, the principal and the interest accrued as of such time shall earn interest at 12% per annum.
The DOH filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for being filed out of time. As such, on motion of the private respondents, the Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution .
I s s u e :
Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction to entertain the suit considering that the Agreements, being to promote the heath and well-being of the citizens, is in furtherance of the state’s sovereign and governmental power and therefore, IMMUNE FROM SUIT.
Held:
In their Memorandum before the Supreme Court, the DOH, for the first time, raised the nullity of the three (3) agreements from the very beginning for failure to include therein a certification of availability of funds which is required under existing laws, particularly the Auditing Code of the Philippines, PD 1445. As such, the fees of the private respondents shall not be based on the project fund allocation but on the basis of reasonable value or on the principle of quantum meruit.
While the agreement is indeed void ab initio for violation of existing laws, the DOH is liable to pay the private respondents their consultancy services based on quantum merit to be determined by the Commission on Audit.
The invocation of immunity from suit is without merit. This is so because the government has already received and accepted the benefits rendered. To refuse payment as a result of the state’s immunity from suit would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. (Citing Eslao vs. COA, 195 SCRA 730)
4. Tests of Suability for incorporated government
Read:
aa. RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, 110 SCRA 456
bb. ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM VS. CIR, 102 Phil. 789
5. Tests of Suability for an unincorporated govt. agency government agency
Read:
aa. NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP. VS. TEODORO, 91 Phil 203
bb. SANTIAGO VS. REPUBLIC, 87 SCRA 294
cc. PNB VS. PABALAN, 83 SCRA595
dd. REPUBLIC VS. PURISIMA, 78 SCRA 470
ee. MOBIL PHIL. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE, 185 SCRA 1120
ff. BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 1 SCRA 340
hh. METRAN VS. PAREDES, 79 Phil. 819
ii. SANTOS VS. SANTOS, 92 Phil. 281
jj. MALAYAN INSURANCE VS. SMITH BELL, Nov. 17, 1980
kk. SYQUIA VS. ALMEDA LOPEZ, 84 Phil. 31
ll. LIM VS. BROWNELL, JR., 107 Phil. 344
mm. CARABAO INC. VS. SPC, 35 SCRA 224
nn. U.S.A. vs. RUIZ, 136 SCRA 487
LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON E. DETWILER and ANTHONY, G.R. No. 90314 November 27, 1990
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. As found by the trial court, she received a Master of Arts degree from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34 semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science; she has also completed all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral degree; she is a civil service eligible; and, more importantly, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.
Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied by Mrs. Abalateo whose appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler.
Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson. Thereafter, said commission sent a communication addressed to private respondent Detwiler, 10 finding Edward Isakson not qualified to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, and requesting that action be taken to remove him from the position and that efforts be made to place him in a position for which he qualifies. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf avers that said recommendation was ignored by private respondent Detwiler and that Isakson continued to occupy said position of guidance counselor.
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on her complaint for discrimination. Consequently, a hearing was held on March 29, 1978 before the U.S. Department of Air Force in Clark Air Base.
Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages, dated April 27, 1978, against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2783, for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-9 position.
Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit. The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the United States Government which would require its consent.
Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that in filing the case, petitioners sought a judicial review by a Philippine court of the official actuations of respondents as officials of a military unit of the U.S. Air Force stationed at Clark Air Base. The acts complained of were done by respondents while administering the civil service laws of the United States. The acts sued upon being a governmental activity of respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the United States, as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its consent and by the immunity of the officials of the United States Armed Forces for acts committed in the performance of their official functions pursuant to the grant to the United States Armed Forces of rights, power and authority within the bases under the Military Bases Agreement. It is further contended that the rule allowing suits against public officers and employees for unauthorized acts, torts and criminal acts is a rule of domestic law, not of international law. It applies to cases involving the relations between private suitors and their government or state, not the relations between one government and another from which springs the doctrine of immunity of a foreign sovereign.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article 11, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only sects against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen etc., et al. “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates crime invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. In the case of United States of America, et al. vs. Guinto, etc., et al., ante we declared:
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
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Political Law Part XIII: Article XIV – Education, Science, etc.
POLITICAL LAW PART XIII
ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE, ETC.
1. Secs. 1-19
a. Read: RA 6655-The Free Secondary Education Act of 1988
Section 5 [2] Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
b. What is academic freedom?
Very Important: (2007 Bar Question)
Under the 1973 Constitution, “Academic freedom shall by enjoyed BY ALL institutions of higher learning” while under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed IN ALL institutions of higher learning.” In short, before, ON LY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING ENJOY ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHILE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS ALSO ENJOYED BY THE TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS AS WELL AS STUDENTS, ASIDE FROM THE SCHOOL.
Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THECOMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE ANDSPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTOVALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands – “parangknuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[2][7] with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints[3][8]were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.
For your strict compliance.[5][13]
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[6][18] finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,[7][19] pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.[8][20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.[9][21]
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration[10][22] before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution[11][23] dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO[12][24] directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,[13][28] in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention[14][29] in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss[15][30] in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss[16][31] the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order[17][32] denying petitioners’ (respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents’ (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.[18][34] Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge’s Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued[19][35] a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering d\De La Salle not to implement its decision expelling private respondents. On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari[20][37] (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge’s September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.[21][38] The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.[22][39]
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters[23][40] to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission’s Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar’s counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.[24][42]
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss[25][43] in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar.
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.[26][46] Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.[27][47]
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.
Hence, this case.
I S S U E S:
Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom in support of its decision to expel the private respondents?
H E L D:
Since De La Salle University is an institution of higher learning, it enjoys academic freedom which includes the right to determine whom to admit as its students.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.[28][74] According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.[29][75]
While La Salle is entitled to invoke academic freedom in its actions against its students, the penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”[30][94] This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.[31][95]
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.[32][96]
Accordingly, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued, not EXPEL.
Read:
1.THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, February 9, 1993
1-a. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RUBEN AYSON, August 17, 1989
1-c. UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA, August 31, 1999
Academic Freedom includes the power of a University to REVOKE a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after it was found out that the student’s graduation was obtained through fraud.
Academic freedom is given a wide sphere of authority. If an institution of higher learning can decide on who can and cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
Academic Freedom—
It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds
a. who may teach,
b. what may be taught,
c. how it shall be taught, and
d. who may be admitted to study”‘ (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491, (1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).
1-b) GARCIA VS. FACULTY ADMISSION, 68 SCRA 277
“What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines.”
“The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher recognized and effectively guaranteed by society to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning.”‘
2) MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION
3) VILLAR VS. TIP, April 17, 1985
4) MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO,129 SCRA 359
5) BELENA VS. PMI
6) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, May 2, 1988
6-a) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, September 29, 1989 (Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration) Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Sarmiento
7) TONGONAN VS. PANO, 137 SCRA 246
8) ATENEO VS. CA, 145 SCRA 100
9) GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706
10) ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26
11. Tan vs. CA, 199 SCRA 212
12. Colegio del Sto. Nino vs. NLRC, 197 SCRA 611
13. Dean Reyes vs. CA,
14. UP vs. CA, February 9, 1993
15. Ateneo vs. Judge Capulong, May 27, 1993
Reference:
Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City
[1][1] College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System.
[2][7] Id. at 127.
[3][8] Id. at 128-129.
[4][9] Id. at 130-133.
[5][13] Id. at 134.
[6][18] Id. at 139-150.
[7][19] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that expulsionis “an extreme penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary. The penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency, drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel, instigating or leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in the stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or school personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties, forging or tampering with school records or school forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents.”
[8][20] Rollo, pp. 151-153.
[9][21] Id. at 150.
[10][22] Id. at 1284-1304.
[11][23] Id. at 172-178.
[12][24] Id. at 180.
[13][28] Id. at 208.
[14][29] Id. at 210-236.
[15][30] Id. at 237-246.
[16][31] Id. at 247-275.
[17][32] Id. at 1116-1124.
[18][34] Id. at 1563-1571.
[19][35] Id. at 114-115.
[20][37] Id. at 336-392.
[21][38] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(b) provides thatexclusion is “a penalty in which the school is allowed to exclude or drop the name of the erring pupil or student from the school rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.”
[22][39] Rollo, pp. 125-126.
[23][40] Id. at 1599-1606.
[24][42] Id. at 1605-1606.
[25][43] Id. at 435-438.
[26][46] Id. at 518-522.
[27][47] Id. at 523-530.
[28][74] Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000), citing Tangonan v. Paño, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257.
[29][75] Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 56. The “four essential freedoms of a university” were formulated by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in the leading case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311, 77 S. Ct. 1203.
[30][94] See note 87, at 663-664.
[31][95] Malabanan v. Ramento, 214 Phil. 319, 330 (1984).
[32][96] Rollo, p. 515.
