Political Law Part XIII: Article XIV – Education, Science, etc.

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Political Law Part XIII: Article XIV – Education, Science, etc.

POLITICAL LAW PART XIII

ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE, ETC.

 1.  Secs. 1-19

a. Read: RA 6655-The Free Secondary Education Act         of 1988

Section 5 [2] Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

b.   What is academic freedom?

Very Important: (2007 Bar Question)

Under the 1973 Constitution, “Academic freedom shall by enjoyed BY ALL institutions of higher learning”  while under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed IN ALL institutions of higher learning.” In short, before, ON LY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING ENJOY ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHILE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS ALSO ENJOYED BY THE TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS AS WELL AS STUDENTS, ASIDE FROM THE SCHOOL.

Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THECOMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE ANDSPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTOVALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980,  December 19, 2007

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE FACTS:

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1][1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.

On  March 29, 1995,   James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux.  He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant.  By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity.  There was no rumble or physical violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council.  The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.  “Kailangan ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar.  But no apology was made.

On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m.,   James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue.  As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back.  Eight to ten guys were running towards him.  He panicked.  He did not know what to do.  Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands – “parangknuckles.”  Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him.  Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him.  As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him.  People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him.  With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.”  What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war.  The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[2][7] with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.”  Similar complaints[3][8]were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente.  Thus, cases entitled “De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.[4][9]

Said notices  issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf.  You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.

For your strict compliance.[5][13]

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.

On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[6][18] finding private respondents guilty.  They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,[7][19] pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.[8][20]  The dispositive part of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.

SO ORDERED.[9][21]

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration[10][22] before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU.  The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution[11][23] dated June 1, 1995.

On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.  It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36.  The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.

The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO[12][24] directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.

On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,[13][28] in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).

On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention[14][29] in Civil Case No. 95-74122.  Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.

On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss[15][30] in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap.  On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss[16][31] the petitions-in-intervention.

On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order[17][32] denying petitioners’ (respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents’ (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996.  Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.[18][34]  Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge’s Order dated September 20, 1995.  On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued[19][35] a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering d\De La Salle not to implement its decision expelling private respondents. On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari[20][37] (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge’s September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.

On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents.  As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.[21][38]  The Resolution states:

RESOLUTION 181-96

RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.[22][39]

Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters[23][40] to petitioner DLSU.  In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96.  However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission’s Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll.  Thus, private respondent Aguilar’s counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.[24][42]

Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss[25][43] in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.

On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar.

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.[26][46]  Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.

On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.[27][47]

On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction.  The pertinent portion of the order reads:

In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.

Hence, this case.

I  S S U E S:

Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom in support of its decision to expel the private respondents?

H E L D:

Since De La Salle University is an institution of higher learning, it enjoys academic freedom which includes the right to determine whom to admit as its students.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.  This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.[28][74] According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.[29][75]

While La Salle is entitled to invoke academic freedom in its actions against its students, the penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”[30][94]  This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed.  If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.  That would give rise to a due process question.[31][95]

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.  Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury.  Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student.  They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases.  Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.[32][96]

Accordingly, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued, not EXPEL.

Read:

1.THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, February 9, 1993

1-a. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON.              RUBEN AYSON, August 17, 1989

1-c. UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS.  CA, August 31, 1999

Academic Freedom includes the power of a University to REVOKE a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after it was found out that the student’s graduation was obtained through fraud.

Academic freedom is given a wide sphere of authority. If an institution of higher learning can decide on who can and cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Academic Freedom—

It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds

a.            who may teach,

b.             what may be taught,

c.            how it shall be taught, and

d.           who may be admitted to study”‘ (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491, (1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).

1-b)   GARCIA VS. FACULTY ADMISSION, 68 SCRA 277

“What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines.”

“The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher  recognized and effectively guaranteed by society  to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning.”‘

          2)   MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION

          3)   VILLAR VS. TIP, April 17, 1985

          4)   MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO,129 SCRA 359

          5)   BELENA VS. PMI

          6)   ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, May 2, 1988

               6-a) ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, September 29, 1989                                        (Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration) Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Sarmiento

          7)   TONGONAN VS. PANO, 137 SCRA 246

          8)   ATENEO VS. CA, 145 SCRA 100

          9)   GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706

         10)   ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26

              11. Tan vs. CA, 199 SCRA 212

         12. Colegio del Sto. Nino vs. NLRC, 197 SCRA 611

         13. Dean Reyes vs. CA,

         14. UP vs. CA, February  9, 1993

         15. Ateneo vs. Judge Capulong, May 27, 1993

 

Reference:

Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan

College of Law, University of the Cordilleras

Baguio City

[1][1]  College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System.

[2][7]  Id. at 127.

[3][8]  Id. at 128-129.

[4][9]  Id. at 130-133.

[5][13] Id. at 134.

[6][18] Id. at 139-150.

[7][19] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that expulsionis “an extreme penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary.  The penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency, drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel, instigating or leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in the stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or school personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties, forging or tampering with school records or school forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents.”

[8][20] Rollo, pp. 151-153.

[9][21] Id. at 150.

[10][22] Id. at 1284-1304.

[11][23] Id. at 172-178.

[12][24] Id. at 180.

[13][28] Id. at 208.

[14][29] Id. at 210-236.

[15][30] Id. at 237-246.

[16][31] Id. at 247-275.

[17][32] Id. at 1116-1124.

[18][34] Id. at 1563-1571.

[19][35] Id. at 114-115.

[20][37] Id. at 336-392.

[21][38] Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(b) provides thatexclusion is “a penalty in which the school is allowed to exclude or drop the name of the erring pupil or student from the school rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.”

[22][39] Rollo, pp. 125-126.

[23][40] Id. at 1599-1606.

[24][42] Id. at 1605-1606.

[25][43] Id. at 435-438.

[26][46] Id. at 518-522.

[27][47] Id. at 523-530.

[28][74] Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000), citing Tangonan v. Paño, G.R. No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257.

[29][75] Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 56. The “four essential freedoms of a university” were formulated by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in the leading case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311, 77 S. Ct. 1203.

[30][94] See note 87, at 663-664.

[31][95] Malabanan v. Ramento, 214 Phil. 319, 330 (1984).

[32][96] Rollo, p. 515.

Political Law Part XI: Article XI – Accountability of Public Officers

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Political Law Part XI: Article XI – Accountability of Public Officers

POLITICAL LAW PART XI

 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

 1.  Sections 1. Public Office is a public trust.

  CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340,  October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

The Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[1][4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),  Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff  Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.  The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[2][6]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[3][7]At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of           E.O. No. 1.

I S S U E:

Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whetherSection 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.  Assuming that it has not been repealed, is it not inconsistent with Section 1, Art. XI which states that public office is a public trust?

The petition has no merit.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits the  power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,     Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.[4][24] 

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability.   It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.  Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.  InPresidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña,[5][25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1.If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x  x  x.

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.    

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[6][26] reiterates the same view.  Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.

2. Sections 12–18

a.   Impeachment, officers of the government who are impeachable, grounds, limitations for its exercise, procedure, etc. . .

 ROMULO, et al vs. YNIGUEZ, et al, 141 SCRA 263

“Culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust”

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any other office under the Republic of the Philippines but shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

Read:

FRANCISCO VS. SPEAKER JOSE DE VENECIA, ET AL, 415 SCRA 44, November 10,  2003

When is an impeachment complaint deemed to be a bar to the filing of another complaint within a 1-year period?

A verified impeachment complaint bars the filing of another complaint against   an impeachable official  within a period of 1 year after the same was received by the House of Representatives and referred by the Speaker to the appropriate committee for its study and recommendation. It is deemed initiated under Art. XI, Section 3 [5] after the referral to the Committee by the Speaker. To “initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint COUPLED WITH CONGRESS TAKING INITIAL ACTION OF SAID COMPLAINT.”

a-1. Degree of loyalty, etc. of government employee.

Read:

Lim-Arce vs. Arce, 205 SCRA 21

b.   The SANDIGANBAYAN AND TANODBAYAN DECREES

Read:

1)   PD’s 1486, 1847, 1606, 1607 and 1630

2)   Exec. Order 244

3)   NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433

          4)   MANGUBAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 147 SCRA 478

          5)   GABISON VS. DE LOS ANGELES, 151 SCRA 61

          6)  ZALDEVAR  VS. RAUL GONZALES, April 27,                1988 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 May 1988

          6)   BAGASO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 155 SCRA 154

          7)   DE JESUS VS. PEOPLE, 120 SCRA 760

          8)   QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December 2, 1986, 146 SCRA

          9)   INTING VS. TANODBAYAN, 97 SCRA 494

b-1 Who prosecutes public officials? Exception

Read:

1. Corpuz vs.  Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281

c.   Disqualification of public officer

Read:

1)   MINOR VS. AGBU, April 10, 1987

          2)   MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING VS. TAGLE, 142 SCRA 553

D. Power of the Ombudsman to suspend public officials.

Read:

Buenaseda vs. Flavier, September 21, 1993

ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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Political Law Part X: Article X – Local Government

POLITICAL LAW PART X

ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1.  Sections 1 & 2. ..shall enjoy local/fiscal  autonomy

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL., May 27, 2004

Local Autonomy; automatic release of  funds of Local Government Units, particularly the IRA.

The petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the General Appropriations Act of 1999, 2000 and 2001 insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each year the amount of P5B of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled “Establishing a Program fro Devolution Adjustment and Equalization “ with the purpose of facilitating the process of enhancing the capacities of LGU’s in the discharge of the functions and services  devolved tot hem by the national government agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.

Issue:

May the Congress or the President impose conditions for the use of the IRA by the different local government units?

Held:

The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unconstitutional as they encroach on the fiscal autonomy of the local government units in violation of the Constitution. And even if this case is already moot and academic because said provisions have been implemented, there is a possibility that the same be incorporated in the future GAA or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided before another GAA is enacted. It behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.

Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is unconstitutional because  it amounts to control to local government units when the President’s power over local government units is confined to general supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of the two powers were enunciated in Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135. Thus:

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have any discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner of doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Section 286 of the Local Government Code is very clear since it provides that the share of each local government unit shall be released without need of any further action, DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY TREASURER as the case may be on a quarterly basis…and which may not be the subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.

Finally, Section 2, Art. X of the Constitution expressly mandates that the local government units shall enjoy local autonomy as well as Section 25, Art. II of the Constitution.

2.  Section 3.. there shall be a LGC which shall provide a more responsive and accountable local government with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum….

Read:

1)   1991 Local Government Code on Recall, requisites, grounds and procedures) and other important aspects.

2. Exec. Order 249

Residence requirement for  local government positions.

TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO, ET AL., 475 SCRA 290

Carpio, J.

Facts:

The petitioner who is the daughter of Rep. Tomas Dumpit, 2nd District of La Union, filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union for the May, 2004 elections. The respondents filed a case for her disqualification on the ground that she is a registered voter of Naguilian , La Union  and only transferred her registration as a voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union, on October 24, 2003. Her presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only after her certificate of candidacy. Barangay officials claimed in an affidavit that she is not a resident of the said Barangay.

The petitioner countered that she acquired a new domicile in San Juan West when she purchased from her father a residential lot on April 19, 2003 and she even designated a person as caretaker of her residential house.

Held:

While residence and domicile are synonymous, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, the following requisites must be present:

1.           an actual removal or actual change of domicile;

2.           a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3.           acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the case of petitioner while she bought a parcel of land in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on April 19, 2003, property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote  or voted for an office.

To effect a change of residence, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, change of domicile or residence must be voluntary and the residence a the place chose for the new domicile must be actual.

In the case at bar, what was constructed by the petitioner on said lot was a beach house which is at most a temporary place of relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Finally, in the Special Power of attorney designating a caretaker with a monthly salary of P2,500.00, it was shown that she is a resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No. 6 butterfly St., Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Memtro Manila. This shows that she has a number of residences and the acquisition of another one does not automatically make the recently acquired residence her new domicile.

Tess Dumpit-Michelena’s cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy for  Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union,  is therefore valid.

2-a. Recall

a. What are the requisites under the Local Government Code of 1991?

b. Read:

1. Garcia vs. COMELEC, October 5, 1993

                    2. Sanchez vs. Comelec, January 24, 1991

3.  Section 4. The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments…

Read:     MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 Phil. 143

1.           Sections 5.. Shall have the power to create their own revenues…

2.           Section 6..shall have a just share in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them..

Read:

1. Basco vs. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52

     1-a. Philippine Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality of Pililla, 198 SCRA 82

     1-b)   WILLIAM LINES VS. CITY OF OZAMIS, 56 SCRA 590         

          1-c. Estanislao vs. Hon. Costales, May 8, 1991

     2)   VELASCO VS. BLAS, 115 SCRA 540

     3)   DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569

     4)   MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE VS. ABELLERA, December 12, 1986, 146 SCRA

     5)   PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION VS. LAC, December 17, 1986, 146 SCRA

     6. MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS VS. LIBANGAN SA

          MALOLOS, 159 SCRA 525

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials shall be not more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation  of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

BENJAMIN BORJA VS. COMELEC, and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998

Mendoza, J.

Issue:

Whether a Vice Mayor who succeeds to the Office of the Mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term for the purpose of the three-term limit on  local officials as provided under the Local Government Code.

Held:

No.

Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:

Section. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be determined by law, which shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

The above provision of the Constitution is restated in Section 43 [b] of RA No. 7160, the Local Government Code.

The term limit for local elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT AN INDIVIDUAL  HAS SERVED THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN AN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICE, HE MUST ALSO  HAVE BEEN ELECTED TO THE SAME POSITION FOR THE SAME NUMBER OF TIMES BEFORE THE DISQUALIFICATION CAN APPLY.

Clearly, therefore, before the disqualification could apply, the following requisites must be present:

1.           the local official must have been elected for the same position [Example: Mayor] three times; and

2.           the local official must have served three consecutive terms as Mayor.

In the present case, only the 2nd requisite is present since in 1988, the private respondent  was not a candidate for  Mayor in 1988 but as Vice Mayor though he succeeded the elected mayor in 1989. It was only in 1992 and 1995 that he was a candidate for Mayor. As such, he could still be a candidate for Mayor in the May, 1998 elections.

(NOTE: Applying the above doctrine, MAYOR MAURICIO DOMOGAN of Baguio City is not prohibited from running for City Mayor of Baguio in the 2001 elections because he was not elected as City Mayor in 1992 though he served as City Mayor since 1992 as a result of the disqualification of RAMON LABO, JR.. His 1992-1995 term was not by election but by operation of law. It was only in 1995 and 1998 that he was a candidate for City Mayor (2 times) though he served 3 times as Mayor. The first requisite before the disqualification applies to him is not present).

ROMEO LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602

The petitioner was elected Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. During his 3rd term (1995 elections), he was proclaimed the winner but his opponent filed an election protest and two (2) months before the next election and 4 months before the end of his 3rd term , the COMELEC declared his opponent to be the winner and was able to occupy the position of Mayor for 2 months.

Is he entitled to run for the position of mayor in the election after he was declared a loser during his 3rd term but he almost completed 3 terms?

Held:

Yes because in order that the prohibition shall apply to him, the following requisites must be present:

1.           the local official must have been elected for the same position [Example: Mayor] three times; and

2.           the local official must have fully served three consecutive terms as Mayor.

In this case, he was not elected to the position 3 times because he lost during the 3rd time though he served the office for 2 years and 10 months. Likewise even assuming that he won the 3rd election, he did not fully serve the term of 3 years. It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Prohibition to run for more than 3 consecutive terms

FEDERICO T. MONTEBONVs. COMELEC & ELEONOR ONDOY, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008

          Petitioners Montebon, Ondoy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.  On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates[1][4] for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.  Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.

In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor.  However, he claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza.  Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.

In the hearing of May 10, 2007, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda.

In petitioners’ memorandum, they maintained that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.  They argued that, according to the law, voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not disqualified from running for the fourth consecutive time to the same office if there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms.

On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service.  His second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.[2][5]

On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division, as follows:

Respondent’s assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in January 2004 during his second term as councilor is not a voluntary renunciation of the latter office.  The same therefore operated as an effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor.  Thus, in running for councilor again in the May 14, 2007 Elections, respondent is deemed to be running only for a second consecutive term as councilor of Tuburan, the first consecutive term fully served being his 2004-2007 term.

Petitioner Montebon’s and Ondoy’s June 9, 2007 manifestation and omnibus motion are hereby declared moot and academic with the instant disposition of their motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[3][6

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.

The petition lacks merit.

The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same post.  Section 8, Article X thereof states:

Sec. 8.  The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:

Sec. 43.  Term of Office.

No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,[4][7] the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.[5][8]   In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[6][9] the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.  Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position.[7][10]

While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.

Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.[8][11]  Section 44[9][12] of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.  Thus:

SEC. 44.  Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.  If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be.  Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. x x x

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.  Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law.  It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.  Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.[10][13] (Emphasis added)

Thus, respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term.  It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.  We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not.  Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception.  Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.  Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law.  Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession.  He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

x x x x

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions.  It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.[11][14]

1.           Section 10. No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Read:

1)   PAREDES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 128 SCRA 6

     2)   LOPEZ VS. METRO MANILA COMMISSION,  136 SCRA 633

     3)   TAN VS. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727

          4)   Padilla vs. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735

6.  Sections 11-14

Read:

1)   CENIZA VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

2)   Differentiate a highly urbanized city from a component city (See BP 337, Sections 162-168)

7.  Sections 15-21

Is there a Cordillera Autonomous Region?

a. Read:     Exec. Order No. 220

b. Ordillo vs. Comelec, 192 SCRA 100

 

Reference:

Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan

College of Law, University of the Cordilleras

Baguio City

[1][4] Jesus C. Mendoza, Teopisto C. Prosia, Jr., Nicolas Y. Edillon, Ernesto B. Caga, Albaerto T. Gallarde, and Eugenio M. Arigo.

[2][5] Rollo, p. 34.

[3][6] Id. at 27-28.

[4][7] 370 Phil. 625 (1999).

[5][8] Id. at 636.

[6][9] 356 Phil. 467 (1998).

[7][10] Id. at 478.

[8][11] See Borja, Jr.  v. Commission on Elections, 356 Phil. 467, 476-477 (1998).

[9][12] SEC. 44.  Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.  If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be.  Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. x x x.

[10][13] Supra note 7 at 638.

[11][14] Rollo, p. 26.

Political Law Part IX: Article IX – Constitutional Commissions

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Political Law Part IX: Article IX – Constitutional Commissions

POLITICAL LAW PART IX

ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

1.  A & B – Sections 1-8

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide  by a majority vote of all its members any case brought before it…Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be brought to the SC on Certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt thereof.

NOTE: Section 1, Rule 43 allows the Court of Appeals to have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC in accordance with RA 7902)

Section 2, Article IX-B. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

[2] Appointments in the CS shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.

[5] The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

Policy determining is one charged with laying down of principal or fundamental guidelines or rules, such as that head of a department.

Primarily confidential position is one denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of the personal trust on confidential matters of the state (Example: Chief Legal Counsel of the PNB, Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA 330).

Highly technical position requires the appointee thereto to possess technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government  owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

a.   Government and controlled corporations

Read:

These cases were decided under the 1973 constitution where it was held that employees of government owned and controlled corporations, with or without charters are within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Under the 1987 Constitution, there is now a distinction and only those with original charters shall be under the CSC while those created under the Corporation Code are not.

1)   NHC VS. JUCO, 134 SCRA 172

          2)   MWSS VS. HERNANDEZ, 143 SCRA 602

          3)   QUIMPO VS. TANODBAYAN, December 2, 1986,      146 SCRA

          4)   PAL VS. CFI, January 8, 1987

   b.   Checking function of the CSC

Read:

1)   DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289

          2)   MEDALLA VS. SAYO, 103 SCRA 587

          3)   MATURAN VS. MAGLARA, 113 SCRA 268

          4)   DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443

          5)   ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353

          6)   CENTRAL BANK VS. CSC, April 10, 1989

     b-1. Security of Tenure

1. Alim vs. CSC, December 2, 1991

                   2. Marohombsar vs. Alonto, February 25, 1991

       b-2. Power of the CSC to change appointee selected by Head of Office

1. Panis vs. CSC, Feb. 2, 1994

                   1-b. Home Insurance vs. CSC, March 19, 1993

                   1-c. Medenilla vs. CSC, February 19, 1991

                   2. Simpao vs. CSC, November 15, 1990

                   3. Barrozo vs. CSC and Valentino Julian, June 25, 1991

                   4. Lapinid vs. CSC, May 14, 1991

                   5. Santiago vs. CSC, 178 SCRA 733

                   6. Orbos vs. CSC, Sept. 12, 1990

                   7. Teologo vs. CSC, Nov. 8, 1990

                   8. Gaspar vs. CSC, Oct. 18, 1990

                   9. Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

    c. Primarily confidential

Read:

1) CADIENTE VS. SANTOS, 142 SCRA 280 (Provincial Legal Officer is a primarily confidential office, but not his assistant)

          2) SAMSON VS. CA, 145 SCRA( The City Legal officer is a primarily confidential officer)

  d. Highly technical/policy determining

1) DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289

          2) MEDALLA VS. SAYO, 103 SCRA 587

          3) MATURAN VS. MAGLARA, 113 SCRA 268

          4) DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443

          5) ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353

e.   Dismissal for cause

Read:

1)   ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO, 9 SCRA 619

          2)   VILLALUZ VS. ZALDIVAR, 15 SCRA 710

          3)   HERNANDEZ VS. VILLEGAS, 14 SCRA 544

          4)   BRIONES VS. OSMENA, 104 Phil. 588

          5)   CORPUZ VS. CUADERNO, 13 SCRA 175

          6)   CRISTOBAL VS. MELCHOR, 78 SCRA 175

          7)   INGLES VS. MUTUC, 26 SCRA 171

          8)   ALCOLALO VS. TANTUICO, 83 SCRA 789

          9)   ABROT VS. CA, 116 SCRA 468

         10)   GINSON VS. MUN. OF MURCIA, 158 SCRA 1

         11)   MARCELINO VS. TANTUICO, July 7, 1986

             12)   CADIENTE VS. SANTOS, June 11, 1986

     f.   May gov’t. employees form unions for purposes of collective bargaining and to strike against the government?

Read:

1)   ALLIANCE OF GOVT. WORKERS VS. MOLE, 124 SCRA 1

          2)   Executive Order No. 180 , June 1, 1987              authorizing govt. employees to form unions.

          3)   SANTOS VS. YATCO, 106 Phil. 745

          4)   PEOPLE VS. DE VENECIA, 14 SCRA 864

5. SSSEA vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686

          6. NSC vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 123

     g. May government employees be removed without       cause as a result of a government reorganization?

Read:

RA 6656, June 10, 1988 , An act to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the implementation of government reorganization.

Read also 1) DARIO VS. MISON, August 8, 1989

                    2) FLOREZA VS. ONGPIN, February 26, 1990

                  3) MENDOZA VS. QUISUMBING, June 4, 1990

                  4. DOTC vs. CSC, October 3, 1991

                 5. Romualdez vs. CSC, August 12, 1993

                 6. Torio vs. CSC, 209 SCRA 677

**********************************************

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

2.  C, Section 1…..any appointment for any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired term…In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Section 2. Powers….enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall….original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction and elective barangay officials  decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

a.            Deputize law enforcement agencies, including the ASFP..

b.            Register political parties, except religious groups

c.            File complaints for violation of election laws

d.           Regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication..

a.   Term of COMELEC Commissioners

Read:

1. Brillantes vs. Yorac, Dec. 18, 1991

          1-a)   NP VS. DE VERA, 35 Phil. 126

          2)   REPUBLIC VS. IMPERIAL, 96 Phil 770

b.   Power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of elections.

Read:

1)   TICZON VS. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 671

          2)   SANCHEZ VS. BILIWANG, 114 SCRA 454

2) SANCHEZ VS. BILIWANG, 114 SCRA 454

         b-1. Powers of the COMELEC

1. PANGILINAN VS. COMELEC, NOVEMBER 18, 1993

                   2. NPC VS. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1

                   3. Labo vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297

     c.   Sole judge of all election contests

Read:

1)   GABATAN VS. COMELEC, 122 SCRA 1

          2)   GAD VS. COMELEC, May 26, 1987

          3)   UPP-KBL VS. COMELEC, June 4, 1987

          4)   DEFERIA VS. PARAS, 141 SCRA 518

     d.   Distinguish referendum from plebiscite

Read:     SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

   e.   Cases to be decided by the COMELEC EN BANC OR IN DIVISION 

Read:

CUA VS. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582

f.   Regulation and control of public utilities like TV stations during the election period

Read:     UNIDO VS. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17

     g.   Election inspectors

Read:     KBL VS. COMELEC, December 11, 1986

     h.   Are decisions of the COMELEC appealable? If so, to what court? On what ground or grounds?

Read:

1. Galido vs. Comelec, January 18, 1991

                   2. Garcia vs. De Jesus, March 4, 1992

3.  Art. IX-D, Secs. 1-4

Powers of the COA

Read:

 1. Caltex vs. COA, 208 SCRA 726

          2. Bustamante vs. COA, 216 SCRA 134

          3. Orocio vs. COA, 213 SCRA 109

Political Law Part VIII: Article VIII – The Judicial Department

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Political Law Part VIII: Article VIII – The Judicial Department

POLITICAL LAW PART VIII

ARTICLE VIII – THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1.           Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such other courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

a.   What is judicial power?

Read: Badua vs. CBA, February 14, 1991

b. Restrictions to the exercise of judicial power

Political question doctrine

Read:

1)   JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30

          2)   DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294

          3)   ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 (When the question deals with the necessity, expediency and wisdom of a particuar act, the same is political and not justiciable)

           4. Read again ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990

b-1. Definition of political question

  Read:

1. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the  legality or validity of the contested act, the matter is definitely justiciable or non-political)

2.           Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30

3.           Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. (Political questions are questions to be answered by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested to the executive or legislative branch of the government).

4. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (When the crux of the problem deals with the validity of an act, it is justifiable.

c.   Cases on judicial power in general

1)   LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756

2)   SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA, 32 SCRA 188

3)   RADIOWEALTH VS. AGRACADA, 86 Phil. 429

4)   NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE, 23 SCRA 405

5)   LINA VS. PURISIMA, 82 SCRA 244

6)   GARCIA VS. MACARAIG,39 SCRA 106

4.           Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members.

3.  Section 3. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the  amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

4.  Section 4. (1) The Supreme    Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 associate justices. It may sit en banc or    in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a divisions hall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations  on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Read:

1)   VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA, 80 Phil. 297

     2)   VIR-JEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577

     3.   JANDUSAY VS. CA, 172 SCRA 376

To be decided by the Supreme Court en banc

1.           Involving the constitutionality of any law, treaty, etc.;

2.           When there is conflict of the decisions of 2 or more divisions of the Supreme Court;

3.           When a case is referred to by the division to the banc and the same was accepted by the latter;

4.           In death penalty cases;

1.           Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1)        Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2)        Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a)         All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;

(b)         All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;

(c)         All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;

(d)        All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher;

(e)         All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3)        Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4)        Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5)        Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading , practice , and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for  all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6)        Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the civil service law.

(READ: Maniago vs. CA, 253 SCRA on the limitation of the Rules…not to diminish, increase or modify substantive  rights.

a.   What is the power of judicial review? What are its requisites?

DISOMANGCOP VS. HON. SIMEON DATUMANONG, 444 SCRA 203

Requisites for the exercise of judicial power.

The following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power:

a.            There must be before the court a case calling for the exercise of judicial review;

b.            The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication;

c.            The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge;

d.           The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and

e.            The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

- Distinguish judicial power from judicial review.

Read:

1. Fernandez vs. Torres, 209 SCRA 677

          1-a. Santos III vs. Northwest Airlines, 210 SCRA 256

          1-c)   ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139

          2)   DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392

           3.   NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 657

          4. Allied Broadcasting Center vs. Rep., Oct. 18, 1991

5.  Lagamy vs. CA, 199 SCRA 501

a-1.   Functions of Judicial Review

1)           legitimizing function

2)           checking function

3)            symbolic or educational function

Read:

aa.  SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438

               bb.  JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

b.   On personality to sue

Is there a difference as to the “personality” requirement if the law being questioned involves disbursement of public funds and on the other hand, if it does not .

Standing to question the validity of an Executive Order which does not involve disbursement of public funds; Requisites before the President may issue executive Orders in furtherance of police power.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, 482 SCRA 673

Ynares-Santiago, J

On December 12, 2002, President Arroyo issued EO 156 entitled “PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.”

Under Section 3.1 of the said EO,  THE IMPORTATION INTO THE COUNTRY, INCLUSIVE OF FREEPORT, OF ALL TYPES OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES IS PROHIBITED.

The private respondent, which has a business of importing all kinds of used motor vehicles questioned the constitutionality of said EO.

I s s u e s:

1.           Does the private respondent have the personality to sue or to question the constitutionality of EO 156?

2.           Does the President have the authority to promulgate EO to promote police power like in this case?

3.           Is EO 156 constitutional?

Held:

1.           The private respondent has the personality to sue to question the constitutionality of an administrative issuance because it will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Respondents would suffer a direct injury if said EO will be implemented  because in  its Certificate of Registration , it is allowed import/trade used motor vehicles and spare parts. Clearly, it would suffer prejudice if importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars will be prohibited.

2.           The President is authorized to issue an executive order provided it complies with the following requisites:

a.            Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

b.            It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

c.            It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

d.           It must be reasonable.

There is no question that no less than Art. VI, Section  28 [2] of the Constitution authorizes Congress to in turn authorize the President by law, within specified limits, and subject to such restrictions and limitations, to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas…”. Likewise, the Tariff and Customs Code likewise delegates to the President similar powers.

3. Is the EO prohibiting the importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars constitutional? In this case, while the first two requisites are present, the 3rd is not. This is so because it is not within the powers of the President to prohibit the importation of other vehicles, not only cars, even in the Freeport Zones like Subic which is allowed by RA 7227. The EO therefore is ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the President because it tries to supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws.

The 4th requisite is not also present because the same is unreasonable  since it likewise prohibit the entry of used motor vehicles into the Freeport which is owed by law, RA 7227.

Read:

1)   PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331

          2)   SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

          3)   DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392

          3-a. Read again NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 57

         4. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, May 5, 1994

Read this very carefully because it changes the original concept of personality to sue when public funds are involved or not.

2.           TATAD VS. GARCIA, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 436 (Even though no public funds are involved and that petitioner is not directly injured by the contract, he has the personality to question the same if it involves national interest)

3.           BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION VS. LARON, 170 SCRA 240 (If the contract is for local consumption only, and that the petitioner is not directly injured by the said contract which does not involve the disbursement of public funds, the petitioner has no personality to sue)

c.            May inferior courts also exercise the power of judicial review in the light of the requirement of Section 4(2) of Article VIII?

Read: YNOT VS. IAC, March 20, 1987

d.   Three views on the effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law

Read:

1)   NORTON VS. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 US 425

          2)   SHEPPARD VS. BARREN, 194 US 553

          3)   DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB, 38 SCRA 429

          4)   REPUBLIC VS. HEREDA, 119 SCRA 411

          5)   REPUBLIC VS. CFI, 120 SCRA 151

e.   Transfer of venue in criminal cases

Read:

1)   PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ, 36 SCRA 172

          2)   PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393

          3)   PEOPLE VS. PILOTIN, 65 SCRA 635

f.   Rule making power; note the limitations

Read:

1)   BUSTOS VS. LUCERO, 81 Phil. 648

          2)   NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433

g.   On admission to the bar

Read: 1. IN RE CUNANAN, 94 Phil. 534

                    2. ZALDEVAR VS. GONZALES, Oct. 7, 1988 Re: Indefinite suspension imposed  on RAUL GONZALES)

g-1. May law students practice law before the  courts? Requisites?

Read:

Circular No. 19, issued by the Supreme Court           on December 19, 1986

h.   On the integration of the bar

Read:     IN RE EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

6.  Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

Read:     DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, 119 SCRA 337

4.           Sections 7. (1) No person shall be appointed member of the Supreme Court  or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least 40 years of age, and must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall      prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.

Section 8. A judicial and bar Council—composition—Chief Justice, Secretary of Justice, Representative of Congress,  Integrated Bar, Professor of Law, retired justice and representative of the private sector..

The regular members—term of 4 years—Commission on Appointments—

Sec. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower court shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the submission of the list.

a. Read:

1. UY vs. Judge Capulong, April 7, 1993

2. Court Administrator vs. Judge Gines

b. Read:

Exec. Order No.216, July 10, 1987, creating  the Judicial and Bar council

8.  Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and the associate justices of the Supreme Court, and the judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

a.   See Sec. 17, Art. XVIII

b.   Read: 1) NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER, 152 SCRA 284

                    2)   PERFECTO VS. MEER, 85 Phil. 552         

                    3)  ENDENCIA  VS. DAVID, 93 Phil. 696

9.  Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and  judges of the lower court shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Read:     1)   OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 51 O.G. 147

                   2)   DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294

10.  Section 12. The members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Read:

1)   GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106

     2)   MANILA ELECTRIC VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION, 57 Phil. 60

     3)   LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756

     4)  IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO, October 5, 1988

11.  Sections 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing o f the opinion o f the court. A certification to this effect signed by the CJ—-Any member who took no part or dissented…must state the reason therefor. The same procedure in all lower collegiate courts.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Read:

1)   AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155

     2)   VDA DE ESPIRITU VS. CFI, 47 SCRA 354

     3)   BUSCAYNO VS. ENRILE, 102 SCRA 7

     4)   MANGCA VS. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 273

     5)   VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG, 121 SCRA 205

     6)   NAPOLCOM VS. LOOD, 127 SCRA 757

      7)   NUNAL VS. CA, 169 SCRA 356

      8)     Mangelen vs. CA, 215 SCRA 230

Requirement that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on which it is based.

BEDRUZ VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 484 SCRA 452

Carpio-Morales, J.

A trial court’s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of the law violated, is not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly  state the law and the facts   on which it was based or the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court as long as the legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision.

Further, the requirement that the “decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on which it is based” applies only to a decision of a court of justice covered by Art. VIII of the Constitution], not the Office of the Ombudsman.

GERMAN MACHINERIES CORPORATION VS. ENDAYA, 444 SCRA 329

When Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution shall be complied with by the courts.

Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

This constitutional provision applies only to cases submitted  for decision, i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, BUT NOT WHERE A RESOLUTION IS ISSUED DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION AND STATING THE LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR like “the petition raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent’s court decision”, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

In this case , the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with that of the Labor Arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals. This complies with the constitutional requirement under Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution

12.  Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission  for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(4) Even after the lapse—-the court shall still decide without further delay.

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary.

Read:

1)   CORPUS VS. CA 98 SCRA 424

     2)   MALACORA VS. CA, 117 SCRA 435

     3)   MARCELINO VS. CRUZ, 121 SCRA 51

     4)   DE ROMA VS. CA, 152 SCRA 205

5)   Administrative Circular No. 1, issued by the Supreme Court thru CHIEF JUSTICE CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE  on January 28, 1988, particularly par. 11 thereof.

13.  Section 16

 

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