POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Q & A (6-10)
- Discuss the various jurisdictions in election cases and quo warranto proceedings, including appeals.
Position |
Election Protest |
Quo Warranto |
Jurisdiction |
Pres & VP |
30 days after proclamation |
10 days after proclamation |
PET, SC sitting en banc. Sole judge = no appeal Art. 7, Sec 4, par 7 |
Members of Congress |
15 days after proclamation = SET 10 days after proclamation = HRET |
15 days after proclamation = SET 10 days after proclamation = HRET |
SET/HRET, sole judge = no appeal. Only certiorari to the SC Art. 6, Sec 17 |
Regional, Provincial, City, Component City Officials |
Within 10 days after proclamation COMELEC |
Within 10 days after proclamation COMELEC |
No appeal = only certiorari to SC Art IX-C Sec 2, par 2 |
Municipal Officials |
Within 10 days after proclamation RTC |
Within 10 days after proclamation RTC |
Appeal to COMELEC Certiorari to SC |
Barangay Officials |
Within 10 days after proclamation MTC |
Within 10 days after proclamation MTC |
Appeal to COMELEC = final executory not appealable Certiorari to SC |
ELECTION PROTEST - filed within 10 days from proclamation of results of election by any candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted upon for the same officer on the grounds of:
- Fraud;
- Terrorism;
- Irregularities, or;
- Illegal acts, committed before, during or after casting and counting of votes
QUO WARRANTO - filed within 10 days from proclamation of results by any registered voter in the constituency on the grounds of:
- Ineligibility, or;
- Disloyalty to the Republic
- Pandong Panday filed his certificate of candidacy for VP on the last day of filing certificate of candidacy. A petition for disqualification was filed by his opponent in the COMELEC asserting that he committed a material misrepresentation when he claimed in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen when in truth and in fact is that he is not a Filipino citizen. The petition was filed on the 25th day from the last day of filing certificate of candidacy. A group of lawyers subsequently filed a petition in the SC challenging his citizenship qualification and questioned the assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC contending that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion when it assumed jurisdiction because jurisdiction is with the SC pursuant to Sec. 4, par. 7 Art VII of the Constitution which provides that the SC en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections; returns, and qualifications of the President and VP. Should the petition be dismissed by the COMELEC on the ground that it was file out of time? Explain.
The Election Law provides that petition seeking to deny due course or cancel a COC exclusively on the ground of material misrepresentation should be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the COC. Such period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
In the case at bar Pandong Panday filed his COC on the last day of filing, thereby the 25 days period starts from that date, which makes the case prosper.
- Do the lawyers have sufficient locus standi to question his citizenship qualification under the given facts? Discuss.
Yes. In a quo warranto proceedings, the issue is based on the eligibility of the candidate which entails his/ her qualifications, which can be filed by any registered voter.
Locus standi is defined as the personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The lawyers are registered voters.
- Will you agree with the contention of the lawyers that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the case because jurisdiction should have been with the SC en banc? Clarify.
Yes, the law is explicit.
Sec. 4, par. 7 Art VII of the Constitution which provides that the SC en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections; returns, and qualifications of the President and VP.
Being the sole judge the COMELEC is not vested with jurisdictions, the qualification issue is lodged to the SC en banc acting as PET.
- A group of unarmed demonstrators, numbering about 10,000 made up of urban poor slum dwellers, students, senior citizens, and several religious personalities marched along Mendiola on their way to Malacanang. They were carrying banners and streamers very critical of the Arroyo administration. Their leaders were delivering fiery speeches, exhorting them to be very vigilant in the protection of basic constitutional rights which, they claimed, are significantly trampled upon and reduced to a myth by the present dispensation. After crossing Mendiola Bridge, they were dispersed by police and military personnel assigned to secure the Palace grounds with truncheons, water cannons and tear gases, causing injuries to several of them.
- Applying the Dangerous Tendency Rule was the violent dispersal of the demonstration and the subsequent arrest, detention and prosecution of the leaders justified? Discuss.
The dispersal is valid.
Under the Dangerous Tendency Rule, a mere tendency to create a substantive evil is enough for a subsequent arrest, detention and prosecution of a person even if the evil expected does not result.
In the case at bar, it is plain that there is a tendency that those demonstrators would create a substantive evil. Thus, the presence of such substantive evil would suffice to justify the dispersal and the subsequent arrest, detention and prosecution of the leaders justified.
- What about if the “Clear and Present Danger Rule” was applied?
NO, under the Clear and Present Danger Rule, the existence of a substantive evil must be of a clear and present danger type. This test is more liberal.
Hence, unless there is a clear showing that a substantive evil exist in the instant case, the violent dispersal is not justified. It is crystal clear that the demonstrators are only exercising their right.
- Distinguish “content-based” restriction on free speech from “content-neutral” restrictions, and explain the significant of knowing the distinction?
Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are therefore subject to the clear and Present Danger test. An example is plebiscite to ratify creation of Autonomous Region of Cordillera
Content-neutral” - It is directed restrictions are not concerned with the time, place of speech. An example is the posting of campaign materials
- While on board a jeepney in Quiapo, Manila, Kumander Lawin, an obscure leader of the NPA, was spotted by police and military authorities upon identification by one of his former comrades who is now a government agent. He was arrested without warrant. The authorities immediately proceeded to his residence in Bustillos, Sampaloc Manila, and searched the apartment dwelling where he resides without warrant. Taken from his residence was a caliber .45 pistol with several rounds of ammunition and assorted rebel propaganda materials. At the police station where he was brought, upon questioning by some media reporters, he admitted ownership of the caliber .45 pistol with several rounds of ammunition, as well as the assorted rebel propaganda materials
- Was his arrest valid?
The arrest is not valid. The case at bar does not fall to any of the Instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure particularly Sec 5 Rule 113, where an arrest can be made without a warrant.
In the instant case, there was no crime committed by Kumander Lawin, nor there was probable cause to believe that a crime was committed by Lawin under the facts and circumstances of the person arresting him. What led to the arrest was a mere tip and the arrest was made when a person is just riding a jeepney which would not create a suspicion at all of his supposed identity.
- Were the caliber .45 pistol with several rounds of ammunition as well as the assorted rebel propaganda materials admissible in evidence against him? Clarify.
No, the caliber pistol and the assorted NBA propagandas are not admissible as evidences. As the law provides that in violation of a valid search warrant, such products are fruits of a poisonous tree.
- Mang Nardo solicited the repair of their community chapel. He knocked on the house of a judge and he was asked whether he had a permit to solicit from DSWD. He had none. He was charged for violation of PD 1564(The Solicitation Law) which makes it criminal offense if one solicits for charitable and public welfare purposes without permit from DSWD. He was convicted by the trial court.
- Explain why his conviction should be reversed on appeal?
PD 1564, prohibits solicitation for charitable or public welfare purpose but not for a religious purpose.
Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose.
Fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church calls upon the virtue of faith and not charity.
Since Mang Nardo, solicited the repair of their community chapel and merely exercised his right to religion, there is no way he did violate PD 1564.
- What are the 2 aspects of freedom of religion? Briefly discuss each.
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare”
- Comment on the constitutionality of PD 1564.
PD 1564 is constitutional.
The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. Since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects as to justify state regulation.
Further more, to require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion.
Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing.
To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution.
Comments: