The Legislative Branch

Introduction

According to the 1987 Constitution, legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law; the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 (unless otherwise fixed by law), 20 percent of whom must be Party-list representatives.

The qualifications to become a senator, as stipulated in the constitution, are:

1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. at least thirty-five years old;
3. is able to read and write
4. a registered voter; and
5. a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years before election day.

Meanwhile, the constitution provides for the following criteria to become a member of the House of Representatives:

1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. at least twenty-five years old;
3. is able to read and write; and
4. except the party-list representatives, a registered voter and a resident for at least one year in the district where s/he shall be elected.

Legislative process

Congress is responsible for making enabling laws to make sure the spirit of the constitution is upheld in the country and, at times, amend or change the constitution itself. In order to craft laws, the legislative body comes out with two main documents: bills and resolutions.

Resolutions convey principles and sentiments of the Senate or the House of Representatives. These resolutions can further be divided into three different elements:

• joint resolutions — require the approval of both chambers of Congress and the signature of the President, and have the force and effect of a law if approved.
• concurrent resolutions — used for matters affecting the operations of both chambers of Congress and must be approved in the same form by both houses, but are not transmitted to the President for his signature and therefore have no force and effect of a law.
• simple resolutions — deal with matters entirely within the prerogative of one chamber of Congress, are not referred to the President for his signature, and therefore have no force and effect of a law.

Bills are laws in the making. They pass into law when they are approved by both houses and the President of the Philippines. A bill may be vetoed by the President, but the House of Representatives may overturn a presidential veto by garnering a 2/3rds vote. If the President does not act on a proposed law submitted by Congress, it will lapse into law after 30 days of receipt.

HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATURE

REPRESENTATION IN THE SPANISH CORTES

Prior to the creation of a legislature in the Philippines, Filipinos, from time to time, were allowed to sit in the Spanish Cortes as representatives of the Philippine Islands. In 1810, the Spanish government allowed Filipinos to receive Spanish citizenship and appropriate representation in the Cortes. When the Cadiz Constitution was in full force and effect, Filipino representation became a standard in the Cortes. However, in 1837, the liberal Cortes finally abolished representation and declared that overseas territories of Spain to be ruled by special laws. This loss of representation was one of the main points that Jose Rizal and other propagandists were fighting for during the Propaganda movement.

MALOLOS REPUBLIC, 1899 – 1901

The first Filipino legislature was convened on September 15, 1898 in Barasoain Church, Malolos, Bulacan. Later known as the Malolos Republic, it drafted the first constitution of the Philippines, which was also the first democratic constitution in Asia. The Congress included delegates from different provinces of the Philippines, some elected and some appointed. It was a short-lived legislature, unable to pass any laws due to the onset of the Philippine-American War. The first Philippine Republic was ended on March 23, 1901 with the capture of President Emilio Aguinaldo in Palanan, Isabela.

PHILIPPINE COMMISSION, 1899 – 1916

In 1899, United States President William McKinley appointed a commission led by Dr. Jacob Schurman to study and investigate the conditions in the Philippine Islands. This would be known as the first Philippine Commission. It was followed by another investigative commission led by William Howard Taft in 1900, which also had limited legislative and executive powers. From 1901 onwards, the Philippine Commission would be regularized. It exercised both executive and legislative powers, with three Filipino delegates, namely Benito Legarda, Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, Jose Luzuriaga. After the organization of the Philippine Assembly (see below) in 1907, the commission stayed on as the upper house of the legislature.

PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY, 1907 – 1916

Electoral representation in the Philippines by Filipinos began when the American insular government allowed partial self-governance by establishing the Philippine Assembly. The assembly, as the lower house, shared legislative power with the Philippine Commission, which remained under American control, as membership in the Philippine Commission was still restricted to appointed American officials. In 1907, still under American rule, the Philippines held its first national elections for the newly created representative body, which had an inaugural membership of 81 Filipinos representing their respective districts. In the succeeding years, the number of districts were increased to 85 in 1910, and 91 in 1912.

RESIDENT COMMISSIONERS, 1907 – 1946

From 1907 to 1946, the Philippine legislature sent a representative to sit in the U.S. House of Representatives, as resident commissioner. Under Spain, the Philippines had also been given limited representation in the Spanish Cortes, and like the resident commissioners, they had the right to speak, but not to vote. The restoration of Philippine independence in 1946 ended Philippine representation in the U.S. Congress. (Note: To this day, Puerto Rico still has a resident commissioner in the U.S. House of Representatives.)

THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE, 1916 – 1935

Upon the enactment of the Jones Law in 1916, the Filipinos were subsequently granted the opportunity to hold other offices in the government. Positions in the Philippine Senate were opened to Filipinos, with 12 senatorial districts and two senators elected from each. The inaugural President of the Senate in 1916 was Manuel L. Quezon, representing the fifth senatorial district. He would hold this position until the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935. For the 19 years prior to the Commonwealth, the Senate presidency was the highest position a Filipino could hold.

From the first Philippine Commission to the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the Philippine legislature were passing public acts. This form of legislation is started at Congress, with the approval of the American governor-general of the Philippine Islands.

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1935 – 1946

On November 15, 1935, Quezon took his oath as the first President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, giving control of the executive branch of government to the Filipinos. It was also in this era that the Supreme Court of the Philippines was completely Filipinized. By virtue of the 1935 Constitution, the bicameral Philippine legislature was merged to form the unicameral National Assembly.

Two elections were held under the Commonwealth. The first, in 1935, elected the President of the Philippines as well as members of the National Assembly; the second, in 1939, elected only members of the National Assembly. The National Assembly would be retained until 1941, when a new structure for the legislature was introduced through a constitutional amendment.

From the Commonwealth period to the inauguration of the Third Philippine Republic, the Philippine legislature was passing Commonwealth acts (CA). This form of legislation is started at the National Assembly and approved by the President of the Philippines.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OF 1941

After six years under a unicameral legislature, the Constitution of 1935 was amended, dividing the National Assembly into two separate houses. The Senate of the Philippines and the House of Representatives were reestablished, with a Senate President and a Speaker of the House leading their respective chambers.

The elections for members of these newly created chambers were held in 1941. However, the onset of World War II prevented the elected members from assuming their posts and the legislature of the Commonwealth of the Philippines was dissolved upon the exile of the government of the Philippines.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1943

On October 14, 1943, the Japanese-sponsored Second Republic was inaugurated, with Jose. P. Laurel as the President. This government followed the newly crafted 1943 Constitution, and reverted the legislature back to a unicameral National Assembly. The National Assembly of the Second Republic would remain in existence until the arrival of the Allied forces in 1944, which liberated the Philippines from the Imperial Japanese forces.

RESTORATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, 1945 – 1946

Upon the reestablishment of the Commonwealth in 1945, President Sergio Osmeña called for a special session of Congress. The first Congress convened on June 9 of that year, with most of the senators and representatives, who were elected in 1941, assuming their positions. Manuel Roxas and Jose C. Zulueta served as Senate President and Speaker of the House, respectively. Not all, however, were allowed to take their post because some were incarcerated for collaboration with the Japanese.

The inaugural session, was held in a converted school house in Lepanto St., Manila, as the Legislative Building in Manila was reduced to ruins as an outcome of the war.

On April 23, 1946, national elections were held to choose new members of Congress, the President, and the Vice President of the Philippines. After the elections the second Congress of the Commonwealth convened on May 25, 1946. It would only last until July 4, 1946, with the inauguration of the Third Republic of the Philippines.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1946 – 1972

The independent Republic of the Philippines was finally proclaimed on July 4, 1946 with Manuel Roxas as President. The Second Congress of the Commonwealth was transformed into the first Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, also made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This would mark the beginning of the count of Congresses of the Republic until the imposition of Martial Law in 1972, when Congress would be dissolved.

This era started the legislation of republic acts which would continue until 1972. Upon the restoration of democracy in 1986 and the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the naming of laws as republic acts would be reinstated.

MARTIAL LAW AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1972-1986

On September 23, 1972 President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law. This coincided with the closing of the sessions of both chambers of Congress. Days before the scheduled reopening of the Senate and the House of Representatives, Marcos promulgated the 1973 Constitution, which effectively abolished the bicameral legislature and replaced it with a unicameral legislature. Opposition legislators reported to the Legislative Building on January 22, 1973, but found the building padlocked and under an armed guard.

Under martial rule, Marcos created the Batasang Bayan in 1976, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 995, to serve as a legislative advisory council—a quasi-legislative machinery to normalize the legislative process for the eventual actualization of the 1973 Constitution. The Batasang Bayan would hold office in the Philippine International Convention Center (a modernist structure designed by National Artist for Architecture Leandro Locsin, within the Cultural Center of the Philippines Complex—a pet project of First Lady Imelda R. Marcos). The consultative body would serve until 1978.

The Batasang Bayan would be replaced in 1978 by an elected unicameral body: the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP), a parliamentary legislature, as provided for in the 1973 Constitution. On April 7, 1978, elections for were held. Those elected to the IBP would be called Mambabatas Pambansa (Assemblymen) who would be elected per region, via a bloc-voting system. The IBP opened on Independence Day 1984 in the Batasan Pambansa in Quezon City.

Members of the Regular Batasang Pambansa (RBP) were elected in 1984, this time at-large and per province. The RBP held its inaugural session on July 23, 1984.

In 1986, President Marcos succumbed to international pressure and called for a snap presidential election. Though Marcos and his running mate former Senator and Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino were proclaimed by the Batasang Pambansa as the winners of the election, a popular revolt installed opposition leaders Corazon C. Aquino and Salvador H. Laurel as President and Vice President, respectively.

For both the IBP and RBP, the laws passed would be called “Batas Pambansa,” which did not continue the previous numbering of Republic Acts.

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC, 1987 – PRESENT

On March 25, 1986, President Aquino declared a revolutionary government by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 3, s. 1986, which suspended some provisions of the 1973 Constitution and promulgated in its stead a transitory constitution. This effectively abolished the Batasang Pambansa. A constitutional commission, tasked with drafting a new charter, was created by virtue of Proclamation No. 9 issued on April 23, 1986.

Following the overwhelming ratification of the 1987 Constitution through a national plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, the 1987 Constitution finally came into full force and effect on February 11, 1987. It re-established a bicameral legislature, composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate, much like the way it was before martial law. The former, being much larger in composition, reopened in the Batasan Pambansa while the Senate, still with its 24 members, returned to the Legislative Building. In 1997, the Senate of the Philippines moved to the GSIS building where it is currently housed.

Laws passed by the bicameral legislature would restore “Republic Acts”, as the laws were named in the Third Republic (1946-1972). Moreover, it was decided to maintain the old count, taking up where the last pre-martial law Congress left off. Thus, the last Congress under the 1935 Constitution was the seventh Congress, and the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution became the eighth Congress.

Local government in the Philippines

• 1 Levels of local government
  • 1.1 Autonomous regions
  • 1.2 Provinces
  • 1.3 Cities and municipalities
  • 1.4 Barangays
• 2 Offices
  • 2.1 Legislatures
  • 2.2 Elected officials
  • 2.3 Offices that are common to municipalities, cities and provinces
• 3 Responsibilities
• 4 Creation and modification

The local government in the Philippines is divided into three levels: provinces and independent cities, component cities and municipalities, and barangays, all of which are collectively known as local government units (LGUs). In one area, above provinces and independent cities, is an autonomous region, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Below barangays in some cities and municipalities are sitios and puroks. All of these, with the exception of sitios and puroks, elect their own executives and legislatures. Sitios and puroks are often but not necessarily led by an elected barangay councilor.

Provinces and independent cities are organized into national government regions but those are administrative regions and not separately governed areas with their own elected governments.

According to the Constitution of the Philippines, the local governments "shall enjoy local autonomy", and in which the Philippine president exercises "general supervision". Congress enacted the Local Government Code of the Philippines in 1991 to "provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local units." Local government units are under the control and supervision of the Department of the Interior and Local Government.

Levels of local government

 

Autonomous regions

Autonomous regions have more powers than other local governments. The constitution limits the creation of autonomous regions to Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras but only one autonomous region exists: the Bangsamoro, which replaced the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 1989, a plebiscite established the ARMM. In 2001, a plebiscite in the ARMM confirmed the previous composition of the autonomous region and added Basilan (except for the city of Isabela) and Marawi in Lanao del Sur. Isabela City remains a part of the province of Basilan despite rejecting inclusion in the ARMM. In 2019, another plebiscite confirmed the replacement of the ARMM with the Bangsamoro, and added Cotabato City and 63 barangays in Cotabato.

A Cordillera Autonomous Region has never been formed because two plebiscites, in 1990 and 1998, both resulted in just one province supporting autonomy; this led the Supreme Court ruling that autonomous regions should not be composed of just one province.

Each autonomous region has a unique form of government. The ARMM had a regional governor and a regional legislative assembly, mimicking the presidential system of the national government. The Bangsamoro will have a chief minister responsible to parliament, with parliament appointing a wa'lī, or a ceremonial governor, in a parliamentary system.

An autonomous region of the Philippines (Filipino: rehiyong awtonomo ng Pilipinas) is a first-level administrative division that has the authority to control a region's culture and economy. The Constitution of the Philippines allows for two autonomous regions: in the Cordilleras and in Muslim Mindanao. Currently, Bangsamoro, which largely consists of the Muslim-majority areas of Mindanao, is the only autonomous region in the country.

Current autonomous region

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

On October 15, 2012, a preliminary agreement was signed by the Government of the Philippines' chief negotiator Marvic Leonen, MILF Peace Panel Chair Mohagher Iqbal and Malaysian facilitator Tengku Dato' Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed along with President Aquino, Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia, MILF chairman Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim and Secretary-General Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation at Malacañang Palace in Manila.

It replaced the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and was formed after voters decided to ratify the Republic Act no. 11054 or the Bangsamoro Organic Law in a January 21 plebiscite. The ratification was announced on January 25, 2019, by the Commission on Elections. This marked the beginning of the transition of the ARMM to the BARMM.

Former autonomous region

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

 

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was proposed in 1976 during the Ferdinand Marcos administration and created on August 1, 1989, through Republic Act No. 6734 (otherwise known as the Organic Act) in pursuance with a constitutional mandate. In 2012 President Benigno Aquino III described ARMM as a "failed experiment". He proposed an autonomous region named Bangsamoro to replace ARMM with the agreement between the government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

A plebiscite was held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur; and in the cities of Cotabato, Davao, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Koronadal, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga to determine if their residents wished to be part of the ARMM. Of these areas, only four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) voted in favor of inclusion in the new autonomous region. The ARMM was officially inaugurated on November 6, 1990, in Cotabato City, which was designated as its provisional capital.

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) ceased to exist after a two-part 2019 plebiscite that ratified the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). It was replaced with the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and now under the interim government, Bangsamoro Transition Authority.

Proposed autonomous regions

Cordilleras

Further information: Cordillera autonomy movement, 1990 Cordillera Autonomous Region creation plebiscite, and 1998 Cordillera Autonomous Region creation plebiscite

The Cordillera Administrative Region administers the area that was designated for an autonomous region. Two plebiscites were held in the Cordilleras, the latest in 1998, to create an autonomous region, but both failed. There have been bills filed in Congress to re-propose and establish an autonomous region in the Cordilleras, but none of these have succeeded.

In 1990, a plebiscite was held to create an autonomous region under Republic Act No. 6766 but only Ifugao voted in favor of the law's ratification. The component provinces of the Cordillera Administrative Region at the time and the city of Baguio participated in the plebiscite with only localities voting in favor of the law's ratification to be part of a new autonomous region in the Cordilleras. There was also a failed attempt to establish an autonomous region with a single province.

Metro Manila

It was proposed that the National Capital Region or Metro Manila be converted to an autonomous region. Metro Manila is governed by mayors of its 16 highly urbanized cities and 1 independent municipality with the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority serving as an advisory body to the local government units of the metropolis. Former Quezon City Mayor Herbert Bautista had advocated for a Metro Manila autonomous region as an alternative to President Rodrigo Duterte’s campaign for federalism, which would render Metro Manila as an independent state within the Philippines.

 

Provinces

 

Outside the lone autonomous region, the provinces are the highest-level local government. The provinces are organized into component cities and municipalities. A province is governed by the governor and a legislature known as the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

In the Philippines, provinces (Filipino: lalawigan) are one of its primary political and administrative divisions. There are 81 provinces at present, which are further subdivided into component cities and municipalities. The local government units in the National Capital Region, as well as independent cities, are independent of any provincial government. Each province is governed by an elected legislature called the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and an elected governor.

The provinces are grouped into seventeen regions based on geographical, cultural, and ethnological characteristics. Thirteen of these regions are numerically designated from north to south, while the National Capital Region, the Cordillera Administrative Region, the Southwestern Tagalog Region, and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao are only designated by acronyms.

Each province is a member of the League of Provinces of the Philippines, an organization which aims to address issues affecting provincial and metropolitan government administrations.

 

Government

A provincial government is autonomous of other provinces within the Republic. Each province is governed by two main elected branches of the government: executive and legislative. Judicial affairs are separated from provincial governance and are administered by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Each province has at least one branch of a Regional Trial Court.

Executive

The provincial governor is chief executive and head of each province. Elected to a term of three years and limited to three consecutive terms, he or she appoints the directors of each provincial department which include the office of administration, engineering office, information office, legal office, and treasury office.

Legislative

The vice governor acts as the president for each Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP; "Provincial Board"), the province's legislative body. Every SP is composed of regularly elected members from provincial districts, as well as ex officio members. The number of regularly elected SP members allotted to each province is determined by its income class. First- and second-class provinces are provided ten regular SP members; third- and fourth-class provinces have eight, while fifth- and sixth-class provinces have six. Exceptions are provinces with more than five congressional districts, such as Cavite with 16 regularly elected SP members, and Cebu, Negros Occidental and Pangasinan which have twelve each.

Every SP has designated seats for ex officio members, given to the respective local presidents of the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC), Philippine Councilors' League (PCL), and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK; "Youth Council").

The vice governor and regular members of an SP are elected by the voters within the province. Ex officio members are elected by members of their respective organisations.

Relation to other levels of government

National government

National intrusion into the affairs of each provincial government is limited by the Philippine Constitution. The President of the Philippines however coordinates with provincial administrators through the Department of the Interior and Local Government. For purposes of national representation, each province is guaranteed its own congressional district. One congressional representative represents each district in the House of Representatives. Senatorial representation is elected at an at-large basis and not apportioned through territory-based districts.

Cities and municipalities

Those classified as either "highly urbanized" or "independent component" cities are independent from the province, as provided for in Section 29 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Although such a city is a self-governing second-level entity, in many cases it is often presented as part of the province in which it is geographically located, or in the case of Zamboanga City, the province it last formed part the congressional representation of.

Local government units classified as "component" cities and municipalities are under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. In order to make sure that all component city or municipal governments act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions, the Local Government Code mandates the provincial governor to review executive orders issued by mayors, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to review legislation by the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) or Sangguniang Bayan (Municipal Council), of all component cities and municipalities under the province's jurisdiction.

Barangays

The provincial government does not have direct relations with individual barangays. Supervision over a barangay government is the mandate of the mayor and the Sanggunian of the component city or municipality of which the barangay in question is a part.

Classification

 

Provinces based on income classification.

Provinces are classified according to average annual income based on the previous 4 calendar years. Effective July 29, 2008, the thresholds for the income classes for cities are:

Class	Average annual income
First	₱450 million or more
Second	₱360 million or more but less than ₱450 million
Third	₱270 million or more but less than ₱360 million
Fourth	₱180 million or more but less than ₱270 million
Fifth	₱90 million or more but less than ₱180 million
Sixth	below ₱90 million

A province's income class determines the size of the membership of its Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and also how much it can spend on certain items, or procure through certain means.

 

Cities and municipalities

 

Municipal government in the Philippines is divided into three – independent cities, component cities, and municipalities (sometimes referred to as towns). Several cities across the country are "independent cities" which means that they are not governed by a province, even though like Iloilo City the provincial capitol might be in the city. Independent city residents do not vote for nor hold provincial offices. Far more cities are component cities and are a part of a province. Municipalities are always a part of a province except for Pateros which was separated from Rizal to form Metro Manila.

Cities and municipalities are governed by mayors and legislatures, which are called the Sangguniang Panlungsod in cities and the Sangguniang Bayan in municipalities.

A city (Filipino: lungsod/siyudad) is one of the units of local government in the Philippines. All Philippine cities are chartered cities (Filipino: nakakartang lungsod), whose existence as corporate and administrative entities is governed by their own specific municipal charters in addition to the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies their administrative structure and powers. As of September 7, 2019, there are 146 cities.

A city is entitled to at least one representative in the House of Representatives if its population reaches 250,000. Cities are allowed to use a common seal. As corporate entities, cities have the power to take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for its general interests, condemn private property for public use (eminent domain), contract and be contracted with, sue and exercise all the powers conferred to it by Congress. Only an Act of Congress can create or amend a city charter, and with this city charter Congress confers on a city certain powers that regular municipalities or even other cities may not have.

Despite the differences in the powers accorded to each city, all cities regardless of status are given a bigger share of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) compared to regular municipalities, as well as being generally more autonomous than regular municipalities.

Government

A city's local government is headed by a mayor elected by popular vote. The vice mayor serves as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (city council), which serves as the city's legislative body. Upon receiving their charters, cities also receive a full complement of executive departments to better serve their constituents. Some departments are established on a case-by-case basis, depending on the needs of the city.

Offices and officials common to all cities

Office	Head	Mandatory / Optional
City Government	Mayor	Mandatory
Sangguniang Panlungsod	Vice Mayor as presiding officer	Mandatory
Office of the Secretary to the Sanggunian	Secretary to the Sanggunian	Mandatory
Treasury Office	Treasurer	Mandatory
Assessor's Office	Assessor	Mandatory
Accounting and Internal Audit Services	Accountant	Mandatory
Budget Office	Budget Officer	Mandatory
Planning and Development Office	Planning and Development Coordinator	Mandatory
Engineering Office	Engineer	Mandatory
Health Office	Health Officer	Mandatory
Office of Civil Registry	Civil Registrar	Mandatory
Office of the Administrator	Administrator	Mandatory
Office of Legal Services	Legal Officer	Mandatory
Office on Social Welfare and Development Services	Social Welfare and Development Officer	Mandatory
Office on General Services	General Services Officer	Mandatory
Office for Veterinary Services	Veterinarian	Mandatory
Office on Architectural Planning and Design	Architect	Optional
Office on Public Information	Information Officer	Optional
Office for the Development of Cooperatives	Cooperative Officer	Optional
Office on Population Development	Population Officer	Optional
Office on Environment and Natural Resources	Environment and Natural Resources Office	Optional
Office of Agricultural Services	Agriculturist	Optional

Source: Local Government Code of 1991

Subdivisions

Cities, like municipalities, are composed of barangays (Brgy), which can range from urban neighborhoods (such as Barangay 9, Santa Angela in Laoag), to rural communities (such as Barangay Iwahig in Puerto Princesa). Barangays are sometimes grouped into officially defined administrative (geographical) districts. Examples of such are the cities of Manila (16 districts), Davao (11 districts), Iloilo (seven districts), and Samal (three districts: Babak, Kaputian and Peñaplata). Some cities such as Caloocan, Manila and Pasay even have an intermediate level between the district and barangay levels, called a zone. However, geographic districts and zones are not political units; there are no elected city government officials in these city-specific administrative levels. Rather they only serve to make city planning, statistics-gathering other administrative tasks easier and more convenient.

Classification

Income classification

Cities are classified according to average annual income of the city based on the previous four calendar years. Effective July 28, 2008, the thresholds for the income classes for cities are:

Class	Average annual income (₱ million)
First	At least 500
Second	320+ but < 500
Third	240+ but < 320
Fourth	160+ but < 240
Fifth	80+ but < 160
Sixth	< 80

Legal classification

The Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) classifies all cities into one of three legal categories:

• Highly urbanized cities (HUC): Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants, as certified by the Philippine Statistics Authority, and with the latest annual income of at least fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000 or USD 1,000,000) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer.

There are currently 33 highly urbanized cities in the Philippines, 16 of which are located in Metro Manila.

• Independent component cities (ICC): Cities of this type have charters that explicitly prohibit their residents from voting for provincial officials. All five of them are considered independent from the province in which they are geographically located: Cotabato, Dagupan, Naga (Camarines Sur), Ormoc, and Santiago.
• Component cities (CC): Cities which do not meet the preceding requirements are deemed part of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is located along the boundaries of two or more provinces, it shall be considered part of the province of which it used to be a municipality.

All but five of the remaining cities are considered component cities.

Independent cities

There are 38 independent cities in the Philippines, all of which are classified as either "Highly urbanized" or "Independent component" cities. A city classified as such:

• does not have its Sangguniang Panlungsod legislation subject to review by any province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
• does not share tax revenue with any province; and
• is directly supervised by the President of the Philippines through the city government (given that the provincial government no longer exercises supervision over city officials), as stated in Section 29 of the Local Government Code.

Currently, there are only four independent cities in two classes that can still participate in the election of provincial officials (governor, vice governor, and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members):

• Cities declared highly urbanized between 1987 and 1992, whose charters (as amended) explicitly permitted residents to both vote and run for elective positions in the provincial government, and therefore allowed by Section 452-c of the Local Government Code to maintain these rights: Lucena (Quezon), Mandaue (Cebu);
• Independent component cities whose charters (as amended) only explicitly allow residents to run for provincial offices: Dagupan (Pangasinan) and Naga (Camarines Sur)

Registered voters of the cities of Cotabato, Ormoc, Santiago, as well as all other highly urbanized cities, including those to be converted or created in the future, cannot participate in provincial elections.

In addition to the eligibility of some independent cities to vote in provincial elections, a few other situations become sources of confusion regarding the complete autonomy of independent cities from provinces:

• Some independent cities still serve as the seat of government for the province in which they are geographically located: Bacolod (Negros Occidental), Cagayan de Oro (Misamis Oriental), Cebu City (Cebu), Iloilo City (Iloilo), Lucena (Quezon), Puerto Princesa (Palawan) and Tacloban (Leyte). In such cases, the provincial government, apart from already financing the maintenance of its properties such as provincial government buildings and offices, may also provide the government of the independent city with an annual budget (determined by the province at its discretion) to aid in relieving incidental costs incurred by the city such as road maintenance due to increased vehicular traffic in the vicinity of the provincial government complex.
• Some independent cities are still grouped with their former provinces for the purposes of representation in Congress. While 24 independent cities have their own representative(s) in Congress, some remain part of the congressional representation of the province to which they formerly belonged: Butuan, for example, is still part of the 1st Congressional District of Agusan del Norte. In cases like this, independent cities that do not vote for provincial officials are excluded from Sangguniang Panlalawigan (provincial council) districts, and the allotment of SP members is adjusted accordingly by COMELEC with proper consideration of population. For example, Agusan del Norte (being a third income-class province) is entitled to elect eight members to its Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and belongs to two congressional districts. The seats of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan are not evenly distributed (4–4) between the province's first and second congressional districts because its 1st Congressional district contains Butuan, an independent city which does not vote for provincial officials. Rather, the seats are distributed 1–7 to account for the small population of the province's 1st Sangguniang Panlalawigan district (consisting only of Las Nieves) and the bulk of the province's population being in the second district. On the other hand, the city of Lucena, which is eligible to vote for provincial officials, still forms part of the province of Quezon's 2nd Sangguniang Panlalawigan district, which is coterminous with the 2nd congressional district of Quezon.
• General lack of distinction for independent cities, for practical purposes: Many government agencies, as well as Philippine society in general, still continue to classify many independent cities outside Metro Manila as part of provinces due to historical and cultural ties, especially if these cities were once or currently socio-economic and cultural capitals of the provinces to which they once belonged. Furthermore, most maps of the Philippines showing provincial boundaries almost never separate independent cities from the provinces in which they are geographically located, for cartographic convenience. Despite being first-level administrative divisions (i.e., on the same level as provinces, as stated in Section 25 of the LGC), independent cities are still treated by many to be on the same level as municipalities and component cities (second-level administrative divisions) for educational convenience and simplicity.

A component city, while enjoying relative autonomy on some matters compared to a regular municipality, is still considered part of a province. However, there are several sources of confusion:

• Some component cities form their own congressional representation, separate from their province. The representation of a city in the House of Representatives (or lack thereof) is not a criterion for independence from a province, as Congress is the national legislative body and is part of the national (central) government. Despite Antipolo, Biñan and San Jose del Monte having their own representatives in Congress, they are still component cities of Rizal, Laguna, and Bulacan, respectively, as their respective charters specifically converted them into component cities and have no provision stating a severance in relations with their respective provincial governments.
• Being part of an administrative region different from the province: Isabela City functions as a component city of Basilan: its tax revenues are shared with the provincial government, its residents are eligible to both vote and run for provincial offices, and it is served by the provincial government and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Basilan with regard to provincially devolved services. However, by opting out of joining the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), Isabela City's residents are ineligible to vote and run for regional offices of the Bangsamoro Parliament, unlike the rest of Basilan. Regional services provided to Isabela City come from offices in Region IX based in Pagadian; the rest of Basilan is serviced by the BARMM based in Cotabato City. Isabela City, while not independent from its province, is this outside the jurisdiction of the BARMM, the region to which the rest of Basilan belongs. Regions are not the primary subnational administrative divisions of the Philippines, but rather the provinces.

Creation of cities

Congress is the lone legislative entity that can incorporate cities. Provincial and municipal councils can pass resolutions indicating a desire to have a certain area (usually an already-existing municipality or a cluster of barangays) declared a city after the requirements for becoming a city are met. As per Republic Act No. 9009, these requirements include:

• locally generated income of at least ₱100 million (based on constant prices in the year 2000) for the last two consecutive years, as certified by the Department of Finance, AND
• a population of at least 150,000, as certified by the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA); OR a contiguous territory of 100 square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau, with contiguity not being a requisite for areas that are on two or more islands.

Members of Congress (usually the involving representative of the congressional district to which the proposed city belongs) then draft the legislation that will convert or create the city. After the bill passes through both the House of Representatives and the Senate and becomes an Act of Congress, the President signs the Act into law. If the Act goes unsigned after 30 days it still becomes law despite the absence of the President's signature.

The creation of cities before 1983 was solely at the discretion of the national legislature; there were no requirements for achieving 'city' status other than an approved city charter. No income, population or land area requirements had to be met in order to incorporate cities before Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 (Local Government Code of 1983) became law. This is what made it possible for several current cities such as Tangub or Canlaon to be conferred such a status despite their small population and locally generated income, which do not meet current standards. The relatively low income standard between 1992 and 2001 (which was ₱20 million) also allowed several municipalities, such as Sipalay and Muñoz, to become cities despite not being able to meet the current ₱100 million local income standard.

Before 1987, many cities were created without any plebiscites conducted for the residents to ratify the city charter, most notable of which were cities that were incorporated during the early American colonial period (Manila and Baguio), and during the Commonwealth Era (1935–1946) such as Cavite City, Dansalan (now Marawi), Iloilo City, Bacolod, San Pablo and Zamboanga City. Only since 1987 has it been mandated under the Constitution that any change to the legal status of any local government unit requires the ratification by the residents that would be affected by such changes. Therefore, all cities created after 1987 – after meeting the requirements for cityhood as laid out in the Local Government Code of 1991 and Republic Act No. 9009 of 2001 – only acquired their corporate status after the majority of their voting residents approved their respective charters.

Motivations for cityhood

Although some early cities were given charters because of their advantageous (Baguio, Tagaytay) or strategic (Angeles City and Olongapo, Cotabato, Zamboanga) locations or in order to especially establish new government centers in otherwise sparsely populated areas (Palayan, Trece Martires, Quezon City), most Philippine cities were originally incorporated to provide a form of localized civil government to an area that is primarily urban, which, due to its compact nature and different demography and local economy, cannot be necessarily handled more efficiently by more rural-oriented provincial and municipal governments. However, not all cities are purely areas of dense urban settlement. To date there are still cities with huge expanses of rural or wilderness areas and considerable non-urban populations, such as Calbayog, Davao, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga as they were deliberately incorporated with increased future resource needs and urban expansion, as well as strategic considerations, in mind.

With the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, municipalities and cities have both become more empowered to deal with local issues. Regular municipalities now share many of the same powers and responsibilities as chartered cities, but its citizens and/or leaders may feel that it might be to their best interest to get a larger share of internal revenue allotment (IRA) and acquire additional powers by becoming a city, especially if the population has greatly increased and local economy has become more robust. On the other hand, due to the higher property taxes that would be imposed after cityhood, many citizens have become wary of their town's conversion into a city, even if the municipality had already achieved a high degree of urbanization and has an annual income that already exceeds that of many existing lower-income cities. This has been among the cases made against the cityhood bids of many high-income and populous municipalities surrounding Metro Manila, most notably Bacoor and Dasmariñas (which finally became cities in June 2012 and November 2009 respectively), which for many years have been more qualified to become cities than others.

In response to the rapid increase in the number of municipalities being converted into cities since the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991, Senator Aquilino Pimentel authored what became Republic Act No. 9009 in June 2001 which sought to establish a more appropriate benchmark by which municipalities that wished to become cities were to be measured.The income requirement was increased sharply from ₱20 million to ₱100 million in a bid to curb the spate of conversions into cities of municipalities that were perceived to have not become urbanized or economically developed enough to be able to properly function as a city.

Despite the passage of RA 9009, 16 municipalities not meeting the required locally generated income were converted into cities in 2007 by seeking exemption from the income requirement. This led to vocal opposition from the League of Cities of the Philippines against the cityhood of these municipalities, with the League arguing that by letting these municipalities become cities, Congress will set "a dangerous precedent" that would not prevent others from seeking the same "special treatment". More importantly, the LCP argued that with the recent surge in the conversion of towns that did not meet the requirements set by RA 9009 for becoming cities, the allocation received by existing cities would only drastically decrease because more cities will have to share the amount allotted by the national government, which is equal to 23% of the IRA, which in turn is 40% of all the revenues collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The resulting legal battles resulted in the nullification of the city charters of the 16 municipalities by the Supreme Court in August 2010.

 

A municipality (Tagalog: bayan/munisipalidad; Hiligaynon: banwa; Cebuano: lungsod/munisipalidad; Pangasinan: baley; Kapampangan: balen/balayan; Central Bikol: banwaan; Waray: bungto/munisipyo; Ilocano: ili) is a local government unit (LGU) in the Philippines. It is distinct from city, which is a different category of local government unit. Provinces of the Philippines are divided into cities and municipalities, which in turn, are divided into barangays (formerly barrios) – villages. As of 7 September 2019, there are 1,488 municipalities across the country.

A municipality is the official term for, and the official local equivalent of, a town, the latter being its archaic term and in all of its literal local translations including Filipino. Both terms are interchangeable.

A municipal district is a now-defunct local government unit; previously certain areas were created first as municipal districts before they were converted into municipalities.

 

History

The era of the formation of municipalities in the Philippines started during the Spanish rule, in which the colonial government founded hundreds of towns and villages across the archipelago modeled after towns and villages in Spain. They were then grouped together along with a centralized town center called cabecera or poblacion where the ayuntamiento, or town hall, was located; the poblacion served as the nucleus of each municipality. Only the communities that were permanently settled under the reduccion system, and have fully converted into Catholicism, are allowed to form municipalities, while others that have not yet been fully converted are to be subdued until conditions permitted for them to be incorporated as municipalities. As time passed, municipalities were created out of already existing ones, leading to them becoming smaller in area over time. Each municipality was governed by a capitan, usually a member of native principalia of the town, who have the task of remitting revenues to the central government in Manila. Ever since its inception to the present day, the term "municipality" holds the same definition as "town" when the first towns grew in size under the Spanish pueblo system (pueblo meaning "town" in Spanish language) to be granted municipal charters, hence the current official term for such type of settlements.

During the American administration, the municipal system put in place by the preceding Spanish authorities was preserved and at the same time reformed with greater inclusiveness among all Filipinos. Municipal districts, which were in essence unincorporated areas presided over by local tribal chiefs set up by American authorities, were created for the first time in 1914. More municipalities were created during this time, especially in Mindanao where there was a massive influx of settlers from the Luzon and the Visayas. After a while the independent Republic of the Philippines was declared in 1946, all municipal districts were dissolved and were absorbed into or broken into municipalities. The latest guidelines in the creation of new municipalities were introduced in 1991 with the issuance of the Local Government Code.

Responsibilities and powers

Municipalities have some autonomy from the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the Local Government Code of 1991. They have been granted corporate personality enabling them to enact local policies and laws, enforce them, and govern their jurisdictions. They can enter into contracts and other transactions through their elected and appointed officials and can tax. They are tasked with enforcing all laws, whether local or national. The National Government assists and supervises the local government to make sure that they do not violate national law. Local Governments have their own executive and legislative branches and the checks and balances between these two major branches, along with their separation, are more pronounced than that of the national government. The Judicial Branch of the Republic of the Philippines also caters to the needs of local government units. Local governments, such as a municipalities, do not have their own judicial branch: their judiciary is the same as that of the national government.

Organization

According to Chapter II, Title II, Book III of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, a municipality shall mainly have a mayor (alkalde), a vice mayor (ikalawang alkalde / bise alkalde) and members (kagawad) of the legislative branch Sangguniang Bayan alongside a secretary to the said legislature.

The following positions are also required for all municipalities across the Philippines:

• Treasurer
• Assessor
• Accountant
• Budget Officer
• Planning and Development Coordinator
• Engineer / Building Official
• Health Officer
• Civil Registrar
• Municipal Disaster Risks Reduction and Management Officer

Depending on the need to do so, the municipal mayor may also appoint the following municipal positions:

• Administrator
• Legal Officer
• Agriculturist
• Architect
• Information Officer
• Tourism Officer
• Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Officer
• Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer

Duties and functions

As mentioned in Title II, Book III of Republic Act 7160, the municipal mayor is the chief executive officer of the municipal government and shall determine guidelines on local policies and direct formulation of development plans. These responsibilities shall be under approval of the Sangguniang Bayan.

The vice mayor (bise-alkalde) shall sign all warrants drawn on the municipal treasury. Being presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan (English: Municipal Council), he can as well appoint members of the municipal legislature except its twelve (12) regular members or kagawad who are also elected every local election alongside the municipal mayor and vice mayor. In circumstances where the mayor permanently or temporarily vacates the position, he shall assume executive duties and functions.

While vice mayor presides over the legislature, he cannot vote unless the necessity of tie-breaking arises. Laws or ordinances proposed by the Sangguniang Bayan, however, may be approved or vetoed by the mayor. If approved, they become local ordinances. If the mayor neither vetoes nor approves the proposal of the Sangguniang Bayan for ten (10) days from the time of receipt, the proposal becomes law as if it had been signed. If vetoed, the draft is sent back to the Sangguniang Bayan. The latter may override the mayor by a vote of at least two-thirds (2 / 3) of all its members, in which case, the proposal becomes law.

A municipality, upon reaching a certain requirements – minimum population size, and minimum annual revenue – may opt to become a city. First, a bill must be passed in Congress, then signed into law by the President and then the residents would vote in the succeeding plebiscite to accept or reject cityhood. One benefit in being a city is that the city government gets more budget, but taxes are much higher than in municipalities.

Income classification

Municipalities are divided into income classes according to their average annual income during the previous four calendar years:

Class	Average annual income ₱
First	At least 15,000,000
Second	10,000,000 – 14,999,000
Third	5,000,000 – 9,999,000
Fourth	3,000,000 – 4,999,000
Fifth	1,000,000 – 2,999,000
Sixth	At most 999,000

Barangays

 

Every city and municipality in the Philippines is divided into barangays, the smallest of the local government units. Barangays can be further divided into sitios and puroks but those divisions do not have leaders elected in formal elections supervised by the national government.

A barangay's executive is the Punong Barangay or barangay captain and its legislature is the Sangguniang Barangay, composed of barangay captain, the Barangay Kagawads (barangay councilors) and the SK chairman. The SK chairman also leads a separate assembly for youth, the Sangguniang Kabataan or SK.

A barangay (/bɑːrɑːŋˈɡaɪ/; abbreviated as Brgy. or Bgy.), historically referred to as barrio (abbreviated as Bo.), is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines and is the native Filipino term for a village, district, or ward. In metropolitan areas, the term often refers to an inner city neighborhood, a suburb, or a suburban neighborhood.^[5] The word barangay originated from balangay, a type of boat used by a group of Austronesian peoples when they migrated to the Philippines.^[6]

Municipalities and cities in the Philippines are subdivided into barangays, with the exception of the municipalities of Adams in Ilocos Norte and Kalayaan in Palawan, with each containing a single barangay. Barangays are sometimes informally subdivided into smaller areas called purok (English: "zone"), or barangay zones consisting of a cluster of houses for organizational purposes, and sitios, which are territorial enclaves—usually rural—far from the barangay center. As of March 2021, there are 42,046 barangays throughout the Philippines.

History

When the first Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in the 16th century, they found well-organized independent villages called barangays. The name barangay originated from balangay, a Malay word meaning "sailboat". Early Spanish dictionaries of Philippine languages make it clear that balangay was pronounced "ba-la-ngay", while today the modern barangay is pronounced "ba-rang-gay".

All citations regarding pre-colonial barangay lead to a single source, Juan de Plascencia's 1589 report Las costumbres de los indios Tagalos de Filipinas. However, historian Damon Woods challenges the concept of barangay as an indigenous political organization primarily due to lack of linguistic evidence. Based on indigenous language documents, Tagalogs did not use the word barangay to describe themselves or their communities. Instead, barangay is argued as a Spanish invention from an attempt by the Spaniards in reconstructing pre-conquest Tagalog society.

The first barangays started as relatively small communities of around 50 to 100 families. By the time of contact with Spaniards, many barangays have developed into large communities. The encomienda of 1604 shows that many affluent and powerful coastal barangays in Sulu, Butuan, Panay, Leyte and Cebu, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Pasig, Laguna, and Cagayan River were flourishing trading centers. Some of these barangays had large populations. In Panay, some barangays had 20,000 inhabitants; in Leyte (Baybay), 15,000 inhabitants; in Cebu, 3,500 residents; in Vitis (Pampanga), 7,000 inhabitants; Pangasinan, 4,000 residents. There were smaller barangays with fewer number of people. But these were generally inland communities; or if they were coastal, they were not located in areas which were good for business pursuits. These smaller barangays had around thirty to one hundred houses only, and the population varied from one hundred to five hundred persons. According to Legazpi, he founded communities with only twenty to thirty people.

Traditionally, the original "barangays" were coastal settlements of the migration of these Malayo-Polynesian people (who came to the archipelago) from other places in Southeast Asia (see chiefdom). Most of the ancient barangays were coastal or riverine. This is because most of the people were relying on fishing for their supply of protein and their livelihood. They also traveled mostly by water up and down rivers, and along the coasts. Trails always followed river systems, which were also a major source of water for bathing, washing, and drinking.

The coastal barangays were more accessible to trade with foreigners. These were ideal places for economic activity to develop. Business with traders from other countries also meant contact with other cultures and civilizations, such as those of Japan, Han Chinese, Indian people, and Arab people. These coastal communities acquired more cosmopolitan cultures, with developed social structures (sovereign principalities), ruled by established royalties and nobilities.

During the Spanish rule, through a resettlement policy called the Reducción, smaller scattered barangays were consolidated (and thus, "reduced") to form compact towns. Each barangay was headed by the cabeza de barangay (barangay chief), who formed part of the Principalía – the elite ruling class of the municipalities of the Spanish Philippines. This position was inherited from the first datus, and came to be known as such during the Spanish regime. The Spanish Monarch ruled each barangay through the Cabeza, who also collected taxes (called tribute) from the residents for the Spanish Crown.

When the Americans arrived, "slight changes in the structure of local government was effected". Later, Rural Councils with four councilors were created to assist, now renamed Barrio Lieutenant; it was later renamed Barrio Council, and then Barangay Council.

The Spanish term barrio (abbr. "Bo.") was used for much of the 20th century. Mayor Ramon Bagatsing of the City of Manila established the first Barangay Bureau in the Philippines, creating the blueprint for the barangay system as the basic socio-political unit for the city in the early 70s. This was quickly replicated by the national government, and in 1974 President Ferdinand Marcos ordered the renaming of barrios to barangays. The name survived the 1986 EDSA Revolution, though older people would still use the term barrio. The Municipal Council was abolished upon transfer of powers to the barangay system. Marcos used to call the barangay part of Philippine participatory democracy, and most of his writings involving the New Society praised the role of baranganic democracy in nation-building.

After the 1986 EDSA Revolution and the drafting of the 1987 Constitution, the Municipal Council was restored, making the barangay the smallest unit of Philippine government. The first barangay elections held under the new constitution was held on March 28, 1989, under Republic Act number 6679.

The last barangay elections were held in October 2013. Barangay elections scheduled in October 2017 were postponed following the signing of Republic Act number 10952. The postponement has been criticized by election watchdogs and in both the Philippine Congress and Senate. The Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting considers the postponement a move that would "only deny the people their rights to choose their leaders."

Organization

 

 

The modern barangay is headed by elected officials, the topmost being the Punong Barangay or the Barangay Chairperson (addressed as Kapitan; also known as the Barangay Captain). The Kapitan is aided by the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) whose members, called Barangay Kagawad ("Councilors"), are also elected.

The council is considered to be a local government unit (LGU), similar to the provincial and the municipal government. The officials that make up the council are the Punong Barangay, seven Barangay Councilors, and the chairman of Youth Council or Sangguniang Kabataan (SK). Thus, there are eight members of the Legislative Council in a barangay.

The council is in session for a new solution or a resolution of bill votes, and if the counsels and the SK are at tie decision, the barangay captain uses their vote. This only happens when the SK which is sometimes stopped and continued. In absence of an SK, the council votes for a nominated Barangay Council President, this president is not like the League of the Barangay councilors which composes of barangay captains of a municipality.

The Barangay Justice System or Katarungang Pambarangay is composed of members commonly known as Lupon Tagapamayapa (Justice of the peace). Their function is to conciliate and mediate disputes at the Barangay level to avoid legal action and relieve the courts of docket congestion.

Barangay elections are non-partisan and are typically hotly contested. Barangay captains are elected by first-past-the-post plurality (no runoff voting). Councilors are elected by plurality-at-large voting with the entire barangay as a single at-large district. Each voter can vote up to seven candidates for councilor, with the winners being the seven candidates with the most votes. Typically, a ticket usually consists of one candidate for Barangay Captain and seven candidates for the Councilors. Elections for the post of Punong Barangay and barangay kagawads are usually held every three years starting from 2007.

The barangay is often governed from its seat of local government, the barangay hall.

A tanod, or barangay police officer, is an unarmed watchman who fulfills policing functions within the barangay. The number of barangay tanods differs from one barangay to another; they help maintain law and order in the neighborhoods throughout the Philippines.

Funding for the barangay comes from their share of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) with a portion of the allotment set aside for the Sangguniang Kabataan. The exact amount of money is determined by a formula combining the barangay's population and land area.

Local government hierarchy. The dashed lines emanating from the president means that the President only exercises general supervision on local government.
Total Local Government Units in the Philippines Type (English) Filipino equivalent Head of Administration Filipino equivalent Number Province Lalawigan/Probinsya Governor Gobernador 81 City Lungsod/Siyudad Mayor Punong Lungsod/Alkalde 146 Municipality Bayan/Munisipalidad Mayor Punongbayan/Alkalde 1,488 Barangay Barangay Barangay Chairman/Barangay Captain Punong-Barangay/Kapitan ng Barangay 42,046

   

Architectural Design of Apo Caligtan House

Background

SPANISH COLONIAL ARCHITECTURE

Spanish Colonial homes are built from indigenous components, has thick walls, stucco-clad walls, thick walls are used by Spanish to absorb the day’s heat and gently radiate it back into the building during the cool evenings. Spanish houses have smaller windows sealed by wrought iron grates rather than glass panes, are sited on the building to best capture breezes while avoiding the direct rays for the sun. wooden shutters, when present, are traditionally mounted on the inside of the home. One story or ranch style is one of the popular style of house in Spain during the Spanish colonial. Ornamentation on informal homes was often limited to arches on entranceways, principal windows and interior passageways. More elaborate homes might feature intricate stone or tile work, detailed chimneys and square towers. Wooden support beams support project out over the exterior walls in classic Spanish Colonials. Inner courtyard let the family move the cooking and its accompanying heat and steam outside. Today, these patios, porches and courtyards acts as informal gathering spots for the family and friends.

Spanish Colonial homes stucco-clad adobe walls are remarkably long-lasting in hot and arid climates. However, when located in colder, wetter climates adobe bricks can shrink and swell, causing the protective stucco to crack or pull away from the interior wall. These homes might require minor patches or complete resurfacing to prevent serious moisture problems. Cracked stucco can also be indicative of foundation issued. (Burch, 2018)

Many Spanish Colonials were built with flat roofs, which, when not drained properly, can leak. Clay-tile shingles are durable lifetime materials that require only periodic maintenance.

Wooden timbers, both interior and exterior, should be inspired for moisture and insect damage.

Georgian Colonial architecture is the second type of architecture in the Colonial Architecture which is a rectangular, symmetrical and formal style. Georgian homes find their roots in both Italian Renaissance and the classical architecture of ancients Greece and Rome. These home are often marked by a centrally located front door, evenly spaced double-hung windows and simple side-gabled roof.

These homes were ideally constructed of brick. But as you moved north toward New England, where brick was less common, wood-frame construction was dominant technique.

The big, central chimney was literally the heart of the home. It provided heat to all the rooms clustered around it, as well as light and of course dinner. Cedar shingles on the exterior and the roof quickly shed rain and snow. Everything about the Cape Cod style was adopted for its function rather than its form.

Most of the Cape Cod homes you see today were built after the World War II, when thousands of returning soldiers and their young families needed inexpensive housing. The Cape Cod style fit the bill, and it was used to build some of the first major housing development.

The large, central chimney is located directly behind the front door, with the rooms clustered around it in a rectangular shape. Cape Cod have steep roofs to quickly shed rain and snow, and a shallow roof overhang. A full Cape has two windows on each side of the door, and often has a dormer on each side of the chimney to open up the attic. Captain’s stairway or the second floor, often kept borders or seafaring men, was accessed by a narrow stair, which has incredibly steep risers and shallow treads to minimize the use of the first-floor space. Weathered gray shingles are one of the most recognizable elements of the classic Cape Cod, but newer homes are built of brick, stucco and stone. (Gray, n.d.)

PHILIPPINES COLONIAL ARCHITECTURE

One of the lasting legacies of Spanish rule in the Philippines is the Antillean style of architecture. Common in many old residential houses, this architectural style can also be seen in convents, municipal and provincial offices as well as schools. With adobe walls as its structural foundation and wood as the main material for the large open layout top levels, the Hispanic style that originated from Central America was suitable for the Philippine climate, and especially against the natural disasters that constantly ravage it.despite the vestiges of Spanish, Chinese and Filipino influences in local culture, the bahay na bato ( Stone house, as the Antillean residential architecture was popularly called) is unique to the Philippines. The grandeur of structural materials, beauty of intricate details and opulence of the furniture are signs of affluence and the stature the family holds in society.

When the Americans came to the country at the turn of the 20th century, electric style and art Nouveau were introduced, adding significant alternations to the classic Antillean architecture. But it was the Art Deco movement that left the most impression, giving us architectural gems as in the Commonwealth Era mansions that survived the war.

Philippine architecture has grown along with the progress of the nation and its people. But memories of a glorious past are still imbedded in a nation’s history. And if the walls of these old houses could only speak, they would be singing songs and poems from the tertulias and bailes that once filled its halls.

The mansions of the principalia class were known for their grandness in scale. Hence, a traditional bahay na bato would have large wooden doors called entrada pricipalia to let carriages enter the corridor. At ground level, there usually is a patio, with flooring of Piedra China or Chinese granite and the patterned hand- painted tiles imported from Spain called azulejo. The patio is used as a garden and serves to cool rooms of the house. Usually the patio is connected to the azotea, an open-air balcony where one can see the aljibe, the water cistern, filled with rainwater or portable water.

To enter the house, an Antillean door knocker can be used to inform the servants that someone is outside. Within the large wooden door is a smaller door for people, called postigo. A grand staircase called escalera welcomes the guests, leading them to the entrsuelo or mezzanine. In houses owned by the elites, there are rooms in the entresuelo that are reserved for the extended family of the owners or to visiting guests. But the main highlight of the entresuelo is the despacho, also known as oficina. This is where the owner of the house conducts business transactions together with his clerks and accountants. It is sensible that the office is located here as beside the zaguan below this level is the silong, where the goods and crops harvested from the hacienda are temporarily stored. (Zeballos, 2012)

The entersuelo leads to the antesala, also known as caida which means “to fall”, referring to the stair landing that connects the two levels. Here in the antesala, visitors are entertained. It is also where the masters of the house take their merienda (afternoon snacks).

Sala mayor is the most important part of the house for the house for it is opened to guest on special occasions only. Its contents furniture, figurines, artworks are used to show off one’s status in society. It becomes a grand hall where tertuila (late afternoon parties) and baile (ball) are held. Here, prominent guest of the masters of the house discuss the latest in politics, business and fashion, while the children lead the singing, dancing and playing of musical instruments. 

Some of the aesthetic details of a bahay na bato are used mainly for their function. The decorative wooden panels that adorn the walls of the antesala as well as other parts of the house circulate air between rooms. These are called calado or carved wooden screen placed at the ceiling and hung one or two meters down. The exterior corridor by the windows is called volada and is used by servants to pass through rooms of the house, from the kitchen to the dining room or from the antesala to the sala mayor, hidden from the visitors.

The oratorio or prayer room in a bahay na bato is usually located in the entresuelo. However, there are also some affluent families who build the chapel inside the house. Here they gather at night to pray the rosary. But the chapel is also another sign of affluence as gauged from the religious statues and images made of wood and ivory and enthroned in a urna that usually resembles the retablo (altarpiece) of nearby church.

Comedor is the dining room where families and friends gather to feast and drink. It showcases the family’s collection of silver, glassware and porcelain. It has a ceiling fan system called punkah that is made of fabrics and strings manually operated by servants.

At the back of the comedor is the cocina (kitchen). It has a banggera or slatted wooden dish rack used for air drying newly washed utensils and tableware before they were kept inside a platera (plate cabinet) or paminggalan (dish rack).

Some heritage towns in the Philippines carry an architectural style distinct from what was prevalent in Manila and most parts of Luzon. Silay, a city near Bacolod in Negros Occidental, is famously called the “Paris of Negros” for its unique Art Deco heritage mansions and structures that survived through centuries. The same style is also evident in some of Iloilo’s heritage mansions such as the famous Molo Mansion, which features some of the classic colonial architecture but with graceful arches, high ceilings, and intricate carvings. Nelly’s Garden, the so called “Queen of Iloilo’s Heritage Houses”, evokes Beaux Art and boast a sprawling garden that was tended by the late Dona Elena Hofilena Lopez.

Though the heritage mansions have been reflections of western architectural styles, they have been proudly made by Filipino hands and artistry. Some design details and furniture are still being produced today, like the kapiya which is a tall and long wooden bench, the sliding windows made with capiz shells for its screen, the intricately adorned baul or wooden chest, the butaca or a chair with long arm rest, the kolumpyo or rocking chair, and our very own latticework called solihiya used on various furniture pieces. Up to now, modern houses carry some elements inspired by the traditional bahay na bato such as the usage of pasamo (windowsill) or barandilla (handrail) by the balconies and stairwells. B (Sorila, 2021)

House of Apo Caligtan

 

Outside the structure is a stone used to contain water for washing of hands and feet of people before entering the house. the front door opens to receiving area or “sala”. A narra coffin was placed in the sala under a hospital bed where he was sleeping together with another bed for Lakay Kalbo’s wife. A rocking chair or “butaka” was also situated in this area for relaxation. At the left of the sala is a two-door bedroom. On the right from the sala is a balcony leading to the kitchen and dining area. The balcony has a short-legged table or “dulang” which was used by the owner and his wife when they dine alone. However, if their rice field workers or “katalonan” will come to visit, they will eat in the dining area.

The exterior position of the house near the kitchen is a washing area or “bangsal” for washing the dishes. Parts of the house namely the flooring, windows and doors are made out of Acacia or “Kalasan” wood and the roof is made of galvanized iron.

There is also a smaller structure outside is made out of wood which was used as storage of “palay” or “agamang”. There is also wide portion of the land on the land on the right side of the house where different plants like banana and fruits bearing trees were planted. Also, it is not occupied and there had been no renovations or repairs done to the house even after it survived the second world war and up to this present time. The minimal historical accounts related to the structure is more to be found out when the project Architectural Documentation, to be granted by the National Commision for Culture and the Arts in partnership with the different stakeholders, be fully implanted as it is seen to be very relevant in discovering our own history. On the project’s implementation, the building which is now a house for birds and insects and in its deterioration state, the documentation will help the people of Tadian capture and re-value the place and will have basis in restoring its old state.

Social, Cultural and Political implications

 

Family

The cover shows the Quilip clan from its beginning, Quilip as the root, stands alone. On the top of her are her five children namely Francisco (Caligtan), Marina ( Ngiwa), Maria (Lucanay), Rita (Gamay) and Carolina (Gamya). Over the five children are Quilip’s grandchildren.

Ethnic costumes worn in Kayan and Tadian are wanes(G-String) gabey(Tapis), bagket (belt), and lamma (jacket). Encircling the Quilip Clan is the Benge (beads), an adornment worn on the women’s head to match their beautiful costumes.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

  A. The President

1.     Qualifications: “No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election” [Sec. 2, Art. VII].

2.     Election [Sec. 4, Art. VII].

a)           Regular Election: Second Monday of May.

b)           Congress as canvassing board. Returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the Senate President who, upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, shall, not later than 30 days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. In case two or more candidates shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the members of Congress.

i)      Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), insofar as it grants sweeping authority to the Comelec to proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is repugnant to Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President [Makalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003].

 

ii)     In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately [Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004]

 

iii)   Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vicepresidential election results without need of any call for a special session by the President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio [Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for President and Vice President, G R No 163783 June 22, 2004], ’

iv)   There is no constitutional or statutory basis for Comelec to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of, results, whether manually or electronically. By conducting such “unofficial” tabulation, the Comelec descends to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns and the election returns themselves. Thus, if the Comelec is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and VicePresident, the Comelec is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes [Brillantes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004].

c)       Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

a)      No re-election: and no person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

 

b)      The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended to noon of June 30, 1992 [Sec. 5, Art. XVIII], See Osmena v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750.

a)      Official residence.

 

b)      Salary. Determined by law; shall not be decreased during tenure. No increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.

 

c)      Immunity from suit. In Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, it was held that while the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. See also In Re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160. In Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534, the Supreme Court said that the President is immune from civil liability.                                                                                ,

 

i)      After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity

from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties [Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001].

ii)     Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President,

he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department Secretary [Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].                                                        -

 

d)      Executive Privilege. It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public”. Thus, presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006], The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as in the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others [Neri v.

Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008], i)

 

i)      However, the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high degree as the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the President) the power to invoke the privilege [Senate v. Ermita, supra.].

ii) In Neri, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are properly covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege w,as validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” (the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President; second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President, Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the “proximity test”, he is covered by executive privilege; and third, there was no adequate showing by the respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

6. Prohibitions/lnhibitions [Secs. 6 & 13, Art. V///. Paragraphs (a) to (d) apply to the Vice President; paragraphs (b) to (d) also apply to Members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. During tenure:

a)    Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source.

i)              In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, the Court noted that the total accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple amounted to P2,319,583.33 which, when converted to dollars at the exchange rate then prevailing would have an equivalent value of $304,372.43. This sum should be held as the only known lawful income of the respondents Marcos since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand Marcos, as President, could not receive “any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities”, and under the 1973 Constitution, could not “receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source”. In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.

b)    Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall not hold any other office or employment.

i)              Note, however that the Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and the Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ii)             In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in government, in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII. The prohibition on the President and his official family is all-embracing and covers both public and private office employment, not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government” x x x This is proof of the intent of the Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

iii)            This prohibition must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity, as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition, but properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To illustrate, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in said position. ' The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to the principal office [National Amnesty Commission v. CO A, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004].

iv)            The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the PEZA Board meetings by authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor; without such designation or authority, petitioner would not have been in the Board at all [Bitonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004].

 

c)     Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

 

d)     Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

 

e)     May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.,

a)     Vacancy at the beginning of the term.

i)               Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: Vice President-elect shall become President.

ii)              President-elect fails to qualify: Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect'shall have qualified.

iii)             President shall not have been chosen: Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

iv)             No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have died or become permanently disabled: The President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified. In the event of inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice President shall have qualified.

 

b)     Vacancy during the term:

i)               Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President: Vice President shall become the President.

ia) In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G. R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001, the Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, [i] he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President; [ii] he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears); [iii] he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity); [iv] he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country; and [v] he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are: [1] intent to resign; and [2] act of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

ii) Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of President and Vice President: Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.

c) Temporary Disability.

i)   When President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary: such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

ii)  When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and the Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President, x x x Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Senate President and Speaker his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of the Members of the Cabinet transmit within 5 days to the Senate President and Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, Congress shall decide the issue. For this purpose, Congress shall convene, if not in session, within 48 hours. And if, within 10 days from receipt of the last written declaration or, if not in session, within 12 days after it is required to assemble, Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

 

d) Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice President: At 10 o’clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs, Congress shall convene without need of a call, and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice President to be held not earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by Congress, x x x The convening of Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed, x x x No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election.

 

8. Removal of the President. By impeachment [Secs. 2 & 3, Art. XI]. 

1.   Qualifications, election, term of office and removal. The same as the President [Sec. 3, Art. VII], but no Vice President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. The Vice President may be appointed as Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

2.   Vacancy in the office of the Vice President [Sec. 9, Art. VII]: The President shall nominate a Vice president from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.

a)             The executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. In National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002, the Supreme Court said that as the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with the power to execute, administer and carry out laws into practical operation. Executive power, then, is the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.

 

b)             Authority to reorganize the Officeofthe President. TheAdministrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency”. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. But the power to reorganize the Office of the President under Sec. 31 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Sec. 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Sec. 31 (2) and (3), the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa [Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003].

c)             In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451, and in Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil 62, the Supreme Court declared that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and no other, and that all executive authority is thus vested in him. [This is in keeping with the rule announced in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a limitation upon the general grant of executive power.] However, in Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil 456, and in Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil 143, the Supreme Court opted for a stricter interpretation of executive power, e.g., the President’s power of general supervision over local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law. See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, on certain “residual powers” of the President of the Philippines.

 

d)             In Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.(MEWAP) v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007, it was held that the President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of the President’s power of control under Art. VII, Secs. 1 and 17, and it is also an exercise of his “residual powers”. However, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department.

 

e)             It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.

a)     Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public service. It is also different from the commission in that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment.

 

b)     Appointments, classified.

                                       

i)        Permanent or temporary. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made.

ia) A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not make the incumbent a permanent appointee [Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692].

ib) In Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, it was held that where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, a designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

ii) Regular or ad interm. A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed “by-passed” through inaction. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices.

iia) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002].

iib) An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution: disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments, or adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the appointment. There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment [Matibag v. Benipayo, supra.].

 

c) Officials who are to be appointed bv the President.

i)        The first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, says that the President shall nominate, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the following: {a] Heads of executive departments; [b] Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; [c] Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and [dj Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution.

ia) In Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are the only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the Commission on Elections. In this case, it was held that the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, because the Commissioner of the Customs is not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16, Art. VII. On the other hand, in Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, the appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of the Philippines is specifically provided for in Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. Thus, the appointment of a sectoral representative falls under category [d] above.

ib) In Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003, the Supreme Court said that because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but is now under the Department of Transporation and Communications (DOTC), a civilian agency, the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Obviously, the clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers to military officers alone.

ii)     The second sentence of Sec. 16, VII, states that he shall also appoint [a] All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; and [b] Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

iia) In Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court held that the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution or in the law. Thus, there is no necessity for such appointment to be passed upon by the Commission on Appointments. In Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, Article 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and commissioners, is unconstitutional, because it violates Sec. 16,Art. VII. Infact, inManalov. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369,August 11,1999, the Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the confirmation of appointments of government officials other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.

iib) In Tarrosa v. Singson, supra., the Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by the petitioner as a “taxpayer” questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as provided in RA 7653, calling attention to its ruling in Calderon v. Carale. The petition was dismissed, however, primarily on the ground that it was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding, which can be commenced only by the Solicitor General or by “a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another”.

 iic) In Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956, July 21, 2006, the Supreme Court declared that a statute cannot circumvent the constitutional provisions on the power of appointment by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. This manner of filling vacancies in public office has no constitutional basis. Thus, because the challenged section of the law is unconstitutional, it is the President who shall appoint the trustees, by virtue of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution which provides that the President has the power to appoint officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

 

d)  Steps in the appointing process:

i)      Nomination by the President;

ii)     Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;

iii)    Issuance of the commission;

iv)    Acceptance by the appointee. In Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740,, the Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance. Pending such acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except for purposes of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art. II, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.

 

e)   Discretion of Appointing Authority. Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position. This discretion also includes the determination of the nature or character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary or permanent. See Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327; Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106; Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738.

                      

i)      In Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, several Senators, including members of the Commission on Appointments, questioned the constitutionality of the appointments issued by the President to respondents as Acting Secretaries of their respective departments, and to prohibit them from performing the duties of Department Secretaries. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. In case of a vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of Department Secretary, the President must necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

 

f)  Special Constitutional Limitations on the President’s appointing power:

 

i) The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations [Sec. 13, Art. VII].

ii)     Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office [Sec. 14, Art. VII].

iii)    Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety [Sec. 15, Art. VII].

iiia) In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.

iiib) During this period, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required by law to fill up vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein, unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Article VII. While the filling up of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban [In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998].

[Note: The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications for public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed.]

 

g) The Power of Removal. As a general rule, the power of removal may be implied from the power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service, e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by impeachment, or judges who are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent, the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure.

 

i)      Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be directly disciplined by him [Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710], provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

ii)     Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term. See Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683; Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231.

a)            Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter [Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.]. It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.

 

i)     The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art. VII, Sections 1 and 17, of the Constitution. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may incidentally include such abolition, is permissible under present laws [Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007].

ii)    The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book II, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines), which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Further, Presidential Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, and to standardize salaries and materials [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].

iii)   Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. R.A, 6656 enumerates the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of reorganization: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].

 

b)            The alter ego principle. Also known as the “doctrine of qualified political agency”. Under this doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees. G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003].

 

i)     The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other subordinate executive officers [City of lligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158; Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328], Even where the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to the President, be reviewed and reversed by the Executive Secretary [Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895]. Thus, in Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582, it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN, since he was acting on behalf of the President who had the power to negotiate such agreement.

ii)    Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be the act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra.].

iii)   But even if he is an alter-ego of the President, the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President [Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].

 

c)            Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet members, completes exhaustion of administrative remedies [Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302], except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies, in which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies [Kilusang Bayan, etc., v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92],

 

d)            But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the actor [Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619].

 

e)            The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2- million or above require the approval of the President of the Philippines under LOI 620 [Hutchinson Ports Phils, Ltd. V. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, August 31,2000]         .

f)      Power of control of Justice Secretary over prosecutors. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra., it was reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors. Review, as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This power may still be availed of despite the filing of a criminal information in Court, and in his discretion, the Secretary may affirm, modify or reverse the resolutions of his subordinates. The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice Secretary’s power of review. Thus, where the Secretary of Justice exercises his power of review only after an information is filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and other proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment, however, does not mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case. See also Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000; Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 11; David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842.

g) The President exercises only the power of general supervision over local governments [Sec. 4, Art. X], i)

 

i)      On the President’s power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002].

ii)     Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance — and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds — is valid, and does not confer the power of control over local government units in the Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government unit [Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135],

 

iii)    In Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 4, Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units, is unconstitutional, because the President’s power over local governments is only one of general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

a)   The Commander-in-Chief clause.

i)      “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines...” In Gudaniv. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, the Senate Committee on National Defense invited several senior AFP officers to testify on matters related to the conduct of the 2004 elections. AFP Chief of Staff General Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee, that “no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear” at the Senate hearing. This notwithstanding, General Gudani and Col. Balutan attended and both testified atthe hearing. On recommendation of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were charged with violation of Articles of War 65, on will fully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Articles of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline. Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the order of PGMA preventing petitioners from testifying be declared unconstitutional, the charges for violation of the Articles of War be quashed, and the respondents be permanently enjoined from proceeding against the petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

ia) The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority — the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, these commander- inchief powers are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

ib) The vitality, of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the AFP is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civil supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Court quoted Kapunan v. De Villa: “The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the matter.”

  

ii)      To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

iia) In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., the Supreme Court said that the petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. The Court noted the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the record. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017, calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

iia1) Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. She cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power.

iia2) General Order No. 5, issued to implement PP 1017, is valid. It is an order issued by the President, acting as commander- in-chief, addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it provides a valid standard — that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence”. But the words “acts of terrorism” found in the GO, had not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress, and thus, should be deemed deleted from the GO.

iia3) However, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to promulgate “decrees”, because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress. Likewise, the inclusion in PP 1017 of Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. Sec. 17, Art. XII, must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and thus, requires a delegation from Congress.

iib) In Guanzort v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623, the Supreme Court recognized, as part of the military powers of the President, the conduct of “saturation drives” or “areal target zoning” by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

iic) In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the Supreme Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the President’s discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”, the President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

iid) In Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001, the Supreme Court said that the President has discretionary authority to declare a “state of rebellion”. The Court may only look into the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power.

iie) In Sanlakas v. Reyes, supra., it was held that the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. However, a mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis for the apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests. As held in Lacson v. Perez, supra., the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity”. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. “The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.”

iie1) It is pertinent to state that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While the authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive (the statutory authority being Sec. 4, Chapter 2, Book II, Administrative Code of 1997), and the declaration was deemed harmless and without legal significance, in declaring a state of national emergency in PP1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution, calling for the exercise of awesome powers which cannot be deemed as harmless or without legal significance [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.].

iii)        The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the armed forces, create military commissions for the punishment of war criminals. See Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875; Kuroda v. Jalandoni 42 0.G.4282.

iiia) But see Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, where it was held that military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open and functioning. In Quilona v. General Court Martial, 206 SCRA 821, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.A. 6975, members of the Philippine National Police are not within the jurisdiction of a military court.

iiib) This is made clear in Navales v. General Abaya, G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004, where the Supreme Court said that in enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War. Thus, the RTC cannot divest the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Art. 63 (Disrespect Toward the President, etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition). 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Articles) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as “service-connected offenses or crimes” under Sec. 1, R.A. 7055.

iiic) In Gudani v. Senga, supra., on the issue of whether the court martial could still assume jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been compulsorily retired from the service, the Court quoted from Abadilla v. Ramos, where it was held that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

 

b)     Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

 

i)             Grounds: Invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.         

ii)            Duration: Not to exceed sixty days, following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress.

iii)           Duty of President to report action to Congress: within 48 hours, personally or in writing. 

iv)           Congress may revoke [or extend on request of the President] the effectivity of proclamation byy a majority vote of all its members, voting jointly.

v)            The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing [Sec. 18, Art. VII]. See Lartsang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448.

vi)           The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the right to bail [Sec. 13, Art. III].

vii)          The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

viii)         During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

 

c)     Martial Law. “A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ” [Sec. 18, Art. VII].

 

i)   The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the writ are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial law.

a)     Definitions:

i)      Pardon. An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

ii)     Commutation. Reduction or mitigation of the penalty. iii)     Reprieve. Postponement of a sentence or stay of execution.

iv)    Parole. Release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as parolee is still in the custody of the law although not in confinement.

v)     Amnesty. Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

b)     Exercise bv the President. Discretionary; may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts, unless there is a constitutional violation. Thus, it was a legal malapropism for the trial court to interject par. 2, Art. 135, Revised Penal Code, recommending the grant of pardon after the convict shall have served a jail term of 5 years, considering that this was a prosecution under a special law, and that the matter of a pardon is within the President’s exclusive prerogative [People v. de Gracia, supra.].

c)     Limitations on exercise:

i)      Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment [Sec. 19, Art. VII].

ii)     Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections [Sec. 5, Art. IX-C].

iii)    Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. In People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581, reiterated in People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44, the Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Any application for a pardon should not be acted upon, or the process toward its grant should not begin, unless the appeal is withdrawn. The ruling in Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, which was laid down under the 1973 Constitution, is now changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under the 1987 Constitution. In People v. Catido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997, it was held that while the pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal, or before conviction by final judgment, and therefore a violation of Sec. 19, Art. VII, the grant of amnesty, applied for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.

iv)    Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation of powers), or civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same)                                                                    ,

v)     Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability. See People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294, September 7, 1995, where the Court said that the grant of conditional pardon and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal did not relieve the accused of civil liability.

vi)    Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v. Factoran, supra.]. But see Sabello v. DECS, 180 SCRA 623, where a pardoned elementary school principal, on considerations of justice and equity, was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of principal and not to the lower position of classroom teacher. On executive clemency re: administrative decisions, see Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356.

d)     Pardon Classified.

i)      Plenary or partial.

ii) Absolute or conditional.

iia) On conditional pardon, see Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273. The rule is reiterated in In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, supra., that a conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal; by the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon. Sec. 64 (i), Revised Administrative Code, authorizes the President to order the arrest and reincarceration of such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon. And the exercise of this Presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.

e) Amnesty.

i)          In People v. Patriarca, G,R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000, it was held that the person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.

ii)         In Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152, it was held that to avail of the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation.

iii)        Distinguished from pardon: A - addressed to political offenses, P - infractions of peace of the state; A - classes of persons, P - individuals; A - no need for distinct acts of acceptance, P - acceptance necessary; A - requires concurrence of Congress, P - does not; A - a public act which the courts may take judicial notice of, P - private act which must be pleaded and proved; A - looks backward and puts into oblivion the offense itself, P - looks forward and relieves the pardonee of the consequences of the offense. See People v. Casido, supra.. 6

6.    The Borrowing Power. Sec. 20, Art. VII:    “The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. ”

7.    The Diplomatic Power. Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. ”

a)            In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351, the Supreme Court distinguished treaties from executive agreements, thus: (i) international agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form of a treaty; while international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements; and (ii) in treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become binding through executive action.

b)            But see Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, where the Supreme Court said that the Philippine government had complied with the Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was concurred in by the Philippine Senate, thus complying with Sec.-21, Art. VII. The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase, “recognized as a treaty”. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA as merely an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.

8.    Budgetary Power. Sec. 22, Art. VII: “The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations act, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. ”

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9.    The Informing Power. Sec. 23, Art. VII: “The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.”

10.  Other powers:

a)            Call Congress to a special session [Sec. 15, Art. VI: “x x x The President may call a special session at any time ],

b)            Power to approve or veto bills [Sec. 27, Art. VI].

c)            To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections [Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C].

d)            To discipline such deputies [Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C].

e)            By delegation from Congress, emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Art. VI], and tariff powers [Sec. 28(2), Art. VI].

f)             General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments [Art. X].

i) See Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 2, 2002.