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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CHAPTER I – FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

 (Police Power)

1.            Define:

police power—is the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)

The basic purposes of police power are:

a.            to promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people;(ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175 SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85

b.            to promote and preserve public health; (VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987; DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 [NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, 50 Phil. 595—apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)

Read more: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

DEFINITIONS

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT

  • Written contract for the payment of money, by its form intended as substitute for money and intended to pass from hand to hand to give the holder in due course the right to hold the same and collect the sum due

PROMISSORY NOTE

  • unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker
  • engaging to pay on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer
  • where a note is drawn to the maker’s own order, it is not complete until indorsed by him

BILL OF EXCHANGE

  • unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another  signed by the person giving it
  • requiring the person to whom it’s addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer
  • check: bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Kinds of checks:
  1. personal check
  2. manager’s/cashier’s check – drawn by a bank on itself. Issuance has the effect of acceptance
  3. memorandum check – “memo” is written across its face, signifying that drawer will pay holder absolutely without need of presentment
  4. crossed check –
  • effects:
  1. check may not be encashed but only deposited in bank
  2. may be negotiated only once, to one who has an acct. with a bank
  3. warning to holder that check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he received check pursuant to such purpose, otherwise not HDC
  • kinds:
  1. general (no word between lines, or “co” between lines)
  2. special (name of bank appearing between parallel lines)

BEARER

Person in possession of a bill/note payable to bearer

HOLDER

Payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.

THE LIFE OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT:

  1. issue
  2. negotiation
  3. presentment for acceptance in certain bills
  4. acceptance
  5. dishonor by on acceptance
  6. presentment for payment
  7. dishonor by nonpayment
  8. notice of dishonor
  9. protest in certain cases
  10. discharge

 

 

NEGOTIABILITY

REQUISITES
  1. in writing and signed by maker or drawer
  • no person liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon ( subject to exceptions)
  • one who signs in a trade or assumed name liable to the same extent as if he had signed in his own name
  • signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent, no particular form of appt. necessary

 

  1. unconditional promise or order to pay
  • unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled with
  1. an indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement to be made, or a particular account to be debited with amount, or
    1. a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument
  • an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional

a sum certain in money

  • even if stipulated to be paid—
  1. with interest, or
  2. by stated installments, or
  3. by stated installments with a provision that upon default in payment of any installment/interest, the whole shall become due, or
  4. with exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the current rate, or
  5. with costs of collection or an attorney’s fee, in case payment not made at maturity

 

  1. payable on demand,
  • when expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight, or on presentation;
  • when no time for payment  expressed, or
  • where an instrument is issued, accepted or indorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or indorsing it, payable on demand

 

or at a fixed or determinable future time

  • when it’s expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date or sight, or
  • on or before a fixed or determinable future time fixed therein, or
  • on or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event which is certain to happen, though the time of happening be uncertain
  • an instrument payable upon a contingency not negotiable, and happening of event doesn’t cure it

*  relate to  sec. 11 ( presumption as to date) and sec. 17 (construction where instrument ambiguous)

* note effect of acceleration provisions, p. 30 Campos

* note effect of provisions extending time of payment, p. 40 Campos

 

  1. payable to order
  • where it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order. May be drawn payable to order of —
  • when the instrument is payable to order the payee must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty
  1. a payee not the maker/drawer/drawee, or
  2. drawer or maker, or
  3. drawee, or
  4. two or more payees jointly, or
  5. holder of an office for time being

or bearer,

  • when expressed to be so payable
  • when payable to person named therein or bearer
  • when payable to order or fictitious/non-existent person, and such fact known to the person making it so payable, or
  • when name of payee doesn’t purport to be the name of any person, or
  • when the only/last indorsement is in blank
  1. where addressed to drawee: such drawee named/ indicated therein with reasonable certainty
  • bill may be addressed to two or more drawees jointly, whether partners or not, but not to two or more drawees in the alternative or in succession
  • bill may be treated as a PN, at option of holder, where
  1. drawer and drawee are same person
  2. drawee is fictitious/incapacitated

EFFECT OF ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

Gen. Rule: order/promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money renders instrument non-negotiable.

Exception: negotiability not affected by provisions w/c

  1. authorize sale of collateral security if instrument not paid at maturity
  2. authorize confession  of judgment…
  3. waives benefit of any law intended for advantage/protection of obligor
  4. give holder election to require something to be done in lieu of money

CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIABLE CHARACTER

Until

  1. restrictively indorsed
  2. discharged by payment or otherwise

TRANSFER

DELIVERY

  • NI incomplete and revocable until delivery for the purpose of giving effect thereto
  • as between
  1. immediate parties
  2. a remote party other than  holder in due course

delivery, to be effectual,  must  be made by or under the authority of the party making/drawing/accepting/indorsing

  • in such case delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument.

PRESUMPTION OF DELIVERY

Where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved (*if in the hands of a HDC, presumption conclusive)

NEGOTIATION

  • When an instrument is transferred from one person to another as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof.
  • If payable to BEARER, negotiated by delivery; if payable to ORDER, negotiated by indorsement of holder + delivery

INDORSEMENT

  • Indorser generally enters into two contracts:
  1. sale or assignment of instrument
  2. to pay instrument in case of default of maker
  • 31 (how indorsement made)
  • 41 (where payable to two or more)
  • 43 (indorsement where name misspelled)
  • 48 (cancellation of indorsement)
  • 45, 46 (presumptions)
  • Indorsement must be of entire instrument. (can’t be indorsement of only part of amount payable, nor can it be to two or more indorsees severally. But okay to indorse residue of partially paid instrument)
  • 67 (liability of indorser where paper negotiable by delivery)
  • 63 (when person deemed indorser)

KINDS OF INDORSEMENT

  1. as to manner of future method of negotiation
  2. special – specifies the person to whom/to whose order the instrument is to be payable; indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to further negotiation.
  3. Blank – specifies no indorsee, instrument so indorsed is payable to bearer, and may be negotiated by delivery
  • the holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement  by writing over the signature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the character of the indorsement
  1. as to kind of title transferred
  2. restrictive
  • prohibits further negotiation of instrument,
  • constitutes indorsee as agent of indorser, or
  • vests title in indorsee in trust for another
  • rights of indorsee in restrictive ind.:
    • receive payment of inst.
    • Bring any action thereon that indorser could bring
    • Transfer his rights as such indorsee, but all subsequent indorsees acquire only title of first indorsee under restrictive indorsement
  1. non-restrictive
  1. as to kind of liability assumed by indorser
  2. qualified-constitutes indorser as mere assignor of title (eg. “without recourse”)
  3. unqualified
  1. as to presence/absence of express limitations put by indorser upon primary obligor’s privileges of paying the holder
  2. conditional – additional condition annexed to indorser’s liability.
  • Where an indorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the instrument may disregard the condition, and make payment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether condition has been fulfilled or not
  • Any person to whom an instrument so indorsed is negotiated will hold the same/proceeds subject to rights of person indorsing conditionally
  1. unconditional

INDORSEMENT OF BEARER INST.

  • Where an instrument payable to bearer is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery
  • Person indorsing specially liable as indorser to only such holders as make title through his indorsement

UNINDORSED INSTRUMENTS

  • Where holder of instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing, transfer vests in transferee
  1. such title as transferor had therein
  2. right of tranferee to have indorsement of transferor
  • for purposes of determining HDC negotiation effective upon actual indorsement

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

HOLDER

Sec. 191

RIGHTS OF HOLDER

  1. sue thereon in his own name
  2. payment to him in due course discharges instrument

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE: REQUISITIES

  1. complete and regular upon its face
  • 124 (effect of alteration)
  • 125 (what constitute material alterations)
  1. holder became such before it was overdue, without notice of any previous dishonor
  • 53 (demand inst. nego after unreasonable length of time: not HDC)
  • 12 (effect antedating/postdating)
  1. taken in good faith and for value
  • 24 (presumption of consideration)
  • sec 25 (definition. of value)
  • 26 (definition. holder for value)
  • 27 (lien as value)
  1. at time negotiated to him, he had no notice  (sec. 56-def;  54-notice before full amt. paid) of —
    1. infirmity in instrument
    2. defect in title of person negotiating
      1. instrument/signature obtained through fraud, etc., illegal consideration/means, or
      2. instrument negotiated in breach of faith, or fraudulent circumstances

RIGHTS OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE:

  1. holds instrument free of any defect of title of prior parties
  2. free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves
  3. may enforce payment of instrument for full amount, against all parties liable

* if in the hand of any holder (note definition of holder) other than a HDC, vulnerable to same defenses as if non-negotiable

RIGHTS OF PURCHASER FROM HOLDER IN DUE COURSE:

General Rule: in the hands of any holder other than a HDC, NI is subject to same defenses as if it were non-negotiable.

Exception: holder who derives title through HDC and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality has all rights of such former holder in respect to all parties prior to the latter.

WHO DEEMED HDC

  • prima facie presumption in favor of holder
  • but when shown that title of any person who has negotiated instrument was defective (sec. 55—when title defective): burden reversed (now with holder)
  • but no reversal if party being made liable became bound prior to acquisition of defective title (i.e., where defense is not his own)

DEFENSES AND EQUITIES

KINDS OF DEFENSES

  1. real defense – attaches to instrument; on the principle that the right sought to be enforced  never existed/there was no contract at all
  2. personal defense – growing out of agreement; renders it inequitable to be enforced vs. defendant

DEFENSES

  1. INCAPACITY: real; indorsement/assign by  corp/infant: passes property but corp/infant no liability
  2. ILLEGALITY: personal, even if no K because void under CC 1409
  3. FORGERY:  real (lack of consent):
    1. forged
    2. made without authority of person whose signature it purports to be.

General Rule:

  1. wholly inoperative
  2. no right to retain instrument, or give discharge, or enforce payment vs. any party, can be acquired through or under such signature (unless forged signature unnecessary to holder’s title)

Exception:

unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up forgery/want of authority

precluded:

  1. parties who make certain warranties, like a general indorser or acceptor
  2. estopped/negligent parties

* note  rules on Acceptance/Payment Under Mistake as applied to:

  1. overdraft
  2. stop payment order
  3. forged indorsements

 

  1. MATERIAL ALTERATION
  • Where NI materially altered w/o assent of all parties liable thereon, avoided, except as vs. a
  1. party who has himself made, authorized or assented to alteration
  2. and subsequent indorsers.
  • But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a HDC not a party to the alteration, HDC may enforce payment thereof according to orig. tenor
  • Material Alteration
  1. change date
  2. sum payable, either for principal or interest
  3. time of payment
  4. number/relations of parties
  5. medium/currency of payment, adds place of payment where none specified, other change/addition altering effect of instrument in any respect.

*material alteration a personal defense when used to deny liability according to org. tenor of instrument, but real defense when relied on to deny liability according to altered terms.

  1. FRAUD
  2. fraud in execution: real defense (didn’t know it was NI)
  3. fraud in inducement: personal defense (knows it’s NI but deceived as to value/terms)
  4. DURESS
  • Personal, unless so serious as to give rise to a real defense for lack of contractual intent
  1. COMPLETE, UNDELIVERED INSTRUMENT
  • Personal defense (sec. 16)
  • If instrument not in poss. Of party who signed, delivery prima facie presumed
  • If holder is HDC, delivery conclusively presumed
  1. INCOMPLETE, UNDELIVERED INSTRUMENT
  • Real defense (sec. 15)
  • Instrument will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery

10. INCOMPLETE, DELIVERED

  • Personal defense (sec. 14)
  • 2 Kinds of Writings:
  1. Where instrument is wanting in any material particular: person in possession has prima facie authority to complete it by filing up blanks therein
  2. Signature on blank paper delivered by person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a NI: prima facie authority to fill up as such for any amount
  • In order that any such instrument, when completed, ma be enforced vs. any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion:
  1. must be filled up strictly in accordance w/ authority given
  2. within a reasonable time
  • but if any such instrument after completion is negotiated to HDC, it’s valid for all purposes in his hands, he may enforce it as if it had been filled up properly.

LIABILITIES OF PARTIES

  1. PRIMARY PARTIES
  • Person primarily liable: person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same.
  • 70 (effect of want of demand on principal debtor)
  1. Liability of Maker
  2. Promises to pay it according to its tenor
  3. admits existence of payee and his then capacity to indorse
  1. Status of drawee prior to acceptance or payment
  • 127 (bill not an assignment of funds in hands of drawee)
  • 189 (when check operates as assignment)

 

  1. Liability of Acceptor
  • Promises to pay inst according to its tenor
  • Admits the following:
  1. existence of drawer
  2. genuineness of his signature
  3. his capacity and authority to draw the instrument
  4. existence of payee and his then capacity to endorse
  • 191, 132, 133, 138 — formal requisites of acceptance
  • 136, 137, 150 — constructive acceptance
  • 134, 135 — acceptance on a separate instrument
  • Kinds of Acceptance:
  1. general
  2. qualified
    1. conditional
    2. partial
    3. local
    4. qualified as to time
    5. not all drawees

* sec. 142 (rights of parties as to qualified acceptance)

  • Certification: Principles
  1. when check certified by bank on which it’s drawn, equivalent to acceptance
  2. where holder of check procures it to be accepted/certified, drawer and all indorsers discharged from al liability
  3. check not operate as assignment of any part of funds to credit of drawer with bank, and bank is not liable to holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies check
  4. certification obtained at request of drawer: secondary parties not released
  5. bank which certifies liable as an acceptor
  6. checks cannot be certified before payable
  1. SECONDARY PARTIES
  2. Liability of Drawer
  3. Admits existence of payee and his then capacity to endorse
  4. Engages that on due presentment instrument will be accepted, or paid, or both, according to its tenor and that
  5. If it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to an subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it
  • drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negativing / limiting his own liability to holder
  1. Liability of Indorsers:
  • Qualified Indorser and one Negotiating by Delivery
  1. Instrument  genuine, in all respects what it purports to be
  2. good title
  3. all prior parties had capacity to contract
  4. he had no knowledge of any fact w/c would impair validity of instrument or render it valueless
  • in case of negotiation by delivery only, warranty only extends in favor of immediate transferee
  • Liability of a General or Unqualified Indorser
  1. instrument genuine, good title, capacity of prior parties
  2. instrument is at time of indorsement valid and subsisting
  3. on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or both, according to tenor
  4. if it be dishonored, and necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amt. To holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it
  • Order of Liability among Indorsers
  1. among themselves: liable prima facie in the order they indorse, but proof of another agreement admissible
  2. but holder may sue any of the indorsers, regardless of order of indorsement
  3. joint payees/indorsees deemed to indorse jointly and severally
  1. Liability of  Accomodation Party
  • Definition: one who signed instrument as maker/drawer/acceptor/ indorser w/o receiving  value thereof, for the purpose of lending his name to some other person
  • AP liable on the instrument to holder for value even if  holder,  at time of taking instrument, knew he was only an AP
  • Liability of Irregular Indorser
    • Where a person not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he’s liable as an indorser, in accordance w/ these rules:
  1. Instrument payable to order of 3rdperson: liable to payee and to all subsequent parties
  2. Instrument payable to the order of maker/drawer, or payable to bearer: liable to all parties subsequent to maker/drawer
  3. Signs for accommodation of payee, liable to all parties subsequent to payee
  • Sadaya v Sevilla Rules:
  1. a joint and several accommodation maker of a negotiable promissory note may demand from the principal debtor reimbursement for the amt. That he paid to the payee
  2. a joint and several accommodation maker who pays on the said promissory note may directly demand reimbursement from his co-accommodation maker without first directing his action vs. the principal debtor provided:
    1. he made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand
    2. or the principal debtor is insolvent
  1. Liability of an Agent
  • Signature of any party may be made by duly authorized agent, establish as in ordinary agency
  • Where instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized, but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent without disclosing his principal, does not exempt from personal liability.
  • Signature per procuration operates as notice that the agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the principal is bound on ly in case the agent in so signing acted within the actual limits of his authority
  • Where a broker or agent negotiates an instrument without indorsement, he incurs all liabilities in Sec. 65, unless he discloses name of principal and fact that he’s only acting as agent

I.  Presentment For Acceptance

When presentment for acceptance must be made

  1. bill payable after sight, or in other cases where presentment for acceptance necessary to fix maturity
  2. where bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance
  3. where bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at residence / place of business of drawee

When failure to present releases drawer/indorser

Failure to present for acceptance of negotiate bill of exchange within reasonable time

Reasonable Time

Must consider

  1. nature of instrument
  2. usage of trade or business with respect to instrument
  3. facts of each case

How and When Made Sec. 145, 146, 147

When Excused Sec. 148

Dishonor and Effects

  • 149 (when dishonored by non-acceptance)
  • 150 (duty of holder where bill not accepted)
  • 151 (rights of holder where bill not accepted)
  • 89 (to whom notice of dishonor must be given)
  • 117 (effect of omission to give notice of non-acceptance)

II. For Payment

Where necessary Sec. 70

Where not necessary Sec. 79, 80, 82, 151, 111

Date and time of presentment of instrument bearing fixed maturity Sec. 71, 85, 86, 194

Date of presentment

  • Where instrument not payable on demand: presentment must be made on date it falls due
  • Where payable on demand: presentment must be made within reasonable time after issue, except that in case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after last negotiation (but note: though reasonable time from last negotiation, it may be unreasonable time from issuance thus holder may not be HDC under sec. 71)
  • Check must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its issue or drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to extent of loss caused by delay

Delay excused Sec. 81

Manner Sec. 74, 72, 75

Place Sec. 73

To Whom Sec. 72, 76, 77, 78

Dishonor by nonpayment Sec. 83, 84

Notice of Dishonor

General rule: to drawer and to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom such notice is not given is discharged

Form, Contents, Time Sec. 95, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 113

By Whom Given

  • By or on behalf of the holder or any party to the instrument who may be compelled to pay it to the holder, and who, upon taking it up, would have a right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice is given
  • Notice of dishonor may be given by an agent either in his own name or in the name of any party entitled to give notice, whether that party be his principal or not
    • Where instrument has been dishonored in hands of agent, he may either himself give notice to the parties liable thereon, or he may give notice to his principal (as if agent an independent holder)

In whose favor notice operates

  1. when given by/on behalf of holder: insures to benefit of
    1. all subsequent holders and
    2. all prior parties who have a right of recourse vs. the party to whom it’s given
  2. where notice given by/on behalf of a party entitled to give notice: insures for benefit of a.  holder , and

b. all parties subsequent to party to whom notice given

Waiver Sec. 109, 110

Where not necessary to charge drawer

  1. drawer/drawee same person
  2. drawee fictitious, incapacitated
  3. drawer is person to whom instrument is presented for payment
  4. drawer has no right to expect/require that drawee/acceptor will honor instrument
  5. drawer countermanded payment

Where not necessary to charge indorser

  1. drawee fictitious, incapacitated, and indorser aware of the fact at time of indorsement
  2. indorser is person to whom instrument presented for paymt
  3. instrument made/accepted for his accommodation

Protest

Definition: testimony of some proper person that the regular legal steps to fix the liability of drawer and indorsers have been taken

When necessary: sec. 152,

Form and contents: sec. 153

By whom made: sec. 154

Time and Place: sec. 155, 156

For better security: sec. 158

Excused: sec. 159

Waiver: sec. 111

Acceptance for Honor

Sec. 161, 131, 171

Bills in Set: 178-183

DISCHARGE

  1. Of the Instrument
  2. payment in due course by or on behalf of principal debtor
  • Payment in due course:
  1. made at or after maturity
  2. to the holder thereof
  3. in good faith and without notice that his title is defective
  4. payment in due course by party accommodated where party is made/ accepted for accommodation
  5. intentional cancellation by holder
  • if unintentional or under mistake or without authority of holder, inoperative. Burden of proof  on party which alleges it was unintentional, etc.
  1. any other act which discharges a simple contract
  2. principal debtor becomes holder of instrument at or after maturity in his own right
  3. renunciation of holder:
  • holder may expressly renounce his rights vs. any party to the instrument, before or after its maturity
  • absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights vs. principal debtor made at or after maturity discharges the instrument
  • renunciation does not affect rights of HDC w/o notice.
  • Renunciation must be in writing unless instrument delivered up to person primarily liable thereon
  1. material alteration (sec. 124: material alteration w/o assent of all parties liable avoids instrument except as against party to alteration and subsequent indorsers)
  1. Of secondary parties
  2. any act which discharges the instrument
  3. intentional cancellation of signature by holder
  4. discharge of prior party
  5. valid tender of payment made by prior party
  6. release of principal debtor, unless holder’s right of recourse vs. 2ndary party reserved
  7. any agreement binding upon holder to extend time of payment, or to postpone holder’s right to enforce instrument, unless made with assent of party secondarily liable, or unless right of recourse reserved.
  8. Failure to make due presentment (sec. 70, 144)
  9. failure to give notice of dishonor
  10. certification of check at instance of holder
  11. reacquisition by prior party
  • where instrument negotiated back to a prior party, such party may reissue and further negotiate, but not entitled to enforce payment vs. any intervening party to whom he was personally liable
  • where instrument is paid by party secondarily liable, it’s not discharged, but
  1. the party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regard to all prior parties
  2. and he may strike out his own and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate instrument, except
  • where it’s payable to order of 3rdparty and has been paid by drawer
  • where it’s made/accepted for accommodation and has been paid by party accommodated.

Criminal Law Digests

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Criminal Law Digests – October 1999

OCTOBER 1999

People v. Marcelino

October 1, 1999

Victims Pineda and Bajos were sent by the governor to investigate reported abuses by para-military groups in the hinterlands. Barangay Chairman Marcelino and some of his Civilian Home Defense (CHDF) cohorts shot to death and incinerated the corpses of said victims.

Issue:

Was there treachery?

Was conspiracy established to hold other accused equally liable for the murder?

Held: YES

Elements of treachery (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.

Victims were deliberately led toward Nabilog by Marcelino when he claimed there was a taxi there waiting for them. When they reached Tampa Creek, said unforwarned victims were suddenly shot to death without chance to defend themselves. Marcelino effectively ordered his men to kill the two by means of a signal (drawing a line across his neck with a finger). The gesture was so conspicuous that even the witness saw it. The group followed the deceased then killed them. Their bodies were set on the ground side-by side, their clothes removed, their personal belongings stolen. Thereafter Marcelino ordered that the bodies be burned in order to conceal their evil deed. These circumstances, taken together, sufficiently established a unity of purpose, community of interest and intent, which were carried out in concert. For conspiracy to exist, there need not be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.

People v. Narido

October 1, 1999

Accused raped his 11-year-old daughter while they are gathering firewood. On another occasion, his common law wife caught him laying on top of his daughter.

Issue:

W/N said crime is punishable by death? (special circumstance imposing death penalty automatically – victim is under 18 years of age and offender is a parent.)

Held: No.

Guilty only of simple statutory rape  and not qualified rape for want of allegation of relationship. Said special circumstances introduced by RA 7659 which sanction automatic imposition of death penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances since these circumstances increase the penalty for rape by one degree. Nonetheless, to be properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, it must be specifically pleaded in the information. Information in this case reveals that although the complainant’s minority was alleged, the fact of relationship, albeit proven during the trial, was not so specified.

People v. Padama

October 1, 1999

Victim Gatchalian was chased by the two accused, each armed with a knife, and stabbed simultaneously several times. He eventually died of severe blood loss. Said killing arose from a previous incident where victim confronted  accused regarding their plan of stealing from the store of the former.

Issue: W/N there was treachery? Yes.

W/N there was evident premeditation? No.

Held:

The conclusion that the killing was attended with treachery or taking advantage of superior strength, as the two accused each armed with bladed weapons and continuously attacking and raining knife thrusts upon the unarmed and unsuspecting victim which caused his eventual death is also not to be disturbed. The evidence shows that the two accused took turns in stabbing the victim while the latter had already fallen down on the pavement.

Proof of the alleged resentment does not constitute conclusive proof of evident premeditation. An expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime; there must be a demonstration of outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest.

People v. Villablanca

October 1, 1999

Villablanca brothers barged in to the house of victim Pedro Natanio late at night. Pedro and his family were awakened by their chickens flying off the perch. Victim was made to kneel on the floor and then stabbed him on the stomach with a samurai, while the other pointed a gun to his face. Victim rolled to his side and was again stabbed thrice which led to his death

Issue: W/N there was treachery? Yes.

W/N there was abuse of superior strength? No.

W/N there was conspiracy? Yes.

Held:

Pedro may have been warned of a possible danger to his person. However, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner making it impossible for Pedro to retaliate. When Pedro was made to kneel on the floor, he was unarmed. There was no risk to the accused when they commenced the stabbing. Pedro’s helplessness was bolstered by the fact that he was suffering from a congenital limpness which allowed him to walk only short distances.

There is no evidence that accused took advantage of superior strength. In any event, even if it was present it was absorbed in treachery. Both accused shall suffer the same fate, as there was conspiracy between them. When the other pointed a gun to Pedro, he provided his brother with moral assistance. This is enough to make him a co-conspirator. It is not necessary to show that he actually he hit and killed Pedro to make him liable for his brother’s acts.

People v. Vergel

October 4, 1999

Vergel and Duran, both drunk and armed with a gun and a fan knife, fetched and forcibly brought victim on board a tricycle to an apartment. Vergel had carnal knowledge with said victim after he poked the gun at her side and pulled her into a bedroom, while Duran stayed guard near the door of the sala.

Issue: W/N there was rape?

Held: Yes.

It is clear there was rape. The prosecution was able to prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant (2) because he intimidated her by pointing a gun at her. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary the complainant’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused. Such resistance is not an element of the felony. It is enough that the malefactor intimidated the complainant into submission. Not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectation of everyone.

People v. Yabut

October 5, 1999

Spouses Yabut on several occasions received money from complainants promising them they will be able to work in Japan. After several cancellation of their scheduled departure, complainants discovered that said spouses were not licensed to engage in recruitment and placement activities. Wife eluded arrest and remains at-large. Husband contends that he was not engaged in recruitment for overseas employment and  but only in processing visas. He was acquitted of the crime of estafa.

Issue: W/N accused could be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of the crime of estafa?

Held: Yes.

It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa Art. 315 of the RPC. The former is mala prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is mala in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.

People v. Caratay

October 5, 1999

Accused in several occasions had carnal knowledge with his common-law wife’s 13 year-old niece. In one occasion he drugged the lugaw of said victim.

Issue: Was there rape?

Held: Yes.

We have ruled that if the ability to resist is taken away by administering a drug, even though the woman may be conscious, sexual intercourse with her will be rape. Moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused in a rape case. We have ruled that even prostitutes can be rape victims.

People v. Suelto

October 7, 1999

Appellant came home late, and his wife was angry with him because she believed that he came from Sing-A-Long. Quarrel ensued resulting to death of the wife after being shot on the head.

Issue: W/N guilty of parricide?

Held: Yes.

Appellant was the only person with his wife when she was shot in their room. Considering, that his defense was built on the theory that the shooting was purportedly accidental, appellant has the inescapable burden of proving the elements of the exempting circumstance of accident.

People v. Floro

October 7, 1999

Witness and victim were walking along a trail on a cassava plantation owned by accused, who suddenly appeared and shot the victim then striked the head several times with the gun.

Issue: W/N guilty of murder?

Held: Yes.

The killing in this case is murder qualified by treachery. The evidence shows that accused suddenly sprang from the cassava plants and shot the victim. The victim was unarmed and unsuspecting of any impending peril to his life and limb at the time he was shot by accused. The swift and unexpected attack by accused rendered the victim helpless.

The rule that treachery may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean it cannot be appreciated if the attack is frontally launched. The suddenness of the shooting without the slightest provocation from he victim who was unarmed and had no opportunity to defend himself, ineluctably qualified the crime with treachery.

People v. Ortiz

October 7, 1999

Accused threw stones on the roof of the victim’s house. After the victim hurled  challenge for the stone thrower to come out, the  four accused suddenly emerged from the dark. Victim was held by the arms and dragged towards the barangay hall. Accused fired their rifles on the ground to dissuade witnesses from coming to his aid. Later, bursts of gunfire were heard coming from the direction of the barangay hall. Lifeless body of the victim was later found near the barangay hall.

Issue: W/N guilty of murder? W/N there was conspiracy?

Held: Yes.

The only clear circumstance that qualifies the killing to murder in this case is the abuse of superior strength between the victim and his four aggressors, as well as the degree of force and the weapons used by the latter.

Conspiracy among the four assailants was proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The accused were together when two of them held the victim, while one was firing his rifle. All of them dragged the latter towards the barangay hall. To establish conspiracy, it is not necessary that there be proof of the previous agreement to commit the crime, it being enough that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. At the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it, each and everyone of the conspirators is criminally liable for the crime committed by anyone of them.

People v. Apelado

October 11, 1999

Victim Rodolfo de Jesus was overtaken by Jose Apelado and his group while walking in front of a house.  His line of way was cut. De Jesus asked him, “What is my fault to you?”  He raised his hands and prepared to fight. German hit his lower legs with a piece of wood. He fell down. The three surrounded him. German pulled out a knife and stabbed him at his legs and then at his throat. Apelado hacked him with a bolo using his left hand. De Jesus was hit twice – at the top of his head and nape. Robert thrust an ice pick at his back and side below the armpit. They then ran away and left him sprawled on the ground.

Held:

To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose. In this instance, the fact that the assailants followed, overtook, surrounded and took turns in inflicting injuries to the victim show a common purpose.

Abuse of superior strength also attended the commission of the crime. This circumstance is appreciated when the aggressors purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In the case at bar, the aggressors who were all armed first hit the legs of their unarmed victim which caused him to fall kneeling. This was followed by a stab above the knee. Having deprived him of his means to stand or run, they took turns in inflicting mortal wounds on him.

Neither treachery nor evident premeditation was present in the commission of the crime. Treachery is absent as the accused-appellants were not entirely risk free during their attack. As stated, the victim prepared to fight it out with the accused-appellants. Evident premeditation cannot be considered for lack of evidence that accused-appellants preconceived the crime.

People v. Renato

October 11, 1999

Victim Ludovico Romano and his wife Melecia were selling tuba in a makeshift hut, several meters away from the highway. Melecia sat on a bench, while Ludovico squatted on the ground, waiting for customers to arrive. Suddenly, a shot was fired. Melecia hid herself in an irrigation canal while Ludovico stood up and tried to find out where the shot came from. When another shot was fired, Melecia shouted for Ludovico to duck. Ludovico then stood an arm’s length away from the highway. It was too late, Melecia saw accused-appellant Ruben Ronato shoot Ludovico. Victim was rushed to the hospital and died two days later.

Issue: W/N there was treachery? Yes.

Held:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. There is treachery when the attack on the victim was made without giving the latter warning of any kind and thus rendering him unable to defend himself from an assailant’s unexpected attack. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. As testified to by Melecia, the victim was “squatting on the ground” in their makeshift hut when the shooting started. The victim stood up to find out what was happening. On the third time, accused-appellant shot him point blank and in a helpless position.

People v. Raganas

October 12, 1999

Accused entered the guardhouse of the Yasay Compound and the office beside it and forthwith proceeded to attack, assault, and stab one Mamerto Lucion, the security guard thereat, who died instantaneously from multiple stab wounds, after which the above-named accused destroyed, cut off, and disconnected the electrical and communication facilities therein such as the radio power supply unit and an intercom set and carried away one cassette recorder.

Issue: W/N accused are guilty of robbery with homicide?

Held: Yes.

In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All the foregoing requisites are here present. The testimonies of Daayata, Obsioma, and Baba pieced together reveal an unbroken chain of events that leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion that the appellant, is guilty of the crime charged.

People v. Lachica

October 12, 1999

Accused boarded the tricycle of Pascasio as his tricycle was running on the shoulder of the road, he heard somebody inside the tricycle cry out ‘aray’ and felt warm blood spurt from inside the sidecar of the tricycle landing at the back of his right palm. He then stopped the tricycle and accused brought out victim Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr. and started to stab him while others served as lookout.

Issue: W/N there was conspiracy? Yes.

W/N there was treachery? Yes.

Held:

Conspiracy – The act of Junuario dela Cruz of hiring a tricycle on the pretext of needing to throw something; their strategic seating positions inside the tricycle, depriving the deceased an opportunity to free himself; their respective acts of stabbing the deceased, and their washing the blood off the tricycle all evinced a unity of action and common design to kill the victim. It is not necessary that there be evidence of a previous plan or agreement to embark upon the assault. It is sufficient that their actions indicate a common intent such that the act of one is the act of all.

Treachery – The deceased had no inkling that he would be killed that fateful night. There was no force employed on him when he boarded the tricycle. Neither was there a heated argument with any of the culprits. In fact, they appeared to be in a jubilant mood even as they were singing “Tayo na sa Heaven”. Evidently, from all appearances the deceased was lured into going with the assailants who suddenly stabbed him inside the moving tricycle, giving the latter no opportunity to retaliate or defend himself from the means or method consciously adopted by the felons in taking his life. Qualifying circumstance of treachery suffices to qualify the offense to murder.

People v. Manegdeg

October 13, 1999

Accused was seen running through the rice fields towards the house of the victim. At about that time, Federico, his wife Lorie and son Ronel, were inside their house listening to the radio. Federico requested Ronel to switch to another radio station while he will go out to urinate and proceeded to the door. As Federico held the door frame with his hand, he was stabbed by appellant. Prior said incident, accused was requesting Federico’s consent to marry his daughter but to which he replied that is more honorable for his daughter to marry son of accused.

Issue: W/N there was treachery?

Held: Yes.

Circumstances surrounding the killing of the victim Federico Abian clearly indicate the presence of alevosia or treachery, for accused-appellant attacked the victim while he was about to exit his house to urinate, with no inkling whatsoever that he would be attacked. A sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the person of the one attacked, is the essence of treachery. Moreover, the trial court correctly considered the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Where the crime was committed in the place of abode of the victims, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling shall be appreciated against the accused.

People v. Gailo

October 13, 1999

Sotela and Mañale went to the store to drink beer. Some minutes later, they were joined in their drinking by Renato Gailo and his elder brother, Ronaldo Gailo, alias “Mukong”. A minor altercation ensued when Ronaldo boxed the victim, but the two were soon pacified and the group resumed their drinking. Ronaldo then invited Sotela and the victim to his house, where allegedly there was a birthday party.

On the way to the said party, Gailos assaulted the victim. Sotela witnessed Ronaldo stab the victim on the face with a bolo, then Renato stabbed the victim on the back, and Rudy hit the victim with a lead pipe on the neck. A minute later, three other accused arrived, and for five minutes, helped stone the victim, hitting him on the head and body.

Issue: W/N guilty of murder?

Held: Yes.

Said killing was qualified to murder by the use of superior strength, the accused having clearly overpowered the victim in terms of number and weapons used. We reverse, however, to the extent that it appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. There are two tests for nocturnity to be aggravating – the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense, and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender in order to facilitate the achievement of his objectives, prevent discovery or evade capture. In the instant case, there is no evidence that nighttime was sought for any of these purposes, or that it aided the accused in the consummation of the murder. Moreover, at the time of the killing, there was sufficient illumination from the moon such that the two eyewitnesses were able to identify the six accused. When the place of the crime is illuminated by light, nighttime is not aggravating.

Neither was treachery proven, as there was no showing that the attack was made swiftly and unexpectedly as to render the victim helpless and unable to defend himself. Neither can we appreciate the presence of evident premeditation, there having been no indication that accused-appellants earlier resolved to kill the victim and clung to such determination for a considerable length of time.

People v. Panique

October 13, 1999

Complainant, eldest child of the accused, was left to the care of latter when her mother went to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper. While complainant was asleep, accused laid himself on top of her. When she awoke, she found accused fondling her breasts even as he inserted his penis into her vagina. All she could do was cry, because she was afraid of her father whom she knew was hooked on drugs.

Issue: W/N there was rape?

Held: Yes.

In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father’s parental authority, which the Constitution the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the children’s duty to obey and observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughter’s will, thereby forcing he to do whatever he wants.

The minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender constitute a special qualifying circumstance which should be alleged in the information and proved to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. For this reason, said penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

People v. Langres

October 13, 1999

Sindo bothers attended a dance which ended about midnight. They proceeded to the house of their elder brother. They sat on a bench opposite said house while sharing light moments. Restituto greeted PO3 Langres when he came, who instead gave a fistblow on the former without provocation. Victim Teodorico intervened to ask what is his brother’s fault. Accused drew his gun and shot the victim at the forehead.

Issue: W/N there was self-defense?

Held: No.

The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. At best, the victim’s brother was discourteous to accused. Even then, such behavior could not be taken as an unlawful aggression to justify the shooting of the victim. The unlawful aggression contemplated under the law must come from the victim himself. Mere belief of an impending attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression. Neither is an intimidating or threatening attitude. Even a mere push or shove not followed by other acts placing in peril the life or personal safety of the accused is not unlawful aggression. It is noteworthy hat the Sindo brothers were unarmed. They were young men having a jovial, innocuous conversation when appellant passed by. Without such imminent threat on his life, the person invoking self-defense has nothing to repel.

People v. Clemente

October 13, 1999

Complainant was selling balut in front of Lanai beerhouse when she met accused. They had sexual intercourse in  friend’s house.

Issue: W/N there was rape?

Held: No.

In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim to be absolutely lacking. Testimony inexorably shows that complainant obviously consented to the sexual act which was done not only once but twice. Glaring too is the fact that by her own admissions that her mouth was not covered and that the accused was not holding or poking the pointed object at her while doing the sexual act, she certainly had every opportunity to make an outcry against the alleged rapist or shout for help had she wanted to.  No woman would meekly give in to a sexual intruder where her life is not in serious jeopardy.

People v. Bello

October 13, 1999

Accused allegedly raped his daughter in several occasions. His previous plea of not guilty was substituted to a plea of guilty before the date of his scheduled cross-examination. Later, accused moved for the reinstatement of his plea of not guilty but was denied by the trial court.

Held: Case remanded for proper arraignment.

A formal plea of not guilty should be properly entered if an accused admits the truth of some or all the allegations of the information, but interposes excuses or additional facts which, if duly established would exempt or relieve him in whole or in part of criminal responsibility.

People v. Aguinaldo

October 13, 1999

Accused allegedly raped his 17 year-old daughter.

Issue: W/N there was rape?

Held: No.

Complainant’s claim that she bled implies that there must have been laceration of her sex organ. When physical evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence, conclusions as to physical evidence must prevail. Physical evidence is that mute but eloquent manifestation of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.

People v. Agunos

October 13, 1999

Accused raped complainant while her husband was away serving as a poll watcher.

Issue: W/N there was rape?

Held: Yes.

Force and violence in rape cases need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. The record shows that amidst complainant’s pleas and struggles, accused pinned complainant’s hand behind her back, covered her mouth with his hand and pulled her underwear to her knee before spreading hr legs apart with such force that her undergarments were ripped. It appears that accused remained unfazed when complainant slapped him and struggled to point the beam of the flashlight at him not only to take a look at her assailant but apparently to deter him from consummating his bestial desires.

People v. Gaballo

October 13, 1999

Two construction workers heard a girl scream for a distance, then saw her being hugged and pulled by accused towards the ipil trees. When they reached the place, they saw the girl in school uniform lying face down. They also saw the accused sitting down, who immediately ran away. Unfortunatey, they were not able to apprehend the unidentified man.

Issue: W/N there was treachery?

Held: Yes.

Treachery is appreciated when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. We ruled that the killing of children, who by reason of their tender years cannot be expected to put up a defense, is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack is not precisely shown.

People v. Costelo

October 13, 1999

Accused Conde grabbed victim Remy by the neck, then stabbed her at the mouth and at the back. When Remy was able to escape from Conde, she ran towards Costelo, who pushed her towards Conde, who again squeezed Remy’s mouth and dragged her. Pablo, who suddenly appeared, sat on her chest and stabbed her more than fifteen times. Costelo held Remy on the shoulders in a stooping position while the latter was being stabbed by Pablo.

Issue: W/N there was treachery?

W/N there was conspiracy?

Held: Yes.

That the locus criminis was a heavily populated area where others could thus intervene is not significant at all. The essence of treachery is that the attack was deliberate and without warning. The defense or retaliation contemplated here must come from the victim, not from anyone else. Treachery was irrefutably indicated in the method by which the assailants waited for the victim to pass by before suddenly attacking her and preventing her escape. At any rate, no help was forthcoming because anyone inclined to lend assistance was intimidated.

Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In this case, conspiracy was shown because Conde grabbed and stabbed the victim while Costelo impeded her escape and shoved her towards Pablo, who in turn straddled her on the ground and stabbed her. Their prior act of waiting for the victim outside her house affirms the existence of conspiracy, for ti speaks of a common design and purpose.

People v. Celis

October 20, 1999

Complainant Racquel arrived from Manila at Magundanao and boarded the passenger jeep driven by accused appellants Roque and Carlos. Upon reaching the terminal, Racquel discovered that there was no more tricycle trip going to San Antonio. Accused invited Racquel to sleep in their house, who agreed after the initial hesitation because she is not familiar with the area. She was raped in several occasions, once in a makeshift hut and twice in a school building.

Issue: W/N there was a rape?

Held: Yes.

For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the appellant had in mind. When Racquel was dragged to the makeshift hut by Carlos, he told her to cooperate with him or she would be shot. These threats were enough to implant fear in the mind of the complainant, who was alone and helpless. Roque, in turn, managed to have sexual intercourse with complainant by flashing a knife in her face. Threatening the victim with a knife, a deadly weapon, is sufficient to cow the victim. It constitutes an element of rape.

People v. Motos

October 20, 1999

Accused invited 7 year-old Jenalyn and her younger sister in his room. Vicitim Jenalyn fell asleep beside her sister, who was playing with a doll. Jenalyn woke up after feeling pain and saw accused on top of her. She was asked to take a bath but was later rushed to the hospital by her parents due to her continuous bleeding.

Held:

Neither does the complaint allege, nor does the evidence introduced show, any qualifying circumstance in the commission of the offense that can make the offense fall within the category of rape punishable by death. The only penalty that can be properly decreed is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Tabion

October 20, 1999

Accused in several occasions, raped his 16- year old daughter while his wife is away. She could not resist the accused because she was afraid of him and of his threat to kill her and her family.

Issue: W/N there was rape?

Held: Yes.

In the incestuous rape of a minor, proof of force and violence exerted by the aggressor is not essential. The moral and physical ascendancy of the father over his daughter-victim is sufficient to cow her into submission to his bestial desires. Fear oftentimes overwhelms the victim. In the instant case, the appellant enhanced his physical supremacy over his daughter by holding the knife to her neck. In the face of such brutal intimidation, she knuckled under, thus enabling him to satisfy his incestuous lust.

The death penalty may be imposed only if the information has alleged and the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the victim.

People v. Maramara

October 20, 1999

A quarrel transpired between the friend of the accused and the victim in a benefit dance. Accused shot to death victim after a rumble occurred.

Issue: W/N accused is guilty of murder?

Held: No. Guilty of Homicide only

The use of a firearm is not sufficient indication of treachery. In the absence of any convincing proof that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the means by which he committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court must resolve doubt in favor of the accused. Accused cannot be held liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray because he joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonist before shooting the victim.

People v. Arizala

October 20, 1999

Accused stabbed to death Sgt. Cara.

Issue: W/N accused is guilty of murder? Yes.

W/N there was self-defense? Yes.

Held:

Even if deceased hurled incentives at him and moved as if to draw something from his waist, we are unable to establish a finding of unlawful aggression on the victim’s part. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. Though deceased was in uniform, the latter did not have a firearm or a holster for the same, and none was retrieved from the scene of the crime.

Deceased was killed with treachery. Not only was it not proven that there was provocation on the part of the hapless victim but the attack at the back of the victim was made in such a manner that would make it difficult for the deceased to offer an effective defense against his aggressor.

People v. Paranzo

October 26, 1999

Held:

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, states:

“Art. 335…When and how rape is committed…Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1……By using force or intimidation;

2……When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3……When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.”

Circumstances 1, 2 and 3 are alternative circumstances…When the rape is committed by using force or intimidation, the victim does not have to be less than twelve (12) years of age…It is only required that the proper complaint and information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstance which would make the carnal knowledge of a woman qualify as rape under Article 335. In addition, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.

People v. Garigadi

October 26, 1999

 

Defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced.  He contends that the testimony of the complainant was unsubstantiated, and contradictory.

Held:

The testimony of Gloridel was clear and convincing. Her declaration that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina was made in a straightforward and unshaken manner. Errorless and accurate to the last detail testimony cannot be expected of Gloridel, who was seven (7) years of age at the time of the trial. The alleged inconsistencies and lapses pointed by accused-appellant to discredit Gloridel’s testimony, e.g. that accused-appellant merely fondled her or inserted his finger in her vagina, are all minor and trivial details which do not touch upon the commission of the offense. These lapses, to THE court’s mind, serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of a witness because they erase any suspicion of coached or rehearsed testimony.  The Court noted that a child of tender age cannot be expected to understand every question asked of her in the course of examination. Ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the experience of testifying before a court.

People v. Lazaro

October 26, 1999

The accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. In his appeal the accused-appellant raises the sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide.

Held:

In cases involving illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866 “Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof and for Relevant Purposes”, as amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

Republic Act No. 8294 has since amended P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession and considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. The law now provides:

“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .45 and also lesser caliber firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Thus in People v. Molina, it was held: ”Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as separate offense.”

People v. Arquillos Tabuso

October 26, 1999

Arquillos Tabuso was found guilty of murder. In the service of his sentence, he is entitled to the provision of Article 29 [Period of Preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners xxx.] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Held:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement on the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In a number of cases, this Court ruled that similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-conspirator. Assumed intimacy between two persons of itself does not give that much significance to the existence of criminal conspiracy. Conspiracy certainly transcends companionship. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.

People v. Romano Manlapaz

October 26, 1999

Accused-appellant admits that he was a passenger of the jeep of the victim, Israel Lacson but denies that participated in the commission of the crime. He insists that when he boarded the jeep he sat himself at the back of the jeepney as there were already several passengers on board at that time. He argues that he was not clearly, convincingly and positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged. Prosecution witness allegedly did not have ample opportunity to see the faces of the alleged malefactors; and in fact did not actually see who fired the gun.

Held:

This Court has ruled on countless occasions that the trial court is in the best position to determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is in a unique position to observe the witnesses’ deportment while testifying which opportunity the appellate court is denied on appeal; this Court will respect the findings and conclusions of the trial court provided that they are supported by substantial evidence on record.

The crime of robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punishable under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the absence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty imposable in the present case is reclusion perpetua. [Article 63, Revised Penal Code.]

People v. William Batoon

October 26, 1999

At issue in this case is the credibility of the victim, Regina. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s candor is the single most important issue. This must be primarily resolved by the trial court because it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected the result of the case.  A painstaking review of the records of the case show that the appellant has failed to controvert the clear, candid, and straightforward testimony of the complainant.

People v. Rolando Espiritu

October 27, 1999

Forcible abduction, as defined and penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, is the taking of a woman against her will and with lewd designs, or of a girl below 12 years of age. When the accused forcibly took away the victim, for the purpose of raping her, as in fact he did rape her, lewd and unchaste designs existed since the commencement of the crime. Consequently, when accused raped Aharan, he committed the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible abduction with rape, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Armando de Labajan

October 27, 1999

It is well-settled that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution were actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credence.” “It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.

People v. Graciano Bolivar

October 28, 1999

Renato Balbon, Joel Soberano and Graciano Bolivar were found by the lower court to be conspirators in committing murder and frustrated murder against the victims Hugo Callao and Damaso Suelan.  The case against Bolivar was dismissed, since he died of cardio-respiratory arrest during the trial.  This is in line with the ruling in the case of People v. Bayotas, where the Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The evidence on record is likewise insufficient to convict Barrion as a principal by inducement.

Held:

Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code provides that principals are those who “directly force or induce others” to commit an offense. “One is induced to commit a crime either by a command (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. Where the circumstances of force, fear, price, promise or reward are not present, the question that may arise is whether the command given by a person to the author of the crime amounts to a criminal inducement. The inducement exists whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act whatever the source of such influence. Thus, the inciting words must have great dominance and influence over the person who acts; they ought to be direct and as efficacious, or powerful as physical or moral coercion or violence itself.

A conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, however, a conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact.

People v. Jeronico Lobino

October 28, 1999

Appellant was convicted for murdering his common-law wife.   He contends he would not stab her without any apparent reasons, and that he attacked her because he could no longer stand her going home late at night and her sarcastic remarks whenever her attention was called to what she was doing.  He contends he should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

Held:

The Court disagrees. The requisites of passion and obfuscation are:

1.   That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind;

2. That said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

It has been held that there is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.  The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense.

People v. Elpidio Hernando

October 28, 1999

Spouses Elpidio and Elena Hernando were convicted to reclusion perpetua for estafa.  On different dates, they issued checks to Johnny Sy which were dishonored upon presentment to the bank.  Accused spouses asserted that the checks had been issued merely an evidence of their indebtedness to the complainant.  In this case, all the checks that bounced were issued and drawn by Elpidio Hernando’s wife, Elena Aban Hernando…The checks, all payable to cash, were personally delivered and negotiated to Johnny Sy by Elpidio. Though he was not the drawer of the checks, accused Elpidio coaxed the complainant to exchange the checks with cash by guaranteeing that the checks were good checks and funded…In all the transactions, Elpidio was present and personally received the money…Though Elena was not present during the negotiation of the checks, except for the first transaction, she issued and signed the checks.

Held:

To constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud…The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check or that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property had there been no check issued to him…Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation.” In this kind of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.

Estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, has the following elements:..(1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.

People v. Romeo Tizon

October 28, 1999

The Rules of Court have set exacting standards to be strictly complied with by the trial court in the arraignment of an accused. Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, in part, provides:

“Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. – (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

“(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

“(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.

“x x x x x x x x x

“Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. – When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.”

These rules are mandatory, affording, such as they do, the proper understanding of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be so informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled against him so essential in aptly putting up his defense. The searching inquiry, which must be recorded , requires the court to make it indubitably certain that the accused is fully apprised of the consequences of his plea of guilt.

In sum, the searching inquiry under Section 3, Rule 116 must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) a complete comprehension of the legal effects of the plea, so that the plea of guilt is based on a free and informed judgment. So indispensable is this requirement that a plea of guilt to a capital offense can be held null and void where the trial court has inadequately discharged the duty of conducting the prescribed “searching inquiry.”

People v. Armando Sarabia

October 29, 1999

The appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense in the charge of murder against him.   Having invoked such circumstance, he is deemed to have admitted having killed the victim and the burden of proof shifts to him to establish and prove the elements of self-defense : (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

It has also been held by this Court that, “unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.” For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating and the appellant must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. Absent such unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense.

If evident premeditation is also proven, it shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. “The essential elements for evident premeditation to be appreciated are: (1) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the appellant clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of the act.

People v. Eduardo Altabano

October 29, 1999

The appellant raises in his defense an alibi.  Firmly settled is the doctrine “that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.” In the case under scrutiny, appellants failed to prove and demonstrate the physical impossibility of their being at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. Moreover, “defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the eyewitness who had no untoward motive to falsely testify.”

Conspiracy was correctly established in this case and as such, “all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all.”

In analyzing the facts, the Court also found that evident premeditation could not be appreciated against appellants. Although the defamatory words uttered by the victim against Corazon Caro-Lascano must have spawned the grudge of appellants towards the victim, the evidence for the prosecution has not established all the elements of evident premeditation, to wit: (1) the time the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

NOVEMBER 1999

People v. Moroy Gallo

November 16, 1999

Moroy Gallo was convicted by the trial court of murder.  He questions the testimony of the witness, Amelita Elarmo because of her relationship with the deceased.

Held:

The Supreme Court repeated the well-settled doctrine that mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not render her testimony less worthy of credit, especially where there is no showing of improper motive. The Court also upheld the claim of conspiracy.  To establish conspiracy it is not essential that there be previous agreement to commit the crime; it is sufficient that there be a common purpose and design, concerted action and concurrence of the interest and the minds of the parties meet understandingly so as to bring about a deliberate agreement to commit the offense charged, notwithstanding the absence of a formal agreement. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court’s appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.  The armed assailants used  their greater number and superior power to overwhelm the unarmed victim.

In addition, since the murder was committed prior to the effectivity of RA 7659, the applicable provision is Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The imposable penalty which has three periods, namely, minimum (reclusion temporal), medium (reclusion perpetua) and maximum (death), makes Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code applicable. In this case the prosecution was able to establish the qualifying aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength. In the absence of any other generic aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the medium period of the penalty pursuant to Art. 64 of the Penal Code. Scncä

People v. Rosalinda Ariola

November 16, 1999

Elvira Obana, with Rosalinda Ariola were convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, under Article 38 and 39 of the Labor Code.  The 6 accused presented themselves as part of the Manila Booking Agency, and offered jobs in New Guinea.  They promised employment upon the payment of recruitment fees.  The victims discovered that the office was not actually Manila Booking Agency, and the recruiters were unlicensed.

HELD:

The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when three (3) elements concur, namely: (a) The offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) The offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code.

ART. 13. Definitions. – x x x x (b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. or any of the prohibited acts enumerated in ART. 34. Prohibited practices. – It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority: (a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance; (b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment; (c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under this Code; (d) To induce or to attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him to another unless the transfer is designed to liberate the worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment; (e) To influence or to attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency; (f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines; (g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor or by his duly authorized representatives; (h) To fail to file reports on the status of employment, placement, vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor; (i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor; (j) To become an officer or member of the Board or any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency; and, (k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under this Code and its implementing rules and regulations.] of the same Code; and (c) The offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

People v. Rodrigo Lasola

November 17, 1999

This is a case for automatic review where Rodrigo Lasola was convicted of two counts of rape of an under-aged relative.

HELD:

The Court reiterated the principle that in cases of qualified rape of an under-aged relative, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of 1) sexual congress, 2) with a woman, 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and 5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. Well-settled too, is the doctrine that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to constitute the commission of the crime, and this rule applies with more vigor when the culprit is a close relative of the victim.  The judgement of the lower court was affirmed.

People v. Joel Pinca

November 17,1999

To properly appreciate the qualifying circumstance of treachery, two conditions must first concur: (1) the offender employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method or manner of execution was deliberately adopted. The essence of treachery is the deliberateness and the unexpectedness of the attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.

With respect to evident premeditation, there must be clear and convincing proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and the execution that allowed the criminal to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested, (2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority, and (3) the surrender was voluntary.  If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary.

Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.

People v. Rustico Rivera

November 17,1999

The case is a review by the Court of the issue of whether the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to an accused has been sufficiently overcome by the State enough to sustain the judgment of the trial court finding the indictee guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and thereby imposing upon him the death penalty.

Held:

The trial court has correctly imposed the death penalty in the case at bar after taking into account the qaulifying circumstances of minority of the victim and the paternity relationship between appellant and the victim, as provided for in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of rape has been established. Alphamia, the victim, is a minor (merely 10 years of age at the time of commission of the offense), and the offender is the father of the victim. These elements have been properly alleged in the information and proven during the trial.

People v. Mateo Balluda

November 19,1999

Appellant was convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 6425.  He contends that he was neither selling, delivering, nor transporting drugs at the time he was apprehended.

Held:

Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership, are owned by him.  In U.S. vs. Bandoc, the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on the possessor of the dangerous drug to explain absence ofanimus possidendi. In the case under consideration, it is not disputed that appellant was apprehended while carrying a sack containing marijuana. Consequently, to warrant his acquittal, he must show that his act was innocent and done without intent to possess, i.e. without knowledge that what he possessed was a prohibited drug.

The legality of the warrantless search and arrest in the case under scrutiny is also beyond question. It bears stressing that appellant was caught transporting a prohibited drug inflagrante delicto. Consequently, a peace officer or any private person, for that matter, may, without warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; and the person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Hence, the warrantless search in this case, being an incident to a lawful arrest, is in itself lawful.

People v. Pascua Galladan

November 19,1999

The accused in this case is invoking alibi as a defense. Significantly, the alibi of accused-appellant cannot prosper. For alibi to be validly invoked, not only must he prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must also satisfactorily establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of commission. In the instant case, accused-appellant only attempted to prove that he was at a different place when Sgt. Galladan was gunned down. He did not even attempt to establish that it was impossible for him to be at the locus criminis when the offense was committed. For this fact alone, his alibi must fail.

People v. Mario Basco

November 19, 1999

Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. “For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.”

People v. Emberga

G.R. 116616 Nov. 26,  1999

The victim supposedly attacked the Emberga brothers with a knife.  The accused then threw rocks at the victim causing the latter to drop his knife.  The accused then grabbed the knife and stabbed the victim 25 times.  They were then charged with murder aggravated by treachery & cruelty.  Accused plead defense of a relative and self defense.

Held:

Both were guilty of homicide only.  Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proven which was not done here.  As for the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, such is unavailing.  The mere fact that the wounds were in excess of what was indispensably necessary does not imply cruelty.

Self defense and defense of a relative may not be availed of.  The alleged unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was not proven by clear & convincing evidence.  Assuming there was an attack, the means used to repel the attack were not reasonably necessary since the victim already dropped the knife after the accused threw rocks and could no longer threaten the accused.

People v. Suba

November 29, 1999

The accused raped his niece twice.  He was caught in the act by the victim’s brother on the second time and was reported to the police.  Charged with rape, he denied the charge against him.  No sperm was found in the victim’s vagina.

Held:

Guilty.  Trial courts assessment as to the credibility of witnesses is to be accorded great weight.  Both the victim and her brother positively identified the accused as the rapist.

The absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of rape.  There may be a valid explanation for such absence, as when the sperm was washed away or the accused failed to ejaculate.

People v. Paraiso

November 29,  1999

Accused, with 1 John Doe, Forced their way into the house of the victim.  The victim’s 4 children were herded into 1 room while the accused ransacked the house for cash and other valuables.  Before leaving, the accused stabbed the victim who died.  He was charged of robbery with homicide aggravated by dwelling, superior strength and disregard of sex.  Accused raised the defense of alibi.

Held:

Guilty.  The defense of alibi is no good when the witnesses have positively identified the accused.  The fact that the witnesses did not identify him immediately to the police is not a defense either.  There is no standard behavior for persons confronted with a shocking incident. One may either report the crime immediately or after a long lapse of time.

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling is appreciated since robbery may be committed without trespassing the sanctity of the home.  He who goes to another’s house to hurt or do wrong is guiltier than he who offends elsewhere.

Superior strength is also present since there was a notorious inequality between the accused who were both armed males and the unarmed female victim.

Disregard of sex is not an aggravating circumstance here since it only applies to crimes against honor and persons.

People v. Capco, Agpoon, et. al.

November 29, 1999

The accused were charged with robbery with homicide and physical injuries for robbing one Alberto S. Flores of P30,000.00 in cash and, on the occasion thereof, shot him to death as well as inflicted physical injuries on his son Bolivar J. Flores. All 4 accused were found guilty.

Held:

Accused Agpoon should be acquitted for failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime.

Well-settled is the rule that for evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible itself.   Agpoon was implicated on the sole testimony of Bolivar who contradicted himself in Court. Besides, Agpoon’s 3 co-accused also retracted their statements that Agpoon was with them went they barged into the store of the victims.  Supposedly,  Agpoon loitered outside the store after the crime was committed.  The Court state that it is contrary to human experience for a criminal to choose to remain at the crime scene within a considerable period of time when he could see his companions escape.

People v. Ocumen

GR 120493-94 & 117692

Ocumen was accused of murder & frustrated murder.  He was at a wedding party & argued with 2 guests.  He pulled out a knife and chased the 2 but went amok and stabbed 2 other people instead. One man died while his other victim, a 14-yr. old girl, lived.

Held:

Guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide only.  There was no treachery here.  The fact that both victims were unarmed does not amount to treachery.  An altercation precedes both incidents.

But, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength must be considered since his 2nd victim was an unarmed 14-yr. old, 4’11” girl.

People v. Barellano

November 29, 1999

The victim was drinking tuba with friends when the accused walked up to the victim from behind and shot him in the head.  The victim fell to the ground and was shot again in the head.  Charged with murder,  the accused raised the defense of alibi.

Held:

Guilty.  The accused was positively identified by witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime.  Treachery was present since the victim was approached from behind,  was unarmed and totally defenseless.

DECEMBER 1999

People v.  Perez

December 2, 1999

Perez was a boarder who raped the 5-year-old niece of the boarding house’s owner. It was done in the bodega of the house. A medical exam showed no lacerations but showed a reddening of the victim’s labia majora, which corroborated the victim’s testimony that she was raped.  Accused denied the whole thing citing inconsistencies in the victim’s testimonies in court and that the victim’s mother put her child up to lying because of a grudge against the accused.

Held:

Guilty.  For rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Even the slightest penetration of the lips of the sex organ constitutes carnal knowledge.

Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies between a witness’ affidavit and testimony do not impair his credibility but even enhance the truthfulness of his declarations as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Plus, it is a settled rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit.  It is inconceivable that the naïve and innocent 5-yr. old victim could make up a story of sexual molestation.

It is also unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.

People v. Santiago

December 2, 1999

The victim was asleep with her child when she woke up after hearing a noise in the house.  She went downstairs thinking it was her husband but it was actually the accused that entered the victim’s house with a scythe.  The accused ordered the victim to remove her clothing & underwear.  The victim refused so she was threatened with her and her child’s death.  The accused raped the victim and threatened her again with death if she told anyone about the incident.  Charged with rape, the accused gave the defense of alibi and the fact that there was no presence of sperm in the victim.

Held:

Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, alibi will not hold water.  The victim also positively identified the accused and it is settled that the negative presence of sperm is immaterial in the crime of rape. Penetration and not emission is the important consideration.

People v. Tumaru

December 2,  1999

The accused shot and killed a municipal councilor and OIC in Kalinga Apayao. The prosecution was based on 12-yr. old Miguel’s testimony as he saw the crime occur. Found guilty of murder, they appealed saying that the judge erred in not holding witness Miguel’s testimony as biased and imputing motive to the accused without any evidence.

Held:   

Proof of motive is not crucial where the identity of the accused has been amply established.

Witness Miguel’s testimony was sufficient to convict the accused.  The testimony of minors of tender age will suffice to convict a person of a crime as long as it is credible.  The fact that Miguel eventually stayed with one of the victim’s widows does not prove bias.  It is but natural for the bereaved family to be concerned about the safety of the lone witness.  The concern for the victim does not make him biased or unreliable.

People v. Magbanua

December 2, 1999

The victim was sexually abused continuously from the time she was13 years old until she got pregnant after 4 years of sexual abuse by appellant, her own father. The sexual assaults usually took place at noontime when she was left alone with appellant while her mother went to town to buy their basic needs and while her brother and sisters were at the house of their grandmother which was far from their house.

She did not report the rape incidents to her mother because appellant threatened to kill her. When her mother noticed her pregnancy and asked her about the supposed father, she did not tell her that it was appellant who authored her pregnancy. Instead, as suggested by appellant, she named one Ricky Pacaul as the one who impregnated her. However, later on, she claimed that she does not know any person by that name.  And only later on when she moved to live with her aunt did she tell the truth about the crime.

Held:

Denial, just like alibi, is insufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the witness for the prosecution. Denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the credible testimony of the witness that the accused committed the crime charged.  It must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to merit acceptability. Appellant, in the present case, failed to discharge this burden. His lame attempt to shift the blame to a certain Ricky Pacaul, who may not even exist, in order to exculpate himself, cannot save him. Moreover, where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

People v. de Leon

December 3, 1999

Accused was charged with raping his 9 year old daughter 17 times.  He denied the charge and his defense was that the charge was filed because his daughter was jealous of her father’s affection for another sibling.  He was convicted for all 17 charges of rape.

Held:

He was found guilty of only one count of rape. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of the 16 other rapes charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The victim’s testimony was overly generalized and lacked specific details on how each of the alleged 16 rapes was committed. Her bare statement that she was raped so many times on certain weeks is clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant insofar as the other sixteen rapes charged are concerned.

People v. Juachon

December 6, 1999

Juachon was a tricycle driver who was charged with Rape with Murder.  The accused was a suitor of the victim.  Witnesses saw the victim ride the accused’s tricycle and also saw a tricycle similar to that owned by the accused at the place where the victim was found.  Juachon’s slippers were also found there and he was heard to have told the victim the night before, “ang sarap mong halikan”.  He raised the defense of denial and alibi.

Held:

Settled is the rule that the real nature of the crime charged is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, such being conclusions of law, but by the actual recitation of facts alleged in the Complaint or Information.

The facts recited in the Information constitute the crime of Rape with Homicide. The elements of said crime are clearly spelled out in the Information, particularly the sexual intercourse against the will of the victim, perpetrated with violence and force and the killing of said victim on occasion of the rape by immersing her in muddy water.

Denial and alibi cannot overcome the amount of circumstantial evidence against the accused showing his carnal desire for the victim and his presence at the scene of the crime.

People v. Nablo

December 6, 1999

The victim had just come from the barrio fiesta mass when the 5 accused, armed with bladed weapons, attacked and killed the victim.  The accused were convicted solely on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses

Held:

Well-settled is the rule that on the issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings by the trial court, which was decisively in a better position to rate the credibility of witnesses after hearing them and observing their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. This doctrine stands absent any showing that certain facts and circumstances of weight and value have been overlooked, misinterpreted or misapplied by the lower court which, if considered, would affect the result or outcome of the case.

The absence of a dying declaration is also unnecessary to convict the accused. The evidence on record suffices to support the judgment of conviction under scrutiny. Neither is proof of motive crucial since the identity of appellants has been established by eyewitnesses.

People v. Ladrillo

December 8, 1999

Facts:

The accused asked the 8 year old victim to come to his house to pick lice from his head.  But then after,  he stripped naked and stripped the victim of his clothes and raped her 4 times during that one day.  He raised the defenses of denial and alibi and questioned the sufficiency of the information since it states that the crime was committed “on or about 1992″.

Held:

ACQUITTED of rape based on insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. Denial and alibi may be weak but courts should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no other defenses but denial and alibi which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak. The crime was supposedly narrated by the victim 2 yrs. after.  The crime was alleged to have been perpetrated at the accused’s residence when the accused was not even living in Abanico at that time.  The victim’s narration of the incident was also not credible

People v. Sevilla

December 8, 1999

The accused raped his 14 yr. old daughter.  He started making sexual advances when she was 6 and finally had sexual intercourse with her 8 yrs. later.  Appellant questions the credibility of the victim’s testimony since it took 8 yrs. before she complained of his acts.

Held:

Guilty.   The Court is not persuaded by accused-appellant’s submission. As held by this Court in People v. Miranda, there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one has just been confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience as heinous as the crime of rape and not every victim to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectation of mankind.

The fact that Myra did not complain to her mother or her aunts about the sexual abuses committed by her father against her for eight long years, is of no moment. Myra, who was of a very tender age when the horrible events in her life began to unfold, could have, in all probability, been confused and bewildered by her experience that for more than half of her young life, she was shocked into utter insensibility.

Furthermore, a rape victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a

close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.

People v. Feliciano

December 8, 1999

Feliciano was charged with highway robbery and robbery with homicide.  He was beaten at the police station and was forced to sign a statement that he was responsible for several hold-ups in the area including the one where the victim was killed.  He was examined without counsel by police and even when counsel was given to him, the lawyer did not advise him of the implications of his testimony.

Held:

Acquitted for lack of evidence.  His testimonies were inadmissible.  The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused. He was questioned before his counsel de officio arrived and even when his counsel was present, his lawyer did not explain to accused-appellant the consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.

We also find that Atty. Chavez’s independence as counsel is suspect — he is regularly engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services.

People v. Ralph Velez Diaz

December 8, 1999

Diaz was convicted of killing and sexually abusing a 12 year old boy.  The trial court convicted him notwithstanding the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant and the absence of any eyewitness to the crime because of:

(a)  the testimony of 10-year old Felbart that he saw his brother last alive in the company of accused-appellant;

(b)  the physical evidence of sexual abuse through sodomy committed against the victim;

(c)  the plea of insanity which only tended to negate liability but was an admission of guilt;

(d)  the reenactment of the crime by accused-appellant the details of which could not have been known to anybody but himself; and,

(e)  the fact that accused-appellant voluntarily confessed to the crime without any evidence of coercion, duress or intimidation exerted upon him.

Accused pleads he is not guilty of murder since there was no evident premeditation.  He pleads insanity and  pleads that he cannot be sentenced to death since the information filed didn’t mention the sodomy.

Held:   

The crime committed by accused-appellant was murder even in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because treachery and abuse of superior strength were present – either of which qualified the crime to murder.  Since the victim was an 11 yr old boy,  both were present although treachery absorbs superior strength.

Insanity must be proved.  All that was proved by the psychiatrists was that accused was sexually perverted or that he was sick of pedophilia but such is different.

But, he may not be sentenced to death.  A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the Information charged him only with murder qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation. It failed to mention the commission of sexual abuse or “sodomy” on the victim. The Information designated the crime as “murder in relation to RA 7610,” but as a rule, what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint or information.

People v. Alberto Flores and Rodolfo Flores

December 8, 1999

The Flores brothers were convicted of murder on the testimony of the victim’s wife.  The wife says she saw the accused enter the victim’s home and one brother stabbed the victim while the other strangled him.  But right after the crime was committed, she said she saw nothing.

Held:

Jurisprudence forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies are present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and her testimonial declarations with respect to one’s participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account.  In the case at bar, it is difficult to reconcile the inconsistencies made by Marissa in her sworn statement and testimony in court. It is even more difficult to accept her explanation in committing these inconsistencies.

People v. Loreto Ringor, Jr.

December 9, 1999

Appellant Ringor and his two companions entered a restaurant where the accused worked. After seating themselves, the group ordered a bottle of gin. Appellant approached one of the tables where Florida, the restaurant’s cook was drinking beer. Without any warning, appellant pulled Florida’s hair and poked a knife on the latter’s throat. Florida stood up and pleaded with appellant not to harm him Appellant relented and released his grip on Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant together with his companions. However, a few minutes later he was back Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly entered the restaurant. Not encountering any resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen where Florida worked. Stealthily approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired six successive shots at Florida who fell down. Ringor left thereafter.  He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.

Held:     

On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of “use of unlicensed firearm” in the commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in appreciating the same to qualify to death the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted that at the time accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of a firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder.  Sentenced to reclusion perpetua instead.

People v. Rolando Alfanta

December 9, 1999

Accused entered the place where the victim was sleeping with a bolo.  He brought her to an abandoned place where he raped her, inserting his fingers and penis into her vagina and anus.  He was sentenced to death because of the aggravating circumstances of use of a deadly weapon, night time and ignominy.

Held:

The use of a deadly weapon was not alleged in the information, hence the offense cannot be considered as qualified rape.  Night time and ignominy were present (sa pwet ba naman).

Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in “all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.”

People v. Rondero

December 9, 1999

The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well.  The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm.  He was convicted of homicide only.

Held:

Guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.  The absence of sperm does not negate the commission of rape since the mere touching of the pudenda by the male organ is already considered as consummated rape. The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on her person. Contusions were found on Mylene’s face, arms and thighs.  Hence, death is the appropriate penalty.

People v. Jaime Quisay

December 10, 1999

A 3-year-old girl was found dead in a canal.  Accused was the last person seen with the little girl.  He was charged with rape with homicide.  He put forth the defense that he was with the girl but she ran away and fell into the canal as an exempting circumstance (“Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.”Par. 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code).

Held:

Guilty.  The physical evidence failed to support the version of accused-appellant that the victim Ainness Montenegro fell accidentally into the canal. The victim had bruises only on the sex organ,  sides of the neck, etc.

The fact that no perineal laceration was found on the genital of the victim does not dispel a finding of rape. The slightest degree of penetration of the pudenda by a male sex organ suffices to consummate the crime of rape. Jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of the hymen is not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustain a laceration, especially when the victim is a young girl.

The crime subject matter of the instant appeal was committed before the death penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 became effective so the penalty for the complex crime of rape with homicide should only be reclusion perpetua.

People v. Edgardo de Leon

December 10, 1999

Accused supposedly raped his daughter in front of the latter’s own 2 year old daughter.  Accused flatly denied the charge. He alleged that the prosecution evidence had not proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because: (1) the evidence for the prosecution which consisted of the victim’s sole testimony is insufficient; (2) this testimony is inconsistent; and (3) the other pieces of vital evidence, i.e., the knife and the victim’s torn clothes, were not presented to substantiate the victim’s testimony.

Held:

The sole testimony of the victim sufficiently establishes the guilt of accused-appellant. Amelia de Leon testified naturally, spontaneously and positively.

Accused-appellant’s claim that the charge against him was merely trumped up by Amelia cannot be believed. No woman, especially a daughter, would subject herself and her family to the humiliation of a public trial and send her father to jail for the rest of his life if her accusation were not true. Since the rape was committed with the use of a knife, a deadly weapon, the crime is therefore punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

People v. Arnold Dizon

December 10, 1999

Accused supposedly entered the victims’ house,  robbed them, raped one of the occupants and stabbed all of them. Only 12 yr. Old Ruel survived the massacre of his family and positively identified the accused as the perpetrator. Death was imposed upon accused after the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide aggravated by Rape, Dwelling and Nocturnity.  Accused pleaded not guilty.

Held:

Guilty of 1 count of rape with homicide, 2 counts of homicide and 1 count of frustrated homicide.

The trial court erred in finding accused guilty of robbery. For a person to be guilty of robbery, it must be proved that there was intent to gain & the taking of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or by using force upon anything.

In his testimony, Ruel only testified that he saw accused opening their closets and throwing things on the floor. Not that accused took something from the house.

On the other hand, this Court agrees with the trial court that rape was satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Ruel’s testimony positively identifying the accused was enough to convict.

People v. Agapito Flores

December 13, 1999

Accused, at knife point, forced his 13 year old daughter to undress and then raped her. All the time and while the accused-appellant was on top of her the knife was poked at her.   Victim also testified her father had raped her 4 times when she was in grade 4.  Accused denied the charges as fabricated. Appellant cites the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and further contends that the medical findings reveal that the healed lacerations in the victim’s hymen were already existing prior to the alleged date of rape, in which case there is no evidence to prove that appellant raped Ma. Cristina on November 8, 1994.  Sentenced to death.

Held:

Guilty but reclusion perpetua only. It is unthinkable for a daughter to falsely impute the crime of rape against her own father if it was not real.  The supposed inconsistencies in the victim’s testimonies refer only to minor details and collateral matters which do not really affect either the substance of her declaration, and its veracity.

But, the information only alleged the minority of Ma. Cristina that she was thirteen years old but did not allege the relationship of the accused to the victim. The seven (7) modes of committing rape introduced under RA 7659 which warrant automatic imposition of death penalty partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape only on which he was arraigned, and be convicted of qualified rape punishable by death. Thus, accused-appellant should only suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Fernando Calang Macosta

December 14, 1999

Accused invited herein complainant to catch shrimps at the side of the MagpayangRiver.The victim acceded but when they were at an uninhabited place,  the accused kissed and touched the victim. He tried to insert his penis but once the penis was in the mouth of her vagina she felt pain so she pleaded for his mercy not to deflower her and she continued crying and pushed him hard until she was able to be free.  Charged with rape,  accused denied the incident and said that he and the victim were even sweet hearts.

Held:

Guilty.  Being sweethearts does not prove consent by complainant to the sexual act. And,  it is perplexing how accused could vigorously deny that the alleged incident ever took place and in the same breath argue that if anything untoward happened it was because they were sweethearts.

It is also well-settled that for a conviction of rape, medical findings of injuries in the victim’s genitalia are not essential. Even the slightest touching of the female genitalia, or mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge. The Court has also ruled that a medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction of rape is proper.

People v. Renato RamonAMON

December 15, 1999

Accused first raped his stepdaughter at knife point when she was 5 yrs. old. Because of  Analyn’s tender age, the rape resulted in the dislocation of her legs and pelvic bones which caused her to become temporarily lame. That same night, Analyn reported the incident to her mother in the presence of appellant. Analyn’s mother refused to believe her. Neither was she brought to the hospital for treatment.

She was raped 2 more times and only told her grandmother of the crime after accused tried to rape her a 4th time.  She didn’t tell her mother about the incidents since the latter refused to believe her anyway.  Accused denied the charges.

Held:

Guilty but sentenced to reclusion perpetua only. The averment that Analyn could have run away when accused-appellant started removing her panties hardly deserves consideration. Different people, previous cases can tell us, react differently to given situations. Most women might, when given the chance, immediately flee from their aggressors but others may become virtually catatonic because of mental shock

But while the law holds that the death penalty shall be imposed if, among other instances, the crime of rape is committed against a victim under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is her step-parent, the information, however, has failed to allege any relationship between accused-appellant and his victim.

People v. Cabalida

December 15, 1999

Accused raped his then 15 yr. old grandniece at gunpoint and threatened her with death if she told on him.  The victim became pregnant and only then did she tell her mother about the crime.

Held:

Acquitted for failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt.  The victim supposedly told nobody of the crime since she feared for her life.  But accused had left for Manila already for several months and the victim supposedly only told her mother when it was obvious she was pregnant.  Second,  victim’s motive for accusing appellant is only so that her stepfather will not be suspected of being the father of the child. Finally. accused returned to Zamboanga City to clear his name. This is a strong indication of innocence.

People v. Lyndon Sanez

December 15, 1999

Victim was found in a canal with hack wounds in his nape and near death.  He gave a dying declaration naming his own son, the accused, as the assailant.  An eyewitness also saw the accused dragging a body across the road and dumping it into the canal where the victim was found.  He was found guilty of parricide.

Held:

Guilty. Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt. The consistent rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if: a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites, not to mention the dying declaration of the deceased victim himself, are extant in the instant case.

People v. Augusto Tanzon

December 15, 1999

Victim was walking with his common law wife when he was invited for drinks by the accused.  Victim refused.  When the wife turned around, she saw the accused shoot her husband with a sumpak twice.  On the ground, he was kicked by accused and 4 of his friends and then shot again by the accused with a short gun.  Accused also shot at thee wife who was able to flee.  An eyewitness corroborated the wife’s version of the events. He was found guilty of murder.

Held:

Gulilty. The rule is settled that in the absence of any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued as to impeach the findings of the trial court, the appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court’s findings on the credibility of the witnesses or set aside its judgment considering that it is in a better position to decide the question having heard the witnesses themselves during trial.

Also, the non-presentation by the prosecution of the items which the accused is charged of having armed himself with in attacking, assaulting, stoning and stabbing the victim is not fatal where the accused has been positively identified

People v. Nicasio Enoja

December 17, 1999

The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the “New People’s Army” (NPA). A day before the incident, the house of Romulo Enoja, brother of the Enojas, was allegedly sprayed with bullets by the NPA, killing Romulo’s daughter and son. Before that, the house of Catelina Enoja, mother of the Enojas, at Barangay Caraudan, was allegedly burned by the NPA.

The victim was walking home with his wife when the accused blocked the couple and took terms shooting the victim.

Held:

Appellants assail the trial court’s finding of conspiracy by pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Salamanca and Paterna. The two testimonies constitute cumulative evidence on who participated in the shooting of Siegfred. Both witnesses pointed to all five accused-appellants.  Accused were positively identified by the witnesses and their testimony is sufficient to convict the accused.

People v. Abordo, et. al.

December 17, 1999

The 4 accused took the victim to an uninhabited area near a creek and hit the victim with stones and pieces of wood.  The victim died before arriving at the hospital.  A witness saw the incident and positively identified the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.  Accused put up the defense of alibi and that the witness is not reliable.

Held:

All guilty.  Although  appellant merely held the victim while the other hit the latter,  he is still guilty as a co-principal because of conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all.

Appellants contend that the trial court convicted them on the basis of the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Hermogenes Pan, which is allegedly not worthy of belief. Appellants allege that it was highly impossible for Pan to have witnessed the alleged commission of the crime as he was drinking all the time that afternoon until the time that he was informed of the victim’s death.

Where there is no concrete evidence to indicate that the witness against the accused has been actuated by any improper motive, and absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the testimony given is ordinarily accorded full faith and credit. Hence, eyewitness Pan’s straightforward testimony against the appellants was rightly accorded credence. The absence of sufficiently convincing evidence as to ill motives actuating the principal witness of the prosecution strongly tents to sustain the finding that no improper motive existed and, thus, his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

People v. Gilbert Dorimon

December 17, 1999

At the time of the incident. appellant was an eighteen (18) year-old senior high school student at the Salug National High School of Salug, Zamboanga del Norte. Found in his possession was a 22 cal. paltik, that he allegedly used to threaten a classmate who had defeated him in a basketball game at school.  One of his classmates went to the police who frisked Dorimon and found the gun.  Dorimon said he merely found the gun at the back of the school.  The RTC found him guilty of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Held:

Acquitted due to insufficient evidence.  In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, the requisite elements are: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have he corresponding license or permit to possess.  While the information alleged that the appellant did not possess any license or permit to carry, such fact was not established during trial. The only reference to the non-possession of a license or permit of the appellant was when the trial judge propounded clarificatory questions to the officers who accosted appellant and nothing else.

People v. Merino

December 17, 1999

The 2 accused, with 4 John Does,   entered the home of Ernesto Pagadian,  robbed him and raped his 2 minor daughters, aged 15 and 16.  One year later,  one of the victims saw one of the accused at a market and reported such to the NBI who subsequently arrested him and his co-accused.

Held:

Guilty. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witness is generally accorded great respect.  Both accused were positively identified by the private complainants. There was no hesitation on their part to point to the accused as the culprits.

Both are guilty of rape since although it was only Siervo who raped the 2 girls,  Merino did nothing to stop it. There was conspiracy because both of them acted as one in their greed and lust. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Nocturnity, to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, must have purposely been sought to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent recognition of the perpetrator.

People v. Santocildes, Jr.

December 21, 1999

Appellant was charged with and found guilty of the crime of rape  of a girl less than nine (9) years old. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty under the advice of a certain Ompong.  Appellant later changed lawyers after he found out that Ompong was not a member of the bar.

Held:

Judgement set aside and case remanded for new trial.  Being represented by a non-lawyer is a denial of due process.

People v. Moreno

December 21, 1999

According to the prosecution, accused entered the secluded house of his 14 year old cousin who was alone in the house.  He held a bolo to her body and succeeded in raping her.  She said nothing until her mother noticed her swelling belly and it was determined that she was pregnant.   Accused put up the defense of denial and alibi.

Held:

Acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. While the version of the defense is not entirely satisfactory, as in any criminal prosecution, conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. The State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.  Force and intimidation not proven. Supposed victim’s actuations before and during the alleged sexual assault did not show the kind of resistance expected of a young woman defending her virtue and honor. A much more vigorous opposition to the assault on her virtue is only to be expected of an inexperienced victim on the threshold of womanhood.

JANUARY 2000

People v. Vicente Valla

January 24, 2000

On appeal is the Quezon RTC’s decisions dated March 29, 1993 convicting Valla of the crime of rape with homicide. Pines, a twelve-year old girl, was passing by a ricefield near the road  when she heard a voice coming from the direction of the forested area. They finally found Dyesebel. Her body was found near the river with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied. Allarey and his companions immediately confronted appellant who, out of remorse, admitted that he raped and killed.  The trial court found Valla guilty of the crime of “rape with homicide.” Hence, the present appeal.

Held: 

More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.

The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in exchange for his crime may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res gestae means “things done.” There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae:

(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim;

(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was found; and

(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim, and even “offered” his daughter in exchange for the victim.

As to the crime committed, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the special complex crime of “rape with homicide,” and not “rape with murder” as designated in the Information, since “homicide” is herein taken in its generic sense.  The aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Article 14, No. 17 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated considering that the medico-legal officer testified that the pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted cigarette.

 

People v. Rudy Cortes

January 24, 2000

Before the Court for automatic review is the Decision of the Masbate RTC convicting the accused-appellant, Rudy Cortes y Caballero, of the crime of rape committed against Analiza Germina y Banculo, sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

Held:

Time-honored is the rule that alibi is inherently weak and easily contrived.  Accused-appellant must therefore prove with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place and approximate time of commission of the felony,  which quantum of proof he failed to come forward with.

In a long line of rape cases, the Court has consistently held that lust is no respecter of time and place, and rape can be and has been committed in even the unlikeliest of places. Venues of rape have been inside a house where there were other occupants, in a room adjacent to where the victim’s family members were sleeping or even in a room which the victim shares with the sister of the offender. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.    Neither does the Court find convincing the claim of delay on the part of the victim in reporting the sexual assault against her. This Court has consistently held that delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim.

 

People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda

January 24, 2000

This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence. It was howevere found that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.

Held: 

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.  Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

People v. Leon Lumilan

January 25, 2000

Accused-appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia were found by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of murder, two (2) counts of frustrated murder, and three (3) counts of attempted murder, under an Information charging them and accused Fred Orbisowith the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866.

Issue:

Whether or not appellants may be properly convicted of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder under an Information that charges them with qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder in violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866?

Held: 

At the time the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction in September 1990, it had already been six (6) months since We held in People v. Tac-an that the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition, whether or not homicide or murder resulted from its use, on one hand, and murder or homicide, on the other, are offenses different and separate from and independent of, each other.  While the former is punished under a special law, the latter is penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other, and double jeopardy will not lie.

Under Sec. 7 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, double jeopardy lies when after the accused has pleaded to the first offense charged in a valid complaint or information and he is subsequently convicted or acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, he is prosecuted for a second offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any other offense, which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. It cannot be said that murder or homicide necessarily includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide. To state otherwise is to contradict Tac-an and its progeny of cases where We categorically ruled out the application of double jeopardy in the simultaneous prosecution for murder or homicide and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide against same accused involving the same fatal act.

Sec. 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an offense other than that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was both established by evidence and is included in the offense charged in the Information. Since murder or homicide neither includes or is necessarily included in qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, the trial court may not validly convict an accused for the former crime under an Information charging the latter offense. Conversely, an accused charged in the Information with homicide or murder may not be convicted of qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide, for the latter is not included in the former.

We observe that the Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, violates Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, which obliterated the now obsolete concept of qualified illegal possession of firearms or illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form, i.e., where the penalty for illegal possession is increased to reclusion perpetua or death by the attendance of homicide or murder. In fact, qualified illegal possession of firearms, which used to be a distinct offense, no longer exists in our statute books.

 

People v. Esteban Arlee

January 25, 2000

Complainant Analyn Villanueva and the accused “Boy Ising” were.  Analyn, who merely finished grade two, was 26 years old but with a mental capacity of a eight-year old child. Boy Ising raped Analyn by poking a knife to her side.  As months passed, Analyn’s belly started to swell and when asked about her bulging stomach, Analyn readily confessed to her mother that Boy Ising was responsible therefor. Analyn then narrated her horrific experience in the hands of accused-appellant. The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimony of the victim, Analyn.

Held: 

In this appeal, the accused contends that the subpoenas directing submission of counter-affidavits for purposes of preliminary investigation, were not received by him since the same were sent to his former residence at A. Del Rosario Street and not to Dalahican Street where he moved to. Accused-appellant therefore, maintains that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. In Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, this Court reiterated the rule that the New Rules on Criminal Procedure “does not require as condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings (in the preliminary investigation) the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence for the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics.”

Being a mentally retarded woman, twenty-six years of age, Analyn is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious when she was raped by accused-appellant. Proof of force and intimidation is not required if the victim is “deprived of reason” or suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency since the same deprives the victim of the natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. It is well-settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape.

Neither is the Court persuaded by accused-appellant’s submission that he cannot be required to acknowledge and support the child begotten by him with Analyn. In point is the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. – Persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced:

1. To indemnify the offended woman;

2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing;

3. In every case to support the offspring. (Underscoring ours)

xxx xxx xxx

The aforecited provision of law is qualified by jurisprudence to the effect that “acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring as part of the sentence.” However, as opined in People vs. Bayani, there is no more need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married, because of the elimination by the Family Code of the distinctions among illegitimate children. No further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides the child’s status as illegitimate. Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married should only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.

 

People v. Armando Gallardo

January 25, 2000

On July 28, 1991, Edmundo Orizal was found dead in the rest house of Ronnie Balao. The victim was found to have sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back. The two suspects Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. They were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal. The trial court rendered decision finding accused Armando Gallardo y Gander and Alfredo Columna y Correa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal.

Held: 

Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.  All these requirements were complied with. It would have been different if the accused were merely asked if they were waiving their Constitutional rights without any explanation from the assisting counsel.

People v. Jovito Barona

January 25, 2000

At about 8:30 o’clock in the evening on June 26, 1988, Eduardo Dimapilisan was requested by his sister to fetch her husband Celedonio Baron at the store of a certain. When he arrived at the store, Dimapilisan was told by Pinang that Celedonio was in the house of appellant Jovito. While waiting at the store, Dimapilisan saw Celedonio come out of the house of Jovito. He was able to clearly identify his brother-in-law because of the electric light from the store and the lamp in Jovito’s house. Shortly, he saw the four appellants follow Celedonio. While the latter was walking, Roberto held, choked and strangled him.

Held:

The stabbing and the shooting rendered the victim weak and defenseless. The collective action of the four appellants readily shows that there was a concurrence in their evil design in perpetrating the crime. Their superiority in number and the fact that they were armed with a bladed weapon and a gun shows that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. Evidently, there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the four accused-appellants. The excessive force was out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked. However, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated separately, it being necessarily absorbed treachery.  Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions, both of which are present in the case at bar:

1.) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself, much less, to retaliate; and

2.) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.

Likewise established with certainty is that the appellants’ concerted actions were indicative of their conspiracy. No direct proof is necessary to show that conspiracy exists among the assailants. Community of criminal design may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.

 

People v. Cresenciano Enolva

January 25, 2000

At around seven o’clock in the evening of July 25, 1995, Rogelio Abunda and his three-year old daughter Julie were shot while they were sleeping on the floor of their house at Barangay Bagombong. Cresenciano “Sonny” Enolva y Alegre was charged in Criminal Case No. 95-6021 and Criminal Case No 95-6047,  both for murder. The trial court convicted the accused thus this appeal.

Held: 

It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation will not necessarily impair the credibility of the complaining witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. The trial court found that the testimony of Pedro Abunda was rendered in a “very straight forward manner,” complete with details of the incidents that could not have been the product of coaching from anyone.  The court a quo also found Lorlita credible. The court did not err in ruling that the alibi of the accused that he was drunk and asleep in his house at the time that the shooting occured will not lie against the positive identification of Lorlita and Pedro Abunda. It is doctrinal that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and substance which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. We find no such basis.

People v. Alfonso Balgos

January 26, 2000

The accused-appellant denied raping Crisselle but claimed that he only inserted his left index finger into her vagina because he was sexually aroused at that time.  The trial court convicted accused.

Issue: 

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of rape and not just acts of lasciviousness?

Held:

The trial is court correct in imposing the supreme penalty of death on the accused-appellant. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, Further amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as “The Anti-Rape Law.” the penalty of death shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years of age. In the present case, there is no dispute that the victim was six (6) years of age when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with her. The victim’s age was duly established by the prosecution, through the testimony of the victim’s mother, Criselda Fuentes, and further corroborated by Crisselle’s Certificate of Live Birth.

 

People v. Zoilo Borromeo

January 27, 2000

The RTC of Pasay City found the accused Zoilo A. Borromeo alias “Sonny” guilty of kidnapping a minor for ransom and sentenced him to death and to pay the offended parties moral damages of P250,000.00 and the costs of suit.

Held: 

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.  And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is, evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the child’s liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the child’s custody.  We find abundant evidence of this fact in this case.

There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim’s liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor. In this case, the minority of Kenneth Hernandez was never disputed. Assuming arguendo that minority was not proved, still under the same provision of law, the imposition of the death penalty is obligatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. This was certainly so in this case.

People v. Tito Zuela

January 28, 2000

The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the RTC, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Br. 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution?

Held:

The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender.. In other words, “the moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to rule that Maximo Velarde’s extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel – that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel – is inadmissible in evidence. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa. Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants’ sworn statements did not leave a void in the prosecution’s case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court stating that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to Romualda’s testimony.

And in the recent case of People vs. Andan, the Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that “when the accused talked with the mayor as confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.”

Treachery was not alleged in the information but the suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and Maria from behind was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery exists when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death.

The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the crime as robbery with homicide and not “robbery with triple homicide” as charged in the information. The term “homicide” in Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing not only the act which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the number of killings in connection with the robbery. The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the same way that robbery with multiple killings would be.

 

People v. Domingo Brigildo

January 28, 2000

Appellant Domingo Brigildo was acquitted of the charge of attempted rape. But the trial court found him guilty of two counts of rape, for which he was twice sentenced to death.  When arraigned, appellant Domingo Brigildo, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.  The lower court rendered its decision finding the accused Domingo Brigildo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE (as) defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659.  Finding the victim Marites Belic to have been below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the rape on March 30, 1994 and finding the offender to be the common-law spouse of Marites’ mother, this court imposes upon the same Domingo Brigildo the mandatory penalty of DEATH.

Held:

In reviewing rape cases, the Court has consistently observed the following long-standing guidelines:

(1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility. Such accusation is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove it;

(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two (2) persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and

(3) The evidence of the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense..

The testimony of the victim leaves us no doubt that her mother’s common-law husband had raped her. But even assuming for argument’s sake, that the alleged penile penetration of private complainant’s vagina had not been shown with indubitable proof, this Court has ruled consistently, that penetration is not an essential element of rape. The mere touching of the labia or pudendum by the phallus is already enough to consummate the crime of rape.  Phallic intrusion necessarily entails contact with the labia and even the briefest contact under circumstances of force, intimidation, or unconsciousness, even without the rupture of the hymen is already rape.

In addition, the Court has repeatedly ruled that when a victim says she has been raped, she almost always says all that has to be said. So long as the victim’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the sole basis thereof.

 

People v. Romenciano Ricafranca

January 28, 2000

The case is an appeal from a decision of the RTC of Pinamalayan finding the accused guilty of murder and guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in disregarding the fact that the evidence of the prosecution did not overcome the time-honored presumption of innocence of the accused in criminal cases?

Held:

We advert to that all-too familiar rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially its assessment on the credibility of witnesses, are not to be disturbed on appeal. The trial court is in a better position than the appellant court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence because of their unique opportunity to directly observe the witness’ demeanor, conduct, deportment and manner of testifying.

Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, it may be inferred from the conduct of all the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.   It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

We disagree, however, with the trial court’s finding of cruelty. The test for determining the presence of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim’s suffering. Consequently, there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before he was killed.

 

People v. Jesus Tanail

January 28, 2000

Accused Jesus Tanail y Borbe has appealed from the decision of the Bulacan RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The court a quo rejected the accused’s defense of denial and alibi. It said that this could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused.

Held:

The court found no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. Contrary to the contention of the accused-appellant that inconsistencies materially affected the credibility of the witnesses, we rather view the minor inconsistencies as indicative of truth. Marites testified with candor and in a straightforward manner. In between sobs and tears, she recounted how she had been sexually abused by the accused in a “dog-style manner.”

It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assaults on their virtue because of the rapist’s threats on their lives.  Delay in making a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.  In any case, the failure of the victim to immediately report a rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. The lapse of three (3) months prior to the criminal accusation for rape is not sufficient to show that the charge of rape is doubtful.

FEBRUARY 2000

 

People v. Pedro Lumacang

February 1, 2000

Brothers Lumacang went out on a drinking spree with 2 friends and the deceased Elmer Salac.  Without warning, Pedro unsheathed his hunting knife and stabbed Elmer Salac. They were charged with murder, which crime was attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime.  RTC found them guilty.  Only Pablo appealed.

Held:

The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. The the severity of the assault during the first incident of stabbing had already rendered the deceased completely defenseless. That he was able to run away to seek succor does not negate the presence of alevosia because the wounded victim, in fact, had little opportunity to run far. He was easily overtaken by the three brothers who mercilessly stabbed him to death.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Since treachery has already been appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, abuse of superior strength should not have been considered separately inasmuch as it is absorbed in treachery. For night time to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance it must be shown that the accused had purposely sought such period to facilitate the commission of the crime or to prevent its discovery or to evade the culprit’s capture.

People  v. Alberto Blanco Y Señora

February 1, 2000

Edgardo Tolentino and Arnel Leovido were riding a tricycle.  During the trip, the driver, Blanco, allowed 3 men to board the tricycle, accelerated its speed, and engaged in a different route than that intended by Tolentino and Leovido.  Sensing that something was wrong, both passengers jumped out the moving tricycle.  After they jumped, Tolentino found out that Leovido had been stabbed by one of the three men who boarded the tricycle.  Leovido died. Alberto Blanco, and Arturo Punzalan were charged with murder

Held:

For the defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was elsewhere when the crime was perpetuated but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the approximate time of its commission. Appellant failed to demonstrate either scenario.  Where there is absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellant by an eyewitness to the stabbing incident, who has no improper motive to testify falsely.

There is conspiracy where, at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim.  Thus, although it appears that it was one of appellant’s co-accused who dealt Leovido the death blow, appellant performed acts to carry out the felonious killing complained of, for which he should be held answerable.

 

People v. Jalosjos

February 3, 2000

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?

Held:

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.

 

People v. Nicolas

February 4, 2000

MELANDRO NICOLAS y FAVELLA was convicted by the court a quo of two (2) counts of statutory rape and one (1) simple rape committed against his own daughter, Shellome Nicolas y Dalisay. The statutory rapes were committed when Shellome was only eleven (11) years old while the simple rape was perpetrated when she was already twelve (12).

Held:

We strongly sustain his conviction. The rule is settled that this Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. Having observed the manner, conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand, the trial court is clearly in a better position to determine the weight to be given to their respective testimonies. Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which might alter the result of the case, this Court accords respect, even finality, to these findings of fact made by the trial court.

The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in virtually all cases that have reached this Court. The relationship of the victim to the perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim.

 

People v. Llanes

February 4, 2000

Appellants Nicanor Llanes and Leandro Llanes were charged with the crime of murder in the RTC.

Held:

The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. The essential requisites for the admission of a dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court are, viz: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant was at that time competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in any case wherein the declarant’s is the subject of inquiry. All these requisites have been met in this case.

It is a well-settled rule that different witnesses testifying on the circumstances of a criminal event would naturally differ in various details. The fact that witnesses Arevalo and Valenzuela gave varying testimonies as to the dying declaration of the victim does not indicate that they are lying. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.

 

People v. Magdato

February 7, 2000

Before us for automatic review of the Criminal Cases finding accused-appellant Pepito Alama Magdato (hereafter PEPITO) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of rape committed on her 12-year old daughter Cherry Ann Magdato.

Held:

We find to be correct the penalty of death imposed by the trial court for each of the six (6) crimes of qualified rape. Such penalty is justified under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. The informations for rape in these cases explicitly allege that CHERRY ANN is the daughter of PEPITO and she was only twelve (12) years old when he committed the rapes in question. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with, inter alia, the following attendant circumstances:

1.         When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

 

PEOPLE v. ALFREDO CABANDE

G.R. No. 132747. February 8, 2000

Appellant Alfredo Cabande appeals the July 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 16) in a Criminal Case, finding him guilty of two counts of murder and sentencing him to two terms of reclusion perpetua. The accused appealed that the State did not correctly appreciate the evidence of the accused. The Court addressed the following matters: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) presence of qualifying circumstances and (3) damages.

HELD:

Well-settled is the rule that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of a clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. Thus, the SC found no reason to reverse or modify the trial court’s assessment.

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The mere fact that there was a feud between appellant and the victims did not necessarily prove that the attack was expected. As the solicitor general pointed out, what was decisive was the suddenness of the attack which made it impossible for the victims to retaliate, flee, or defend themselves.

In line with current jurisprudence, we affirm the award of indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of each victim in the sum of P50,000 or a total of P100,000. This may be awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.  We cannot sustain, however, the award of exemplary damages, which are awarded only in the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances. None was established in this case.

 

PEOPLE v. CORNELIA SUELTO

G.R. No. 126097. February 8, 2000

Accused-appellant Cornelia Suelto alias Rogelia Suelto appeals from the judgment rendered by the RTC finding her guilty of the murder of Isabel Ruales. The prosecution’s case rests primarily on the testimony of two witnesses who claimed to have personally witnessed the killing. Â h Y

HELD:

Alibis are generally considered with suspicion and are always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they can be easily fabricated. Therefore, for alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) that it would thus be physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the alibi must receive credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses.We hold that accused has failed to establish her alibi by clear and convincing evidence.

The trial court found that the killing of Isabel Ruales by accused was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

 

PEOPLE v. DIOLO BARITA

G.R. No. 123541. February 8, 2000

Diolo Barita (BARITA), Denver Golsing (GOLSING) and Dionisio Cuison (CUISON) were charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the accused was charged with selling and delivering more or less 2,800 grams of dried marijuana. In support of his appeal, BARITA denies any participation in the alleged sale of marijuana. He claims that no buy-bust operation was conducted and that the accusation against him was all part of a frame-up. To prove this, BARITA alleges that the prosecution evidence is replete with numerous flaws and glaring inconsistencies.

HELD:

Accused-appellants’ defense of “frame-up” does not convince us of their innocence. Such defense has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove and is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.  Any person who sells or acts as a broker in the sale of marijuana shall be punished with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos if 750 grams or more of marijuana is sold.

 

PEOPLE v. GOMEZ

G.R. Nos. 131946-47. February 8, 2000

On 29 December 1995 an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque charging Rogelio Gomez y Reyes a.k.a. Philip Roger Lacson or Roger Eleazar Gomez with illegal recruitment in large scale resulting in economic sabotage.

HELD:

Anent the first issue, we have consistently ruled that any objection to the warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

The more significant issue at hand is whether the culpability of accused-appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Under the Labor Code, there are three (3) elements which constitute illegal recruitment in large scale.First, the accused undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or any practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; second, the accused does not comply with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and third, the accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

On several occasions, this Court has held that there is illegal recruitment when one purports to have the ability to send a worker abroad although without the authority or license to do so. He may merely give such an impression in order to induce an applicant to tender payment for fees. Although accused-appellant initially might not have done anything to encourage individuals to apply to him for employment abroad, such fact does not in any way blot out his liability for illegal recruitment. Recruitment is a legal term; its meaning must be understood in the light of what the law contemplates and not of common parlance.

 

PEOPLE v. ALFREDO ENTILA

G.R. No. 135368. February 9, 2000

The RTC found appellant Alfredo Entila alias “Bogie” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He contends in his appeal that the trial court erred in rendering a decision against him.

HELD:

In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied on the oft-cited rule that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense since it is easily fabricated or concocted. There are nonetheless settled pronouncements of this Court to the effect that where an accused sets up alibi, or denial for that matter, as his line of defense, the courts should not at once look at the same with wary eyes for taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as found by the trial court and thereby rightly set the accused free. Furthermore, the defense of alibi or denial may assume significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness, as in the instant case.

PEOPLE v. ALFREDO ARAFILES

G.R. No. 128814. February 9, 2000

The accused was charged withed rape. Maria Corazon Dampil (Corazon) was 15 years old at the time she was allegedly raped. Accused-appellant is her uncle. He interposed this appeal claiming that the trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of complaining witness.

HELD:

It is well-settled that full penile penetration is not necessary in order to consummate the crime of rape; it is enough that the male organ touches the female external genitalia for there to be carnal knowledge. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the complainant to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

PEOPLE v. JOEY BARCELONA

G.R. No. 125341. February 9, 2000

Barcelona was charged with the rape of Dolly Maglinte, a 17 year old minor.

HELD:

In adjudging rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the nature of the crime in which only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

The Court has repeatedly held that rape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submitted against her will because of fear for her life or personal safety. It is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted because all that is required is that it be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind. . .

While the Court has upheld the defense of consensual sex in some cases, this was on the basis of strong evidence, consisting of letters and the testimonies of witnesses, showing that the alleged rape was actually sex by mutual consent.Having been raised as an affirmative defense, the “sweetheart theory” must be established by convincing proof. Accused-appellant bears the burden of proving that he and complainant had an affair which naturally led to a sexual relationship. This accused-appellant failed to do.

PEOPLE v. BERLY FABRO

G.R. No. 114261. February 10, 2000

Appellant Berly Fabro y Azucena, together with her common-law husband Donald Pilay y Calag and Irene Martin, was charged with the crime of “violation of Section 21 (b) Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425: sell and/or deliver to PO2 ELLONITO APDUHAN, who acted as poseur-buyer, one (1) kilo of dried marijuana leaves.

HELD:

As between a writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of these facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative value than oral testimony of a witness as to such facts based upon memory and recollection. The reason behind this is obvious, human memory is fallible and its force diminishes with the lapse of time.

It must be stressed, however, that failure to present the marked money is of no great consequence. The Dangerous Drugs Law punishes the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the prohibited drug seller. It is clear that Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of selling, delivering, distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual execution thereof. While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception is when such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the case at bar.

PEOPLE v. EULOGIO IGNACIO

G.R. No. 134568. February 10, 2000

The RTC convicted Eulogio Ignacio of murder.The trial court ruled that appellant failed to prove by credible, clear and convincing evidence that he had acted in lawful defense of the landowner’s property. There was no legal reason for him to shoot the victim, an unarmed minor at the time of the incident. The said court qualified the killing to murder because of the presence of treachery.

HELD:

In the present case, we find ample evidence that appellant did shoot the victim. It should be stressed that appellant’s conduct cannot be justified as a lawful defense of property rights. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the accused has the burden of proving unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. In this case, the first requisite was not proven, because he was not attacked by the victim. In fact, he did not even see the victim steal the crabs; he merely suspected him of doing so. Furthermore, assuming that unlawful aggression was proven, there was no necessity to shoot because, according to him, the victim was already running away when hit.

There is treachery when the accused unexpectedly and deliberately shoots an unarmed minor who is thus not in a position to put up a defense or to inflict harm on the former. Voluntary surrender is not appreciated even if the accused submits himself to the members of the barangay tanod who, by their presence in his house, precluded his escape.

In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated, the defense must clearly satisfy three requisites: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. The defense must show an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, because of an acknowledgement of guilt or because of a wish to spare them the trouble and the expense concomitant to the search and the capture of the accused.

PEOPLE v. CARLIE ALAGON

G.R. No. 126536-37. February 10, 2000

Two separate Informations were filed against ALAGON and RAFAEL, both dated February 2, 1994, charging them with two counts of murder for the deaths of Elarde Magno and Isidro Barcelona. The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the testimony of Remedios Punzalan. Accused-appellants ALAGON and RAFAEL had denial for their defense.

HELD:

As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case. ALAGON points out, however, that this rule does not apply when the judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the prosecution witnesses testify, as in the present case. The SC has carefully perused and considered the records of this case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of the trial court in regard to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.

Conspiracy was not duly proven. There is conspiracy where, at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. Conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Existence of conspiracy must be clearly and convincingly proven. The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design.

 

PEOPLE v. ROMMEL BALTAR

G.R. No. 130341. February 10, 2000

Three criminal complaints were filed by Kristine against Rommel Baltar. The prosecution presented Kristine. She relayed that on four separate incidents Baltar came to her house and forced her to have iintercourse with him.

HELD:

The evidence proving the use of force by the accused-appellant is overwhelming. Kristine also adequately explained why she did not immediately report to the police authorities. The threats made by accused-appellant scared her. Accused-appellant can not also dismiss the complaints against him as merely instigated by Kristine’s mother. Even assuming that accused-appellant and Kristine were lovers, this fact alone is not exculpatory. A sweetheart can not be forced to have sex against her will. Love is not a license for lust. Accused-appellant’s sweetheart theory can not stand in the light of Kristine’s positive assertions that he raped her.

PEOPLE v. APOLINAR DANDO

G.R. No. 120646. February 14, 2000

This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Siniloan, Laguna finding PO3 Apolinar E. Dando (“accused-appellant”) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

HELD:

Well-settled is the rule that “inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed. Alibi is one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases and it should be rejected when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape this case, accused-appellant, whose face was covered by a handkerchief, approached the victim, who was merely standing by the gate in front of his house, and shot him. The victim was undoubtedly caught unaware and had no chance of putting up any defense. Clearly, treachery attended the commission of the crime since the attack, although frontally, was no less sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or offer any defense of his person.

 

PEOPLE v. JULIAN CASTILLO

G.R. No. 131592-93. February 15, 2000

With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered, not as a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance. In the case at bar, appellant JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms.

HELD:

P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the penalty for said crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance.Thisamendment has two (2) implications: first, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as only a single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm) is committed under the law, only one penalty shall be imposed on the accused.

Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.

 

PEOPLE v. ABUNDIO MANGILA

G.R. No. 130203-04. February 15, 2000

Death is the most severe penalty for crime. It is imposed in incestuous rape, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. In the case at bar, sixteen (16) year old MADRILYN D. MANGILA accused her father, ABUNDIO MANGILA y PAREÑO, of two (2) counts of RAPE, allegedly committed as follows:

HELD:

Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

“Section 3. Pleas of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence – When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.” (emphasis supplied)

To breathe life into this rule, we made it mandatory for trial courts to do the following:

(1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused’s plea;

(2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and

(3) inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.

The records show that the trial court failed to comply to the letter with these guidelines. It did not conduct a searching inquiry on whether accused understood the legal consequences of his admission of guilt. It is not shown that accused was informed of the effect of the concurrence of the special qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim and his parental relationship to her. After the accused testified on how he raped his daughter, he was not apprised that his crime is punishable by death. The trial court also failed to explain to him that as the penalty of death is indivisible, it shall be imposed despite any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending its commission. Apparently, the trial court entertained the erroneous notion that the alleged intoxication of accused would lessen his liability.

PEOPLE v. ELRANIE MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 130606. February 15, 2000

This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant Elranie Martinez guilty of rape of Melina and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

While denial is a legitimate defense in rape cases bare denials can not overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. Here, Melina’s testimony is clear, candid, straightforward and consistent. She had positively identified accused-appellant as her malefactor and established all the elements of the offense. That the physical examination yielded no conclusive evidence that she had been raped does not affect her credibility. The lack of tell-tale signs of rape on her private part can be explained by the fact that she is a married woman with four children. This fact actually bolsters her credibility. She had no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant.

 

PEOPLE v. BULU CHOWDURY

G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000

In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus:

“The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.”

As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.

 

PEOPLE v. ROGELIO GALAM

G.R. No. 114740. February 15, 2000

On appeal is the decision of the RTC convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing as the two conditions for the same are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The attack was not only sudden, it was unexpected, as the victim even cried out in surprise “Why are you firing at me, I have not done anything wrong!” Further, appellant deliberately or consciously adopted the means of attack as shown by the fact that he even wrapped the gun inside a jacket prior to shooting the victim.

However, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated inasmuch as the following elements were not duly proven: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow the offender to reflect on the consequences of his act.

Nor can the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated, for the prosecution failed to demonstrate (1) that the malefactor particularly sought or took advantage of the darkness to commit the offense, or (2) that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. Although the crime took place at around 11:00 in the evening, the store/house where the incident occurred was sufficiently lighted by a fluorescent lamp, and there were still people milling around because of the dance held at a nearby plaza.

 

PEOPLE v. GREGORIO TOLIBAS

G.R. No. 103506. February 15, 2000

On appeal is the decision the RTC convicted accused-appellant Rodel Quijon and accused Gregorio Tolibas of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, to indemnify the widow of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.

HELD:

Once more, we are guided by the tenet that “when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if, considered, might affect the result of the case.

For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. The concerted actions of the four accused showed their intent to kill the victim. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in this case as the two conditions therefore were proved: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offenders consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. Treachery absorbs the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength so the same need not be appreciated separately.

 

PEOPLE v. CIELITO BULURAN

G.R. No. 113940. February 15, 2000

On May 20, 1993, appellant Cielito Buluran and three (3) John Does were charged with the crime of murder. The Information was later amendedwhen Leonardo Valenzuela was identified as one of the assailants. Upon arraignment, both accused entered pleas of not guilty. On February 4, 1994, the trial court, finding conspiracy and treachery, rendered judgment convicting appellants of murder.

HELD:

First. Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they never raised this issue before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.  Second. There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. In this case, the basis of the conviction by the trial court was the testimonies of the three eyewitnesses, Artemio Avendaño, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria Castillo.

Third. The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. While the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.

The SC found that no treachery attended the killing. On numerous occasions, we have held that where a killing was preceded by an argument or quarrel, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery can no longer be appreciated since the victim could be said to have been forewarned and could anticipate aggression from the assailants. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation alleged by the prosecution was not proved clearly and convincingly. Considering that the attack was made about two minutesafter the initial altercation, it cannot be said that there was sufficient lapse of time between such determination to commit the crime and its execution so as to allow the assailants to reflect upon the consequences of their actions.

PEOPLE v. RODOLFO BATO

G.R. No. 134939. February 16, 2000

Rodolfo Bato alias “Rudy Bato” is charged of rape and sentenced to suffer imprisonment ofreclusion perpetua. He raped Delia Hernandez, a minor of nine (9) years old, against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

HELD:

Neither is the absence of spermatozoa in Delia’s genitalia fatal to the prosecution’s case. The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for rape. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.

The crime committed is statutory rape, defined and penalized under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R. A. 7659. This Court has held that if the woman is under twelve (12) years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force is not an element of statutory rape but the absence of free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. The two (2) elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below twelve (12) years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under twelve (12) years old is always rape.”

PEOPLE v. GALLARDER

G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000

On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide of a minor.

Held:

A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term “homicide” as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability.

PEOPLE v. REYNALDO QUILLOSA

G.R. No. 115687. February 17, 2000

The RTC convicted Quillosa of the murder of Ambrosio Ilocto, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00.

HELD:

We have long held that “the testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Minor and inconsequential flaws in the testimony of the witness strengthen rather than impair his credibility.  As to appellant’s participation in the killing, the Court in previous cases have held that holding the hand of the victim to render him immobile while he is being stabbed amounts to an act of indispensable cooperation without which the crime would not have been accomplished. Appellant’s act of holding the right arm of the victim, while another held the left arm, thus enabling their third companion to stab the victim, shows that they acted together with one purpose and design to kill the victim.

As to the crime committed, we find that treachery attended the commission of the offense, hence the crime is murder. For treachery to be present, two conditions must be shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means ofexecution.In this case, appellant and another person held the hands of the victim to enable their companion to stab him while he was in a defenseless position. While abuse of superior strength was alleged in the Information, it is already absorbed in treachery and need not be appreciated separately. Evident premeditation was not proven by the prosecution.

 

PEOPLE v. RADEL GALLARDE

G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000

This is an appeal from the judgment of the RTC finding accused-appellant Radel (hereafter GALLARDE) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

We sustain GALLARDE’s contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term “homicide” as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged.

The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. The importance of circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with homicide. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the commission of rape. Our doubt on the commission of rape is based on the fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ.

 

PEOPLE v. CHEN TIZ CHANG

G.R. Nos. 131872-73. February 17, 2000

Before the Court is an appeal by Chen Tiz Chang and Chen Jung San, also known as Willy Tan challenging the October 16, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 95) in a Criminal Case finding them guilty of illegal possession and sale of shabu and sentencing each of them to two counts of reclusion perpetua                   

HELD:

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be shown that (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Here, as in Boco, the prosecution witnesses were able to establish these elements.

We are not persuaded by the argument that the samples examined were not taken from the drugs seized. On the contrary, the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses fairly established that the shabu taken from the appellants is the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later presented as evidence in court. Verily, the presumption of regularity must prevail over appellants’ unfounded allegations and speculations. Appellants’ behavior during the entrapment showed that there was conspiracy between them and a third person who got away with the buy-bust money. It is an established rule that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracyas it may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all of which indubitably point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.

 

PEOPLE v. RAMIL DACIBAR

G.R. No. 111286. February 17, 2000

On appeal is the decision dated January 25, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court  finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder, imposing upon them the amended penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, instead of life imprisonment.

HELD:

While the principal witnesses for the prosecution did not actually see appellants shoot and kill the victim, direct proof of their culpability is not necessary when circumstantial evidence would suffice. The requisites thereof are: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

We have held that conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances, which vary according to the purpose accomplished. Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to ajoint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

The trial court was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without.

 

PEOPLE v. RAUL ACOSTA

G.R. No. 126351. February 18, 2000

Accused was charged with arson.  He interposes this appeal because he claims that the trial court erred in finding him guilty basing its conclusion merely on circumstantial evidence.

 HELD:

Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire. In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record.

In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendants as the one responsible for the crime.

 

PEOPLE v. BONIFACIO TOREJOS

G.R. No. 132217. February 18, 2000

Accused-appellant Bonifacio Torejos y Pañares @ Boning was convicted for raping a three-year-old child and was meted the supreme penalty of death.

HELD:

Accused-appellant’s attempt to discredit ROSALIE is unconvincing. The assessment of credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. It is well established in this jurisdiction that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless the court a quo overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.

The information filed against TOREJOS specifically alleges that he raped MARY CRIS, a three-year-old child. We therefore affirm the judgment of the RTC imposing the death penalty for being in accordance with law. Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray that R.A. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

 

PEOPLE v. LIBERATO MENDIONA

G.R. No. 129056. February 21, 2000

Before this Court for automatic review is the decision finding accused-appellant Liberato “Renato” Mendiona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to pay the complainant, Maricel Capongcol, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.

HELD:

Accordingly, the range of penalty imposable on appellant is composed of two indivisible penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death. Following Article 63 (1)of the same Code, which provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties, appellant was correctly meted the supreme penalty of death since the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and unlawful entry attended the commission of the rape. The attendance of these aggravating circumstances is not contested by the accused-appellant.

On a final note, we correct the trial court’s erroneous classification of the award ofP50,000.00 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, we explained that “x x x the award authorized by criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party x x x is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.” Further, our more recent rulings hold that the indemnification for the victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law. Applying the foregoing rulings, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the complainant should be seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).

PEOPLE v. RENATO DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 118670. February 22, 2000

Renato de Guzman, Marciano Ramos, Frederick Mosqueda and Paquito Ancheta were charged with Robbery with Homicide and were found guilty. Only De Guzman, Ramos and Mosqueda were apprehended. Ancheta remains at-large. When they were arraigned, the three accused entered a plea of “not guilty.” At the trial and upon motion of the prosecution, Mosqueda was discharged and was utilized as state witness.

HELD:

The requirements for the discharge and utilization of an accused as a state witness are enumerated in Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, viz:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused;

(c) The testimony of the accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

While this Court agrees that some of the requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119 for the discharge of Mosqueda to become state witness were not strictly and properly met, nonetheless, this Court does not subscribe to the suggestion of the defense that Mosqueda’s testimony should be disregarded. This issue has long been settled. Although the trial court may have erred in discharging the accused, such error would not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. The discharge of an accused under these circumstances is not reversible. Once his discharge is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows unless the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant to his commitment. The order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, and that is when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused.

MARCH 2000

PEOPLE V. PAMBID

G.R. No. 124453.  March 15, 2000.

Defense of insanity

Facts:

A man diagnosed of schizophrenia and mild mental retardation raped a six-year old girl.  Accused pleaded not guilty on the ground of insanity.

Held:

Accused-appellant’s plea of insanity is unacceptable. While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he has acted during a lucid interval, the presumption under Art. 800 of the Civil Code is that every man is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it. He must show that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged, for mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

PEOPLE V. FRONDA

G.R. No. 130602.  March 15, 2000.

Direct Evidence v. Circumstantial Evidence

Facts:

Three students were convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act after they allegedly delivered a brick of marijuana to policemen who posed as buyers.

Held:

To be caught flagrante delicto necessarily implies positive identification by the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a “direct evidence” of culpability, which is “that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption”, in contrast to circumstantial evidence, which is “the proof of facts from which taken collectively the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence.”  Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence, for our rules make no distinction between direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct; for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

Under the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if the following concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty.

PEOPLE V. ARIZAPA

G.R. No. 131814.  March 15, 2000.

Improvident plea of guilt

Facts:

Accused was sentenced to death after being convicted of incestuously raping his stepdaughter.

Held:

The record discloses the failure of the lower court to make a searching inquiry on whether the accused’s admission of guilt was voluntarily made and whether he understood the legal implications of such admission. However, since the trial court extensively received evidence in determining the guilt of the accused, the manner in which the plea of guilt was made, whether improvidently or not, loses its significance for the simple reason that the conviction of the accused was based on the evidence proving his commission of the offense charged and not on his admission in open court; his conviction may only be set aside when the improvident plea of guilt was the sole basis for the condemnatory judgment.

PEOPLE V. FABON

G.R. No. 133226.  March 16, 2000.

Aggravating circumstance – robbery with homicide

Circumstantial evidence

Held:

The proper designation of the crime committed is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it is the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code that applies, the rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, dwelling is also considered aggravating in cases such as this primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party’s house.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. Under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict an accused if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. MACARSE

G.R. No. 121780.  March 17, 2000.

Defense of alibi

Facts:

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of Highway Robbery with Homicide.  His main defense was alibi.

Held:

For alibi to be believed, the following must be shown: (a) presence of accused-appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.

PEOPLE V. MANRIQUEZ

G.R. Nos. 122510-11.  March 17, 2000.

Waiver of Counsel; Extrajudicial Confession

Conspiracy

Treachery

Facts:

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of Murder.  He impugned the validity of his waiver of counsel and extrajudicial confession and denied conspiracy and the attendance of treachery.

Held:

One’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms — e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do — and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication, which results in the subject’s understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel, who, under prevailing jurisprudence, must be a lawyer.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish the existence of a conspiracy, direct proof is not essential since it may be shown by facts and circumstances from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make, which means that no opportunity was given to the latter to do so.

 

PEOPLE V. SAPAL

G.R. No. 124526.  March 17, 2000.

Irregularities in arrest

Conviction based on proof beyond reasonable doubt

Accused-appellant was arrested based on a warrant issued against him after he failed to attend his arraignment.  He contends that certain irregularities attended his arrest, and that the prosecution failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

Admittedly, accused is deemed to have waived his right to question the irregularities attending his arrest for his failure to raise the same at the opportune time, i.e., before he entered his plea. Nonetheless, the peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the case, e.g., the police authorities’ failure to comply with the clear directive of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Barrios, the undue delay in preparing the documents relating to the arrest of accused and his wife and in delivering them to the proper authorities for inquest, and the failure of the law enforcers to provide accused with a counsel during the custodial investigation, effectively destroy the presumption of regularity in the performance by Gomez and his colleagues of their duties. Such being the case, the presumption of regularity cannot be made the sole basis of the conviction of accused.

It is well-settled that “where the circumstances shown to exist yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.”

PEOPLE V. SAN DIEGO

G.R. No. 129297.  March 17, 2000.

Rape – jurisprudential guidelines

Held:

In rape cases, courts are guided by the following considerations:

1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person, though innocent, to disprove the same;

2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and

3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

The test of sufficiency of force or intimidation in rape is whether it produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not give in to the sexual demands of the accused, the threat would be carried out.

PEOPLE V. CHE CHUN TING

G.R. Nos. 130568-69.  March 21, 2000.

Warrantless searches and seizures

Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted for dispatching in transit and having in his possession large amounts of shabu.  He contends that the shabu is inadmissible in evidence as it was seized without a valid search warrant.

Held:

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to “dangerous weapons” or “anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.” With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach. The exception therefore should not be strained beyond what is needed in order to serve its purposes.

As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the “fruit of a poisonous tree.” However, objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives, which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.

PEOPLE V. ADILA, JR.

G.R. No. 133434.  March 21, 2000.

Defense of alibi

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted for incestuously raping his 11-year old stepdaughter.  He interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

Held:

The defense of alibi interposed by the accused-appellant hardly deserves any serious consideration. For this defense to prosper, the accused must prove, among other things, that not only has he been at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it would have also been physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time thereof.

PEOPLE V. SAPINOSO

G.R. No. 122540.  March 22, 2000.

Held:

In rape cases, three well-known principles guide the Court, namely: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove, (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution, and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.  Likewise, when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show rape has been committed, the offended party most often being the only one available to prove directly the commission of rape. The credibility of the complainant is, thus, of utmost importance, for the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the complainant’s testimony if the same meets the test of credibility. Furthermore, we have held that the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.

Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim. For alibi to prosper, the defendant must prove not only (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but (2) it must be likewise demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

 

PEOPLE V. DEDACE

G.R. No. 132551.  March 22, 2000.

Statutory rape

Held:

The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years of age. It is well-settled that complete or full penetration of the complainant’s private part is not necessary to consummate rape.  What is essential is that there be penetration of the sexual organ, no matter how slight.  Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential for the offense of consummated rape. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. Therefore, it is unnecessary to show to what extent penetration of the woman’s body has been made.

PEOPLE V. MAMALIAS

G.R. No. 128073.  March 27, 2000.

Appeal of an accused-escapee

Held:

The general rule is that a party appealing who flees the jurisdiction, pending the appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law and places himself in a position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile keeping out of the reach of justice and preparing to render the judgment nugatory or not, at his option.  Moreover, the escapee loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.    Be that as it may, the escape of an accused-appellant during the pendency of his appeal will not necessarily prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction in exceptional cases.

PEOPLE V. MITRA

G.R. No. 130669.  March 27, 2000.

Rape – physical resistance

Held:

It is well-settled that “physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.”  It is sufficient that the intimidation produces fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not submit to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would befall her at the time she was being molested. As pronounced by the Court, “if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim’s submission to the sexual act voluntary.”

PEOPLE V. MERIS

G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447.  March 28, 2000.

Jurisdiction over person of the accused

Estafa

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.  She contends that her conviction was erroneous because the court never acquired jurisdiction over her person, as her arrest was illegal, and that the prosecution failed to establish estafa.

Held:

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in court.  Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellant’s arrest was defective, such is deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It should be stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused.

Estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damages.

PEOPLE V. TIPAY

G.R. No. 131472.  March 28, 2000.

Rape – jurisprudential guidelines

Held:

The Court has laid down certain guiding principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution, and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

PEOPLE V. CULA

G.R. No. 133146.  March 28, 2000.

Rape – physical resistance; burden of proving victim’s minority

The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for life and personal safety.

At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim’s duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s age.

PEOPLE V. BARREDO

G.R. No. 133832.  March 28, 2000.

Rape

Held:

In rape cases, the courts are guided by the long-standing rule that penetration is not essential for conviction of the culprit.  Mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused’s penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape, and the fact that her hymen is still intact does not negate its commission.

PEOPLE V. CABINGAS

G.R. No. 79679.  March 28, 2000.

Rape with a feeble-minded person

Held:

Sexual intercourse with a feeble-minded woman is rape. The offense charged is within the contemplation of paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, like when the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason.

PEOPLE V. CAVERTE

G.R. No. 123112.  March 30, 2000.

Self-defense; treachery

Accused appellant was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder.

Held:

There is self-defense when the following elements concur: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the offender; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It is a doctrinal rule that when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one making a defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.

There is treachery when two conditions concur, to wit: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. Treachery exists where the attack was perpetrated suddenly and without warning.

PEOPLE V. AQUINO

G.R. No. 129288.  March 30, 2000.

Robbery with homicide

Accused-appellants were charged and convicted of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.  They contend that they should have been convicted of homicide only.

Held:

The elements of the crime were proved beyond reasonable doubt. In any event, in robbery with homicide, the important consideration is that there be a nexus between the robbery and the killing whether prior, subsequent to or committed at the same time.

PEOPLE V. BALTAZAR

G.R. No. 115990.  March 30, 2000.

Held:

The more pressing issue is whether all the elements of rape as alleged in the Information were duly proved by the prosecution. Here we find the following duly established beyond reasonable doubt.  First, appellant had carnal knowledge with the victim.

PEOPLE V. BASE

G.R. No. 109773.  March 30, 2000.

Extrajudicial confessions

Conspiracy; treachery

Held:

For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3.] express; and 4.] in writing. While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has thefinal choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.  A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.  Verily, to be an effective counsel “[a] lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.  The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything that might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.  The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.”

When, as in this case, “[a]n extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress, promise or reward.”

Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.” In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some person is criminally responsible.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest.

There is treachery “[w]hen the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.”  The essence of alevosia is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the victim’s part.  The fact that treachery may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean it can not also be appreciated if the attack is frontal.  Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and the victim is unarmed.

PEOPLE V. CAMPUHAN

G.R. No. 129433.  March 30, 2000.

Stages of rape

In the case of People v. Orita, the SC held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of thelabia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts.  The inference that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated stage.

But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into thelabia or lips of the female organ, even if there be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majoralabia minora, etc., the crucial doctrinal bottom line is thattouching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.

Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim’s vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim’s testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labiaof her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be “touched” by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath themons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of thepudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

PEOPLE VS. BALTAZAR

G.R. No. 115990.  March 31, 2000.

Elements of Rape

Evidentiary value of medical examinations

Held:

The more pressing issue is whether all the elements of rape as alleged in the Information were duly proved by the prosecution. Here we find the following duly established beyond reasonable doubt.  First, appellant had carnal knowledge with the victim. Second, carnal knowledge took place by using force or intimidation. Appellant insists that “the complainant did not offer any tenacious resistance to the alleged sexual assault.”  Nowhere is it required in our law or jurisprudence, however, that a woman must offer “tenacious” resistance to a sexual assault. The law does not impose upon the rape victim the burden of proving resistance.  We have held countless of times that “the force or violence required in rape cases is relative. When applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible; it is enough that it has enabled the offender to consummate his purpose or to bring about the desired result.”  For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Thus we have held that physical resistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon her and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for her life and personal safety. The victim’s failure to resist the accused’s assault successfully and to escape when the opportunity presented itself should not be construed as a manifestation of consent. Thirdly, the coitus was against her will and without her consent.

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that “a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible.” A medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction for rape is proper.

PEOPLE VS. SUITOS

G.R. No. 125280.  March 31, 2000.

Defense of alibi

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of murder.  His defense was one of alibi.

Held:

For alibi to prosper, the accused should prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission.

PEOPLE VS. CUPINO

G.R. No. 125688.  March 31, 2000.

Cupino and Dejoras were charged and convicted for conspiring to commit murder.

Held:

Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts that yielded the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference.”

PEOPLE VS. ABALDE

G.R. No. 123113.  March 31, 2000.

Rape – guidelines

Held:

In the disposition of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution, and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.

PEOPLE VS. AMIGABLE

G.R. No. 133857.  March 31, 2000.

Medical examination/findings – evidentiary value in rape cases

Held:

Lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. For that matter, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the prosecution of the crime as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused as in this case.

APRIL 2000

 

PEOPLE VS. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 121906.  April 5, 2000.

Qualifying circumstance – alleged in the information

Accused-appellant was sentenced to death after he was convicted of raping his stepdaughter.  He argues that the Information filed against him failed to state that he is the stepfather of the victim, hence, his relationship with the victim may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

Held:

The circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act 7659 the attendance of any which mandates the single indivisible penalty of death, instead of the standard penalty of reclusion perpetua to death prescribed in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances.” Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment.

PEOPLE VS. PAVILLARE

G. R. No. 129970.  April 5, 2000.

Police line-ups

Kidnapping with ransom

Accused-appellants were charged and convicted of kidnapping for ransom for abducting an Indian national.  He contends that the identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of counsel, and that the money given to them was not ransom money but was given in exchange for their dropping of the charges of rape against private complainant.

Held:

The accused-appellant’s defense is without merit.   Section 12 (1) Art III of the Commission states that “Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The prohibition however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.  The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court identification.

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. As squarely expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.

PEOPLE VS. REGALA

G.R. No. 130508.  April 5, 2000.

Robbery with rape

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of robbery with rape.

Held:

It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an “anomalous situation” where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.

PEOPLE VS. ALVERO

G.R. Nos. 134536-38.  April 5, 2000.

Held:

The allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not important in a prosecution for rape. This is because the precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape and it has no substantial bearing on its commission.  Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. It is equally settled that a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.

People v. Roche, et al.

G.R. No. 115182(6 April 2000)

Accused-Appellants were charged and convicted of murder based on testimonies of witnesses which contradicted each other and was inconsistent with the physical evidence. The sole reliable testimony does not show complicity among the appellants before, during, or after the commission of the crime.

Held:

  1. On oral testimony of witnesses

A witness whose testimony is perfect in all aspects, without a flaw and remembering even the minutest details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays herself open to suspicion of having been [coached] or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.

  1. On importance of physical evidence

Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.

  1. On Conspiracy

For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a conditionprecedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do

  1. On being an accomplice

The following requisites must concur in order that a person may be considered an accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;

(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,

(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the  person charged as accomplice.

 

People v. Bago

G.R. No. 122290(6 April 2000)

Appellant was accused and convicted of the crime of qualified theft through taking cold-rolled steel from the company which he is employed as a leader in the cutting department.

Held:

Clearly,  when all the elements of theft were established, to wit: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. When  the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence, accused is guilty of qualified theft.

In the crime of theft, if the value of the thing stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum period and one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty shall not exceed twenty years or reclusion temporal. However, if that crime of theft is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances which convert the taking into qualified theft, the penalty next higher by two degrees shall be imposed, that is, at least,reclusion perpetua.

People v. Suza

G.R. No. 130611(6 April 2000)

Appellant was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide, based on the testimony of a lone eye-witness who saw how he and his co-accused killed the victim, and was sure that they took the victim’s clothes, money and other wares, which she sold.

Held:

  1. On the crime of  robbery with homicide.

It is well settled that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In order for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it is necessary that it be clearly established that a robbery has actually taken place, and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of such robbery, a homicide be committed. Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery, the killing of the victim would therefore, be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the complex offense of robbery with homicide.

  1. On the aggravating circumstance of use of superior strength

There was a clear and notorious disparity of force between the victim and the aggressors as the former was unarmed and alone. The felons took advantage of their collective strength to overwhelm their comparatively defenseless victim. Thus, it was held that “an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.

People v. Ramos

G.R. No. 120280 (12 April 2000)

The appellant was convicted of raping his own 10-year old daughter and relies solely on the defense of denial of the said accusation against him.

Held:

A rape victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father. Earlier and long-standing decisions of this Court have likewise held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed. This is true when made against any man committing the crime; it is more so when the accusing words are said against a close relative.

People v. Aspiras

G.R. No. 121203(12 April 2000)

The appellant is a policeman who was positively identified by a witness to be the killer of the victim, who was gun-downed during a political rally. The witness is alleged to be biased against the appellant since he has a grudge against the latter.

Held:

a. As to credibility of a witness

The credibility of a witness could not be affected by an alleged grudge where said witness was not discredited on cross-examination.

  1. As to damages awarded

Only actual expenses supported by receipts shall be granted as actual damages. As to future earnings of the victim, it is computed by multiplying the years for which the victim could have worked with his employer were it not for his death by his annual gross earnings.

People v. Francisco

G.R. 121682(12 April 2000)

Appellant was convicted of the crime of murder qualified by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and pleads the justifying circumstance of defense of relative.

HELD:

a. On the claim of defense of relative

As correctly pointed out by the trial court, anyone who admits the killing of a person but invokes the defense of relative to justify the same has the burden of proving these elements by clear and convincing evidence. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the prosecution evidence is weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has admitted the killing.

b. On the essence of treachery

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Belaro, the Court explained that the essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Even a frontal attack can, therefore, be treacherous if it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.

The swift and unexpected attack by accused-appellant rendered the victim helpless. The rule that treachery may be shown if the victim is attacked from behind does not mean it cannot be appreciated if the attack is frontally launched. The suddenness of the shooting, without the slightest provocation from the victim who was unarmed and has no opportunity to defend himself, ineluctably qualified the crime with treachery.

People v. Ballenas

G.R. No. 124299(12 April 2000)

The appellants abducted a 19-year old girl from her dwelling, raped her several times, and stabbed her to death 13 times.

HELD:

  1. On the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and cruelty

For the court to consider nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, it must have been deliberately taken by the perpetrator to augment the wrong they committed, not being necessary for its completion. It has been held that when the scene of the crime was sufficiently illuminated by a  lamp, nocturnity cannot be appreciated.

The aggravating circumstance of cruelty is present when “the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission”.There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act.

b.   Whether  the accused indeed committed forcible abduction with rape

The accused committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and 48 of the same Code. The two elements of forcible abduction are (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented

People v. Rojas

G.R. No. 125292(12 April 2000)

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of rape, after he was positively identified by his victim in a 20-man police line-up, twice.

HELD:

Amidst the sea of faces before her, the victim readily pointed out accused-appellant as her attacker. This positive identification of accused-appellant will prevail over the defense of alibi and denial of accused-appellant. Besides, for the defense of alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.

People v. Razonable

G.R. No. 128085-87(12 April 2000)

Appellant was charged and convicted of murder for hacking to death a neighbor, qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. Supreme Court held that the aggravating circumstance were not proven by conclusive evidence.

HELD:

a. As to evident premeditation

Like treachery,  the requisites of evident premeditation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The requisites of evident premeditation are:  a.] the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, b.] an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination, and c.] sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act.

b. As to abuse of superior strength

Abuse of superior strength requires, at base, a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactor to take advantage thereof. Besides the inequality of comparative force between the victim and the aggressor, there must be a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of by the offender in the commission of the crime.

People v. Orio

G.R. No. 128821(April 12, 2000)

Appellants, both armed with Balisongs attacked and killed their unarmed victim. They were charged and convicted of murder qualified by treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength.

HELD:

  1. As to the aggravating circumstance of  Treachery

There is treachery when the offenders commit any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order that alevosia may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that : a.] the malefactor employed means, method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b.] the means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. However, the fact that both accused-appellants were armed with bladed weapons while their victim was unarmed and defenseless does not make the attack treacherous. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.

  1. As to the aggravating circumstance of Evident Premeditation

Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable they might be would not suffice to establish evident premeditation. In the case at bar, there was no evidence of the planning and preparation to kill the victim. In fact, no attempt was ever made to establish the requisites of evident premeditation, viz : a.] the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, b.] an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination, and c.] sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act. In the absence of any evidence of the planning to kill or when the plan was conceived, there is no basis for appreciating evident premeditation.

  1. As to the aggravating circumstance of  Abuse of Superior Strength

Abuse of superior strength, however, attended the killing of Domingo Francisco. Abuse of superior strength requires, at base, a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactor to take advantage thereof. Besides the inequality of comparative force between the victim and the aggressor, there must be a situation of strength notoriously selected and made use of by the offender in the commission of the crime.

People v. Baer

G.R. No. 130333(April 12, 2000)

The appellant is the step grandfather of the victim who at her tender age was repeatedly raped by the appellant. The appellant argued that the victim did not resist his alleged sexual assault, since she did not even scream. As to the amount of force required to constitute rape.

HELD:

In rape cases, the force applied need not be irresistible. It merely has to be enough to successfully carry out the assailant’s carnal desire. In the present case, appellant did apply sufficient force and intimidation to consummate his lustful desire.

People v. Adoc

G.R. No. 133647(April 12, 2000)

The victim was held by Danny and Tony while Eddie delivered several blows, flowed by Tony stabbing the victim. Appellants questioned their conviction of murder and the liability imposed on each of them, since it is not clear who inflicted the fatal wound. Whether there is conspiracy between the appellants.

HELD:

Conspiracy exists when two or more person come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the acts of the accused. It is sufficient that the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, that they had the same purpose or common design, and that they were united in its execution. Coming now to the instant case, the successive acts of the accused – the blow delivered by EDDIE, while DANNY and TONY were holding Ricky; followed immediately by the infliction of a second blow by DANNY; and finally, the stabbing of the victim by TONY – clearly manifest the existence of a common intent among the three accused to commit the crime. Since conspiracy has been established, there is no need to determine who among the accused delivered the fatal blow. All of the accused are liable as principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation, for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

People v. Reyes

G.R. No. 133647(April 12, 2000)

The appellants assails the ruling of the court finding that conspiracy attended their attack to the victim. Whether direct evidence is necessary to prove conspiracy.

HELD:

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. The actuations of the appellants clearly established a conspiracy. One started the attack with an utterance coupled with the actual stabbing of victim. Finally, the rest of the assailants’ companions ganged up on the helpless victim by successively stabbing and hitting him. All these acts sufficiently prove that they conspired to kill victim.

People v. Antolin

G.R. No. 133880(April 12, 2000)

The appellant was convicted of raping a 23-year old mental retardate with a mind of a 4-year old girl. The appellant questions the credibility of the victim since she is the sole witness against him. What is the importance of credibility of the victim in rape.

HELD:

In a prosecution for rape the complainant’s credibility becomes the most important issue since her testimony alone is sufficient for a verdict of conviction. It is well established that when the credibility of a witness is questioned, the appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a more advantageous position to determine the issue as it heard the witness and observed his deportment during trial. The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case.

People v. Fraga

G.R. No. 134130-33(April 12, 2000)

The appellant had an altercation before they embarked to go out to sea, after they came back the accused with his CAFGU firearm went to the house of the victim and shot him to death. The appellant raises the defense of self-defense. Whether or not the appellant is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

HELD:

The invocation of self-defense is an admission of the killing and of its authorship. By this admission, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must now establish with clear and convincing evidence all the elements of this justifying circum, stance, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self- defense. In proving these elements, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence. He can no longer assail the weakness of the evidence against him simply because it cannot be disbelieve after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. Indeed, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful by itself. It is an oft- repeated rule that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea for self-defense because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself.

People v. Estroco

G.R. No. 111941(April 27 2000)

In order to appreciate allevosia, it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might make. While a victim may have been warned of a possible danger to his person, in treachery, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.

People v. Guiwan

G.R. No. 117324(April 27, 2000)

The victim was the biological daughter of the appellant who was raped several times by the latter and was only able to disclose such bestial acts after two years.

HELD:

Two important doctrines on rape

  • The moral influence of a father over his daughter suffices to establish rape.
  • At any rate, although a woman may be viewed by the public as unchaste or impure she can still be raped as she is still free to refuse a man’s lustful advances. The victim’s character in rape is immaterial.

People v. Legaspi

G.R. No. 117802(April 27 2000)

What is required to establish the defense of alibi?

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke, and the courts have always looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is inherently unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate. To prosper, alibi must strictly meet the requirements of time and place. Thus, we have consistently ruled that it does not suffice to prove that the accused was somewhere else at the time of the commission of the crime. Similarly, jurisprudence dictates that the element of physical impossibility be clearly shown; The accused must clearly establish that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime.

What constitutes robbery with homicide?

In this specie of offense, the phrase “by reason” covers homicide committed before or after the taking of personal property of another, as long as the motive of the offender (in killing a person before the robbery) is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition, or to do away with a witness or to defend the possession of stolen property.

What is the proof necessary to establish conspiracy?

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose overt acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.

People v. Acuram

G.R. No. 117954(April 27, 2000)

The appellant shot the victim who later died. After charges were filed and his commanding officer was told of the incident, he was ordered not to leave camp, where he surrendered.

HELD:

Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, it was appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law.

People v. Villa

G.R. No. 129899(April 27, 2000)

The appellant  fired his rifle at the victim causing the latters death. After such incident the appellant surrendered to his commanding officer and pleaded guilty before the court but claimed the defense of temporary insanity. Whether the appellant is entitled to the defense of insanity.

HELD:

No. The fact that immediately after the incident (accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.” Similarly, a feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his acts, he acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them.

People v. Castillo

G.R. No. 130188 (April 27, 2000)

The lone witness saw the appellant running out of the house of his cousin, after a shot was heard. His cousin was later found dead. The appellant was convicted of murder.

Whether or not the testimony of the lone witness was sufficient.

No, the witness only testified that the appellant fled the scene of the crime in a rush with a gun. Flight, in most cases, strongly indicates guilt. As a lone circumstantial evidence, however, it does not suffice as plurality of circumstantial evidence is required before guilt beyond reasonable doubt may be inferred from such indirect proof. To fully dispose of this issue, the motive of accused-appellant is a key element in the web of circumstantial evidence.

People v. Bautista

G.R. No. 131840(April 27, 2000)

The appellants were convicted for conspiring to murder the victim. One of the co-conspirators surrendered voluntarily. Whether the liability of each co-conspirator should be always equal.

HELD:

No. Since the existence of a conspiracy does not prevent the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance exclusively in favor of the co-conspirator to whom such circumstance may relate, to him alone.

What constitutes civil liability arising from a crime?

The civil liability of accused-appellants for indemnity for death and actual and moral damages, however, is solidary and not joint as ruled by the trial court. Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased are entitled to moral damages “for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.” The victim’s widow testified that she suffered pain from the death of her husband. Thus, in accordance with recent decisions of this Court, accused-appellants should be awarded the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Exemplary Damages. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, “exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.”

People v. Muyco

G.R. No. 132252(April 27 2000)

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity. In People v. Verde, the non-presentation of evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent the Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the victim’s wife as to earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award.

In that case, Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of P100.00 as a construction worker. As in People v. Verde, this Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under the current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

People v. Sultan

G.R. No. 132470(April 27, 2000)

The victim was abducted by the appellant, who brought her to his house. When they arrived at the appellant’s house the victim was divested of her jewelry and other valuables, afterwhich she was raped several times.  The appellant was convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Whether multiple rape can be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

HELD:

No. In several cases the Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “(i)n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied,” the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.

MAY 2000

People v Tanoy

GRNo 115692 May 12,2000

After a prior incident, the victim went to the police station. The victim therein found the appellant who is a policeman.  After, a few exchanges appellant shot the victim with an armalite hitting him in the chest.  He alleges that they were grappling for the gun before the “accident” occured thus he is entitled to an exempting circumstance under par 4 Art 12.

Held:

The shooting was intentional as shown by the location and nature of the wounds. Also a brown envelope remained tucked under his arm and was bloodied after he was shot.If they were grappling for possession of the gun then the envelope containing his complaint should have fallen.It would be highly inconceivable for a retired PC colonel to hold the barrel of the gun pointing towards him while grappling for its possession.

It is settled jurisprudence that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses lies within the province and expertise of the trial courts.Absent any showing of abuse of discretion or that trial courts overlooked material and relevant facts which could affect the outcome of the case, their findings are accorded great weight and respect.

There is also treachery in the commission of the crime.  The deceased did not expect any attack coming from the accused when he went to the police station. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person.What is decisive is that the execution of the attack mde it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.The victim was totally defenseless when he went out of his hiding place(went behind a cemented wall when the accused pointed the gun).he was 71 years old and his left hand was extended as if in supplication and surrender but the accused shot him nonetheless.

People v Avillana

GRNo119621 May 12,2000

Accused was convicted for murder by the lower court.He allegedly approached the victim and two others while they were waiting for a jeepney.He stabbed the victim in the chest and attacked the two others who were able to escape.

Held:

Conviction affirmed. The testimony of the sole witness is upheld.Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, such that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict./there is no showing that the implication by the witness was ill-motivated.Where the locus criminis afforded good visibility and where no improper motive can be attributed to the prosecution eyewitnesses for testifying against the accused, then his version of the offense deserves much weight.Alibi,though supported by the testimonies of friends, weakens in the face of positive identification by one credible, unbiasedwitness.His place was only 1 kilometer from the scene.There was treachery as the victim was caught by surprise and defenseless when accused made his stealthful approach from behind and lunged a knife into the victim’s chest.

People v de Leon

GRNo-124338-41 May 12,2000

The victim, a ten year old girl, was raped by the appellant in the tobacco field in four occasions. Appellant avers he was on the field with his wife.

Held:

While denial is a legitimate defense in rape cases, bare denials cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.Also, when there is an inconsistency between affidavits and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.Delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of threats of pysical violence, cannot be taken against the victim.It is fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build up a climate of extreme sychologiccal terror,w/c would, he hopes, numb his victim to silence and submissiveness.

People v PO1 Maing

GRNo122112 May 12, 2000

The victim was shot four times with a witness standing three meters away.The witness reported the incident that the victim was gunned down by an unidentified assailant.  Two weeks later he executed an affidavit pinpointing the appellant.  In the witness stand he denied having identified the assailant and clarified that he only heard rumors on who was the killer from his townmates.The appellant was in a mosque only 5oo meters away and there was motive, the appellant was boxed  and kicked by the victim before.

Held:

Despite his familiarity with appellant’s figure, the witness still failed to identify the assailant of the victim.He only based his testimony from rumors, thus he did not have first-hand knowledge of the identity of the assailant.His testimony was pure hearsay and has no evidentiary weight.Without any testimony positively identifying accused as the gunman nor any evidence directly linking him as the author of the crime, the appellant cannot be convicted of the murder.he enjoys the presumption of innocence, which can only be overcome by reasonable doubt.Mere suspicions or conjectures, however strong, can never become substitutes for this required quantum of proof.There must be moral certainty that the accused is guilty.Appellant’s alibi may be the weakest of all defenses.Nonetheless, this weakness ought not be used as proof of his guilt.The prosecution must rest on the strength of its evidence and not rely on the weakness of the defense.

People v Madarang

Gr. No. 132319 May 12,2000

Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing his wife, causing her death. Appellant alleges he was in a state of insanity and claims he had no recollection of the stabbingincident.He insists that he was deprived of intelligence , making his act involuntary.Hispsychiatric evaluation revealed he was suffering from schizophrenia but after two years in the National Center for Mental Health his condition improved thus, he was released.

Held:

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of the will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not excludeimputability.The issue of insanity is a question of fact.The state or condition of a man’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.Establishing one’s insanity requires testimony of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist.The proof must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commisssion of the offense with which he is charged.Noneof the witnesses declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident.Alsoschizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

 

People v Dequito

G.R. No.-132544 May 12,2000

A fifteen year old girl was raped by the common-law husband of her sister in the field.

Held:

A torn underwear is not indispensable to prove the crime of rape.Rape can be committed without damaging the apparel of the victim.The victim testified that appellant already started to remove her clothes but she ran away. He caught up with her and forced himself on her.The delay in reporting the incident can not diminish her credibility.Our consistent doctrine is that delay in reporting a rape, if sufficiently explained, does not affect the credibility of the witness.In this case, she was dependent on him, her parents were absent.Appellant threatened that he would leave the victim’s sister if the victim reported the incident.  Also the information is sufficient alleging therein that rape was committed on or about the month of July 1996.Thus, the prosecutor’s error in stating that what was being tried was the last rape committed in July in his offer of proof did not prejudice the rights of the appellant.Also, counsel for the defendant did not object to the offer of victim’s testimony. Sec 34-36 of Rule 132 govern.

People v Rimorin

GRNo-124309 May 16,2000

Two persons were kidnapped and brought to a forest area where they were killed.The bodies were set afire while in a pit then buried in the same spot.A helper of the suspects and the families of the victims were threatened with retaliation if they reported the incident.Tenyears later, the helper, after learning that one of the suspects have died, reported the incident and the bodies were then exhumed.  Appellants were convicted of kidnapping with murder.

Issue:

W/N guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The trial courts are in the best position to view the witness’ demeanor and deportment during the trial. Since the offense were committed prior to RA7659 on Deceber 31, 1993 thus said law amending Art267 of the RPC providing:  “when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.”Since in this instance the purpose of the appellant and his companions when they kidnapped the victims was to kill them the two counts of complex crime of kidnapping with murder is valid. However, as ruled in P v Ramos 297SCRA618, the rule now is: where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under the last paragraph of Art267as amended by RA7659.

There was also treachery as the victims’ hands were tied behind their backs when they were killed.However, there is no evident premeditation.there was no showing by the prosecution of the 1)time when the offender determined to commit the crime 2)act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination3)sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, to allow the offender to reflect on the consequence of his act.

People v Obrero

G.R. No.-122142 May 17, 2000

Appellant was convicted of robberry with homicide.He executed a written confession as a result of a custodial ivestigation.The issue is whether such is valid.

Held:

The extrajudicial confession was invalid.  The perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights is inadequate to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art IIISec12(1) requires an independent and competent counsel  of the suspect’s choice. Atty de los Reyes was not an independent counsel being the PC Captain and Station Commander. As held in P v Bandula, the independent counsel cannot be a special prosecutor, private or public prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the police whose interest is adverse to the accused.

While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession. The lack of objection of appellant to the introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidence did not satisfy the burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. Acquitted of robbery with homicide.

People v Toledano

G.R. No.-110220 May 18,2000

Bunao, while a member of Sangguniang Bayan, entered into a lease contract covering 2 public market stalls.Two administrative cases were filed against against him violating RA3019 and R6713 with the Ombudsman.However, said cases were dismissed.  An information for violation of Sec41(1) in relation to Sec221 of BP337 was filed against respondent before the RTc of Iba, Zambales which prohibits gov’t officials from engaing in any business transaction with the local gernment unit.The RTC, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal case on the ground of the dismissal of the administrative cases.

Held:

There is nothing in the law(Art 89RPC) which states that exoneration from an administrative charge extinguishes criminal liability.It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative law that administrative cases a independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. RA 7160,LGC of 1991, which replaced BP337 reenacted in its Sec89 the legal provision of Sec 41 of BP337.Thus, the act committed before the reenactment continuous to be a crime.

People v Saragina

G.R. No.-128281 May 30,2000

Accused stabbed and klled a Vulpangco, who uttered malicious remarks and showed his private part to the appellant’s sister a week earlier. He admits the incident but claims it was self-defense.

Held:

Because of this claim, the burden of proof was shifted to the appellant to establish the elements thereofa)unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;b)reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; c)lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The first element is lacking.Evidence must positively show that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack on the person of the accused which placed him in danger and justified him in inflicting harm upon his assailant hrough the employment of reasonable means to repel the aggression. In this, case the appellant attacked the victim while the latter was fanning charcoal.

The second element is also absent.The nature, location and number of the wounds belie appellant’s defense.Even considering he was able to wrest the knife away from Vulpanco and stab him on the chest, he still ran after the victim and stabbed him againin the face. However, there was no treachery because before he attacked, the appellant uttered “Ano pare, umpisahan na natin?”.Also, victim’s  niece shouted “Tiyong Takbo”.The victim was able to run away bu the accused caught up with him.Treachery cannot be appreciated when the victim was aware of the attack against him and was even able to flee even though briefly from his attacker.

Also, there is o evident premeditation.The prosecution failed to adduce evidence showing when and how the accused planned and prepared to kill Vulpangco.The mere fact that the accused learned that Vulpangco was pestering his sister a week before the killing is insufficient to prove evident premeditation  beyond reasonable doubt.

People v Babera

G.R. No.-130609, May 30,2000

Appellant was convicted of two counts of rape. He raped a 17 yr old having moderate retardation with the use of a balisong.

Held:

Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature, the conviction or acquittal of the accused would virtually depend on the credibility  of the complainant’s testmony. The trial court observed that the victim remained consistent and answered in a frank, sincere and straighforward manner. Also, factual findings of the trial court are generally sustained on appeal unless arbitrary or baseless.

People v Francisco

The appellant was convicted of frustrated murder.Together with two more persons, he assaulted and stabbed Ariel while seated in the driver’s seat of a jeepney.

Held:

The mere fact that the principal witness was the victim of the crime does not make him a biased witness and does not make his testimony incredible.It would be unnatural and illogical for him to impute the crime to an innocent person and let the culprit escape prosecution.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to do it.Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.In this case, the two John Does pulled the victim out of the jeepney.As the victim was getting down, he was stabbed by the appellant.  As to Antonio his participation was limited to shouting “heto na sila”.In a case, we ruled that the phrase “andiyan na”, which has similar import with the phrase herein, does not have conclusive conspiratorial meaning for the supposedly damning utterances are susceptible of varied inerpretations.One’s overt act, to be shown in pursuance of the conspiracy, may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.

As to Ricardo’s physical disability, the limp suffered by him due to polio has not been shown to restrict his means of action, defense or communication with his fellow beings as required by Art 13(8).  The location of the stab wounds (stomach) manifest his intention to kill thus contradicting his claim of not intending to commit so grave a wrong.

The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation must immediately preceded the act and that it was adequate to excite a person to commit a wrng, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.

The lack of aversion in the information of “intent to kill” does not not make itinsufficient.An information is sufficient if it states the designation of the offense bystatute.The information more than substantially satisfies the requirement of designating the offense of frustrated murder considering that it contains the acts constituting the felony, the name of the crime by statue and the stage (frustrated) of the commission of the crime by definition.Besides the absence of the averment of intent to kill may be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused the death of the victim.

People v Balora

G.R. No.-124976 May 31, 2000

The victim was raped inside the cubicle of the women’s restroom of the cinema theater of Manuela Complex.The appellant went over the divider and banged the head of the victim on the wall.After the incident, he was captured by the guards and mobbed by the other watchers.

            Held:   

Appellant avers that the victim could not be made to lie on the floor there being a toilt bowl in the middle an the cubicle was too small.The evil in man has no conscience.The beast in him bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit rae anywhere–even in places where people congregate.Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an isolated place and can in fact be committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual advances.

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.it is sufficient that the intimidation produces fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not submit to the bestial demands of the accused, somehing far worse would befall her at the time she was being molested. In P v Luzorate we held that intimidation was addressed to the mind of the victim and therefore subjective, its presence could not be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must be viewed in light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the crime.When a victim become paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently, her failure to take advantage of the early opportuniy to escape does not automatically vitiate the credibilityoher account.Complainant cannot be faulted for not taking any action inasmuch as different people react differently to a given type of situation, there being no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.

Lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse.A freshly broken hymen is not a essential element of rape.      e part of the victim;b)reaonable nec

People v Alicante

G.R. No.-127026-27 May 31,2000

The appellant, a father, raped his 13 yr old daughter fifteen times impregnating her.

Held:

The purpose of a formal offer is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes fro which the proponent is representing the evidence.As it is the victim herself who testified, to state the reason for the presentaiton of said witness is to state theobvious.The Court has consistently upheld that the presumptio hominis that a young filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true, does not go against theconstitutional presumption of innocence.It has been decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the Sate fo some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burdeen is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention. The actor in the affidavit of desistance, as worded, was the mother.Thus, it cannot be given weight.Also, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as pardon in so-called private crimes is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted.  Sec 11 RA7659 applies the offender being a parent.Thus the penalty of death is to be imposed

 

People v Mendoza

GRNo-128890 May 31, 2000

While playing mahjong the victim was suddenly attacked from behind with a bolo by Sanches and stabbed by the appellant.

Held:

We uphold the testimony of the witness.In the absence of proof to the contrary and by the defense’s failure to impugn the credibility of prosecution witness Ignacio.

In criminal jurisprudence, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court for it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and obsereved their deortment and manner oftestifying.There are are exceptions:a)when patent inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence.

As the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be describes as trechearous.As the attack waas synchronl, sudden and unexpected, treachery was evident.But the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength since this is deemed absorbed in treachery.

 

People v Traya

G.R. No. 129052 May 31, 2000

This is a case of incestuous rape.

Held:

The fact of minority of the victim was not stated in the Information.Only the relationship of the victim as daughter of the offender was alleged therein.The rule is that the elements of minority of the victim and her realtionship to the offender must concur.The failure toa llege on of these elements precludes the imposition of the death penalty. There being no allegation of the minority  of the victim in the Information, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not informed that he is being accused of qualified rape.

 

People v Magat

G.R. No.-130026 May 31, 2000

This is a case of incestuous rapeTwo informations were filed against appellant.Uponarraignment, he pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case.The mother of the complainant and the public prosecutor agreed and an order was issued the same day imposing tenyears imprisonment for each case.After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty was too light.Appellant was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty.Two months later, he entered anew a plea of guilty.The court then imposed the enalty of death.He now appeals on the ground that there was double jeopardy upon the re-arraignment and trial on the same information.

Held:

The first order issued by the trial is void ab initio on the ground that the accused’s plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated by law and the rules of procedure.The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when the accused  pleads guilty to a lesser offense.Sec 2 Rule 116 (note that there is a new set of Rules of Criminal Procedure).Here the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser penalty.The appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only baargained for a lesser penalty.He did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed.This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.It is the essence of a plea of guilty that that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally hid guilt and responsibilty for the offense imputed to him.Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Since the judgment of conviction is void, double jeopardy will not lie. Whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea.he did not question the procedural errors in the first arrraignment and having failed to do so, waived the errors in procedure.

Under the present rule, if the present rule, if accused enters a plea of guilty the trial courts are now enjoined to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt and precise degree of culpability, and to ask if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so.

 

People v Mamac

G.R. No.-130332 May 31,2000

Appellant woke up the victim by poking her with along stick while lying alongside her brother and sister.When she opened the window, she saw appellant brandishing a bolo and ordered her to go dwon.Appellant brought her to the bank of the river and raped her there while sticking the bolo at her.

Held:

We have long recognized that different people react differently to a given type of situation and there is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,startling or frightful experience.Appellant cannot claim that the victim had  no reason to be cowed outside by his mere act of stabbing her with a stick or mere brandishing of the bolo.  The information does not charge appellant with qualified rape and he cannot be sentenced to death.Unlike a generic aggravating circumsance which may be proved even if not alleged, aqualifying aggravating cannnot be proved unless alleged in the information.Itmust be alleged to properly inform the acused of the nature and cause of accusation against him in order not to violate due process.

The appellant is not a step-grandfather.he co-habited and lived with the materialgrandmother of Bernadette without the benefit of marriage.The word “step”, when used as a prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is indicative of relationship by affinity.There is no relationship by affinity between Bernadetted and appellant, thus he cannot be considered as a step-grandfather.At most he is a common law husband of Bernadette’s grandmother thus not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.Thus only recusion perpetua may be imposed.

People v Decena

G.R. No.-131843 May 31,2000

Appellant raped the daughter of his common-law wife.

Held:

The minority and the relationship of the complainant to the accused must be alleged in the information in order to convict the appellant of qualified rape.Qualifying circumstances under Sec11 of RA7659 must be alleged with particularity in the information to be proved and used in the imposition of the penalty.It would be a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape but convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not aleged in the indictment under which he was arraigned.

 

People v Cotas

G.R. No.132043 May 31,2000

Appellant stabbed the victim whiles sleeping. He alleges that it was self-defense.

Held:

Even Assuming that the victim was the aggressor, it is clear that at the time was killed, the danger to accused has already ceased.It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defende has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. There was treachery.It is settled that if the victim, whenkilled, was sleeping or had just awakened, the killing is with treachery because in such cases, the victim was not in a position to put up any form of defense.

 

People v Obosa

G.R. No.-132069 May 31, 2000

The appellant, with two other persons, waylaid former Secretary of Local Government Jaime Ferrer and his driver. The appellant’s defense is that as aprison inmate who based on prison records was inside the compound of the Nat’l Bilibid Prisons Prisons on the date and time of the incident, he could not have participated in the ambush; and if indeed he was able to leave the prison premises it is unbelievable that an escaped convict would return to prison.

Held:

The cited circumstances do not present a physical impossibility for the appellant to have participated in the commission of the crime.First, the log book presented in court referred only to the south gate.The Director of the Bureau of Prisons testified that Obosa was given preferential treatment in prison and was allowed to park his vehicle inside the prison compound despite prohibition.

Appellant’s objection to the admissibility of the testimony of an inmate that the accused confided his participation in the crime is without merit.A convicted felon is not disqualified by the Rules of Evidence from testifying in Court.The judgment of conviction did not rest on the alleged confession made by Obosa.Treachery is present for the car was shot at while it was slowing down as it approached a corner ensuring  the accomplishment of the attack and eliminating any risk from possible defenses that the victim may put up.

 

People v Gomez

G.R. No.-132171May 31,2000

Appellant stabbed the victim while in a drinking session.

Held:

Physical ipossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accused maintains he was at, but more importantly, the accessibility between these two points—in the instant case, how this distance translate to hours of travel.Thus, although geographical distances may be taken judicial notice of, this alone will not suffice for purposses of proving an alibi, because it remains for the defense to prove the relative accessibility of accused from the scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed.The defense should have introduced evidence of a verage travel time as of that day from between the two points—and it should have done so during the trial, not on appeal.

The burden is upon the accused to present credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime; otherwise, an alibi may not prevail over the positive testimony and clear identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.

Also, the presence of treachery is not discounted by the fact that the killing was effected by a single stab wound or that the attack was frontal—for as long as the method employedtended directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk of defense or retaliation of the offender.

 

P v Leonardo

G.R. No.-133109 May 31,2000

The appellant was convicted of homicide.The lower court relyed solely on the testimony of victim’s father.

Held:

The rule as to motive and how it affects the witness’ credibility is: absent evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses for the prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.On the other hand, if for any motive there is a possibility that a witness might have been prompted to testify falsely, courts should be on guard in assessing the witness’ credibility. it is basic in criminal law that the prosecution has the obligation of proving beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the malefactor and his participation in the crime or offense charged.Such degree  of proof does not mean  excluding the possibility of error, as producing absolute certainty.Only moral certainy is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.Only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction.

 

People v Contega

G.R. No.-133579 May 31,2000

The victim was found bleeding while lying face down on the floor. When asked who his assailant was he answered; “Rogelio,former pakyaw worker.”

Held:

It is axiomatic that the prosecution bears not only the onus to show that a crime has been committed but also to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the person or persons who should be responsible therefor.The utterance of the victim did not sufficiently identify the appellant.The prosecution has not eliminated the possibility that another piecemeal worker with the name “Rogelio” was employed by the Barbas. The conclusion that accused was the same person referred to by the prosecution has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Alibi is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and concoct between relative, friends and even those not related to the offender. In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.

JUNE 2000

People v Robles

G.R. No.-101335 June 8,2000

Appellant was convicted of robbery with homicide.He was apprehended after admitting the crime. He was with the other perpetratorsin a taxi which was stopped in a routine inspection.

Held:

The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to apresumption of theft, unless it is proved that the owne of the articles was deprived of possession by violence, intimidation, in which case the presumption becomes one of robbery.In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need only to prove these elements: 1)the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; 2)property taken belongs to another; 3)the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and 4)on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof the crime of homicide, here used in a generic sense is committed.The homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery.What is essential is that there an intimate connection between robbery ad the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.The rule is that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears they endeavored to prevent the homicide.

 

People v Antonio

G.R. No.-122473 June 8,2000

This is a case of incestuous rape.

Held:

Rape may be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone, or while the rapist’s spouse are asleep, or in a small room where other family members also slept.A daughter would not accuse her own father of such unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not been aggrieved.It is highly improbable for a woman, especially one of tender age, to concoct a brutal tale of ravishment, allow a gynecologic examination, and undergo the humiliation of a public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.

People v Mumar

G.R. No.-123155 June 8,2000

The victim was shot while his back was turned towards his assailants.

Held:

A direct proof to show that the accused had come to an agreement to commit a felony is notnecessary.It is sufficient that all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent to do harm to the victim.

 

People v Monieva

G.R. No.123912 June 8,2000

The victim was hacked with a bolo and was decapitated by the appellant.

Held:

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witness credibility. Even where a witness is found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particular, and it was not shown that there was such intended prevarication, it is not required that the entire testimony be rejected, since such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.

Abuse of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself. Before it may be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefacto to take advantage thereof.The prosecution is of the opinion that since the appellant was armed with a bolo and was chasing the unarmed victim who was trying to flee, this shows that the latter was powerless to offer resistance thereby admitting his inferiority and superiority of the defendant.This is mere conjecture, it was not all apparent that the appellant consciously adopted that particular means. The mere fact that the victim was running away from the appellant who was wielding a bolo shows that the victim was aware of the danger to himself, thus negating the suddenness of the attack for which reason treachery cannot be appreciated.

People v Cambi

G.R. No.127131 June 8, 2000

The 15 yr old complainant was rape by the appellant.

Held:

The absence of illumination in the place of the commission of the crime does not detract from the positive identification by Margie of the appellant as her assailant. Although visibility is an important factor in the identification of a criminal offender, its relative significance depends largely on the attending circumstances and the discretion of the trialcourt.In the case at bar, the assailant was well known to Margie as the former was heremployer.Also, the voice of the appellant was heard when he uttered threats against thecomplainant.It has been this Court’s observation that it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which he crime was committed.

Not every rape victim can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations ofeveryone.Some may shout, some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion. The force or violence that is required in rape cases is relative.When applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible.It is enough that it has enabled the offender to consummate his purpose to bring about the desiredresult.It is not even necessary that the offender be armed with a weapon.

PEOPLE V. OSCAR CARILLO

G.R. NO. 129528

Oscar Carillo together with Eduardo Candare were accused of murder.  The physical evidence shows that the death of the victim was caused by 2 stab wounds probably caused by 2 separate instruments.  Candare executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility.  Prosecution presented a second cousin of the victim as its main witness.

HELD:

Physical evidence ranks high in the hierarchy of evidence.  As physical evidence is compatible with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but inconsistent with the claim of the defense witnesses, the former should prevail.  For the same reason, the court cannot accept as true the affidavit of Candare owning sole responsibility for the crime.

Relationship per se does not automatically discredit a witness. In fact, kinship by blood or marriage to the victim would deter one from implicating innocent persons as one’s natural interest would be to secure conviction by the real culprit.

PEOPLE V. ROMEO CAPILI

G.R. NO. 130588

Accused was convicted of murder.  Three high school students testified for the prosecution and claimed that they actually saw the accused in flagrante delicto actually striking and submerging the head of the victim in the river.  Right after the incident, accused apparently saw them by the riverbank and offered them a ride across the river, to which they readily acceded.

HELD:

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.  There can never be a better gauge by which a witness’ testimony may be evaluated and analyzed than the ordinary common human experience.

In this case, it is rather unnatural, to say the least, actually defying sound reasons for 3 young students, to allow themselves to be ferried by an adult male whom they have just recently witnessed kill and drown a helpless and unsuspecting victim.  It makes the court wonder if the 3 supposed eye witness directly saw the actual killing in this case.

PEOPLE V. RUFINO TESTON & ROGELIO GACO

G.R. NO. 134938

The 3 accused were charged with murder.  The prosecution presented one eyewitness.  The defense interposed self-defense.  Accused questions trial court’s appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witness as unbelievable and biased.

HELD:

The trial court’s evaluation of a witness’ trustworthiness is entitled to highest respect for it has the distinct opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether he is telling the truth. Moreover, the defense has not presented any evidence that witness was impelled by dubious or improper motives, therefore, it must be presumed that he was not so moved.  The testimony of a single prosecution witness, if found credible and positive, is sufficient to convict, for the truth is not established by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies.

Besides, credibility of witness is no longer the issue since self-defense was invoked as justifying circumstance.  Whenever the accused admits inflicting a fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense, the burden of proof immediately shifts from the prosecution to the defense, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.

PEOPLE V. JOSE GERAL ALIAS “JOSE”

G.R. NO. 122283

Accused was convicted of murder.  He assails the credibility of the prosecution witness and the sufficiency of evidence against him.

HELD:

On the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made by the trial court.  Moreover, patent inconsistencies in and between appellant’s testimony and those of his witnesses only undermine appellant’s defense.

PEOPLE V. MACARIO U. CASTILLO

G.R. NO. 111734-35

Spouses Castillo were convicted as conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Wilhelmina.  The victim is a businesswoman engaged in the real estate business.  The 2 accused are both her sales agents on commission basis.

HELD:

Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence.  It may be inferred from the conduct of all accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.  The conduct should point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.  Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence or deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. Here, the spouses referred the main perpetrator to the victim.  The perpetrator who posed as buyer did not even inform the seller who referred him, which is contrary to common practice.

PEOPLE V. EPIE ARLALEJO

G.R. NO. 127841

The accused was convicted for Robbery with Homicide in an information alleging conspiracy.  The 2 accused hoisted the defense of denial and alibi.  One of the accused was acquitted and so the accused questions his conviction because in as much as conspiracy was not proved by the prosecution, the appellant should likewise be acquitted.

HELD:

By its nature, conspiracy is a joint offense as one person cannot conspire alone.  In conspiracy, the commission of a crime is through the joint act or intent of 2 or more persons.  However, there is nothing irregular with the acquittal of one of the supposed co-conspirators and the conviction of another. Generally, conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed as the mere act of conspiring is not by itself punishable.  Hence, it does not follow that one person alone cannot be convicted when there is a finding of conspiracy.  As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.

In the case at bar, it is incorrect to state that the accused was acquitted because conspiracy was not proved.  The evidence established beyond doubt the existence of conspiracy to rub.  However, the evidence proved only the existence of a conspiracy but not the culpability of the appellant.  The trial court noted that the victims had no sufficient opportunity to recognize the acquitted accused.  The evaluation of evidence reveals that the same is true insofar as the appellant is concerned.

PEOPLE V. DOMINADOR HISTORILLO

G.R. NO. 130408

Appellant was convicted for raping his 12 year old daughter and was sentenced to death.  Appeal assails the criminal complaint which was not under oath and is therefore void.  Also, prosecution failed to establish the use of force in the occasion of the crime.  Further, the penalty of death was also questioned as the information does not allege the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender.

HELD:

A complaint presented by a private person when not sworn by him is not necessarily void.  The want of an oath is a mere defect of form which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving the resistance where there is intimidation.  Moreover, in a crime of rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation.

Age and relationship are special qualifying circumstances that changes the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form punishable by death.  Since the charge of rape in the complaint is not in its qualified form so as to fall under the special qualifying circumstance stated in section 11 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

PEOPLE V. ROBERTO ESTRADA

G.R. NO. 130487

Accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to death.  Defense interposed insanity with proof of his history of mental illness filed for suspension of arraignment and suspension of proceedings.  Both were denied without subjecting accused to mental examination.

HELD:

Case remanded for the conduct of a proper mental examination to determine competency to stand trial.  By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial and the proceedings before the court are therefore nullified. He who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence.  The absence of direct proof however, does not entirely discount the probability that accused was not of sound mind at that time. In passing the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings, the test is found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance which the law secures or gives.  There are 2 distinct matters to be determined under this test (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court.  In the case, the trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of the accused.  The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental health.  The court should have at least ordered the examination of the accused, especially in the light of the latter’s history of mental item.

PEOPLE V. VENANCIO FRANCISCO

G.R. NO. 130490

Accused was convicted of murder and slight physical injuries.  The trial court imposed penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua medium.  In imposing the penalty, the trial court applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law stating that RA 7659 (An act to impose the death penalty on certain heinous crimes) made the penalty of reclusion perpetua divisible.

HELD:

Notwithstanding RA 7659, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua remains an indivisible penalty.  Although RA 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua to 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.  It remains as an indivisible penalty.

PEOPLE V. MARCELO NAVA JR.

G.R. NO. 130509-12

Accused was convicted of 4 counts of rape of his 13 year old daughter.  The information does not allege the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender.  He was sentenced to death and made to pay civil indemnity only.

HELD:

Crime is only simple rape since the information does not allege the age of victim and her relationship with he offender. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.  An award of 50,000 as moral damages for each of the counts of rape is granted in recognition of the victim’s injury as being inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape and to warrant per se an award of moral damages.

PEOPLE VS ROMEO ARILLAS

G.R. NO. 130593

Accused was convicted for raping his 16 year old daughter.  He was sentenced to death despite the fact that the information does not allege the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender.

HELD:

When the age and the relationship are not alleged in the information, such should not be considered as special qualifying circumstances that will change the nature of simple rape and punish offender with the penalty of death.  If the qualifying circumstance is not alleged but proved, it shall only be considered as an aggravating circumstance.  It is a denial of the right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and consequently a denial of due process if he is convicted of a crime in its qualified form notwithstanding the fact that the information on which he was arraigned charges him only of the crime in its simple form by not specifying the circumstance that qualifies the crime.

PEOPLE V. ANGEL RIOS

G.R. NO. 132632

Accused was convicted of murder.  The crime was preceded by a heated argument.  The accused left and came back minutes after the altercation and stabbed victim at the latter’s terrace.

HELD:

Homicide and not murder.  Treachery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Qualifying and aggravating circumstances before being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as a criminal offense. Dwelling was correctly considered aggravating.  The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms part thereof.

PEOPLE V. JOEL TANEZA

G.R. NO. 121668

Accused was convicted of murder for shooting a bakery delivery man.  The victim was brought to the hospital and subjected to an operation.  He was interviewed and he named the accused as his assailant.  He died a day after giving his statement.

HELD:

The statement was considered as a dying declaration and is admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.  The requirements for the admissibility of an ante-mortem statement are: (1) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; (4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent was the victim. Although it may not be ascertained from the written statement whether the victim was speaking with a consciousness of impending death, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.

PEOPLE V. WILSON DREU

G.R. NO. 126282

Accused was convicted of rape.  He interposed the defense that he and the victim was sweethearts.  He offered marriage but was rejected.

HELD:

The “sweethearts defense” cannot be appreciated as the defense failed to come up with convincing proof.  Indeed, the accused bears the burden of proving that he and the complainant had an affair which naturally led to a sexual relationship.  The guilt of the accused was also established by the fact that he offered marriage to the complainant after the incident was reported to the authorities.  As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an admission of guilt.

PEOPLE V. PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES

G.R. NO. 124670

Accused was convicted of murder.  He interposed self-defense and that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty.

HELD:

Self defense cannot be appreciated.  Where the accused admits to killing the victim in self defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. For a person not to incur criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty; (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.  However, second requisite here was not proved since killing need not be a necessary consequence of his duty.

PEOPLE V. JOHNNY DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 133921

Accused was convicted of rape.  The charge was filed 12 years after the alleged incident, when the victim was already 20 years old.

HELD: 

An accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent to disprove the charge.  In rape cases, the testimony of the complainant must stand or fall on its own merits and should never be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.  The long delay of the complainant in reporting the incident makes it difficult for the court not to have compelling doubts on the veracity of her episode.  Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt not proven.

PEOPLE V. ROLANDO FLORES

G.R. NO. 124977

Accused was convicted of murder.  The conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence because there was no eye witness to the actual killing of the victim.

HELD:

A judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

PEOPLE V. FELIPE HOFILENA

G.R. NO. 134772

Accused was convicted of raping a 12 year old girl.  The accused interposed alibi as defense.

HELD:

When a victim of rape says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.  In the absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail over the positive testimony of the victim, who had no improper motive to testify falsely against him.

PEOPLE V. HENRY FLORES

G.R. NO. 116794

Accused was convicted of murder. Only one eyewitness was presented.

HELD:

The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a conviction.

PEOPLE V. HERMOGENES FLORA

G.R. NO. 125909

The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were convicted for the murder of Emerita and Ireneo and the attempted murder of Flor.  The 2 were found to have conspired to kill Ireneo.  However, during the commission of the crime, Emerita was also killed and Flor hit by a bullet.

HELD:

Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy.  For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else.  Hence, both can be convicted for the murder of Ireneo.  However, only Hermogenes who fired at Emerita and Flor can be convicted for  the murder of Emerita and Flor respectively.

PEOPLE V. EDDY PANEZA

G.R. NO. 131829

The 3 accused were convicted of highway robbery.  They assert that they cannot be convicted of highway robbery as the crime was not committed by at least 4 persons as required in Article 306 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

Highway robbery is now governed by PD No. 532, otherwise known as Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. It is no longer required that there be at least 4 armed persons forming a band of robbers.  The no. of offenders is no longer an essential element of the crime of highway robbery. PD 532 only requires proof that persons were organized for the purpose of committing highway robbery indiscriminately.  The robbery must be directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims but against any and all prospective victims.

PEOPLE V. JUDGE ESTRELLA ESTRADA

G.R. NO. 124461

Motion for the return of seized goods on the ground that the warrant was illegal.  Further, the seized medicines were found genuine but were only illegally imported.

HELD:

Even if the medicines were genuine if the seller has no permit from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search warrant was declared illegal.

PEOPLE V. MARIANO AUSTRIA

G.R. NO. 123539

Accused, 82 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, was convicted of the crime of rape.  He raises as defense the 2 week delay in reporting the offense and his alleged impotency.

HELD:

Delay or vacillation in criminal accusations do not necessarily impair the complainant’s credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.  It is not uncommon to conceal rape because of rapist’s threats to life, fear of public humiliation and lack of courage.  Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim. The presumption is always in favor of potency.  Impotency is considered an abnormal condition and should not be presumed.  The doctor’s testimony stated that his sex organ was diseased but never was there even a hint that accused was impotent.  The trial court also observed that accused was still strong, agile and capable of committing the sexual act and seriously doubts that he is 82 years old.

PEOPLE V. ABDULAJID SABDANI

G.R. NO. 134262

The accused was convicted of murder.  He interposed self-defense as defense.

HELD:

The accused who invokes self-defense admits authorship of the killing and therefore the burden of proof shifts to him who must then establish with clear and convincing evidence all the elements of self-defense.  Accused failed to prove unlawful aggression.  Unlawful aggression presupposes not merely a threatening/intimidating attitude, but an actual and sudden attack or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils one’s life or limb. In the case at bar, there was no sign that victim was armed other than the fact that his hands were tucked inside his shirt.  Accused did not ascertain whether victim was really armed, or warn him to drop his weapon.

PEOPLE V. ROLANDO TABANGGAY

G.R. NO. 130504

Accused was convicted of raping his 2 minor children.  He was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

HELD:

Penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua.  The victim’s minority was not sufficiently proved.  In accusations involving incestuous rape, the relationship of the accused with the offended party as well as the latter’s age must be alleged in the information and proven by the prosecution with competent evidence during their trial.  A bare photocopy of the victim’s birth certificate which is neither certified nor offered formally in evidence is not sufficient proof of the victim’s age.

PEOPLE V. PEPE LOZADA

G.R. NO. 130589

As Danilo Morin and his cousin were walking one evening, Lozada followed from behind and shot Morin to death.  Lozada was convicted of murder appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

HELD:

Affirmed.  There was treachery since Morin was unsuspectingly shot from behind.  The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.   The 2 conditions for treachery to be considered as qualifying circumstance are: (1) employment of means, methods and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim; (2) and the deliberate adoption of such means, methods and manner of execution.

PEOPLE V. ARMANDO REANZARES

G.R. NO. 130656

Accused was held guilty of highway robbery with homicide.  Accused interposed alibi as defense.  He questions credibility of witness.

HELD:

For alibi to be believed it must be shown that: (a) the accused was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.  This was not shown here. However, he cannot be held liable for highway robbery.  Conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately.  There is no proof in the instant case that the accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery.  Neither is there proof that they attempted to commit robbery as to show the “indiscriminate” perpetration thereof.  On the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a single act of depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another.

Accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide as the allegation in the information are enough to convict him therefore.

PEOPLE V. REYNALDE LAZARTE

G.R. NO. 130711

Accused was convicted of the crime of murder.  Accused interposed self-defense.

HELD:

In instances where an accused acknowledges full responsibility for the death of the victim but claims self-defense, the burden of evidence is transferred to the accused to prove that his taking of a life was justified and that he did not incur any criminal liability for the same.  In order that he may be acquitted, the accused must prove that the 3 circumstances are present, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. Unlawful aggression was not proven.  The alleged revolver used by the victim was not even presented in evidence.  Further, accused did not even voluntarily surrender and opted to remain silent about the incident.  A person claiming self-defense would have reported the incident to the police as he has nothing to hide.

As to civil liability, aside from the ordinary indemnity of P50,000 accused is obliged to compensate the heirs of the victim for the latter’s lose of earning capacity and pay the heirs of the victim moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by them.

PEOPLE V. ERNESTO SANTOS

G.R. NO. 131103 & 143472

Accused was found guilty of 2 counts of rape of his 14 year old daughter.  The information alleges that the crime was committed on or about sometime in 1988 and 1989.  He avers that such allegations are indefinite and have deprived him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

HELD:

It is too late for the accused to question the form or substance of the information in these cases since he did not move to quash the information before he was arraigned. Further, in the crime of rape, the date of the commission is not an essential element of the crime.

PEOPLE V. PACITA ORDONO

G.R. NO. 132154

The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy on the bases of their extra judicial confession.  An interview with a radio announcer was also done where the 2 accused accepted responsibility for the crime.  They now assail their conviction as their confession was attended by infirmities’ i.e. mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation.

HELD:

The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible.  The presence of the mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not cure the defect.  However, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to a news reporter on televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.  By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible.  The interview was not in the nature of an investigation, and thus, the uncounselled confession did not violate accused’s constitutional rights.

PEOPLE V. BENIDO ALCARTADO

G.R. NO. 132379-82

The 2 accused, stepfather and step grandfather of the victim, were convicted of rape and sentenced to suffer supreme penalty of death.  The information, however, does not allege the relationship of the accused with the victim.

HELD:

The absence of the allegation of relationship in the information converted the crime to simple rape which is not punishable by death.  Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment.  If the same are not pleaded, but are proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances.

PEOPLE V. ARNOLD RATUNIL

G.R. NO. 137270

The accused was convicted of the crime of rape with the use of force.  Accused used sweetheart defense.  He presented a letter written by the victim asking for money from the accused since she was leaving town.

HELD:

In a rape case, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with great caution, for the crime is usually known only to her and to her rapist.  The dubious behavior of the alleged victim after the rape detracts from her credibility and creates reasonable doubt that may lead to the acquittal of the accused.  Conviction always rests on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, never on the weakness of that of the defense.

PEOPLE V. EDISON ARELLANO

G.R. NO. 122477

Accused was convicted of murder.  He assails credibility of the witnesses.

HELD:

Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. However, appellant should be convicted of homicide not murder since treachery was not established.  Appellant’s stabbing of the victim was done on an impulse.  As appellant did not consciously adopt the means of attack, treachery cannot be appreciated.

As regards the monetary award, aside from the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 in accordance with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent and physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of award.  The amount of loss of earning capacity is based mainly on 2 factors: (1) the number of years of which the damages shall be computed;  and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the respondent should be fixed.

JULY 2000

PEOPLE V. AGAPITO LISTERIO

G.R. NO. 122099

The accused was convicted of murder and frustrated murder committed with conspiracy.  He assails the testimony of the witness as insufficient to convict him of her crime charged.

HELD:

It is well settled that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, such that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused.  The trial court found the witness’ testimony as candid and straightforward.  Court defer to the lower court’s findings consistent with the principle that the trial judge is the best and the most competent person who can weigh and evaluate the testimony of witnesses.

Conspiracy was also proven.  A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.  To establish the existence of a conspiracy, direct proof is not essential since it may be shown by facts and circumstances from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.  If there is a chain of circumstances to that effect, conspiracy can be established.

PEOPLE V. ELMER YPARRAGUIRE

G.R. NO. 124391

Accused was convicted of raping a mentally retarded girl.  Appellant contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complainant was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant.

HELD:

Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.  Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from physical deformity.  No woman would come out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her, unless her purpose is to redress the wrong done against her honor.  Once the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the requirement of Art 344 of the RPC to the effect that the offense of rape shall not be prosecuted excerpt upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents are satisfied. Said provision is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is governed by the Judiciary law, not the RPC.  The complaint required in Art 344 is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.  The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case.

PEOPLE V. KENNETH CANEDO

G.R. NO. 128382

Accused was convicted of murder.

HELD:

Accused acquitted on reasonable doubt.  The records do not show how witness described appellant and which description enabled an anonymous person to point at appellant as the one who stabbed the victim.  In the absence of these critical details of description, we cannot adjudge whether the appellant was correctly and properly identified.  Further, the crime was committed when a dance was being held.  The fight was a rumble, participated in by a lot of people.  All theses circumstances should make the identification of appellant difficult and we should be extra careful in evaluating witness’ testimony.   Positive identification of malefactors should not be disregarded just because the name of some of them were supplied to the eyewitness.  But in such cases, the description of the criminal was detailed and fitted the accused.  In the instant case, these reliable details which could provide a good index for identification are missing.

PEOPLE V. PETRONIL CASTILLO

G.R. NO. 130205

Accused was convicted of raping the 9 year old daughter of his live-in partner.  He assails the credibility of testimony since there are inconsistencies with the executed affidavit.

HELD:

Although there are omissions in the affidavit, such omissions did not diminish nor affect her credibility as a witness.  Ex parte affidavits are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate and will thus not prevail over a witness statements on the stand.

PEOPLE V. ORLIE SULTAN

G.R. NO. 130594

Accused was convicted of carnapping with homicide.  Appellant’s defense is alibi and denial.  They also content that their identification in the police line up was a violation of their constitutional right and thus inadmissible.

HELD:

Alibis are generally considered with suspicion and are always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they can easily be fabricated.  Ergo, for alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime and (b) that it would be physically impossible for him to have her at the scene of the crime.  Since accused was unable to present witnesses to corroborate his testimony, his alibi cannot be appreciated.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out of court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) he witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Applying this, there was no violation of constitutional right.  The witnesses positively identified the 3 accused inside the jail.  The 3 accused were in the company of other inmates.  Thus, they were in a group.

PEOPLE V. ROBERT ARANETA

G.R. NO. 137604

The accused was convicted of the crime of murder.  He anchors his defense on mistaken identity and denial and alibi.

HELD:

The appellant’s claim that witness was mistaken in naming him as “Gilbert Araneta” and not “Robert Araneta” does not destroy her credibility and is not sufficient to exculpate him.  For even assuming that the accused real name is Robert, it is sufficient that she was positive as to his physical identity as a participant in the shooting of her son from her personal knowledge for purposes of identifying him in the present case.  Given the positive identification made by the lone prosecution witness, the appellant’s uncorroborated defense of denial and alibi must fail. However, treachery and evident premeditation were not established, therefore, the crime committed can only be homicide, not murder.  Abuse of superiority was however established.  Considering that the victim when assaulted was unarmed, he was therefore no match to his 3 adversaries who were all armed with handguns.  Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where 3 armed persons attacked the defenseless victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commence and treachery was not proved, the fact that there were 3 armed assailants would constitute abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE V. ROSENDO MENDEZ

G.R. NO. 132546

Accused was found guilty of raping his 16 year old step daughter.  He assails the defective information.

HELD:

The failure of the information to state that the accused raped the victim “through force or intimidation” is not a fatal omission in this case because the complaint alleged the ultimate fact that the accused raped the victim “by means of force”.  So at the outset, the appellant could have readily ascertained that he was being accused of rape committed through force, a charge that sufficiently complies with Art 335. However, since the information alleges that the victim was his daughter, when in truth the actual relationship of the appellant with the victim is that of stepfather and stepdaughter, the appellant can be held liable only for simple rape.

PEOPLE V. BERNARDINO CARANGUIAN

G.R. NO. 124514

Accused was convicted of murder.  He assails credibility of witness and interposed alibi as defense.

HELD:

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated the killing.  The information given by the witnesses at the identity of appellant is hearsay.  The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing.  Section 36 of Rule 130 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules.  In fact, the witness’ testimony is even double or multiple hearsay since it is based upon “third hand” information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others.  Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay.

 

PEOPLE V. FERNANDO DIASANTA

G.R. NO. 128108

Accused was convicted of the crime of rape committed against his 12 year old daughter.  He interposed alibi ad defense.

HELD:

Established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims especially of child victims are given full weight and credit.  Well settled is the rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been rapes, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Considering the categorical and unequivocal testimonies of the victim and an eyewitness, appellant’s alibi and self-serving denial cannot prosper.

PEOPLE V. RAELITO LIBRANDO

G.R. NO. 132251

The accused were convicted of murder.  Appellants point out that they have no reason to assault the deceased since they had never any quarrel with the victim.  They also assail the credibility of the child witness.

HELD:

While it is true that they have no motive to assault the deceased, nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that crimes have been attributed to persons who appear to have no reasons for committing them as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders.  Motive gains importance only when the identity of the culprit is suspect. It is also well-established that any child regardless of age can be competent witness if he can perceive and can make known his perceptions to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined.  The child’s competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; (c) capacity of communication.  The child’s lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

 

PEOPLE V. ROBERT FIGUEROA

G.R. NO. 134056

Accused was convicted of violating Sec 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 972 – Unauthorized manufacture of regulated drugs.  He contends that since his alleged co-conspirator was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence to prove that she conspired with him, he should likewise be acquitted.

HELD:

Once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators.  It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own respective acts.  Accordingly, appellant’s criminal liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.

PEOPLE V. EVANGELINE ORDONO

G.R. NO. 129593  143533-35

Accused was convicted of 2 counts of illegal recruitment and 2 counts of estafa.

HELD:

To be convicted for illegal recruitment, 2 elements must concur: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement”.  The 2 elements were proven.  The testimonies of complainant corroborated each other and were buttressed by other prosecution witnesses.

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused by offended party.  These were also established in the case.

 

PEOPLE V. MEYNARD PANGANIBAN

G.R. NO. 133028

Accused was convicted of estafa.  Appellant contends that his conviction should be reversed because the element of fraud or deceit was not proven.  He insists that the “stop payment” order was made in good faith and was not meant to evade payment of the debt.

HELD:

Despite his denials during testimony, it is obvious that appellant was aware at the time he made the postdated checks for several creditors that he would have several debts maturing at the same time, of which are recoverable from the same bank account.  Then knowing that the balance is not sufficient to cover complainant’s check, he immediately ordered the drawee bank to stop its payment.  These circumstances, taken together, indicate appellant’s intent to deceive and defraud at the time he issued the check.  The indeterminate sentence law must also be applied.

 

PEOPLE V. LEONCIO ALIVIANO

G.R. NO. 133985

Accused was convicted of raping a 7 year old girl.  He interposed denial and assails the admissibility of the medical certificate since the doctor who prepared it was not presented.

HELD:

Concededly, the subject medical certificate cannot be given any probative value.  It is settled that since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight nor credit unless the doctor who issued it be presented in court to show his qualifications.  In any case, medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape.  It is merely a corroborative evidence.  The lone testimony of the complainant which is credible and free from serious and material contradictions is sufficient to warrant the conviction of appellant.

PEOPLE V. LUDIGARIO CANDELARIO

G.R. NO. 125550

Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with multiple rape.  One of the accused is a youth offender and was thus placed under the custody of DSWD, Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth.  DSWD recommended that the case of the accused be dismissed and his custody be transferred to his father after taking into account the minor’s performance in the rehabilitation center.

HELD:

The Final Report and Recommendation of the DSWD should be referred to the RTC for its appropriate action and disposition.  Where the DSWD recommends the discharge of a youthful offender, it is the trial court before whom the report and recommendation is subject to judicial review.  Recommendation alone is not sufficient to warrant the release of a youthful offender.  The youthful offender however is not to be tries anew by the trial court.  The inquiry is not a criminal prosecution but is rather limited to the determination of the offender’s proper education and his moral and social fitness to re-join the community.

 

PEOPLE V. FEDERICO ULGASAN

G.R. NO. 131824-26

Accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape committed against an 11 year old girl.  Accused interposed denial and alibi.  He assails the credibility of witness.

HELD:

A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. When the accused was positively identified by the victim who harbored no ill motive against the accused, the defense of alibi must fail.  For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus criminis.  In the case at bar, it is possible for appellant to be present at the scene of the crime.

 

PEOPLE V. ROLDAN BOHOL

G.R. NO. 130587

Accused was convicted of kidnapping with murder.  He interposed alibi as defense.

HELD:

For alibi to be tenable, accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. Here, the alleged place where the accused was at the time of the crime was only 40 meters from the place where the victim was shot.  It was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of the shooting.

PEOPLE V. MARCOS MUCAM

G.R. NO. 137276

Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide.  He questions sufficiency of evidence to warrant conviction.

HELD:

As a rule, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is binding on appellate courts, absent any fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.  In this case, the court a quo committed serious lapses which warrant the acquittal of the appellant.

PEOPLE V. ERNESTO DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 118967

Accused was convicted of murder.  Defense interposed denial and alibi.  He questions credibility of sole witness and testimonies being insufficient to sustain conviction.  He points inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony and her declarations during preliminary investigation.

HELD:

The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Declarations at the preliminary investigation which are conducted to determine the existence of a probable cause and to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, should not be equated with testimonies before the court.  While transcripts of a preliminary investigation may form part of the records of the case, testimony taken at the trial on the merits of the case where the adverse party has the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness and to ferret out the truth, deserves more credence.  Similarly, sworn statements that are taken ex-parte are generally incomplete and therefore, discrepancies between statements made on the witness stand and those in an affidavits are generally subordinated in importance in open court declarations because they are often times not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which transpired.

PEOPLE V. ALBERTO ANTONIO

G.R. NO. 128900

Accused was convicted of murder.  He questions credibility of witness because the latter’s first statement differed with his succeeding statements and his testimony in open court.

HELD:

Affidavits or statements taken ex-parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate.  Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight. Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit said witness.  Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to explain them.  It is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.

Further, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of trial court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect. There was no treachery.  It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder.  There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.  All the evidence shows was that the incident was an impulse killing.  It was a spur of the moment crime.  A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to penetrate the homicide without risk to himself.

 

PEOPLE V. ROLANDO BAYBADO

G.R. NO. 132136

Accused was convicted for raping his own daughter.  He interposed alibi as defense,.  Information however failed to allege the minority of the complainant.

HELD:

For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.  The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.  Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible that lies outside pf judicial cognizance.  In this case, the testimony of appellant barely meets the minimum standard of credibility. Accused however is guilty only of simple rape as there was no allegation as to the minority of the complainant.

 

PEOPLE V. VALENTIN MATIBAG

G.R. NO. 110515

Accused was convicted of murder.  Statements from 2 witnesses were taken.  However, only 1witnes was presented.

HELD:

Their extrajudicial statement of the witness who was not placed in the witness stand  should not be considered because it deprived the defense of its right to cross-examination.  The veracity of her statements, not having been ascertained, should not have been given any probative value at all.  Be that as it may, her testimony is merely corroborative and its exclusion will not affect the finding of guilt of the accused.

 

PEOPLE V. BERNARDO DAROY

G.R. NO. 118942

The accused was convicted of murder.  Defense questions the credibility of witnesses.

HELD:

Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion.  The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrate, can weigh such testimony in light of the accused’s behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.

PEOPLE V. ANICETA AQUINO

G.R. NO. 130742

Accused was convicted of estafa.  Trial court found conspiracy on the acts of the accused appellant of facilitating and initiating the meeting between the other 2 accused and the complainant and in convincing the latter to sell rice to the former and following it up till the delivery of the same.

HELD:

Court is not convinced that conspiracy to defraud complainant was proven. A conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.  It is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.  To establish conspiracy, there must be proof that 2 or more persons agreed to commit the crime.  However, mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one as a conspirator, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.  And to be he basis of conviction, conspiracy must be proven in the same manner as any element of the criminal ct itself.  The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist s clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.

PEOPLE V. BETH BANZALES

G.R. NO. 132289

Accused was found guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.  Defense challenges the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.

HELD:

Despite non presentation of POEA officer to testify, the POEA certification will suffice to prove that she has no permit to engage in the business.  POEA certification is a pubic document issued by a public officer in the performance of an official duty, hence, it is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.  Public documents are entitled to presumption of regularity, consequently, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary.

PEOPLE V. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES

G.R. NO. 136303

The accused were convicted of murder.  Defense interposed alibi as defense.  The conviction of the 2 accused was based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to 2 witnesses of the prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense.

HELD:

Dying declaration is one of the exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence.  The requirement are: (1) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; (4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, homicide or parricide where the declarant was the victim. In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant were made under the consciousness of impending death.  No proof to this effect was ever presented by the prosecution.

Neither may the alleged statements be admissible as part of the res gestae.  Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of a crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion ands there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.  In order to admit the statements as evidence part of res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical.

PEOPLE V. ROLANDO CARDEL

G.R. NO. 105582

The accused were convicted of murder.  They boxed and stabbed a snatcher who was caught while running with the loot.  Conspiracy, treachery and abuse of superior strength were found by the trial court.  Defense interposed alibi.

HELD:

The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses.  Conspiracy was not proven.  The existence of conspiracy is never presumed.  It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.  Hence, appellant will be separately adjudged according to the extent of their individual participation in the commission of the crime charged in the information.

Treachery was also not present.  The fact that the victim had a stab wound at the back is not, in itself, indicative of treachery.  Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven.  It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime.  Also, the appellant does not appear to have consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the killing of the victim without risk to himself.  The stabbing was the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment, rather than from a deliberate act of will, thus negating the existence of treachery.

Abuse of superior strength may not be appreciated to qualify the killing to the crime of murder for the reason that the same is not alleged in the information.  It has been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment.

 

PEOPLE V. ARIEL PEDROSO

G.R. NO. 125128

The accused was convicted of robbery with homicide.  He was sentenced by the trial court to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death.

HELD:

Under Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if an accused is found guilty of a felony for which the law prescribes a penalty composed of 2 indivisible penalties, the trial court judge has to impose one or the other, not both.  Since no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the information and since neither was any mitigating circumstance established by the defense, the lesser penalty of Reclusion Perpetua should be imposed.

PEOPLE V. DOMINADOR GUILLERMO

G.R. NO. 111292

The accused were convicted of murder.  Defense interposed alibi.

HELD:

Prosecution witness’ inconsistencies are more than enough to engender some doubt as to the guilt of the appellants.  The “onus probandi” in establishing the guilt of an accused for a criminal offense lies with the prosecution.  The burden must be discharged by it on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense or the lack of it.  Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.  The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

PEOPLE V. LIBERATO GIGANTO, SR.

G.R. NO. 123077

The accused were convicted of murder.  The defense interposed alibi.  Conviction was rendered based on the testimony of he eyewitness.

HELD:

Trial court relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the prosecution evidence, by emphasizing that alibi is a weak defense. It is settled that where the evidence of the prosecution is itself feeble, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, the defense of alibi assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength.  The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases, otherwise, the accused would be put in the difficult position of proving his innocence even where the prosecution’s evidence is vague and weak.  The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of the appellant’s alibi.  It must rely on the strength of its evidence and establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. ERNST GEORG HOLZER

G.R. NO. 132323

The accused were convicted of estafa.  Appellants contend that their liability is only civil and not criminal since the check was issued only to secure the loan they obtained from complainant and that there was no deceit on their part because they duly informed the complainant that the check was not yet funded.

HELD:

The elements of estafa involved in this case are: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been defrauded. The drawer of the dishonored check is given 3 days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check.  Otherwise, a prima facie presumption of deceit will arise which must then be overcome by the accused. In this case, no evidence of deceit accompanied the issuance of the check.  The prosecution presented evidence to show that a notice of dishonor had been sent to appellant.  The complainant actually knew at the time of the issuance of the check that it was not funded and that the money to cover it was still to come from Switzerland.

PEOPLE V. JIMMY ANTONIO

G.R. NO. 128149

The accused was found guilty of 3 counts of rape.  Appellants make issue of the trial; court’s reliance on the victim’s testimony.

HELD:

Credible, natural and convincing testimony of the victim is sufficient basis to convict.  The inconsistencies pointed out cannot overthrow the trial court’s conviction.  For a discrepancy in testimony to acquit, such must refer to significant facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused.  Inconsistencies irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds to reverse the conviction. Further, appellants were at large for 5 years.  Flight indicates guilt.  Accused’s acts of not confronting their accuser goes against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent man when accused with wrong doing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time.

PEOPLE V. ALEJANDRO SURILLA

G.R. NO. 129164

The accused was found guilty of the crime of rape committed against his 14 year old daughter.

HELD:

There are 3 guiding principles in rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only 2 persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Here, the trial court’s finding as to the credibility of the complainant’s testimony deserve respect.  Further, the accused escaped from jail and was only recaptured.  Flight is an implied admission of guilt and his desire to evade responsibility therefore. Death penalty however cannot be imposed because relationship of complainant with the accused was not alleged in the information.

PEOPLE V. SALVACION CAPARAS

G.R. NO. 133568

Accused was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1072.  Appellant questions judgment of conviction because there was no showing that a sale of prohibited drug took place.  She argues that the prosecution has failed to establish that money or specifically “marked money” was paid or exchanged hands between her and the supposed poseur-buyer.  She theorizes that in a contract of sale, the payment of the contract price is essential to consummate the transaction.  Considering that there was no payment made, the contract of sale was not consummated and inevitably, the accused cannot be convicted for the illegal sale of prohibited drug.

HELD:

Under Sec 4, the act of selling or acting as broker in a sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime.  It punishes the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. The absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court.  In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material and indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer.

PEOPLE V. ROLAND MOLINA

G.R. NO. 134777-78

Accused was found guilty of murder and frustrated murder.  Accused denied commission of the crime and imputed the same to another person.

HELD:

As weighed against the positive identification of accused by one of his victims, which was further corroborated by an eyewitness to the scene, and the absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part other than their quest for justice, appellant’s denial of the commission of the crime and imputation of the same to another person is demolished to obscurity.  Besides, the imputation of the crime to another malefactor was heard of only during his testimony, and was never raised before the police authorities during the investigation.  Clearly, his bare denial amounts to nothing more than negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. As to the amount of damages, prevailing jurisprudence sets the civil indemnity for death in the amount of P50,000, which can be awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim.  With respect to actual damages, the court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by receipts.  Moral damages may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries but there must be a factual basis for the award.  As to exemplary damages, there being one aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000 may be awarded in both murder and frustrated murder case pursuant to Art 2230 of the New Civil Code.

PEOPLE V. FEDERICO CAMPANER

G.R. NO. 130500 & 143834

The accused was found guilty of 2 counts of rape against his 15 year old daughter of his common law spouse.

HELD:

In evaluating the credibility of rape victims, the court has repeatedly held that it is not unnatural for inconsistencies to creep into the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is of tender age, as the witness is narrating the details of a harrowing experience.  So long as the testimony is consistent on material points, slightly conflicting statements will not undermine the witness’ credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.  On the contrary, these mistakes in fact strengthen, rather than weaken, the complainant’s credibility as they erase suspicion that the testimony is rehearsed. However, death cannot be imposed since the relationship of the complainant with the accused was not alleged in the information.

PEOPLE V. MARCELINO SAN JUAN

G.R. NO. 112449-50

Accused was convicted of (1) robbery with rape and (2) highway robbery.  He contends that since he did not flee from his residence, he should be exonerated.

HELD:

It is true that the flight of an accused is competent evidence against him tending to establish his guilt.  However, no law nor jurisprudence holds that non-flight per se is conclusive proof of his innocence. Further, for alibi to be validly invoked, the accused must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but must also establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE V. RICARDO TORTOSA

G.R. NO.116739

Accused was convicted of murder.  He questions the credibility of witnesses.

HELD:

The trial court did not err in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witness.  The record is bereft of any evidence to show that the witnesses had improper motive to testify falsely against appellant and the rule is well settled that absent evidence showing any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

PEOPLE V. JAIME BALACANO

G.R. NO. 127156

Accused was found guilty of the crime of rape committed against his 14 year old step daughter.  He contends that there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt to warrant his acquittal.

HELD:

“Reasonable doubt” is not a mere guess that the appellant may or may not be guilty.  It is such a doubt that a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence.  It is a state of mind engendered by insufficient proof. But, time and again, the Court has ruled that the lone testimony of the victim may suffice to convict the rapist.  When a victim says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. Further, absence of threats does not negate the charge of rape.  Although it is true that there were no physical injuries found in the victim’s body, in rape cases, absence of bodily threats does not matter where there is an existing relationship between the appellant and the victim, resulting to moral ascendancy of the former over the latter.

PEOPLE V. RAMIL SAMOLDE

G.R. NO. 128551

Accused was convicted of murder.  Accused executed an extrajudicial confession.  He also admitted in open court to the commission of the crime.

HELD:

Extrajudicial confession of accused is not admissible in evidence.  He was not informed of his constitutional right before his statements were taken.  However, his open court testimony is enough to convict him.  His subsequent allegation that he was given money to accept culpability deserves scant consideration. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.  The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience.  Further, accused went into hiding.  Flight has been held to be an indication of guilt.

PEOPLE V. ERIC BAID

G.R. NO. 129667

Accused was convicted of rape committed against a mental patient.  He contends that as complainant is schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been given credence by the trial court.  Further, he contends that victim consented with the sex.

HELD:

Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness.  She could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others.  Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give her responsive answers to them. Although complainant herself admitted that she agreed to have sex with him after he gave her a stick of cigarette, it should be stressed that complainant was in no position to give her consent.   Accused is to be convicted under Art 335 par 2, rape of a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.  The phrase “deprived of reason” has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency or some other form of mental retardation, those who are feebleminded although coherent.

PEOPLE V. ANTONIO DE LA TONGGA

G.R. NO. 133246

Accused was convicted of murder.  Defense argues that prosecution failed to establish the identity of the assailant.

HELD:

The finding of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses deserves respect.  Further, the defense of alibi is so weak.  In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. Further, treachery was properly appreciated.  The fact that the victim had been forewarned by somebody against possible attack does not negate the presence of treachery.  What is important is that the victim was attacked even before he and his companions could get out of the tricycle.  The mode of attack ensured the commission of the crime without risk to the accused.

PEOPLE V. OSCAR MANSUETO

G.R. NO. 135196

The accused was convicted of murder.  Defense interposed denial and alibi.

HELD:

Alibi is an inherently weak defense, easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.  For said defense to prosper, he accused must not only prove that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.  However, this was not shown here.

AUGUST 2000

PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO VILLANOS

G.R. NO. 126648

Accused was convicted of rape.  The victim was raped when unconscious.

HELD:

In cases where the victim is raped in a state of unconsciousness, the fact of sexual assault and the identity of the assailant can be established from the events preceding or following the victim’s loss of consciousness. True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks given to the victims which caused them to lose momentarily control of their faculties. But this is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for rape.  Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found to have been unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.

PEOPLE V. BLAS ROSARIO

G.R. NO. 122769

Accused were convicted of murder.  Defense assails credibility of prosecution’s lone witness.

HELD:

Assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of the trial courts.  Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of the witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the latter could have overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.  In the case at bar, the findings of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence.

PEOPLE V. PONCIANO AGLIPA

G.R. NO. 130941

Accused was found guilty of murder and frustrated murder.  Defense interposed self-defense.

HELD:

The burden of proof shifts to the person invoking self-defense, who, with clear and convincing evidence must establish all the following requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.  Upon failure to establish these requisites, conviction is inevitable because the accused, by setting up self-defense, admits being the author of the killing.

PEOPLE V. RAMWELL LOMIBAO

G.R. NO. 135855

Accused was convicted of raping his 11 year old daughter.  Defense interposed denial.

HELD:

Defense of alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.  A positive identification of the accused made by an eyewitness prevails over such a defense.  The denial of the accused cannot prevail over the categorical testimony of the victim that he raped her.  The absence of convincing evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. Even if the victim was not familiar with the precise date of the commission of the offense and the time of its occurrence, this fact does not convince the court that she was not raped by him.  The date of commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. However, since relationship was not alleged in the information, death sentence cannot be imposed in the absence of the qualifying circumstance.

PEOPLE V. ELMER FEGIDERO

G.R. NO. 113446

Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide.  He was committed based on circumstantial evidence.

HELD:

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.  Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the ff. elements are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit.  In the case at bar, the combination of all the circumstancial evidence presented established the participation of the accused in the robbery and death of the victim.

PEOPLE V. CRISPIN CANONIGO

G.R. NO. 133649

Accused was convicted of statutory rape committed against an 11 year old girl in full view of the latter’s 5 year old sister.  Death was imposed.

HELD:

Death cannot be imposed.  In the case at bar, the attendant aggravating circumstance that the victim was raped in full view of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity was not alleged in the information filed against the accused. Further, trial court erred in considering this as statutory rape.  To effectively prosecute for statutory rape, its elements must be set out in the complaint or information to apprise the accused of the crime of which he is being charged.  The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is in having carnal knowledge with a girl under 12 years of age.  In the case a bar, although it was established during the trial that the victim was only 11 years old at the time the crime was committed, the information filed against the accused charged him with having carnal knowledge of a girl who is 12 years of age.

PEOPLE V. BERNALDO DOCDOC

G.R. NO. 134679

Accused was convicted of rape.

HELD:

There is an absence of physical evidence to corroborate victim’s claim of resistance.  Verily, the law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving resistance where force was used on her.  However, in the case at bar, where the victim’s narration of the rape incident is open to doubt and does not jibe with human experience, physical evidence of bruises and scratches on her face or arms which were allegedly pinned behind her back would have spoken louder than words.

PEOPLE V. DELANO MENDIOLA

G.R. NO. 134846

Accused was convicted of raping his 5 year old daughter.

HELD:

A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible witness.  The lone testimony of the victim, which if credible and free from any serious and material contradictions, as in this case, is enough basis for the accused’s prosecution and conviction.

PEOPLE V. JOCELYN ACBANGIN

G.R. NO. 117216

Accused was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.  Two days after the taking of the child, she informed the child’s parents of the whereabouts of the child.

HELD:

In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there was actual deprivation of the child’s liberty and whether it was the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. The child in this case was deprived of liberty.  True, she was treated well, however, there is still kidnapping.  For there to be kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure.  It is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.  The intention to deprive the child’s parents of her custody is indicated by the accused’s hesitation for 2 days to disclose the whereabouts of the child and more so by her actual taking of the child.  Accused’s motive at this point is not relevant.  It is not an element of the crime.  The fact that she later on felt remorse and showed the child’s parents where the former was, cannot absolve her.  At that point, the crime was consummated.

The testimony of the child is also credible.  A witness’ young age will not deter him or her from being a competent and credible witness.  To be a competent child witness, the following must be met: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; (c) capacity of communication

PEOPLE V. VIVENCIO LABUGUEN

G.R. NO. 127849

Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide.  Defense interposed denial and alibi.  He was convicted based on circumstantial evidence.

HELD:

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses spawn and generate facts which constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of the appellant.

PEOPLE V. POTENCIANO ARCO

G.R. NO. 132062

Accused was convicted of raping a 10 year old child.  Defense interposed alibi.

HELD:

Not only was accused’s alibi weak, it also did not rule out the possibility of his having committed the crime.  It was not physically impossible therefore, for the accused to be at the crime scene, rape the victim and go back to his work.

PEOPLE V. AGAPITO AGRAVANTE

G.R. NO. 119955

Accused was convicted of raping a 14 year old retardate.  He contends that victim’s testimony is unreliable because of her mental capacity or state of mind.

HELD:

A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness.  In this case, the victim was able to intelligently make known such perceptions or narrate them truthfully despite the grueling examination by both prosecutor and defense counsel.

PEOPLE V. PEDRO DUCTA

G.R. NO. 13460

Accused was convicted of raping a 43 year old retarded woman.

HELD:

State of mental retardation of a victim of rape can be established by evidence other than the medical findings of a specialist.  So also, the court has said that a woman need not be completely deprived of reason for sexual intercourse by a man with her to constitute the crime of rape.  The term “deprived of reason” has been construed to include the feeble-minded although coherent and those suffering from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder.  Further, a mental retardate who has the ability to make known her perceptions is still a competent witness.

PEOPLE V.  MARIO MYRNO TAN

G.R. NO. 120672

Accused was found guilty of estafa.  Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove that the merchandise he ordered were delivered to and received by him or his authorized representatives.  Thus, he argues, he cannot be held liable for estafa since he was not able to obtain the goods from the private complainant by means of the check he issued.

HELD:

Art 315 (2)(d) of the RPC penalizes any person who shall defraud another by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has no funds in the bank.   The transaction between the parties here is in the nature of contract of sale.  The contract of purchase and sale is reciprocal and from it arises not only the obligation to deliver the thing but also that of paying the price. In this case, there is no ample proof that appellant or his representatives ever received the merchandise.  Since no damage was sustained by complainant in as much as appellant received nothing of value from the complainant, appellant cannot be held guilty of estafa.  He had no obligation to pay or to make good the issued check.

PEOPLE V. PEDRO GABIANA

G.R. NO. 123543

Accused was convicted of raping an 11 year old girl.  Appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

HELD:

Basic is the rule that alibi which is easy to concoct cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses.  What is more, appellant utterly failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of his commission.

PEOPLE V. IAN CONTRERAS

G.R. NO. 137123-34

Accused was convicted of raping several children.  On appeal to CA, the accused escaped from jail.

HELD:

His appeal should be dismissed.  He cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to seek a review of his conviction after he has made a mockery of the judicial process by escaping from prison.  However, this does not affect the review in criminal cases where death penalty had been imposed because review in such case is not only automatic but also mandatory.

PEOPLE V. AGUSTIN AGPAWAN

G.R. NO. 123853

Accused was convicted of murder.  Conspiracy and treachery were found by court.

HELD:

Conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.  Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Conspiracy was established in the instant case by the concerted and synchronized actions of the accused and his companions in carrying out the ambush. Treachery was also correctly appreciated as the method employed in the execution of the crime ensured no risk to the assailants arising from the defense which their victims might put up.

PEOPLE V. FELIX ANTIDO

G.R. NO. 129217

The 2 accused were convicted of murder.  Defense questions adequacy of evidence and finding of treachery.

HELD:

One of the witnesses is a victim himself having been stabbed by the appellant.  As such, his testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of accused’s prosecution and conviction, if such testimony meets the test of credibility.  The matter of accuracy of the identification by the victim of the offenders is a factual issue resolved by the trial court which should be given weight on appeal, unless there are convincing indications that certain facts or circumstances of weight and significance have been overlooked. An unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia and the fact that the act was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery.

PEOPLE V. ROBERTO BANIHIT

G.R. NO. 132045

Accused was convicted of raping his 9 year old niece.  He contends that death penalty should not be imposed since the information accuse him of rape under Art 335 par 3 which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

What is controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein cited.  The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law allegedly violated, but from the actual recital of facts alleged in the body of the information. However, the relationship to the victim, while proven by competent evidence, was not sufficiently alleged in the information.

PEOPLE V. RENATO PUZON

G.R. NO. 123156-59

Accused was found guilty of statutory rape for raping his own daughters.  The victims testified that appellant was not able to insert his penis into their vagina because they kept on moving in an effort to evade the sex organ of the appellant.  However, they recounted that the penis of appellant touched the lips of their vagina and they felt pain in the process.  The information indicted him for the crime of rape with force and intimidation under par 1 of Art. 335, although the prosecutor established that complainants were below 12 years old at the time of the rape.

HELD:

Conviction of appellant for statutory rape absent any allegation in the information that the complainants were below 12 years old at the time of the rape and not for rape through force or intimidation which was the method alleged would violate the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, which right is granted by the Constitution.  Convicting appellant of a crime not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the offense alleged would be unfair and underhanded.

However, the force or intimidation employed by the culprit and resistance put up by the victim are not necessary for the conviction of the perpetrator.  In incestuous rape, the absence of violence or offer of resistance by the victim would not matter because of the overpowering and overbearing moral ascendancy by the father over his daughter. Lack of penetration cannot exculpate appellant.  Settled is the rule that complete penetration is not essential.  The slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.

PEOPLE CARLOS MENEQUE

G.R. NO. 129964-65

Accused was convicted of 2 counts of murder.  Accused invoked self-defense.

HELD:

A plea of self-defense automatically shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense since such a plea means that the accused admits to having performed the criminal act, but disclaims legal liability on the ground that his life had been exposed to harm first before he committed the act in defense of himself.  Thus, when the accused invokes self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused’s open admission of responsibility for the killing. In the case at bar, apart from self-serving statements, appellant’s testimony is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, thus cannot be given weight.

PEOPLE V. SEGUNDO CANO

G.R. NO. 130631

Accused was convicted of 2 counts of rape committed against his 15 year old daughter.  He assails delay in filing of complaint and interposed alibi as defense.

HELD:

By itself, delay in prosecuting rape is not an indication of fabricated charges.  The charge is only rendered doubtful if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.

PEOPLE V. MARIO LACBAYAN

G.R. NO. 125006

The 2 accused were convicted of murder.  In their defense, appellants denied any knowledge of the incident.  They assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses by pointing to alleged inconsistencies.

HELD:

It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember.  In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dove tailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.  Finally, a careful examination of the evidence on record shows that while the prosecution witnesses differ in their narration of trivial details like those mentioned on appeal, they did not waver in their identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.

PEOPLE V. CESAR MELENDRES

G.R. NO. 133999-4001

Accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape committed against the 11 year old daughter of his common law wife.  He contends that accused and complainant were actually lovers.

HELD:

In rape cases falling under Art 335 (3) – when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented, 2 elements must be established to hold the accused guilty of rape: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Proof of consent of the woman is immaterial.  Sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years old is statutory rape.  Her consent to the intercourse is involuntary because she is considered to have no will of her own.

SEPTEMBER 2000

PEOPLE V. ALBERTO DANO

G.R. NO. 117690

Acused was convicted of murder.  An extrajudicial confession was made.  Defense interposed self-defense.

HELD:        

Extrajudicial statement is inadmissible because of violation of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.  A suspect’s confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellant’s confession were gospel truth.  However, his statements made to the barangay captain, who is neither police officer nor a law enforcement agent is admissible. When an accused invokes self-defense, the onus probandi to show that the killing was justified shifts to him.  Even if the prosecution’s evidence was weak, it could not be readily dismissed after the accused had openly admitted his responsibility for the killing.

PEOPLE V. PAUL LAPIZ

G.R. NO. 129239

Accused was convicted of rape.  He questions the credibility of the testimony of the complainant.

HELD:    

There are 3 guiding principles in the review of rape cases: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only 2 persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.  Equally unquestionable is the principle that as long as the complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on its basis.

PEOPLE V. ARMANDO JUAREZ

G.R. NO. 128158

The accused were found guilty of rape.  Defense put up denial and alibi.

HELD:    

Alibi is a weak defense which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification of appellants by the prosecution witness.  Denial and alibi unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence bearing no real weight in law and jurisprudence.  Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only when an accused had been shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that it would have been physically impossible form him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime.  The presence of the appellants at the crime scene immediately after the victim was raped indicates strongly that they were the culprits. Also, there is  nothing to show that the victim was moved by any ill motive to testify falsely against the accused.  She did not know them before the fateful evening.  Her honest and straightforward testimony deserves full faith and credence.

PEOPLE V. ROBERTO BANIGUID

G.R. NO. 137714

Accused was found guilty of raping his minor daughter.  He questions credibility of complainant.

HELD:      

There are 3 guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only 2 persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Even if the complainant is less than chaste, this fact would not detract from the fact that appellant violated her.  As long as the victim’s testimony measures up to the standard of credibility, the fact that she had sexual relations with other men would not destroy or affect her credibility.  The moral character of the victim is immaterial in rape cases.  For even a prostitute can be the victim of rape.

PEOPLE V. JIMMY DAGAMI

G.R. NO. 123111

Accused was found guilty of murder.  In his defense, he denied responsibility and pointed to a certain person as the real culprit.  One eyewitness was presented by prosecution.

HELD:    

The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a conviction.  Appellants likewise failed to show any ill-motive on the part of the witness.  There is no showing of improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

PEOPLE V. LITO ROSALES

G.R. NO. 126402

Accused was convicted of rape.  He raises the credibility of complainant’s testimony.

HELD:   

The general rule in criminal cases is that the conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is accorded great weight and respect, if not conclusive effect.  In this case, there is nothing that would warrant a deviation from the general rule.

PEOPLE V. EDGARDO ALORO

G.R. NO. 129208

Accused was convicted of 2 counts of rape.  He was convicted on the basis of the lone testimony of the victim despite lack of physical injuries.

HELD:     

It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to convict if credible.  Equally settled is the principle that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped and where the testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Further, in proving rape cases, it is not necessary that the act was committed with genital injury.  And a finding that the victim’s hymen is intact, as in this case, does not disprove rape.  In fact, a medial examination is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape.

PEOPLE V. FAUSTINO CAMPOS

G.R. NO. 133373-77

Accused, 72 years of age, was convicted of 5 counts of rape committed against 2 minors.  He insists in his appeal that he could not be convicted considering that the medical examination showed that the complaining witnesses suffered no lacerations, abrasions or contusions.

HELD:     

Medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.  In fact, there can be rape even if the medical examination shows no vaginal laceration.  Medical findings only serve to corroborate the testimonies of the victims.  The accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim provided that her testimony is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of this.

PEOPLE V. WALPAN LADJAALAM

G.R. NO. 136149-51

The accused was convicted of the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an M14 rifle to police men who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant.  Further, he was also convicted for illegal possession of firearm.

HELD:  

RA no. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed “no other crime”.  Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense.  Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.  Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.

PEOPLE V. AMADEO TRELLES

G.R. NO. 137659

Accused was convicted of raping a 22 year old retardate woman.  He questions credibility of complainant.

HELD:    

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.  It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

PEOPLE V. SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP

G.R. NO. 132547

Accused was convicted of murder.  He interposed self-defense and justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty.

HELD:     

Preliminarily, having admitted the killing, the accused assumed the burden of proving legal justification therefore.  He must establish clearly and convincingly how he acted in the fulfillment of his official duty and/or in complete self-defense, otherwise, he must suffer all the consequences of his malefaction.  He has to rely on the quantitative and qualitative strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing. To justify the incident as fulfillment of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1) that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office; (2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

The second shot, which was the fatal shot was uncalled for and therefore was no longer a necessary consequence of appellant’s due performance of duty.  Thus, only an incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty can be appreciated.

PEOPLE V. EDGAR BACALSO

G.R. NO. 129055

Accused was convicted of the complex crime of double murder with frustrated murder.  The conviction hinges on the testimony of 2 prosecution witnesses.

HELD:      

In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-pronged: (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefore, for even if the commission of the crime is given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.

The identification of the perpetrator of the crime bears heavily on the reasonableness or probability of the testimony of the prosecution witness.  There is unfortunately, no single test to determine with all exactitude the probity of testimony, and the courts can only give conformity to the quotidian knowledge, observation and experience of man. It has been observed that the most positive testimony of a witness may be contradicted on the fact that the testimony is contrary to common observation or experience or the common principles by which the conduct of mankind is governed.  The courts are not required to believe that which they judicially know to be incredible.  A close scrutiny of the accounts given by the witnesses produce a serious doubt as to the veracity of the malefactor’s identity almost as if it were merely contrived to pin the liability of the crime upon appellant.

PEOPLE V. ABE VALDEZ

G.R. NO. 129296

Accused was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.,  An extrajudicial confession was made as to the ownership of marijuana plants.

HELD:    

The marijuana plants seized were product of an illegal search because of the absence of search warrant and are therefore inadmissible in evidence.  The voluntary confession of ownership of marijuana was in violation of the custodial rights because of the absence of competent and independent counsel, and thus, inadmissible too.  In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to the appellant’s voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant’s guilt failed to meet the test of constitutional competence.  Without these, the prosecution’s remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellant’s conviction.  Hence, the presumption of innocence on his favor stands.

PEOPLE V. FERIGEL OLIVA

G.R. NO. 122110

Accused was convicted of arson and murder.

HELD:   

There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is intentional burning; (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecution for felonies and offense.  Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime.  It refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed.  Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimonies of the witnesses.  In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.  Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. ELMEDIO CAJARA

G.R. NO. 122498

Accused was convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to death.  The victim was the sister of the common law wife of the accused.

HELD:    

Although the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was alleged in the information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the lack or absence of such circumstance to qualify the rape because the accused and the sister of the victim were common law husband and wife and were not legally married at the time of the tape.  The accused and the victim cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE V. OSCAR NOGAR

G.R. NO. 133946

Accused was convicted of statutory rape committed against a 9 year old girl.  However, during trial, the fact of age was not proven.  Can the accused be convicted of simple rape when the charge against him was for statutory rape?

HELD:         

It is too late to assail the duplicitous character of the information as no objection was raised in a motion to quash before a plea to the information is made.  The defect is deemed waived.

PEOPLE V. EFREN TEMANEL

G.R. NO. 97138-39

The accused were convicted of Robbery with Homicide.  They contend that in as much as they were the only ones apprehended and held for trial, their non-flight should have been considered as indication of their innocence.

HELD:    

While flight indicates guilt, non-flight does not mean innocence.

 

PEOPLE V. ARMANDO QUILATAN

G.R. NO. 132725

Accused was convicted of incestuous rape committed against his 13 year old daughter.  He questions credibility of the complainant.

HELD:     

The bare denial of the accused cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.  Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in this case, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

 

PEOPLE V. PEDRO ABUNGAN

G.R. NO. 136843

Accused was convicted of murder.  He died pending appeal.

HELD:      

The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities (civil liability ex delicto) arising from the delict or crime.  Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed.  However, it must be added that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict.  For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law or procedural rules.

PEOPLE V. CARUNGAL AND ESPINOSA

G.R. No.123299 Sept. 29, 2000

This is a hold-up but a passenger was a policeman. He was stabbed. Later a tabloid reported that his gun was found with a killed hold-upper not a party to the case.

Held:

In the light of positive identification, appellant’s defense of alibi and denial must fail. Positive testimony is stronger that negative testimony, and alibi becomes worthless in the face of positive identification of the accused. For alibi to prosper it must be shown that it was physically impossible to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (place of alibi was only 5 minutes away).

Even if there are flaws in the testimony as to who stabbed the victim is immaterial because conspiracy was proven. They masqueraded as passengers, positioned themselves strategically inside the jeep, pulled out their knives simultaneously, concertedly inflicted stab wounds upon learning that he was a policeman. It is no moment that an accused has not taken part in the actual commission of every act constituting the crime. The precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all.

As to the report of the gun, it is merely hearsay. The authors of the newspaper reports had no personal knowledge of the identity of the perpetrators. Such was only obtained from the police investigators handling the case. This fact is of no moment for a possession thereof could have reached this person for a number of reasons.

PEOPLE V. PO2 RODEL SAMONTE

G.R. No.126048 Sept.29, 2000

There was a shooting incident resulting to the death of Perez. Accused was detailed in the Mayor’s Office. His revolver and a 38 palter was taken from him. Branch 9 acquitted him of the crime of homicide but Branch 3 found him guilty of illegal possession of firearms aggravated by homicide under PD1866.

Issue:

W/N the doctrine of P v Quijada stating that qualified illegal possession of firearms and homicide are distinct and separate offenses is still followed.

Held:

No.  Applying the new law RA8249 in P v Molina the Court has declared that under the amendment in said law that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed forearm, such use of the same should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE V. JOSE PATRIARCA

G.R. No.135457 Sept.29, 2000

Accused was found guilty of murdering a fellow member of the NPA. Accused now appeals on the ground that the crime of murder is an offense committed in pursuance or in furtherance of rebellion.

HELD:

The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was approved and one of the acts listed in the resolution of the Nat’l Amnesty Commission is the killing of the victim in this case. The approval was pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty  to all persons  who shall apply who have committed crimes on or before June 1 1995 in pursuit of their political beliefs.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36).

 

PEOPLE V. GENOSA

GRNo.-135891 Sept. 29, 2000

Appellant was found guilty of parricide. She now requests an examination by psychologists to determine her state of mind then under the ground of the “battered woman syndrome”.

Held:

There are four characteristics of the syndrome:1)woman believes that the violence was her fault;2)she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere;3)she fears for her life and/or the children’s lives;4)she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate o her acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.

Petition granted. In P v Pares, after a final conviction of appellant therein, the Court granted his Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to undergo mental and neuralgic other examinations to determine that he was  a deaf-mute. Based on that finding and that he was unaided in the trial, he was granted a rearrangement and retrial. This action is justified on the rule that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may an accused to consigned to a lethal injection chamber. Also as Justice Pun said, man should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.

OCTOBER 2000

 

PEOPLE  V. SANTIAGO

GRNO.129371 OCT. 4, 2000

Appellant was convicted of murder for shooting the victim  after a prior street altercation that erupted when the parties’ vehicles collided.

Held:

Only Homicide. No treachery. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself. When the witnesses did not see how the attack was carried out and cannot testify how it began, the trial court cannot presume from the circumstances of the case that there was treachery. Treachery cannot be considered  where the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault. Since the lone witness failed to witness the initial attack inflicted upon the victim, treachery cannot be considered a qualifying circumstance.

All the elements of evident premeditation must also be proven. Premeditation to kill must be plain notorious and sufficiently proven by the evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill. A 15-minute interval is not sufficient time for the accused to coolly reflect on their plan to kill the victim. In one case, 30 minutes was held also insufficient time between determination to commit and the execution is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the act.

Liability of one whose participation in crime was limited to driving for the killers is only that of an accomplice. The lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, which creates the doubt whether he has acted as principal or an accomplice, implies the court to resolve the question in favor of the accused.

PEOPLE V. BAWANG

GRNo.-131942 October 5, 2000          

A case of incestuous rape.

Held:

The fact that the hymen is intact does not prove absence of sexual intercourse and the presence of laceration does not prove defloration. The hymen may be lacerated due to some other causes not sexual intercourse.

The qualifying circumstance  provided by RA7658 for the imposition of death penalty is present in the information–minority and relationship having been averred. However, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. In this case, no evidence was given–not even a Certificate of Live Birth.

 PEOPLE V. LOPEZ

 GRNo.-132168 October 10, 2000

An old woman was hacked to death by appellant because of a land dispute.

Held:

There was treachery. Accused suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed the hair of the deceased and simultaneously hacked her to death. The deceased had no inkling whatsoever of the murderous intent of the accused. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist, to avoid or escape.

Abuse of superiority was proved. She was unarmed. The accused was a 22-year old male, in the prime of his life, and armed with  a deadly weapon. Since aloveosia is already appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, abuse of superiority is absorbed therein.

The fact that the victim has 7 hacking wounds does not conclusively demonstrate cruelty. The number of wounds does not per se give rise to cruelty. The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by committing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increased the victim’s suffering, or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. Records are bereft of evidence showing the accused continued to hack the victim when she was already dead. Passion or obfuscation to be appreciated must arise from lawful sentiments. The act of victim demanding the family of appellant to vacate her land was not unlawful or unjust. The exercise of  a lawful right cannot be a proper source of obfuscation that may be considered a mitigating circumstance.

NOVEMBER 2000

 

PEOPLE V. BALMORIA

GRNo.-134539 November 15, 2000          

A case of rape of an eight-year old.

Held:

It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of the threat on their lives. A young girl, unlike a mature woman, can not be expected to have the courage and intelligence to immediately report a sexual assault committed against her especially  when a death threat hangs ver her head. We cannot reject the testimony of victim  on the ground that her 3 other companions were not awakened by her groans while she was being raped. It is not impossible to commit rape in a small room even if there are several persons in it.

PEOPLE V. MOYONG

GRNo.-135413-15 November 15, 2000          

Facts:

The hotel guests and manager were stabbed to death in a room. Appellant was caught while fleeing the establishment with stained clothes.

Held:

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is proper if:1)there is more than just one circumstance in attendance;2)the facts from which inferences can be derived  are adequately proven;3)the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought to be established and can lead to no rational assumption that may be congruent with the innocence of the accused. Since no  eyewitness was presented and no evidence was shown on how the killings transpired the aggravating and qualifying circumstances cannot be appreciated.

PEOPLE V. PACANA

G.R. No.97472-73 Nov.20, 2000          

A case of murder and frustrated murder.

Held:

If the accused was positively identified by the victim himself who harbored no ill motive against the former, the defense of alibi must fail. In any even the proof of motive is not indispensable for conviction when there is positive identification. Motive assumes significance only when there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime might be.  An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not effect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Hence, the reduction of the indeterminate penalty for the frustrated murder case shall affect not only the appellant but also those who withdrew their appeal.

PEOPLE V. CASTURIA

G.R. No.-122819 Nov 20, 2000         

Appellant was convicted of murder.

Held:

For conspiracy to exist it does not require an appreciable period lapsed prior to the occurence. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose. The accused act of mauling the victim and thereafter handling the bolo to his brother who hacked the victim.

PEOPLE V. ALVAREZ

G.R. No.-121769 November 22, 2000          

Appellant was convicted of murder after shooting the victim with a bardog–a locally made shotgun.

Held:

It is well-settled that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame for the killing and implicating his co-accused cannot by itself and without corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter had committed or participated in the commission of the crime. Thus, it is required that the testimony be substantially corroborated by other evidence in all its material points. The reason for the above cited rule is that the testimony of a co-conspirator proceeds from a polluted source. It must be received with caution because, as is usual with human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put to blame as far as possible on others rather than himself.

The settled rule is that testimony of a witness ma be believed in part and disbelieved in part as the corroborative evidence or improbabilities of the case may require. There was treachery. Victim was unaware of the evil design of the accused and his group who concealed themselves behind colon grasses. Being unarmed, he could not offer resistance nor attempt to escape from their sudden and unexpected attack. Conspiracy was present, the assailants one after the other shot at the victim.

PEOPLE V. VELASQUEZ

G.R. No.-137383-84 Nov. 23, 2000         

Appellant used a toy gun in abducting and raping the victim.

Held:

The mere fact that Karen did not attempt to escape when the opportunity resented itself should not be construed as a manifestation of consent and does not necessarily negate her charge of rape or taint her credibility considering the accused employed force and intimidation. A complainant’s act in immediately reporting the commission of rape is a factor in strengthening her credibility.

Appellant imputes no ill motive towards the victim to falsely accuse him. In the absence of such motive, it is presumed that no such motive exists. To support a conviction for rape, the court may rely solely on the testimony of the victim provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. By its nature, rape is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the public.

FEBRUARY 2001

PEOPLE V. REYNALDO DE VILLA

GR 124639; Feb1, 2001

Accused was charged of raping a 12yr old minor who is his niece by affinity.

ISSUE:

Nature of Rape: Penalty; Whether the death penalty should be imposed

HELD:

SIMPLE RAPE! RECLUSION PERPETUA! Although, art. 335, RPC says, death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender…is a relative by affinity within the third civil degree… such circumstances (minority and relationship) are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which should be alleged in the information and proved at the trial (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Dec1, 2000). IN THIS CASE, the prosecution failed to allege the relationship of the accused with the victim, Thus the accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape punishable by death but only simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE V. FERNANDEZ

GR 137647; Feb.1, 2001

Accused was charged of raping the 15yr old daughter of his common law spouse.

HELD:

SIMPLE RAPE! RECLUSION PERPETUA! Although art.335 of the RPC says that death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender is …the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim… having been charged only of simple rape in the information, the accused is held guilty only of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
PEOPLE V. LAUT, ET AL.

GR 137751; Feb1, 2001

The three accused were charged of murder.

HELD:

GUILTY! The Defense of self-defense and alibi was outweighed by the positive and categorical eyewitness accounts corroborated by the extent of hack wounds on the victim; MURDER! The killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE V. BAYOD

GR 122664; Feb 5, 2001

Accused was charged with murder and frustrated homicide

HELD:

Accused is GUILTY of MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER not frustrated HOMICIDE. There was intent to kill and treachery, accused and his companions ganged up with advantage in number and strength, in both instances; a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence which nevertheless, do not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. In this case, timely medical attention.

PEOPLE V. BAYANG

GR 134402; Feb 5, 2001

Accused was charged of robbery with homicide

HELD:

GUILTY and sentenced to reclusion perpetua under art. 294, RPC. Although there were NO eyewitness accounts of the robbery with homicide, the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to convict. Under the revised rules on evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient, when a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In affirming convictions beyond reasonable doubt the degree of proof required is NOT proof that excludes all possibility of error but only moral, not absolute certainty, is what the fundamental law requires.

PEOPLE V. PABILLANO

GR 108618; Feb.6, 2001
Accused was found guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide by the trial court.

HELD:

Accused are guilty or robbery with homicide and were sentenced to reclusion perpetua; Alibi is a weak defense. It should be rejected when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the offense. Note there is no law that a police line-up is an essential requisite to proper identification.
PEOPLE V. LOYOLA

GR 126026; Feb.6, 2001

The trial court sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua for the
rape of a 16yr old girl while aboard a bus.

HELD:

Accused is guilty and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The defenses of alibi and denial by the accused were found unavailing in the face of positive and credible testimony of prosecution witnesses. Note, no young Filipina of decent repute even in modern times, would publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the truth. Accused was not able to prove that he and the victim were indeed lovers. Likewise, the claim of lack of force or intimidation cannot prevail. The TEST is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that is she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to sexual assault. Lastly, an offer of marriage which occurred in this case is an admission of guilt.

PEOPLE V. RAYOS

GR 133823; Feb.7,2001

Accused was charged of raping a 9yr. old girl

HELD:

Accused is guilty and sentenced to DEATH in accordance with art 335 of the RPC (as amended by RA 7659) or where on the occasion of a rape homicide was committed, the penalty is death. ! The guilt of the accused was established through circumstantial evidence, taken in entirety unmistakably pointing to guilt. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted in the absence of eyewitnesses and is sufficient for conviction if, a)there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which that inferences were derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO

GR 135200; Feb.7,2001

The trial court found the accused guilty of qualified rape sentencing him to death for raping his daughter.

HELD:

SIMPLE RAPE with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; The prosecution failed to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim in the information. This is not a mere technicality but a concept of due process as provided in the Constitution.

PEOPLE V. CORDERO

GR 136894-96; Feb.7, 2001

Accused, a 63-yr-old was charged of 3 counts of rape of the Nana sisters, one was 13 and the other 15.

HELD:

GUILTY and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on each information charged. The assertions of the accused cannot stand against the testimonies and positive identification of the two rape victims. Alibi is weak and age is not a determinant of the inability to have carnal knowledge rather it is impotency, which nonetheless should be proven by the defense.

PEOPLE V. RONDILLA

GR 134368; Feb.8,2001

The accused was sentenced to death by the trial court in accordance with art 335 of the RPC for raping his own daughter.

HELD:

The accused is guilty but only of simple rape for the prosecution merely charged him of simple rape. Nonetheless he is guilty and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Hardly can any defense stand a chance against the unimpeached testimony of the young victim in great detail the sexual assault. The testimony is even given greater weight when the victim accuses a close relative.

PEOPLE V. NAVARRO

GR 132696 Feb.12,2001

Accused was convicted by the trial court for the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.

HELD:

GUILTY! Trial court Affirmed and the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The crime was murder because the killing was attended with treachery. There was no opportunity for the deceased to retaliate or defend himself, the particular means employed which was the use of a motor vehicle, and, the circumstance of nighttime, all point to the nature of the killing. On the issue of the firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the illegal use of a firearm. As the law now stands, this is merely considered as an aggravating circumstance (P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294). Since the death penalty was not yet effective at the time of the offense, the penalty is reclusion perpetua. The original penalty for murder was reclusion temporal but since there was an aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty was raised to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE. V. OPTANA

GR 133922; Feb.12,2001

4 information for the violation of the sec. 5 RA7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse) and 4 informations for rape were filed against the accused.

HELD:

The SC affirms the decision of the trial court convicting the accused for one incident of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and one charge violating RA7610, sentencing him to suffer 8yrs and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 17 yrs. and 4mos of reclusion temporal as maximum. The other informations failed to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise, charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date against the same victim is erroneous and illegal except where the law itself so allows. This is not allowed by RA7610. It specifically provides that in instances where the victim is under 12, the
case should fall under art. 335 of the RPC, thus only cases where the victim is over 12 but under 18 can fall under this law. In the case at bar, where the accused was charged for several occasions of rape and abuse the conviction or acquittal on the informations was based on the age of the child, the concept of non-multiplicity of suits, and the evidence presented. Thus, only one rape case prospered (incident when the child was below 12) and one violation of RA7610 (when the child was above 12 but below 18).

PEOPLE V. VELASCO

GR 128089; Feb13,2001

The accused was indicted for parricide under art 246 of the RPC for the killing of his wife.

HELD:

The accused is guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Parricide is committed when 1) a person is killed; 2)the deceased is killed by the accused; 3)the deceased is the…or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element is the relation of the offender to the victim. In case of a marital relationship the best evidence is the marriage certificate. The own testimony of the accused as married to the victim may also be taken as an admission against penal interest. The case was proved through circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishing the malefactor, destroying the presumption of innocence, and fulfilling the standard of moral certainty. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted in the absence of eyewitnesses and is sufficient for conviction if, a)there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which that inferences were derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction based on such can be upheld if the circumstances established would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.

PEOPLE V. PEREZ

GR 134756; Feb.13,2001

Accused was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the trial court.

HELD:

Accused is guilty of murder. A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. Although the shots were taken facing the accused, according to witnesses, the victim was eating merienda with her back turned to the accused when he came; the victim only stood and faced him after he cursed her. The accused deliberately sought the manner of the attack, going to the victim’s barangay, armed with a pistol, approaching the victim from behind and shooting her at close range. Treachery was present. The attack was sudden and the victim was defenseless, had no opportunity to escape, and lastly, there was no risk to the accused when he fired his gun.

PEOPLE V. GUZMAN

GR 117952-53; Feb.14,2001

The accused was found guilty by the trial court of violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

HELD:

The accused is GUILTY. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto, possessing an unlicensed firearm. The search conducted thereafter was valid. It was within the immediate control of the arrested person. Likewise, the drugs and paraphernalia obtained where in plain view of the police when the accused was arrested. Quoting PEOPLE v. Khor, the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: 1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not authorized by law; and 3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All elements concurring, the accused is thus guilty. Lastly, the accused failed to quash the information against him before arraignment thus he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.

PEOPLE V. YBANEZ

GR 136257; Feb.14, 2001
Accused was charged of raping a 10yr old girl who is the daughter of his common law spouse. He was sentenced to death by the trial court.

HELD:

Accused was sentenced by the SC to reclusion perpetua convicting him only of simple rape. The prosecution failed to indicate the relationship of the accused to the victim in the information thus merely charging Ybanez of simple rape. Convicting the accused of an offense not specifically charged in the complaint is a violation of his right to due process.

PEOPLE V. AVECILLA

GR117033; Feb.15, 2001

Accused was charged of qualified illegal possession of a firearm; accused willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to kill, and actually killing a victim as a consequence, possess and carry an unlicensed firearm.

ISSUE:

Conviction and Retroactivity of RA8294 (An act Amending the Provisions of PD 1866)

HELD:

SC dismissed the case. Originally he could have been convicted of illegally possessing a firearm separately from his conviction on the killing that occurred as a consequence thereof, which happened in 1991. With the passage of RA 8294 in 1997 amending PD1866, the possession of an unlicensed firearm has become merely an aggravating circumstance to a murder or homicide charge. As a general rule, penal laws have prospective effect EXCEPT where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, as in this case, sparing him of two separate convictions.

PEOPLE V. PAGDAYAWON

GR 130522; Feb.15,2001

Accused, a police officer was charged of raping his 11yr. Old stepdaughter. Both circumstances, minority and relationship was indicated in the complaint. The trial court sentenced the accused to death.

HELD:

The accused is guilty. The witness is credible and there was indeed force and intimidation in the act. The penalty prescribed by the trial court was also correct. Under art335 of the RPC, death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender is the stepparent of the victim. Such information was formally included in the charge.

PEOPLE V. B. TUMANON
GR 135066, Feb.15, 2001

The accused were charged on murder.

HELD:

The accused are guilty of murder. There was abuse of superior strength shown through superiority in number and the use of arms. To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself. Conspiracy was also present. It is not necessary that there be a previous plan or agreement to commit the assault. It is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the accused, by their acts, gave evidence of common intent to kill the victim, so that the act of one becomes the act of all and all of them will thus be liable as principals.

PEOPLE v. NAAG

GR No. 136394; Feb. 15, 2001

Accused was charged and found guilty by the lower court of the special complex crime of robbery with rape.

ISSUE:

Was there rape? Was he guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape?

HELD:

There was rape. In rape cases, what is material is that there is penetration no matter how slight. The only essential point is to prove the entrance or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum. The moment the accused¹s penis knocks at the door of the of the pudenda it suffices to constitute the crime of rape. Accused is guilty of separate crimes of rape and theft. Facts show that the primary intent of accused was to rape the victim and not to rob her. Moreover, the crime of taking away the property is theft and not robbery because of the absence of violence and intimidation.

PEOPLE v. MACAYA

GR No. 137185-86; Feb 15, 2001

Accused was charged of raping the two children of his common-law spouse in two separate complaints and was found guilty in both cases and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in one case and death in the other.

HELD:

NO. The accused was charged only with simple rape. Under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when rape is committed against a victim who is under 18 years of age, and the offender among other circumstances, is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. But these circumstances must be alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, even if the minority of the victim and the relationship of the victim and the accused are established during the trial, he cannot be punished for a graver offense than that with which he is charged. He can only be convicted of simple rape the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. ALBIOR

GR No. 115079; Feb 19, 2001

Accused was charged and found guilty by the lower court of rape and was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Is the absence of spermatozoa in the victim¹s genitalia negate rape? Do minor inconsistencies in victim¹s testimonies destroy credibility?

HELD:

Absence of spermatozoa in the victim¹s genitalia does not negate rape. Further, as for appellant¹s claim that the victim did not suffer complete lacerations and other signs of physical violence, suffice it to say that even the absence of hymenal laceration does not rule out sexual abuse, especially when the victim is of tender age. Nor is it necessary for the victim to suffer external injuries in order for the crime of rape to be established. As for the minor inconsistencies, these are badges of truthfulness and candor for they erase the suspicion the testimony was
rehearsed. Also, victims are not expected to have a total recall of the incident.

PEOPLE v. NAVARRA

GR No. 119361, Feb 19, 2001

The accused-appellants were charged and found guilty by the RTC of illegal recruitment committed in a large scale resulting to economic sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.

ISSUE:

Did the RTC err in disregarding their defense of denial and in finding them guilty of the offense charged.

HELD:

Denials, without clear and convincing evidence to support them, can not sway judgement. They are self-serving statements and are inherently weak. Decision of lower court affirmed. Illegal recruitment has 2 essential elements: first, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment or placement of workers; second, the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Art 34 of the Labor Code. A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity without a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment or placement from the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Sec. of Labor.

Under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refer to, any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to 2 or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment or placement. Accused-appellants committed acts of recruitment and placement, such as promises to the complainants of profitable employment abroad and acceptance of placement fees. They were also not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as certified by the DOLE. Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of the following qualifying circumstances exists: first, when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate; second when it is committed in a large scale, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.

PEOPLE v. BLAZO

GR No. 127111; Feb 19, 2001

Accused was charged and found guilty of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution proved the accused¹s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

Delay in criminal accusation is not an indication of a fabricated charge, if such charge is satisfactorily explained. A young girl, such as the victim in this case, cannot be expected to have the courage and intelligence of a mature woman to immediately report her defilement, especially when accompanied by a death threat. A medical examination and a medical certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case. Lacerations of the hymen, while considered as the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of a penile invasion, are not always necessary to establish the commission of rape, where other evidence is available to show consummation

 
PEOPLE v. MURILLO

GR No. 128851-56; Feb 19, 2001

Accused were charge and found guilty of rape and were sentenced to death.

ISSUE:

Whether the penalty of death was correct?

HELD:

NO. The death sentence given to the accused was based on the following attendant circumstances: first, the victim is under the custody of the police or military officers, and second, when committed by and member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency. To merit the punishment of death, these circumstances must be properly alleged in the information. For the prosecution¹s failure to do so, these circumstances cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances, therefore the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. MOLINA

GR No. 133917; Feb 19, 2001

Accused were charged and found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for having in their possession 946.9 grams of marijuana and were sentenced to death.

HELD:

NO. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit, or have committed a crime. There was no probable cause in arresting the accused thus making the arrest illegal. Because the arrest was illegal, so was the search made by the police officers. This being the case, the evidence is inadmissible and the accused are found not guilty of the alleged offense.

PEOPLE vs AWING

GR No. 133919-20; Feb 19, 2001

Accused was charged and found guilty of 2 counts of rape against his stepdaughter.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court gave him the correct sentence of death?

HELD:

NO.  Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the victim¹s parent. Both the age of the offended party and the filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this case, complainant¹s age n the accusatory portion of the informations were omitted, hence appellant was only charged of simple rape and not qualified rape. The proper penalty to be imposed to the appellant is reclusion perpetua and not death.

PEOPLE v. TOLENTINO

GR No. 139834; Feb 19, 2001

Accused was charged and convicted for committing the crime of rape.

HELD:

Victim will not go through the humiliation if it is not to seek justice, hence her testimony is credible. Also, there was no showing that the victim was impelled by ill motive to testify against the accused. Conviction for rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the victim cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape because she was unconscious when the act was committed, provided that one circumstance is duly proved and the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical conclusion than accused¹s guilt.

PEOPLE v. MUSTAPA

GR No. 141244; Feb. 19, 2001

Accused was charged and found guilty of violating Sec. 16 of RA No 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether the court erred in not appreciating the accused¹s testimony denying ownership of bag containing shabu?

HELD:

Lower Court¹s decision affirmed. Denial is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Also, issues raised by the defense are factual and involves credibility of witnesses, a matter addressed to the trial court because it is in a better position to decide such questions. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the trial court¹s findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Also, minor inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses refer merely to minor details and does not impair the credibility of witnesses. Witnesses are not expected to remember everything that happened in exact detail, since a long time has already lapsed.

PEOPLE v. CONSEJERO

GR No. 118334; Feb 20, 2001

Accused-appellant was charged and found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:

Whether accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

The circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair conclusion, that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances or a combination thereof should point to overt acts of the appellant that would logically lead to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty. Rule 113, Sec 4 of the Rules of Court provides the requisites for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence: a) there is more than one circumstance; b) facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c) combination of all the circumstances is such to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. However, the crime committed was not robbery with homicide; in this case, the primary purpose of the accused was not to rob but to take the life of the victim, the taking of property came only as an afterthought subsequent to the killings. The crimes committed are separate offenses of homicide, murder, and theft.

PEOPLE v. TIO

GR Nos. 132482-83; Feb 20, 2001

Accused was charged and found guilty of committing the crime of murder qualified by treachery and with the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether relationship of witnesses to the victim affects their credibility?

HELD:

NO.  Relationship per se does no give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of the witnesses. The eyewitnesses were not shown to have any ill feeling or resentment against the appellant as to prevaricate and impute upon him a heinous crime. Besides, there is also a mere chance witness that pointed to the appellant as the assailant and whose account of the incident coincided with the accounts of the other witnesses. Moreover, the eyewitness accounts of the prosecution witnesses not only reinforced and corroborated each other but were also confirmed by the physical evidence.

PEOPLE v. ENDINO

GR. No. 133026; Feb 20, 2001
The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-appellant Galgarin. Galgarin was arrested and convicted for the crime of murder qualified by treachery, while on the other hand Endino remained at large.

HELD:

Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.

PEOPLE v. DE LEON

GR No. 124297; Feb 21, 2001

Accused-appellant was charge and convicted of several counts of the crime of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

HELD:

GUILTY. Rule 110, Sec. 11 provides that it is not necessary for the information to allege the exact date and the time of the commission of the crime is such is not an essential ingredient of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date of the commission is not an essential element. The delay in reporting the crime committed can also be attributed to the tender age of the victim and the moral ascendancy of the accused over the victim. Oftentimes, a rape victim’s actions are moved by fear rather than by reason, and because of this, failure of the victim to report the crime immediately is not indicative of fabrication. Also, victims are not expected to recall the exact and accurate account of their traumatic experiences. However, accused cannot be sentenced to death because the information against him failed to allege victim¹s minority and her relationship to the accused. RA 7659 enumerates the circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty. Consistent with the accused¹s right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, these circumstances must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial. Accused is guilty only of simple rape and sentenced only to reclusion perpetua on each count of rape.

PEOPLE V. ZUNIEGA

GR 126117; Feb. 21,2001

Accused was charged for the murder of a certain Aujero.

HELD:

Accused is guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua (since the accused was found guilty by the trial court prior to the effectivity of the death penalty law the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua). The facts show that the accused perpetrated the crime in such a way that he easily rendered his victim totally defenseless, with no opportunity to escape or defend himself, and without the slightest provocation. NOTE: 1)The circumstance that the judge who penned the decision did not personally hear the testimonies of witnesses does not disturb the decision more so when the judgment is supported by evidence on record such as the transcript of stenographic notes. 2) Failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the perpetrator of a felony does not impair the credibility of the witness more so if the delay has been adequately explained, such as due to fear of a great danger to his life and/or his family.

 
PEOPLE V. BOLIVAR

GR130597; Feb. 21, 2001
Three accused were charged of murder.

HELD:

The accused were guilty of murder and were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The accused alibi cannot prosper against positive identification of prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper 2 requisites must concur: 1) accused must prove that he was at another place at the time of the crime; and 2)the accused must demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The court also found that there was conspiracy, as inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.

PEOPLE V. VELASQUEZ

GR132635 & 143872-75; Feb. 21, 2001

Accused was found guilty by the trial court of Acts of Lasciviousness against his 2 yr. old granddaughter and the crime of Rape against his alleged stepdaughter who is a minor. He was sentenced to death for the rape.

HELD:

SC found the accused guilty of acts of lasciviousness and simple rape which modified his sentence for the rape to reclusion perpetua. NOTE: (A)On the 1st charge: acts of lasciviousness… 1)By failing to invoke the lack of a preliminary investigation during the trial, the court deems that the accused has waived the same; 2)The testimony of the mother of the 2 yr. Old child/victim is sufficient considering the victim’s age and the medical examination conducted. B) On 2nd charge: rape of his alleged minor stepdaughter…1)The sole testimony of the victim is sufficient; 2) The three yr. delay in the filing of a complaint does not necessarily mean that the charge was fabricated. The delay was due to fear; 3) The penalty for the rape is reclusion perpetua since the court found the marriage of the accused to the victim’s mother as doubtful, the information against the accused being different from what was actually proven, that the relationship of the accused to the victim is one of daughter of a common law spouse, the crime was considered as only simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE V. MANALO

GR 135964-71; Feb. 21, 2001

Accused was charged of 8 counts of rape of two minors (4 counts of rape for each child). One was 6 yrs. old and the other 7.

HELD:

The accused is guilty and is sentenced to death. According to art.335 of the RPC, the death penalty shall be imposed if rape is committed on a child below seven yrs. of age.

PEOPLE  v. FERNANDO SABALAN

G.R. No. 134529.  February 26, 2001.

Accused was convicted of incestuous rape (raped 12-yr old daughter), and meted out with the supreme penalty of death.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court, but lowered the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The settled rule is that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.

It must be stressed that the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance, particularly when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself to the rapist’s will for fear for life or personal safety. It suffices that the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused-appellant, the threat would be carried out.

Accused was meted out with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, since the special circumstance of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender was not alleged and proven. In the case at bar, the information alleged the special qualifying circumstance of relationship and minority. The prosecution evidence, however, is insufficient to prove the minority of the victim. Besides the bare declaration of the victim as to her age, there was no independent evidence presented by the prosecution that could accurately show her age. We have held that the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Failure to sufficiently establish the victim’s age will bar any finding of rape in its qualified form.

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v. RAYMUNDO VISAYA

G.R. No. 136967   February 26, 2001

Accused was convicted of murder (with circumstances of treachery and conspiracy), and meted out with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. It is well settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. The presence of the element of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. The prosecution was able to establish that accused and the other suspects, by their acts at the time of the aggression, manifested a common intent or desire to kill the victim, so that the act of Visaya became also the act of appellant Ocampo. Moreover, their coordinated escape from the crime scene when somebody shouted “sibat na” confirmed the existence of conspiracy.

With regard to the circumstance of treachery, it exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the evidence showed that the unsuspecting victim was completely unprepared for the unexpected attack as he was facing a wall and totally deprived of a chance to ward off or escape from the criminal assault.

THE PEOPLE  v. EDGAR CAWAYAN y CRUZ

G.R. No. 128117.  February 28, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of murder attended by the generic aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party (morada), but offset by the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication. He was sentenced to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. Two witnesses, Vilma and Maricris, positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant. Accused’s alibi cannot overcome the eyeball testimonies, especially since it has not been shown that it was impossible for him to be physically at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his being at another place at the time of its commission; it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.

PEOPLE  v. DANIEL MAURICIO Y PEREZ

G.R. No. 133695.  February 28, 2001.

The trial court found accused guilty of raping his 11-yr old daughter and sentenced him to death. He was also found guilty of attempted rape in the other case, and sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum.

HELD:

With regard to the first criminal case, the SC convicted the accused of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, although the Information did properly allege the complainant’s minority, it failed to specify the relationship between the complainant and accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death.

With regard to the second criminal case, the SC ruled that the evidence on record cannot sustain a conviction for attempted rape. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Applying the above definition to the facts of the case, it would be stretching the imagination to construe the act of the accused of throwing the victim to her bed as an overt act that will “logically and necessarily ripen” into rape. The external act must have a direct and necessary connection with the crime that the accused intended to commit. Whether accused indeed intended to commit the crime of rape cannot be seen merely from this particular act. Thus, accused should be acquitted of the charge of attempted rape.

PEOPLE  v. CASTANITO GANO

G.R. No. 134373   February 28, 2001

Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced to the penalty of death. The core issue now before us is whether the three (3) killings should be appreciated as separate aggravating circumstances to warrant the imposition of the penalty of death.

HELD:

The SC found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, but imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an “anomalous situation” where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v. BLESIE VELASCO

G.R. Nos. 135231-33   February 28, 2001

The accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape (rape of his 12-yr old stepdaughter), and sentenced to death for each count.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. In qualified rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must both be alleged and proved with certainty, otherwise the death penalty cannot be imposed.

Since the allegation of minority (twelve 12 years old) in the Informations was established by the complainant herself, who is considered competent to testify on her age as it constitutes an assertion of family tradition, 67 and by the open admission of the accused as well as the categorical finding of the trial court, then such fact is deemed established with certainty. In this case, the birth certificate or any other official document proving minority serves no other purpose than to corroborate the testimonies of the competent witnesses and the categorical finding of the trial court.

The second circumstance to be established is the relationship of the accused to the complaining witness. In this case, such a relationship was also shown by the testimonies of witnesses.

PEOPLE  v. FILOMENO SERRANO

G.R. No. 137480   February 28, 2001

Accused was convicted for the crime of rape, aggravated by the fact that the victim was the minor daughter of the accused. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. In imposing the penalty of death, the trial court took into consideration the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced. The SC agreed that it has been duly established that the victim is the daughter of accused-appellant and that she was only thirteen years old at the time of her sexual assault. Proof of these circumstances are the marriage contract between accused-appellant and Adeluisa (“Adel”) Biato Agos, and the certificate of live birth of victim indicating therein that she was the second child of accused-appellant and Adeluisa (“Adel”) Biato Agos, and that she was born on June 13, 1983. Accused-appellant never disowned this relationship when he was put on the stand during the trial. There was likewise no competent evidence presented by accused-appellant to rebut the documents presented by the prosecution.

PEOPLE  v. REFORMADOR VIDAL y BALLADARES

G.R. No. 137946.  February 28, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of the crime of rape, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

The SC upheld the decision of the lower court. The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to a question of the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. The SC found the contentions to be without merit. First. The SC found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court that complainant was raped. It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and voice tone of a witness while testifying and, therefore, competent to determine whether or not the witness is telling the truth.  Furthermore, the alleged inconsistency is minor and inconsequential in nature and does not detract from the fact that complainant was raped.

Second. In rape cases, the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than complainant herself, as accused-appellant may be convicted solely on the testimony of complainant, provided the same is credible, natural, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The testimony of complainant complied with such standards.

Third. The failure of complainant to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not imply her submission to accused-appellant’s desires. To be sure, it is not required that the victim of rape resists her assailant unto death. All that is necessary is that the force or intimidation employed against complainant enabled the assailant to effect sexual penetration.

Fourth. The absence of fresh injuries in complainant’s private part does not negate rape as proof of hymenal lacerations is not an element of rape.  Fifth. Accused-appellant’s contention that he and complainant were lovers is not worthy of any consideration at all. He presented no witness to corroborate his claim.  Sixth. While it is true that flight raises the presumption of guilt on the part of an accused, the converse does not necessarily mean innocence. There is no rule that, in every instance, the fact that the accused did not flee is a proof of his innocence. It is not unnatural for a criminal, as in this case, to desist from leaving the place where the crime was committed to feign innocence.

THE PEOPLE  v. SANDY HINTO y BUENO

G.R. Nos. 138146-91.  February 28, 2001.

In the first criminal case, accused was found guilty of the crime of rape, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He was also found guilty of 45 counts of acts of lasciviousness, there being the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship. He was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, both of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of the forty-five (45) cases and to pay the costs of the suit.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. With regard to the credibility of witnesses, settled is the rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of the testimony of witnesses is entitled to great respect. Unless shown that it has overlooked some facts which would affect the result of the case, the trial court’s factual findings will not be disturbed by the appellate court.

With regard to the defense of alibi, it is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, there must be proof not only that the accused was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.

Under Art. 335, par. 7(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is death. In these cases, the information for rape alleges that the victim was under 18 years of age at the time she was raped and that accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of her mother. Her birth certificate was offered as evidence in this case. It was also proven during the trial that accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother. Considering the foregoing, the SC was constrained to affirm the death sentence imposed by the trial court on accused-appellant.

PEOPLE  v. EDGARDO MACEDA

G.R. No. 138805   February 28, 2001

Accused was convicted for the crime of rape of a mental retardate, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

HELD:

With regard to the contention of accused that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation was used against complainant, the SC found the contention to be unmeritorious. To begin with, under Art. 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 34 the crime of rape may be committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The force necessary in rape is relative. The intimidation must be judged in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule. It must be stressed that complainant in this case does not possess the intelligence of an average individual. Indisputably, her mental faculties are different from those of a fully-functioning adult; hence, the degree of force or intimidation needed to overwhelm her is less than what it would take to frighten an ordinary woman.

Furthermore, it is erroneous for accused-appellant to contend that no rape was committed because the prosecution failed to prove that the mental age of the victim was equivalent to a girl below 12 years old. It must be emphasized that this requirement is necessary if the charge is statutory rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d). In this case, complainant was deprived of reason, and, under Art. 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, having sexual intercourse with her, even if accomplished without the use of force or intimidation, constitutes rape.

However, the trial court erred when it imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant under Art. 266-B (10) of the RPC. True enough, accused-appellant knew of the mental condition of the victim prior to and at the time of the incident, as evidenced by his own admission in open court. Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot be meted the death penalty. Under Art. 266-B in relation to Art. 266-A, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of the victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. This circumstance must, however, be alleged in the information because it is a qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty and changes the nature of the offense. In this case, while accused-appellant admitted that he knew complainant to be a mental retardate, this fact was not alleged in the information. Therefore, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying, but only as a generic aggravating, circumstance. Accordingly, accused-appellant must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of simple rape.

MARCH 2001

PEOPLE  v. ROBERT NUÑEZ y LAGASCA

G.R. No. 112092.  March 1, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of Illegal possession of firearm resulting to the death of the victim and pursuant to P.D. 1866 in relation to the 1987 Constitution the court sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and with costs.

HELD:

Appellant was convicted of “illegal possession of firearms resulting to the death of the victim.” At the time of the commission of the crime, the existing jurisprudence was People v. Quijada. The SC held then that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes — one for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two, for homicide or murder. In the meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8294, 27 which lowered the penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Further, Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294 provides — If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In the present case, there were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately tried. Hence, the evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide cases were neither adopted nor presented before the trial court trying the illegal possession case. For this reason, there is a dearth of evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated homicide.

The Court held that accordingly, appellant should only be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in R.A. No. 8294, being favorable to the accused, should be applied retroactively.

PEOPLE  v. PEDRO SASPA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 123069   March 1, 2001

The trial court found both Pedro Saspa and Rafael Sumiling principally liable for the murder of Isidro Hayo, and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with its accessory penalties, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the trial court’s holding that appellants employed superior strength in the execution of the crime, thus qualifying the killing to murder. When appellants attacked the victim, they had the advantage of numerical superiority and were carrying high-powered firearms; whereas the victim was unarmed and utterly defenseless, not to mention that he was taken by surprise by the swiftness of the assault. Clearly, there was a notorious inequality between the strength of the victim and his assailants. The Court, however, did not sustain the trial court’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of band and ignominy. A band consists of at least four armed malefactors acting together in the commission of an offense. The prosecution failed to prove that there were at least four armed men — Thelma testified that three of Isidro’s assailants were armed, while Sulpicio did make any declaration as to how many of his son’s attackers were actually armed. Neither did the prosecution prove the existence of ignominy, which is a circumstance that adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. There was no showing that appellants deliberately employed means which would cause more suffering or humiliation to the victim.

At the time the crime was committed the penalty for death was reclusion temporal in the maximum period to death. In the absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, or reclusion perpetua.   The SC found appellants guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced them each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs.

PEOPLE v. MARIO CALDONA y LLAMAS

G.R. No. 126019   March 1, 2001

Accused was found guilty of raping his 15-yr old daughter. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

HELD:

The SC found accused guilty, but sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua instead of death. The Court said that when a victim of rape says she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.   As in most rape cases, accused-appellant assails the credibility of the victim. However, the SC has consistently held that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of complainant’s testimony is entitled to great weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case.

Nevertheless, while the guilt of the accused-appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the imposition of the death penalty against him unwarranted. The circumstances under the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 7659, Section 11, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which can not be proved as such unless alleged in the information. Even if such circumstances are proved, the death penalty can not be imposed where the sane were not properly alleged in the Information.

However, while the qualifying circumstance of relationship has been alleged in the Information, it is devoid of any averment on private complainant’s minority. Since one of the twin requirements mentioned, namely, minority, was not alleged in the Information, accused-appellant can neither be convicted for qualified rape nor could the death penalty be meted upon him because to do so would be to deprive him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

PEOPLE  v. RODELIO PERALTA

G.R. No. 131637   March 1, 2001

Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery as charged in the Information and sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. With regard to the issue of conspiracy, the SC held that it was amply and sufficiently proven in this case. Accused-appellants approached the victim from behind. When accused-appellant Quiambao told Peralta to stab the victim, accused-appellant Peralta yanked the left shoulder of Ramon and immediately stabbed the latter on his chest. After the stabbing, both accused-appellants fled and were apprehended only after more than nine (9) years from the filing of the criminal case in court. These acts taken together, are sufficient to establish the existence of a common design among accused-appellants to commit the offense charged.

With regard to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the SC also agreed with the lower court. In crimes against persons, treachery exists when the accused employs, means, methods, and forms which directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To rule that treachery exists in the commission of the crime it must be shown that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and accused-appellants consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him. In the instant case, the victim was stabbed on his chest. While the stab wound appears frontal, it was shown that accused-appellants came from behind and yanked the victim’s shoulder in order to inflict the fatal blow. The manner of attack was duly proven and the infliction of the stab wound was the result of a deliberate act.  At the time of the fatal attack, the victim was standing in front of the parlor while waiting for his wife. The victim, at that moment was unaware of what would befall him and was not given an opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

PEOPLE  v. ALFREDO NARDO

G.R. No. 133888   March 1, 2001

Accused was found guilty of raping his 14-yr old daughter, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. For humanitarian reasons, however, the trial court recommended that the DEATH penalty be commuted to RECLUSION PERPETUA.

HELD:

The SC found accused guilty, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The concurrence of the two special qualifying circumstances, namely the victim’s minority and the relationship between the victim and the culprit, increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree, thus resulting in the imposition of the death penalty. In order to be appreciated as qualifying circumstances, however, these must be properly pleaded in the indictment. In addition, the qualifying circumstances should be duly proved during the trial.

The SC held that these requirements were met in this case. The Information sufficiently alleges that accused-appellant is the father of the victim, and that the latter was fourteen (14) years old at the time of commission of the rape. These elements, furthermore, were categorically affirmed by Elizabeth Nardo, the victim’s mother and the most competent witness.  Moreover, the victim’s birth date and her relationship to accused-appellant were shown by her Certificate of Baptism.  This was presented by her mother, Elizabeth, in lieu of her Certificate of Live Birth, which was destroyed by fire. The baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother’s testimony, is sufficient to establish victim’s age.

PEOPLE  v. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO

G.R. Nos. 135667-70 1 .  March 1, 2001.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, it found him guilty of three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced  him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correctional in its maximum period for each count. It also ordered him to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of P50,000.00, and P100,000.00 for moral damages.

HELD:

The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of acts of lasciviousness. The SC took however to its finding that statutory rape was committed by him on 5 June 1993. A thorough evaluation of the records will show that accused-appellant should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not for consummated rape.

The SC held that absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e. touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

The SC found accused guilty of 4 counts of acts of lasciviousness, aggravated by obvious ungratefulness. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor maximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of Lasciviousness.  Accused-appellant was further directed to pay the private complainant P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of the four (4) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, and to pay the costs.

PEOPLE  v. BALTAZAR AMION y DUGADUGA

G.R. No. 140511.  March 1, 2001.

Accused was found guilty as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R. A. 7659. The following ordinary aggravating circumstances were present in the commission of the crime:

1.         Abuse of public office due to the use of his service firearm in the killing;

2.         Use of motor vehicle which facilitated the commission of the crime; and

3.         Aid of armed men in the commission of the crime.

There is present only one (1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The accused was sentenced to suffer the MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH.

HELD:

The SC held that with respect to the attendant circumstances, the use of a motor vehicle cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance, as the police vehicle used to reach the Sanicas residence was not used directly or indirectly to facilitate the criminal act.

Neither may the aggravating circumstance of aid of armed men be appreciated in this case. The trial court found that during the shooting, an armed companion was on board the patrol car pointing his rifle in the direction of Dejoras. In the first place, this aggravating circumstance contemplates more than one armed man, as the use of the plural form easily suggests. In the second place, the requisites of this aggravating circumstance are: 1) that armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly, and 2) that the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed. Neither circumstance was proven present; it is clear from the evidence that the accused-appellant carried out the killing all by himself and did not rely on his companion for assistance.

The SC also did not agree that the fact that accused-appellant used his service firearm in shooting Vaflor should be considered as an aggravating circumstance as he took advantage of his public position. There is authority to the effect that for public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose.  In the absence of proof that advantage was taken by appellant, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of position could not be properly appreciated against him.

In view of the absence of aggravating circumstances and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed by the trial court should be modified. The penalty for murder Under Article 248 is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63, in case of two indivisible penalties, when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Hence the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE  v. MANUEL PEREZ y MAGPANTAY

G.R. No. 113265.  March 5, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of raping a 12-yr old, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is the common-law husband of the victim’s mother.

HELD:

Having examined the entire record, the SC found that the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution proved beyond doubt all the elements of rape. Private complainant testified as to how appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The carnal knowledge took place under circumstances of violence and intimidation. Her testimony is supported by the results of the medico-legal examination conducted upon her at the police crime laboratory. Moreover, she positively pointed to appellant in open court as the person responsible for her defilement. Against said positive identification, appellant’s puerile defense of denial will not hold water, for he does not even deny that he was with the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast ill motive on private complainant or her family for fabricating the charge of rape against him have no evidentiary weight. It would be most unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story of rape by her mother’s common-law spouse; allow a medical examination of her genitalia; and subject herself to a public trial and possible ridicule, all because her maternal relatives want her mother to separate from her common-law spouse. Perforce, appellant’s conviction must stand.

As to the penalty imposed, the SC held that the trial court correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua. Note that the rape complained of in this case took place on May 31, 1990 or way before the restoration of the death penalty for cases of qualified rape by virtue of R.A. No. 7659. The death penalty law took effect only on December 31, 1993, as per the Court’s holding in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994).

PEOPLE  v. ROQUE “UKING” ELLADO

G.R. No. 124686.  March 5, 2001.

Appellant was convicted of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. The SC held that both of the accused acted in concert in the assault on the victim. They had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Conspiracy exists at the time of the commission of the offense. Their actuation could only point to the existence of a pre-conceived plan to maim and kill the victim.  Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.

The SC also held that the acts of appellant indicate that he and Bakunawa had planned the attack in a manner that would catch the victim unaware. Their move initially was in the guise of a conciliatory overture. It served to cover their nefarious plot. Even if it was Bakunawa who inflicted the fatal wound, liability also exists on the part of appellant notwithstanding non-participation in every detail in the execution of the crime. The deceptive manner by which the two accused fatally assaulted the victim shows that they had intended to catch him off guard, to insure the success of the attack. An unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia.

As treachery attended the killing of the victim, the offense committed by appellant and his co-accused Bakunawa is murder. However, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength alleged in the information to be attendant cannot be appreciated, as the elements of the former were not proven, and the latter is deemed absorbed by treachery.

PEOPLE  v. JULIO HERIDA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 127158   March 5, 2001

Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Jamila, on the other hand, was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The SC agreed with appellant that nowhere in the assailed judgment is it shown how the trial court arrived at its conclusion that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. There was absolutely no showing from the testimony of the witness how the attack commenced; no indicia whether the attack was so sudden and unexpected that it afforded the victim no chance to defend himself. In the absence of this information, treachery cannot be established from the circumstances. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as clearly as the killing itself. Where the attack was not treacherous, the number of aggressors would constitute abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength, therefore, qualifies the killing as murder.

In finding the killing aggravated by evident premeditation, the trial court characterized the method of attack as deliberately and consciously adopted by the three attackers. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In the instant case, however, there is no showing of the time when appellant and his confederates decided to commit the crime. Neither is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants planned the killing of the victim. Nor is there any evidence showing how much time elapsed before the plan was executed. Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified the killing of Delara is devoid of any factual mooring.

With regard to the issue of conspiracy, there was a transparent manifestation of their common sentiment to inflict harm and injury upon the victim. First, while Rene and Edmund were hacking and stabbing the victim, appellant was with them, pounding him with a concrete hollow block. Evidently, appellant was performing overt acts, which directly or indirectly contributed to the execution of the crime. Second, after the victim somehow managed to fend off his attackers and flee, all three attackers pursued him.

Clearly, the aforementioned acts point to a common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest among the assailants. In conspiracy, it is immaterial who inflicted the fatal blows. A conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation, is as guilty as the principal perpetrator of the crime.

 

PEOPLE  v. ALFREDO IBO

G.R. No. 132353   March 5, 2001

Accused was convicted of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court found that there was treachery in the taking of the life of the victim as without any warning, accused-appellant suddenly and unexpectedly shot the victim in front of his family right in his own home. Neither the victim nor his family had any opportunity to put up any defense. The mode of attack was executed in such a manner that retaliation was not possible. The victim did not even have an inkling of the danger to his life, the attack against him being sudden and unexpected. The prosecution has effectively shown that the shooting was calculated as to ensure the infliction of the fatal wounds without giving the victim and his family any opportunity to put up a defense. The qualifying circumstance of treachery having been likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt, the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder.

At the time of the commission of the crime in 1995, the penalty for murder was reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the SC held that the trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

 

PEOPLE  v. JOMER CABANSAY y PALERMO

G.R. No. 138646.  March 6, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder. After considering in his favor the mitigating circumstance of surrender, the accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

HELD:

The accused admits the killing of the victim but denies any liability by invoking self-defense. Taking into account the version of the prosecution, the theory of self-defense is not tenable. At the outset, we mentioned that for self-defense to prosper, all the essential elements thereof must be adequately proven by the accused. Unlawful aggression, the first of these three essential elements, presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of the person defending himself. Without this element, there can be no successful invocation of self-defense. When the accused stabbed the victim, the latter and his companions were conversing and sorting “bulang”. They posed no threat or danger to the accused. If there is any aggression present in this case, it would be that authored by the accused which resulted in the death of Castillo. Absent the element of unlawful aggression, the theory of self-defense of the accused collapses. Inevitably, the result would be the conviction of the accused springing from his own admission that he killed the victim.

Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the SC held that it was duly proven by the prosecution. In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established by the prosecution witness who testified that he and the victim, together with two other companions, were conversing and sorting “bulang” when the accused suddenly and without provocation stabbed the victim. The location of the wound indicates that the victim was stabbed by the accused from the back. After the victim fell to his side, the accused-appellant made a follow-up thrust. The witness, who was shocked by the suddenness of the attack, was likewise stabbed by the accused three times.

The SC held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated by the trial court. Prosecution witness SPO4 Patrocinio Abesia himself testified that the mother of the accused interceded for the latter’s surrender, and subsequently, the accused voluntarily surrendered to him.

 

PEOPLE  v. ANTONIO SAMUDIO

G.R. No. 126168.  March 7, 2001.

All of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

With regard to the claim of self-defense of Samudio, he failed to discharge this burden convincingly for he did not adequately support his allegation of self-defense. No one corroborated his testimony that the aggression was initiated by the victim. Thus, his testimony is self-serving. An accused who invokes self-defense has to rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.

It is alleged in the Information that the killing was qualified by treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his rank. However, the SC held that the trial court failed to make a finding as to the existence of any of these qualifying circumstances.

In the instant case, treachery cannot be appreciated considering that the only eyewitness to the actual stabbing, did not see the initial stage and particulars of the attack on the victim. Similarly, the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of evident premeditation. There was no proof or showing of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit and the execution thereof, to allow the offender to reflect on the consequence of his act. None of these elements of evident premeditation can be fairly inferred from the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case at bar.

Neither can abuse of superior strength be appreciated. Mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior strength. The prosecution did not present any direct proof that there was a deliberate intent on the part of the accused-appellants to take advantage of the obvious inequality of force between the victim and the accused-appellants.

The qualifying circumstance of “disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, being a barangay captain” alleged in the information is likewise unavailing. The prosecution failed to establish proof of the specific facts demonstrating that Samudio’s act of killing the victim was deliberately intended to disregard or insult the respect due him on account of his rank as a barangay captain.

Absent any of the above qualifying circumstances, the crime committed is not murder, but only homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable by reclusion temporal. It appears, however, that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in Samudio’s favor. To be thus considered, three (3) requisites must be proven, namely, (a) the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrender himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary.

The acts of Samudio vis-a-vis those of his co-accused failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. Since the sole prosecution witness to the actual killing, did not see its inception and the details as to how it progressed, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to completely establish the existence of conspiracy among the accused. It bears stressing that conspiracy must be proved as convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. Nonetheless, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of conspiracy does not eliminate any criminal liability on the part of the other accused-appellants.  Although they could not be convicted as a co-principal, they are liable as accomplices.

PEOPLE  v. ERNESTO ICALLA y INES

G.R. No. 136173.  March 7, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

HELD:

The SC noted that appellant faults the trial court for its reliance on circumstantial evidence. However, it is well-settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Conviction may still be proper if factual circumstances duly proven by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty to the exclusion of all others. To support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the concurrence of the following requisites is essential: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Even if there is no eyewitness to the crime, responsibility therefor can be established by the totality of the duly proven facts that yield an inevitable conclusion consistent with the guilt of the accused.

The offense committed is not murder. Appellant cannot be held liable for the crime of murder as charged in the information, but only for homicide, which was the offense proved. As observed by the OSG, there is no evidence as to the manner in which the assault was made or how the stabbing began and developed. Although the deceased sustained five wounds, some of which were at the back, this fact by itself does not constitute treachery which would qualify the killing to murder. There being no eyewitness to the killing or evidence on the mode of attack adopted by appellant, treachery could not be appreciated in this case as a qualifying circumstance.

Likewise, there is a dearth of evidence to establish evident pre-meditation as either a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance. While the witnesses may have testified regarding incidents prior to the killing, there is no evidence that appellant had ever conceived or expressed a resolve to kill the victim.

PEOPLE v. CONRADO SALADINO Y DINGLE

G.R. Nos. 137481-83 & 138455   March 7, 2001

Accused was convicted of three (3) counts of rape for raping his 13-yr old niece. Taking into account the qualifying circumstance of the minority of the victim and her relationship to accused-appellant, the lower court meted three (3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. The trial court also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted rape, and sentenced him to serve an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.

HELD:

The SC said that the victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of the accused-appellant. They held that the “(i)ntimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.” The failure to shout or offer resistance was not because she consented to the deed but because she honestly believed she would be killed if she shouted or resisted. Such threat is sufficient intimidation as contemplated by our jurisprudence on rape. And be that as it may, if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim’s participation in the sexual act voluntary.

However, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos 20 the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, being special qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove complainant’s minority and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both minority and relationship in the four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny accused-appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. Thus, he can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.

The imposition of an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, in attempted rape is also erroneous. The proper penalty for rape in the attempted stage should be two (2) degrees lower than the penalty for consummated rape, or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum imposable penalty should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period and the minimum from prision correccional.

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v. EUGENIO MANGOMPIT

G.R. Nos. 139962-66   March 7, 2001

Accused was found guilty for 5 counts of rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death for each count. He was found guilty for raping his 16-yr old niece.

HELD:

The SC found the accused guilty, but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua for each count. In the case at bench, the trial court apparently relied on the 1st special circumstance introduced by R.A. 7659, that of minority of the victim and relationship with the offender, in imposing the death penalty. However, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender should be specifically alleged in the information conformably with the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Even though the minority of Marites and her relationship with accused-appellant were proven beyond doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed because both of these qualifying circumstances were not alleged in the information. Therefore, despite the five (5) counts of rape committed by accused-appellant, he cannot be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death. Accordingly, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The SC held that the trial court likewise correctly imposed the amount of P25,000 for each count of rape, or a total of P125,000.00, as and by way of exemplary damages. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, “(I)n criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.” In the case at bench, the aggravating circumstances of relationship, dwelling, and, for two of the charges, nighttime were proven to have attended the commission of the crime. Relationship, that of uncle and niece, was proven by the testimony of the victim and by the admission of accused-appellant himself. Dwelling was likewise proven as it was shown that the five incidents of rape were all committed inside the house of the family of the victim where accused-appellant was staying as a houseguest. Finally, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was likewise proven in two of the five rape incidents as it was shown that accused-appellant waited until late in the night when the other family members were in deep slumber before consummating his carnal desire for the victim.

PEOPLE  v. ARNEL MATARO

G.R. No. 130378.  March 8, 2001.

Accused-appellants were found guilty for the crime of murder, and both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim.

HELD:

The accused appellants invoke the “equipoise” rule because their guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The SC said that it has enumerated the requisites for credible identification in the case of

People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995) as follows:

1)         the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;

2)         witness’ degree of attention at that time;

3)         the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;

4)         the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;

5)            the length of time between the crime and the identification; and

6)         the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 18

The Court held that in their view, these requirements were met. In the instant case, there is no question that both witnesses had the opportunity to view the incident as it unfolded before them with a degree of attention that allowed them to take in the important details and recall them clearly. Moreover, as repeatedly stressed, appellate court should accord to the factual findings of trial courts and their evaluation great weight and respect concerning the credibility of witnesses. The conditions of visibility being favorable and these witnesses not appearing to be biased, the conclusion of trial courts regarding the identity of the malefactors should normally be accepted.

The SC also held that the trial court did not err in qualifying the killing as murder. There was treachery in this case since, as testified to by prosecution witness Fernandez, the victim had already dismissed the appellants after they talked to him. The victim was deliberately allowed to enjoy a false sense of security. They shot the victim when the latter had his hands raised. The SC therefore affirmed the ruling of the lower court, but made modifications with the costs to be paid by the accused.

PEOPLE  v. RICKY ROGER AUSTRIA

G.R. No. 134279   March 8, 2001

Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

HELD:

The SC held that the inconsistencies in Rowena Junio’s testimony do not refer to incidental or collateral matters. The basis of her identification of accused-appellant as the victim’s assailant was precisely her purported familiarity with accused-appellant. She did not pick him out of a police line-up nor did she provide the police with a description of the assailant. She pointed to accused-appellant because she allegedly knew him prior to the killing. If the witness was not at all familiar with accused-appellant, the prosecution’s whole case collapses for such familiarity was its very foundation.

In the face of doubts regarding the familiarity of the witness with the alleged assailant, the distance of the witness from the scene and the visibility conditions thereat assume greater significance. The prosecution did not show, however, whether the intensity of the defective lamp was sufficient to enable the witness to see accused-appellant’s face, considering her distance from the scene.

Accused-appellant invoked alibi, which he failed to corroborate with other evidence. Nevertheless, this circumstance would not sustain his conviction. As a rule, alibis should be considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they can easily be fabricated. But equally fundamental is the axiom that evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. And, where the prosecution’s evidence is weak or just as equally tenuous, alibi need not be inquired into.

The prosecution has also failed to establish any motive on the part of the accused-appellant to kill the deceased. While generally, the motive of the accused is immaterial and does not have to be proven, proof of the same becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question.

Considering the apparent unreliability of the evidence proffered by the prosecution, this Court is constrained to rule for an acquittal. In all criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused on the principle that it is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proven by the required quantum of evidence. Conviction, it is said, must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt that we find here to be wanting. The SC reversed the decision of the lower court, and acquitted the accused on ground of reasonable doubt.

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v. RODOLFO VILLADARES

G.R. No. 137649   March 8, 2001

Accused was found guilty of raping a 12-yr old girl, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

Accused assails the credibility of the witness and the supposed inconsistencies in the testimonies. The SC still affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

First. It is doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a witness is accorded with highest respect because the trial court had the direct and singular opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture and tone of voice of a witness while testifying and therefore, competent to determine whether or not the witness is telling the truth.

Second. The alleged inconsistency between the testimony of Eliza (victim) and Emma, that is, that the latter testified that Eliza shouted, is trivial and cannot affect the veracity of their testimonies. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor inconsistencies even manifest truthfulness and candor and erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

Third. The inconsistencies in Emma’s statement before the police authorities and her testimony in open court cannot detract from Eliza’s testimony that she was raped on July 20, 1996 by accused-appellant. Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness’ affidavit and testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. In any event, we find that Emma’s testimony in court sufficiently corroborates that of Eliza on material points.

Lastly, with or without the medical certificate, the testimony of Eliza, as corroborated by her sister Emma is sufficient to convict. This Court has ruled that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; and that a victim’s testimony alone if credible is sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime.

 

PEOPLE  v. EFREN VALEZ

G.R. No. 136738.  March 12, 2001.

Accused was found guilty of raping a 12-yr old girl, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. In the Information that was filed, it was indicated that there was abuse of confidence and trust, the accused being the husband of complainant’s half-sister.

HELD:

Accused-appellant maintains that he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness because there was no sexual intercourse. The SC held that it is well-settled that where the accused tried to insert his penis into his victim’s vagina, that was all that was necessary to commit consummated rape. Full penetration of the victim’s genital organ is not required in order to sustain a conviction for rape. In fact, so long as there was an attempt to insert, even without rupture of the hymen, rape is considered to have already been consummated. In this case, undoubtedly, there is no issue as to whether or not there was insertion or penetration which calls for a fine distinction between mere brushing or “epidermal contact” and actual touching or sliding into the female organ as enunciated in the case of People v. Campuhan.

The SC found the accused guilty, but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Minority and relationship under the first paragraph are special qualifying circumstances which qualify rape to warrant the mandatory penalty of death. As such, they must both be specifically pleaded in the Information and proven during trial. These two circumstances, minority and relationship, must concur; otherwise, if only one is proven during trial, even if the Information alleged both, the death penalty cannot be imposed. And, as special qualifying circumstances, the same must be proven beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself.

In the case under review, the SC found that evidence is wanting as to the special qualifying circumstance of minority. The only proof as to the minority of the complainant is her testimony during direct examination that she was 13 years old and a Grade VI student. No other proof, was presented by the prosecution to establish complainant’s minority at the time of the incident. Even complainant’s mother failed to testify as to her daughter’s age on the witness stand.

As to filiation, the Court notes that the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was properly alleged in the Information which stated that accused-appellant “is the husband of complainant’s half-sister and likewise duly proven during trial. Complainant herself declared that accused-appellant was the husband of her elder sister. The mother of the complainant and mother in-law of the accused also testified that accused-appellant is his son-in-law. Moreover, the accused himself admitted that the victim is his sister-in-law. This notwithstanding, for failure of the prosecution to establish minority by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

People v. Nellie Cabais y Gamuela

G.R. No. 129070.  March 16, 2001.

Accused was convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine. She was also convicted for two counts of estafa, and sentenced to (a) in Criminal Case No. 13999-R, to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party Joan Merante, in the amount of P40,000.00 as actual damages, and costs; (b) in Criminal Case No. 14000-R, to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party, Nancy Oidi, in the amount of P21,000.00 as actual damages, and costs.

HELD:

The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the requirement to secure a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

Accused-appellant contends that she was not involved in recruitment but was merely an employee of a recruitment agency. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. In this case, accused was the one who informed complainants of job prospects in Korea and the requirements for deployment. She also received money from them as placement fees. All of the complainants testified that they personally met accused-appellant and transacted with her regarding the overseas job placement offers. Complainants parted with their money, evidenced by receipts signed by accused Cabais and accused Forneas. Thus, accused-appellant actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants.

Furthermore, accused-appellant did not possess any license to engage in recruitment activities, as evidenced by a certification from the POEA and the testimony of a representative of said government agency. Her acts constituted recruitment, and considering that she admittedly had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment. Despite the fact that she was just an ordinary employee of the company, her criminal liability would still stand for being a conspirator with the corporate officers in undertaking illegal recruitment activities. Since the recruitment involves three or more persons, accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in a large scale punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos.

As to the charges of estafa, accused-appellant contends that she is not liable for the offenses charged because she did not appropriate for her own use the money given to her by complainants as placement and passport fees. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. From the foregoing, the fact that the money was appropriated by accused for her own use is not an element of the crime of estafa. Thus, accused-appellant Cabais’ contention under such ground is untenable. Moreover, accused-appellant misrepresented herself to complainants as one who can make arrangements for job placements in Korea. Complainants were successfully induced to part with their money, causing them damage and prejudice. Consequently, accused-appellant is guilty of estafa.

 

People v. Edgardo Liad

G.R. Nos. 133815-17.  March 22, 2001.

Facts:

Accused-appellants were found guilty as principals by direct participation of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They were also found guilty of illegal possession of firearms, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision correctional sic.

Held:

The Court finds that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy between accused-appellants and the deceased. In conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.  Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime. In this case, there were several circumstances immediately before, during and after the robbery indubitably which show that the perpetrators were one in their purpose to rob the victim. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise extent of participation of each accused in the crime is secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.

The SC held that the trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellants of robbery with homicide. Whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide.

In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, the requisite elements are: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The latter is a negative fact that constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The Court agrees with accused-appellants and the Solicitor General that the prosecution in this case failed to prove the second element.

The SC does  not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally manufactured as recognized in People v. Fajardo, and cannot be issued a license or permit, it is no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears to be, at first blush, a very logical proposition. The Court, however, yield to it because Fajardo did not say that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or a permit, and that proof that a firearm is a paltik dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed.

Criminal Law Book 2

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TITLE ONE

I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

Article 114

  • ELEMENTS OF TREASON:
  1. That the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines
  2. That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved
  3. That the offender either –
  4. Levies war against the government,
  5. breech of allegiance
  6. actual assembling of men
  7. for the purpose of executing a reasonable design
  8. breech of allegiance
  9. adherence
  10. giving aid or comfort to the enemy
  11. Adheres to the enemies, giving them aid and comfort
  • Ways of proving treason:
  1. 2 witnesses testifying to same overt act

Example: X saw arms landed in La Union and loaded into a motor vehicle. At this stage, not sufficient to convict yet. Y later saw the arms unloaded in a warehouse. Will X + Y be sufficient witnesses to convict? Answer: NO. Because the law requires that 2 witnesses see the SAME OVERT ACT.

  1. Confession of the accused in open court. Arraignment, pre-trial, trial – OK.
  2. If he has pleaded NOT guilty already during arraignment, he can still confess in open court by stating the particular acts constituting treason.
  3. During trial, simply saying “I’m guilty” is not enough.
  4. Withdrawing plea of “not guilty” during arraignment not necessary
  5. If during arraignment he pleads guilty, court will ask if the accused understands is plea. Submission of affidavit during trial, even if assisted by counsel is not enough.
  • Treason: breach of allegiance to the government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it. Allegiance: obligation of fidelity and obedience. It is permanent or temporary depending on whether the person is a citizen or an alien.
  • Evident premeditation, superior strength and treachery are circumstances inherent in treason, and are, therefore, not aggravating.
  • Treason cannot be committed in times of peace, only in times of war – actual hostilities. But no need for declaration of war
  • Levying of war: a) that there be an actual assembling of men; b) for the purpose of executing a treasonable design by force (deliver the country in whole or in part to the enemy)
  • Not Treasonous:
  1. Acceptance of public office and discharge of official duties under the enemy does not constitute per se the felony of treason (exception: when it is policy determining)
  2. Serving in a puppet government (ministerial functions) and in order to serve the populace is NOT treasonous. But it is treason if: a) there is discretion involved; b) inflicts harm on Filipinos; c) it is disadvantageous to them.
  3. Purpose of offender: to deliver the Philippines to enemy country; if merely to change officials – not treason
  4. Filipino citizens can commit treason outside the Philippines. But that of an alien must be committed in the Philippines.
  5. Only Filipino citizens or permanent resident aliens can be held liable
  6. Alien: with permanent resident status from the BID – it is neither the length of stay in the Philippines nor the marriage with a Filipino that matters.
  • On Citizenship
  • Treason cannot be proved by circumstantial evidence or by extra-judicial confession of the accused
  • Actual hostilities may determine the date of the commencement of war
  • No such thing as attempted treason; mere attempt consummates the crime
  • Giving aid or comfort – material element, enhances forces of the enemy country. Acts which strengthen or tend to strengthen the enemy in the conduct of war against the traitor’s country or that which weaken and tend to weaken the power of the same.

Example: Financing arms procurement of enemy country. But giving of shelter is not necessarily “giving aid and comfort.”

  • Adherence and giving aid or comfort must concur together. Adherence: when a citizen intellectually or emotionally favors the enemy and harbors convictions disloyal to his country’s policy. But membership in the police force during the occupation is NOT treason.

Example: Giving information to, or commandeering foodstuffs for the enemy.

  • Adherence may be proved by: (1) one witness; (2) from the nature of the act itself; (3) from the circumstances surrounding the act.
  • Treason is a CONTINUING CRIME. Even after the war, offender can be prosecuted.
  • If you convict a person for treason by reason of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear, you may use 12.  No treason through negligence
  • When killings and other common crimes are charged as overt act of treason, they cannot be regarded as (1) separate crimes or (2) as complex with treason.

Article 115

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT TREASON

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. In time of war
  2. 2 or more persons come to an agreement to

1. levy war against the government, or

2. adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort,

  1. They decide to commit it
  • ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON
  1. In time of war
  2. A person who has decided to levy war against the government, or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, proposes its execution to some other person/s.
  • Mere agreement and decisions to commit treason is punishable
  • Mere proposal even without acceptance is punishable too. If the other accepts, it is already conspiracy.

Article 116

MISPRISION OF TREASON

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender must be owing allegiance to the government, and not a foreigner
  2. That he has knowledge of any conspiracy (to commit treason) against the government
  3. That he conceals or does not disclose  and make known the same as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides
  • Offender is punished as an accessory to the crime of treason
  • This crime does not apply if the crime of treason is already committed
  • Crime of omission
  • “To report within a reasonable time” – depends on time, place and circumstance – the RPC did not fix time.
  • RPC states 4 individuals, what if you report to some other high-ranking government official? Ex. PNP Director? Judge Pimentel says any gov’t official of the DILG is OK.

Article 117

Espionage by entering, without authority therefor, warship, fort, or naval or military establishments or reservation to obtain any information, plans, photographs or other data of a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines.

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender enters any of the places mentioned therein
  2. That he has no authority therefore;
  3. That his purpose is to obtain information, plans, photographs or other data of a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines

Espionage by disclosing to the representative of a foreign nation the contents of the articles, data, or information referred to in paragraph 1 of  Article 117, which he had in his possession by reason of the public office holds

  1. ELEMENTS:That the offender is a public officer
  2. That he has in his possession the articles, data or information referred to in par 1 of art 117, by reason of the public office he holds
  3. That he discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign nation
  • Purpose: to gather data
  • Espionage: the offense of gathering, transmitting, or losing information respecting the national defense with the intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the Philippines or the advantage of any foreign nation.  It is not conditioned on citizenship.
  • Not necessary that Philippines is at war with the country to which the information was revealed. What is important is that the information related is connected with the defense system of the Philippines.
  • Wiretapping is NOT espionage if the purpose is not something connected with the defense
  • See CA 616

II. CRIMES AGAINST LAWS OF NATIONS

 

Article 118

INCITING TO WAR OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR REPRISALS

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender performs unlawful or unauthorized acts
  2. That such acts provoke or give occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the Philippines or expose Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or property
  • Crime is committed in time of peace, intent is immaterial
  • Inciting to war – offender is any person
  • Reprisals is not limited to military action, it could be economic reprisals, or denial of entry into their country. Example. X burns Chinese flag. If China bans the entry of Filipinos into China, that is already reprisal.

Article 119

VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY

ELEMENTS:

  1. That there is war in which the Philippines is not involved
  2. That there is a regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of enforcing neutrality
  3. That the offender violates such regulation
  • Gov’t must have declared the neutrality of the Phil in a war between 2 other countries
  • It is neutrality of the Phil that is violated
  • Congress has the right to declare neutrality

Article 120

CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILE COUNTRY

ELEMENTS:

  1. That it is in time of war in which the Philippines is involved
  2. That the offender makes correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops
  3. That the correspondence is either –
    1. prohibited by the government, or
    2. carried on in ciphers or conventional signs, or
    3. containing notice or information which might be useful to the enemy
  • Circumstances qualifying the offense:

a. notice or information might be useful to the enemy

b. offender intended to aid the enemy

  • Hostile country exist only during hostilities or after the declaration of war
  • Correspondence to enemy country – correspondence to officials of enemy country – even if related to you.
  • It is not correspondence with private individual in enemy country
  • If ciphers were used, no need for prohibition
  • If ciphers were not used, there is a need for prohibition
  • In any case, it must be correspondence with the enemy country
  • Doesn’t matter if correspondence contains innocent matters – if prohibited, punishable

Article 121

FLIGHT TO ENEMY’S COUNTRY

 

  • ELEMENTS
  1. That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved
  2. That the offender (Filipino or resident alien) must be owing allegiance to the government
  3. That the offender attempts to flee or go to enemy country
  4. That going to enemy country is prohibited by competent authority
  • Mere attempt consummates the crime
  • There must be a prohibition. If none, even if went to enemy country – no violation
  • Alien resident may be guilty here.

Article 122

PIRACY

  • 2 Ways of Committing Piracy
  1. By attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas or in the Philippine waters (PD 532)
  2. By seizing the whole or part of the cargo of said vehicles, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers
  • Elements:
  1. That a vessel is on the high seas/Philippine waters
  2. That the offenders are not members of its complement or passengers of the vessel
  3. That the offenders –
    1. attack or seize that vessel or (hence, if committed by crew or passengers, the crime is not piracy but robbery in the high seas)
    2. seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers
  • High seas: any waters on the sea coast which are without the boundaries of the low water mark although such waters may be in the jurisdictional limits of a foreign gov’t
  • PD 532 has been already repealed
  • Piracy in high seas – jurisdiction is with any court where offenders are found or arrested
  • Piracy in internal waters – jurisdiction is only with Philippine courts
  • For purpose of Anti-Fencing Law, piracy is part of  robbery and theft

Piracy

Mutiny

Robbery or forcible degradation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done with animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

Unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of commotion and disturbances on board a ship against the authority of its commander

Intent to gain is an element.

 

Attack from outside.  Offenders are strangers to the vessel. (this is the standing rule with the repeal of PD 532 which made it possible for any person to commit piracy including a passenger or complement of the vessel).

Attack from the inside.

Article 123

QUALIFIED PIRACY

  • CIRCUMSTANCES:
  1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same
  2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves
  3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape. (the above may result to qualified mutiny)
  • Parricide/infanticide should be included (Judge Pimentel)
  • Note the new rape law. Death is imposed in certain types of rape
  • There is a conflict between this provision and the provision on rape. Ex. If rape is committed on someone below 7 – death under the new rape law. But if rape committed on someone below 7 during the time of piracy – RP to death. Irreconcilable.
  • Murder/rape/homicide/physical injuries must have been committed on the passengers or complement

TITLE TWO

 

I. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

Classes of Arbitrary Detention:

  1. By detaining a person without legal ground
  2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities
  3. Delaying release

Article 124

ARBITRARY DETENTION

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee (whose official duties include the authority to make an arrest and detain persons; jurisdiction to maintain peace and order).
  2. That he detains a person (actual restraint).
  3. That the detention was without legal grounds (cannot be committed if with warrant).
  • Detention: when a person is placed in confinement or there is a restraint on his person.
  • Though the elements specify that the offender be a public officer or employee, private individuals who conspire with public officers can also be liable.
  • Legal grounds for the detention of any person:
  • Without legal grounds:
  • Know grounds for warrantless arrest:
  • For escaped prisoner – no need for warrant
  • Rolito Go v. CAis an example of arbitrary detention (Judge Pimentel)
  • Example:Y was killed by unknown assailant. Officers got a tip and arrested X. X voluntarily admitted to the officers that he did it although he was not asked. X was detained immediately. According to the SC, there was NO arbitrary detention.  Why? Because once X made a confession, the officers had a right to arrest him.
  • Continuing crime is different from a continuous crime
  • Ramos v. Enrile: Rebels later on retire. According to the SC, once you have committed rebellion and have not been punished or amnestied, then the rebels continue to engage in rebellion, unless the rebels renounce his affiliation. Arrest can be made without a warrant because this is a continuing crime.
  1. commission of a crime
  2. violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital
  3. he has not committed any crime or no reasonable ground of suspicion that he has committed a crime
  4. not suffering from violent insanity or any other ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital
  5. Crime is about to be, is being, has been committed
  6. Officer must have reasonable knowledge that the person probably committed the crime

Article 125

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he has detained a person for some legal grounds
  3. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authority within:
  4. 12 hours, if detained for crimes/offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent
  5. 18 hours, for crimes/offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent or
  6. 36 hours, for crimes/offenses punishable by capital punishment or afflictive penalties, or their equivalent
  • Really means delay in filing necessary information or charging of person detained in court. May be waived if a preliminary investigation is asked for.
  • Does not contemplate actual physical delivery but at least there must be a complaint filed. Duty complied with upon the filing of the complaint with the judicial authority (courts, prosecutors – though technically not a judicial authority, for purposes of this article, he’s considered as one.)
  • The filing of the information in court does not cure illegality of detention. Neither does it affect the legality of the confinement under process issued by the court.
  • To escape from this, officers usually ask accused to execute a waiver which should be under oath and with assistance of counsel. Such waiver is not violative of the accused constitutional right.
  • What is length of waiver? Light offense – 5 days. Serious and less serious offenses – 7 to 10 days. (Judge Pimentel)
  • Article does not apply when arrest is via a warrant of arrest
  • If offender is a private person, crime is illegal detention

Arbitrary Detention (124)

Delay in Delivery of Detained (125)

Detention is illegal from the beginning.

Detention is legal in the beginning, but illegality starts from the expiration of the specified periods without the persons detained having been delivered to the proper judicial authority.

Article 126

DELAYING RELEASE

ELEMENTS:

  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That there is a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or that there is a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person
  3. That the offender without good reason delays:
    1. the service of the notice of such order to the prisoner, or
    2. the performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner, or
    3. the proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person
  • Three acts are punishable:
  • Wardens and jailers are the persons most likely to violate this provision
  • Provision does not include legislation
  1. delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner
  2. delaying the service of notice of such order to said prisoner
  3. delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person

Article 127

EXPULSION

ELEMENTS:

  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he expels any person from the Philippines, or compels a person to change his residence
  3. That the offender is not authorized to do so by law
  • 2 acts punishable:
  1. by expelling a person from the Philippines
  2. by compelling a person to change his residence

(The crime of expulsion absorbs that of grave coercion. If done by a private person, will amount to grave coercion)

i.e.,Villavicencio v. Lukban: prostitutes’ case

  • Does not include undesirable aliens; destierro; or when sent to prison
  • If X (Filipino) after he voluntarily left, is refused re-entry – is considered forcing him to change his address here
  • Threat to national security is not a ground to expel or change his address.

Article 128

VIOLATION OF DOMICILE

ELEMENTS:

  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a search  therein for papers or other effects
  3. That he commits any of the following acts:
    1. entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof
    2. searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner
    3. refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the same
  • Aggravating Circumstance (medium and maximum of penalty imposed):
  • If the offender who enters the dwelling against the will of the owner thereof is a private individual, the crime committed is trespass to dwelling (Art 280)
  • When a public officer searched a person “outside his dwelling” without a search warrant and such person is not legally arrested for an offense, the crime committed by the public officer is grave coercion, if violence or intimidation is used (Art 286), or unjust vexation, if there is no violence or intimidation (Art 287)
  • A public officer without a search warrant cannot lawfully enter the dwelling against the will of the owner, even if he knew that someone in that dwelling is having unlawful possession of opium
  • 3 acts punishable:
  • “Being authorized by law” – means with search warrant, save himself or do some things good for humanity
  • There must be expression that entry is denied or that he is asked to leave
  • Papers and effects need not be part of a crime.
  1. offense committed at nighttime
  2. papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately
  3. person enters dwelling w/o consent or against the will
  4. person enters and searches for papers and effects
  5. person entered secretly and refuses to leave after being asked to

Article 129

SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED

ELEMENTS:

  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he procures a search warrant
  3. That there is no just cause

ABUSE IN THE SERVICE OF WARRANT OR EXCEEDING AUTHORITY OR USING UNNECESSARY SEVERITY IN EXECUTING A SEARCH WARRANT LEGALLY PROCURED

ELEMENTS:

  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he has legally procured a search warrant
  3. That he exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same
  • Search warrant is valid for 10 days from its date
  • Search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People, signed by the judge and directed to a public officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court
  • No just cause – warrant is unjustified
  • Search – limited to what is described in the warrant, all details must be with particularity
  • Malicious warrant. Example. X was a respondent of a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms. A return was made. The gun did not belong to X and the witness had no personal knowledge that there is a gun in that place.
  • Abuse examples:
  1. X owner was handcuffed while search was going-on.
  2. Tank was used to ram gate prior to announcement that  a search will be made
  3. Persons who were not respondents were searched

Article 130

  • ELEMENTS OF SEARCHING DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESSES:
  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he is armed with a search warrant legally procured
  3. That he searches the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person
  4. That the owner, or any member of his family, or two witnesses residing in the same locality are not present
  • Order of those who must witness the search:
  • Validity of the search warrant can be questioned only in 2 courts: where issued or where the case is pending. Latter is preferred for objective determination.
  1. Homeowner
  2. Members of the family of sufficient age and discretion
  3. Responsible members of the community (can’t be influenced by the searching party)

Article 131

PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. Offender is a public officer or employee
  2. He performs any of the ff. acts:
  3. prohibiting or interrupting, without legal ground the holding of a peaceful meeting, or dissolving the same (e.g. denial of permit in arbitrary manner).
  4. hindering any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meetings
  • prohibiting or hindering any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances
  • If the offender is a private individual, the crime is disturbance of public order (Art 153)
  • Meeting must be peaceful and there is no legal ground for prohibiting, dissolving or interrupting that meeting
  • Meeting is subject to regulation
  • Offender must be a stranger, not a participant, in the peaceful meeting; otherwise, it’s unjust vexation
  • Interrupting and dissolving a meeting of the municipal council by a public officer is a crime against the legislative body, not punishable under this article
  • The person talking on a prohibited subject at a public meeting contrary to agreement that no speaker should touch on politics may be stopped
  • But stopping the speaker who was attacking certain churches in public meeting is a violation of this article
  • Prohibition must be without lawful cause or without lawful authority
  • Those holding peaceful meetings must comply with local ordinances. Example: Ordinance requires permits for meetings in public places. But if police stops a meeting in a private place because there’s no permit, officer is liable for stopping the meeting.

Article 132

INTERRUPTION OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the officer is a public officer or employee
  2. That religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are about to take place or are going on
  3. That the offender prevents or disturbs the same
  • Circumstance qualifying the offense: if committed with violence or threats
  • Reading of Bible and then attacking certain churches in a public plaza is not a ceremony or manifestation of religion, but only a meeting of a religious sect. But if done in a private home, it’s a religious service
  • Religious Worship: people in the act of performing religious rites for a religious ceremony; a manifestation of religion. Ex. Mass, baptism, marriage
  • X, a private person, boxed a priest while the priest was giving homily and while the latter was maligning a relative of X. Is X liable? X may be liable under Art 133 because X is a private person.
  • When priest is solemnizing marriage, he is a person in authority, although in other cases, he’s not.

Article 133

OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the acts complained of were performed –
  2. in a place devoted to religious feelings, or (for this element, no need of religious ceremony, only the place is material)
  3. during the celebration of any religious ceremony
  4. That the acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful (deliberate intent to hurt the feelings)
  5. The offender is any person
  6. There is a deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of  the faithful, directed against religious tenet
  • If in a place devoted to religious purpose, there is no need for an ongoing religious ceremony
  • Example of religious ceremony (acts performed outside the church). Processions and special prayers for burying dead persons but NOT prayer rallies
  • Acts must be directed against religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule, as mocking or scoffing or attempting to damage an object of religious veneration
  • There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful, mere arrogance or rudeness is not enough.

CRIME

Nature of Crime

Who are Liable

If Element Missing

Prohibition, Interruption and Dissolution of Peaceful Meeting (131)

Crime against the fundamental law of the state

Public officers, Outsiders

If not by public officer = tumults

Interruption of Religious Worship (132)

Crime against the fundamental law of the state

Public officers, Outsiders

If by insider = unjust vexation

If not religious = tumult or alarms

If not notoriously offensive = unjust vexation

Offending the Religious Feeling (133)

Crime against public order

Public officers, private persons, outsiders

If not tumults = alarms and scandal

If meeting illegal at onset = inciting to sedition or rebellion

 

TITLE THREE

I. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Article 134

REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That there be –
  2. public uprising and
  3. taking arms against the government (force/violence)
  4. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either

1. to remove from the allegiance to said government or its laws –

  1. the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or

ii. any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or

2  To deprive the chief executive or congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives

  • Persons liable for rebellion
  1. Any person who:

1.  promotes

2.  maintains, or

3.  heads a rebellion or insurrection; or

  1. Any person who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein by:
  2. engaging in war against the forces of the government
  3. destroying property or committing serious violence
  4. exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated (Note: “diverting public funds” is malversation absorbed in rebellion);
  5. Any person merely participating or executing the command of others in rebellion
  • Success is immaterial, purpose is always political
  • Rebellion used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government
  • Insurrection refers to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor importance to prevent the exercise of gov’t authority w/ respect to particular matters or subjects
  • Actual clash of arms w/ the forces of the gov’t, not necessary to convict the accused who is in conspiracy w/ others actually taking arms against the gov’t
  • Purpose of the uprising must be shown but it is not necessary that it be accomplished
  • A change of government w/o external participation
  • RISING PUBLICLY and TAKING ARMS AGAINST GOVERNMENT – actual participation.  If there is no public uprising, the crime is of direct assault.
  • Mere giving of aid or comfort is not criminal in the case of rebellion. Merely sympathizing is not participation, there must be ACTUAL participation
  • Not necessary that there is killing, mere threat of removing Phil is sufficient
  • Rebellion cannot be complexed with any other crime.  However, illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion is distinct from the crime of rebellion. Furthermore, it is a continuing crime such along with the crime of conspiracy or proposal to commit such
  • A private crime may be committed during rebellion. Examples: killing, possessions of firearms, illegal association are absorbed. Rape, even if not in furtherance of rebellion cannot be complexed
  • If killing, robbing were done for private purposes or for profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately be punished and would not be embraced by rebellion (People v. Fernando)
  • ReadPeople v. Hernandezand Enrile v. Salazar
  • Person deemed leader of rebellion in case he is unknown:
  • Any person who in fact:
  1. directed the others
  2. spoke for them
  3. signed receipts and other documents issued in their name
  4. performed similar acts on behalf of the rebels

Article 134-A

COUP D E’TAT

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. Swift attack
  2. Accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
  3. Directed against:
  4. duly constituted authorities
  5. any military camp or installation
  6. communication networks or public utilities
    1. other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power
  7. Singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines
    1. Committed by any person or persons belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment; with or without civilian support or participation
  8. With or without civilian support or participation
  9. Purpose of seizing or diminishing state power
  • Crime may be committed by a single person, any government employee and even by civilian
  • Taking up of arms not even necessary, what is important is violence, threat, intimidation, strategy or stealth
 

Treason (114)

Rebellion (134)

Coup d’etat (134-A)

Sedition (139)

Nature of Crime

Crime against National Security

Crime against Public Order

Crime against Public Order

Crime against Public Order

Overt Acts

levying war against the gov’t;

OR

adherence and giving aid or comfort to enemies

Public uprising

AND

Taking up arms against the gov’t

See article.

Rising publicly or tumultuously (caused by more than 3 armed men or provided with means of violence)

Purpose of objective

Deliver the gov’t to enemy during war

See article.

Seizing or diminishing state power.

See enumeration in article.

Article 135

Penalties

  • Who are liable?
  1. Any person who:
  2. Promotes
  3. Maintains
  4. heads a rebellion or insurrection
  5. engaging in war against the forces of the gov’t
  6. destroying property or committing serious violence
  7. exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated
  8. Any person who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein
  9. Any person merely participating or executing the command of other in a rebellion.

In Government Service

Not in Government Service

Anyone who leads, directs, commands others to undertake a coup.

Anyone who participates or in an manner, supports, finances, abets, aids in a coup.

  • Serious violence is that inflicted upon civilians, which may result in homicide. It is not limited to hostilities against the armed force.
  • Diverting public funds is malversation absorbed in rebellion
  1. Public officer must take active part because mere silence or omission not punishable in rebellion
  2. It is not a defense in rebellion that the accused never took the oath of allegiance to, or that they never recognized the government
  3. Rebellion cannot be complexed with murder and other common crimes committed in pursuance of the movement to overthrow the government
  4. Killing, robbing etc for private persons or for profit, without any political motivation, would be separately punished and would not be absorbed in the rebellion.

Article 136

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. 2 more persons come to an agreement to rise publicly and take arms against the government
  2. For any of the purposes of rebellion
  3. They decide to commit it

PROPOSAL TO COMMIT REBELLION OR INSURRECTION (136)

  • ELEMENTS:
  • Organizing a group of soldiers, soliciting membership in, and soliciting funds for the organization show conspiracy to overthrow the gov’t
  • The mere fact of giving  and rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make the accused guilty of conspiracy if there’s no evidence that the hearers then and there agreed to rise up in arms against the gov’t
  • Conspiracy must be immediately prior to rebellion
  • If it is during the rebellion, then it is already taking part in it.
  1. A person who has decided to rise publicly and take arms the government
  2. For any of the purposes of rebellion
  3. Proposes its execution to some other person/s

Article 137

DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

  • ELEMENTS:
  • Presupposes existence of rebellion
  • Must not be in conspiracy with rebels or coup plotters
  • If there are means to prevent the rebellion but did not resist it, then there’s disloyalty. If there are no means, no fault
  • If position is accepted in order to protect the people, not covered by this
  • The collaborator must not have tried to impose the wishes of the rebels of the people.
  1. Failing to resist rebellion by all the means in their power
  2. Continuing to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of rebels
  3. Accepting appointment to office under rebels

Article 138

INCITING TO REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government
  2. That he incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion
  3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end
  • Intentionally calculated to seduce others to rebellion
  • There must be uprising to take up arms and rise publicly for the purposes indicated in Art 134

Proposal to Commit Rebellion (136)

Inciting to Rebellion (138)

The person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion.

Not required that the offender has decided to commit rebellion.

The person who proposes the execution of the crime uses secret means.

The inciting is done publicly.

Article 139

SEDITION

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offenders rise –
  2. Publicly (if no public uprising = tumult and other disturbance of public order)
  3. Tumultuously (vis-à-vis rebellion where there must be a taking of arms)
  4. to prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election
  5. to prevent the national government, or any provincial or municipal government, or any public thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of any administrative order
  6. to inflict any act or hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee
  7. to commit for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social class (hence, even private persons may be offended parties)
  8. to despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the national government of all its property or any part thereof
  9. That they employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods
  10. That the offenders employ any of those means to attain any of the following objects:
  • Sedition: raising of commotion or disturbances in the State. Its ultimate object is a violation of the public peace or at least such measures that evidently engenders it.
  • Difference from rebellion – object or purpose of the surprising. For sedition – sufficient that uprising is tumultuous. In rebellion – there must be taking up of arms against the government.
  • Sedition – purpose may be either political or social. In rebellion – always political
  • Tumultuous – caused by more than 3 persons who are armed or provided with means of violence
  • Preventing public officers from freely exercising their functions
  • In sedition – offender may be a private or public person (Ex. Soldier)
  • Public uprising and the object of sedition must concur
  • Q: Are common crimes absorbed in sedition? InP v. Umali, SC held that NO. Crimes committed in that case were independent of each other.
  • Preventing election through legal means – NOT sedition
  • But when sugar farmers demonstrated and destroyed the properties of sugar barons – sedition
  • Persons liable for sedition:
  1. leader of the sedition, and
  2. other persons participating in the sedition

Article 142

INCITING TO SEDITION

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender does not take a direct part in the crime of sedition
  2. That he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition (134)
  3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writing, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end (purpose: cause commotion not exactly against the government; actual disturbance not necessary)
  • Different acts of inciting to sedition:
  • When punishable:
  1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems etc.
  2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace or writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous [vulgar, mean, libelous] libels against the government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the public peace
  3. Knowingly concealing such evil practices
  4. when they tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office; or
  5. when they tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes
  6. when they suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; or
  7. when they lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the government

 

II. CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION

 

Article 143

ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF CONGRESS AND SIMILAR BODIES

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That there be a projected or actual meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or division thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board
  2. That the offender who may be any persons prevents such meeting by force or fraud
  • Chief of Police and mayor who prevented the meeting of the municipal council are liable under Art 143, when the defect of the meeting is not manifest and requires an investigation before its existence can be determined.

Article 144

DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That there be a meeting of Congress or any of its committees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board
  2. That the offender does any of the following acts
    1. he disturbs any of such meetings
    2. he behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it
  • Complaint must be filed by member of the Legislative body. Accused may also be punished for contempt.

Article 145

VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

  • Acts punishable:
  1. By using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member of Congress from –
  2. attending the meeting of the assembly or any of its committees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or from
  3. expressing his opinions or
  4. casting his vote
  5. By arresting or searching any member thereof while Congress is in a regular or special session, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the code by a penalty higher than prision mayor

Elements:

  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
  2. That he arrests or searches any member of Congress
  3. That Congress, at the time of arrest or search, is in a regular or special session
  4. That the member searched has not committed a crime punishable under the code by a penalty higher than prision mayor (1987 constitution: privilege from arrest while congress in session in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment).
  • Article partly inoperative because of the 1987 Constitution

III. ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS

 

Article 146

ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES

  • Two (2) Types of illegal assemblies:

a. Meeting of the first form

  1. Meeting, gathering or group of persons whether in a fixed place or moving
  2. purpose : to commit any of crimes punishable under the code
  3. meeting attended by armed persons

b. Meeting of the second form

  1. Meeting, gathering or group of persons whether in a fixed place or moving
  2. Audience whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or direct assault.
  • Not all the persons present at the meeting of the first form of illegal assembly must be armed
  • Persons liable for illegal assembly
  • Responsibility of persons merely present at the meeting
  • Presumptions if person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm:
  1. the organizers or leaders of the meeting
  2. persons merely present at the meeting (except when presence is out of curiosity – not liable)
  3. if they are not armed, penalty is arresto mayor
  4. if they carry arms, like bolos or knives, or licensed firearms, penalty is prision correccional
  5. purpose of the meeting is to commit acts punishable under the RPC
  6. considered as leader or organizer of the meeting

Article 147

ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS

  • ELEMENTS:
  • Persons liable:
  1. Organized totally or partially for the purpose of committing any of the crimes in RPC
  2. Or for some purpose contrary to public morals
  3. founders, directors and president of the association
  4. mere members of the association

Illegal Assembly (146)

Illegal Association (147)

Must be an actual meeting of armed persons to commit any of the crimes punishable under the RPC, or of individuals who, although not armed, are incited to the commission of treason, rebellion, sedition or assault upon a person in authority of his agent.

No need for such

It is the meeting and the attendance at such that are punished

Act of forming or organizing and membership in the association

Persons liable: leaders and those present

Founders, directors, president and members

IV. ASSAULT, RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE

Article 148

DIRECT ASSAULT

  • ELEMENTS OF THE 1STFORM OF DIRECT ASSAULT
  1. That the offender employs force or intimidation.
  2. That the aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects of the crimes of sedition. (victim need not be person in authority)
  3. That there is no public uprising.
  • ELEMENTS OF THE 2NDFORM OF DIRECT ASSAULT:
  1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
  2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
  3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties (motive is not essential), or that he is assaulted (b) by reason of the past performance of official duties (motive is essential).
  4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties (with intention to offend, injure or assault).
  5. That there is no public uprising.
  • Always complexed with the material consequence of the act (e.g. direct assault with murder) except if resulting in a light felony, in which case, the consequence is absorbed
  • Hitting the policeman on the chest with fist is not direct assault because if done against an agent of a person in authority, the force employed must be of serious character
  • The force employed need not be serious when the offended party is a person in authority (ex. Laying of hands)
  • The intimidation or resistance must be serious whether the offended party is an agent only or a person in authority (ex. Pointing a gun)
 

Force Employed

Intimidation/Resistance

Person in Authority

Need not be serious

Serious

Agent

Must be of serious character

Serious

  • Person in authority: any person directly vested with jurisdiction (power or authority to govern and execute the laws) whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission
  • A barangay captain is a person in authority, so is a Division Superintendent of schools, President of Sanitary Division and a teacher
  • Agent: is one who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property. (Example. Barrio councilman and any person who comes to the aid of the person in authority, policeman, municipal treasurer, postmaster, sheriff, agents of the BIR, Malacañang confidential agent)
  • Even when the person in authority or the agent agrees to fight, still direct assault.
  • When the person in authority or the agent provoked/attacked first, innocent party is entitled to defend himself and cannot be held liable for assault or resistance nor for physical injuries, because he acts in legitimate self-defense
  • There can be no assault upon or disobedience to one authority by another when they both contend that they were in the exercise of their respective duties.
  • When assault is made by reason of the performance of his duty there is no need for actual performance of his official duty when attacked
  • Circumstances qualifying the offense (Qualified Assault):
  • Complex crime of direct assault with homicide or murder, or with serious physical injuries.
  • Direct assault cannot be committed during rebellion.
  1. when the assault is committed with a weapon
  2. when the offender is a public officer or employee
  3. when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority

Article 149

INDIRECT ASSAULT

  • ELEMENTS:  
  1. That a person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the forms of direct assault defined in ART. 148.
  2. That a person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent.
  3. That the offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person coming to the aid of the authority or his agent.
  • Indirect assault can be committed only when a direct assault is also committed
  • To be indirect assault, the person who should be aided is the agent (not the person in authority because it is already direct assault, the person coming to the aid of the person in authority being considered as an agent and an attack on the latter is already direct assault). Example. Aiding a policeman under attack.

Article 150

DISOBEDIENCE TO SUMMONS

  • Acts punishable:
  1. refusing without legal excuse to obey summons
  2. refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation
  3. refusing to answer any legal inquiry to produce books, records etc.
  4. restraining another from attending as witness in such body
  5. inducing disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn

Article 151

RESISTANCE DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR THE AGENT OF SUCH PERSON (par. 1)

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender.
  2. That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority or his agent.
  3. That the act of the offender is not included in the provisions of arts. 148, 149 and 150.

SIMPLE DISOBEDIENCE (par. 2)

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That an agent of a person in authority is engaged in the performance of official duty gives a lawful order to the offender.
  2. That the offender disobeys such agent of a person in authority.
  3. That such disobedience is not of a serious nature.

Direct Assault (148)

Resistant and Disobedience to a Person in Authority or Agents of such Person (151)

PIA or his agent must be engaged in the performance of official duties or that he is assaulted

PIA or his agent must be in the actual performance of his duties.

Direct assault is committed in 4 ways – by attacking, employing force, and seriously resisting a PIA or his agent.

Committed by resisting or seriously disobeying a PIA or his agent.

Use of force against an agent of PIA must be serious and deliberate.

Use of force against an agent of a PIA is not so serious; no manifest intention to defy the law and the officers enforcing it.

Article 152

PERSONS IN AUTHORITY/AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY:

  • Persons in Authority – any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission.
  1. Barangay captain
  2. Barangay chairman
  3. Teachers
  4. Professors
  5. Persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities
  6. Lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance
  • Agent of Person in Authority – any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property.
  1. Barrio councilman
  2. Barrio policeman
  3. Barangay leader
  4. Any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority
  • Section 388 of the Local Gov’t Code provides that “for purposes of the RPC, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed aspersons in authorityin their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and the security of life, property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority shall be deemed AGENT of persons in authority.  

 

V. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC DISORDERS

 

Article 153

  • TYPES OF TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER:
  1. Causing any serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment
  2. Interrupting or disturbing public performances, functions, gatherings or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in Art 131 and 132 (Public Officers interrupting peaceful meetings or religious worship).
  3. Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting, association or public place
  4. Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of public order in such place
  5. Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.
  • If the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting or religious ceremony is NOT committed by public officers, or if committed by public officers they are not participants therein, this article applies. Art 131 and 132 punishes the same acts if committed by public officers who are NOT participants in the meeting
  • The outcry is merely a public disorder if it is an unconscious outburst which, although rebellious or seditious in nature, is not intentionally calculated to induce others to commit rebellion or sedition, otherwise, its inciting to rebellion or sedition.
  • Tumultuous – if caused by more than 3 persons who are armed or provided with means of violence (circumstance qualifying the disturbance/interruption) – “tumultuous in character”

Article 154

  • TYPES OF UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES:
  1. Publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing, lithography or any other means of publication as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State.
  2. Encouraging disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities or by praising, justifying or extolling any act punished by law, by the same means or by words, utterances or speeches
  3. Maliciously publishing or causing to be published any official resolution or document without proper authority, or before they have been published officially
  4. Printing, publishing or distributing or (causing the same) books, pamphlets, periodicals or leaflets which do not bear the real printer’s name or which are classified as anonymous.

Article 155

  • TYPES OF ALARMS AND SCANDALS:
  1. Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive within any town or public place, calculated to cause alarm or danger
  2. Instigating or taking active part in any charivari or other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility
  3. Disturbing the public peace while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other nocturnal amusement
  4. Causing any disturbance or scandal in public places while intoxicated or otherwise, provided the act is not covered by Art 153 (tumult).
  • Charivari – mock serenade or discordant noises made with kettles, tin horns etc, designed to deride, insult or annoy
  • Firearm must not be pointed at a person, otherwise, it is illegal discharge
  • What governs is the result, not the intent

CRIME

Nature of Crime

Who are Liable

Tumults and other Disturbances (153)

Crime against Public Order

Private persons, outsider

Alarms and Scandals (155)

Crime against Public Order

Private persons, outsider

Article 156

  • ELEMENTS OF DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAILS:
  1. That there is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment.
  2. That the offender removes therefor such person, or helps the escape of such person (if the escapee is serving final judgement, he is guilty of evasion of sentence).
  3. Offender is a private individual
  • Prisoner may be detention prisoner or one sentenced by virtue of a final judgment
  • A policeman assigned to the city jail as guard who while off-duty released a prisoner is liable here
  • It may be committed through negligence
  • Circumstances qualifying the offense – is committed by means of violence, intimidation or bribery.
  • Mitigating circumstance – if it takes place outside the penal establishment by taking the guards by surprise

VI. EVASION OF SENTENCE OR SERVICE

 

Article 157

  • ELEMENTS OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE:
  1. That the offender is a convict by final judgment.
  2. That he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty (destierro included)
  3. That he evades the service of his sentence by escaping during the term if his sentence. (fact of return immaterial).
  • A continuing offense.
  • Offenders – not minor delinquents nor detention prisoners
  • If escaped within the 15 day appeal period – no evasion
  • No applicable to deportation as the sentence
  • Flimsy excuse for violating destierro – not acceptable
  • Circumstances qualifying the offense (done thru):
  1. unlawful entry (by “scaling”)
  2. breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors
  3. using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation
  4. connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution

Article 158

  • ELEMENTS OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION OF DISORDERS, CONFLAGRATIONS, EARTHQUAKES OR OTHER CALAMITIES:
  1. That the offender is a convict by final judgement who is confined in a penal institution.
  2. That there is disorder, resulting from- 1. conflagration,

2. earthquake,

3. explosion, or

4. similar catastrophe, or

5. mutiny in which he has not participated.

  1. That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny.
  2. That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the insurance of a proclamation by the chief executive announcing the passing away of such calamity.
  • Penalty: an increase by 1/5 of the time remaining to be served under the original sentence, in no case to exceed 6 months.
  • Offender must escape to be entitled to allowance
  • Mutiny – organized unlawful resistance to a superior officer, a sedition, a revolt
  • Disarming the guards is not mutiny

Article 159

VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender was a convict.
  2. That he was granted a conditional pardon by the chief executive.
  3. That he violated any of the conditions of such pardon.
  • Condition extends to special laws – violation of illegal voting
  • Offender must have been found guilty of the subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under this Article. But if under Revised Admin Code, no conviction necessary. President has power to arrest, reincarnate offender without trial.

VIOLATION OF PARDON

ORDINARY EVASION

Infringement of conditions/terms of President

To evade the penalty given by the courts – disturbs the public order

  • Two penalties provided:
  1. prision correccional in its minimum period – if the penalty remitted does not exceed 6 years
  2. the unexpired portion of his original sentence – if the penalty remitted is higher than 6 years

VII. COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME

Article 160

COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE-PENALTY: (quasi-recidivism)

  • ELEMENTS
  1. That the offender was already convicted by final judgement of one offense.
  2. That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same.
  • Quasi-recidivism : a person after having been convicted by final judgement shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same.
  • Second crimes must belong to the RPC, not special laws. First crime may be either from the RPC or special laws
  • Reiteracion: offender shall have served out his sentence for the prior offense
  • A quasi-recidivist may be pardoned at age 70. Except: Unworthy or Habitual Delinquent
  • If new felony is evasion of sentence – offender is not a quasi-recidivist
  • Penalty: maximum period of the penalty for the new felony should be imposed (mitigating circumstance can only be appreciated if the maximum is divisible)
  • Quasi-Recidivism may be offset by a special privileged mitigating circumstance (ex. Minority)

TITLE FOUR

I. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

Article 161

  • TYPES OF COUNTERFEITING GREAT SEAL OF GOVERNMENT:
  1. Forging the great seal of the Government
  2. Forging the signature of the President
  3. Forging the stamp of the President
  • When the signature of the President is forged, it is not falsification but forging of signature under this article
  • Signature must be forged, others signed it – not the President.

Article 162

  • USING FORGED SIGNATURE OR COUNTERFEIT SEAL OR STAMP:
  1. That the great seal of the republic was counterfeited or the signature or stamp of the chief executive was forged by another person.
  2. That the offender knew of the counterfeiting or forgery.
  3. That he used the counterfeit seal or forged signature or stamp.
  • Offender is NOT the forger/not the cause of the counterfeiting

Article 163

  • ELEMENTS OF MAKING AND IMPORTING AND UTTERING FALSE COINS:
  1. That there be false or counterfeited coins (need not be legal tender).
  2. That the offender either made, imported or uttered such coins.
  3. That in case of uttering such false or counterfeited coins, he connives with counterfeiters or importers.
  • Coin is counterfeit – if it is forged, or if it is not an article of the government as legal tender, regardless if it is of no value
  • Counterfeiting – imitation of legal or genuine coin (may contain more silver, different design) such as to deceive an ordinary person in believing it to be genuine
  • Utter – to pass counterfeited coins, deliver or give away
  • Import – to bring to port the same
  • Both Philippine and foreign state coins
  • Applies also to coins withdrawn from circulation
  • Essence of article: making of coins without authority

Article 164

  • ELEMENTS OF MULTILATION OF COINS – IMPORTATION AND UTTERANCE:

This has been repealed by PD 247. Under this PD, the acts punishable are:

  1. willful defacement
  2. mutilation
  3. tearing
  4. burning
  5. destruction of Central Bank notes and coins
  • Mutilation – to take off part of the metal either by filling it or substituting it for another metal of inferior quality, to diminish by inferior means (to diminish metal contents).
  • Foreign notes and coins not included. Must be legal tender.
  • Must be intention to mutilate.

Article 165

SELLING OF FALSE OR MUTILATED COIN, WITHOUT CONNIVANCE

  • 2 Types
  1. Possession of coin, counterfeited or mutilated by another person, with intent to utter the same, knowing that it is false or mutilated.

ELEMENTS:

  1. possession
  2. with intent to utter, and
  3. knowledge
  4. Actually uttering such false or mutilated coin, knowing the same to be false or mutilated.

ELEMENTS:

  1. actually uttering, and
  • Possession does not require legal tender in foreign coins
  • Includes constructive possession
  • Read RA 427

Article 166

FORGING TREASURY OR BANK NOTES – IMPORTING AND UTTERING

  • Acts punishable:
  1. Forging or falsity of treasury/bank notes or documents payable to bearer
  2. Importing of such notes
  3. Uttering of such false or forged obligations and notes in connivance with forgers and importers
  • Forging – by giving a treasury or bank note or document payable to bearer/order an appearance of a true and genuine document
  • Falsification – by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures and letters, words, signs contained therein
  • g. falsifying – lotto or sweepstakes ticket. Attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Phil
  • PNB checks not included here – it’s falsification of commercial document under Article 172
  • Obligation or security includes: bonds, certificate of indebtedness, bills, national bank notes, coupons, treasury notes, certificate of deposits, checks, drafts for money, sweepstakes money

Article 167

  • ELEMENTS OF COUNTERFEITING, IMPORTING, AND UTTERING INSTRUMENTS NOT PAYABLE TO BEARER:
  1. That there be an instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer.
  2. That the offender either forged, imported or uttered such instruments.
  3. That in case of uttering, he connived with the forger or importer.

Article 168

  • ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES AND OTHER INSTRUMENT OF CREDIT:
  1. That any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person.
  2. That the offender knows that any of those instruments is forged or falsified.
  3. That  he performs any of these acts –
    1. using any of such forged or falsified instrument, or
    2. possessing with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instrument.
  • Act sought to be punished: Knowingly possessing with intent to use any of such forged treasury or bank notes

Article 169

FORGERY

  • How forgery is committed:
  • if all acts done but genuine appearance is not given, the crime is frustrated
  1. by giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order, the appearance of a true and genuine document
  2. by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, altering by any means the figures, letters or words, or signs contained therein.

Article 170

  • ELEMENTS OF FALSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS:
  1. That these be a bill, resolution or ordinance enacted or approved or pending approval by the national assembly or any provincial board or municipal council.
  2. That the offender (any person) alters the same.
  3. That he has no proper authority therefor.
  4. That the alteration has changed the meaning of the document.
  • Accused must not be a public official entrusted with the custody or possession of such document otherwise Art 171 applies.

Article 171

FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE, OR NOTARY OR ECCLESTASTICAL MINISTER

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
  2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
  3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
    1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.

Requisites:

  1. That there be an intent to imitate, or an attempt to imitate
  2. That the two signatures or handwritings, the genuine and the forged, bear some resemblance, to each other
  • (lack of similitude/imitation of a genuine signature will not be a ground for conviction under par. 1 but such is not an impediment to conviction under par. 2)
  1. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
  2. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.

Requisites:

  1. That the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person/s participated in an act or a proceeding; and
  2. That such person/s did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding
  3. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

Requisites:

  1. That the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts
  2. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (required by law to be done) and
  3. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
  4. That the perversion or truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person
  • There must be a narration of facts, not a conclusion of law. Must be on a material matter
  • Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. Ex. Residence certificates
  • The person making the narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts narrated by him. This kind of falsification may be committed by omission
  1. Altering true dates. – date must be essential
  2. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.

Requisites:

  1. That there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document
  2. That it was made on a genuine document
  3. That the alteration/intercalation has changed the meaning of the document
  4. That the change made the document speak something false.
  5. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; (if no knowledge, falsification through negligence) or
  6. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book. (genuine document)
  7. In case the offender is an ecclesiastical minister, the act of falsification is committed with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
  • There is no crime of attempted or frustrated falsification of public document
  • Persons liable – public officer, employee or notary public or ecclesiastical minister
  • If offender does not take advantage of his public position, he may still be liable for falsification of documents by a private person
  • Document: any written statement by which a right is established or an obligation is extinguished
  • Not necessary that what is falsified is a genuine or real document, enough that it gives an appearance of a genuine article
  • Counterfeiting – imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric
  • Feigning – simulating a signature, handwriting, or rubric out of one of which does not in fact exist

Article 172

FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC, OFFICIAL, OR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT BY A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL (par 1)

  • ELEMENTS
  1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position.
  2. That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in ART. 171.
    1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
    2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participated.
    3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.
    4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
    5. Altering true dates.
    6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
    7. That the falsification was committed in any public or official or commercial document.
  • Under this paragraph, damage is not essential, it is presumed
  • Defense: lack of malice or criminal intent
  • The following writings are public:
  • Examples of commercial documents – warehouse receipts, airway bills, bank checks, cash files, deposit slips and bank statements, journals, books, ledgers, drafts, letters of credit and other negotiable instruments
  • Cash disbursement vouchers or receipts evidencing payments are not commercial documents
  • A mere blank form of an official document is not in itself a document
  • The possessor of falsified document is presumed to be the author of the falsification
  1. the written acts or records of cats of the sovereign authority of official bodies and tribunals, and of the public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country.
  2. Public records kept in the Philippines.

FALSIFICATION UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF ART. 172. OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT

  • ELEMENTS :
  1. That the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7 and 8, enumerated in art. 171.
  2. That the falsification was committed in any private document (must affect the truth or integrity of the document)
  3. That the falsification caused damage (essential element; hence, no crime of estafa thus falsification of private document) to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
  • Not necessary that the offender profited or hoped to profit from the falsification
  • A document falsified as a necessary means to commit another crime must be public, official or commercial
  • There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document because the immediate effect of the latter is the same as that of estafa
  • If the estafa was already consummated at the time of the falsification of a private document was committed for the purpose of concealing the estafa, the falsification is not punishable, because as regards the falsification of the private document there was no damage or intent to cause damage.
  • A private document may acquire the character of a public document when it becomes part of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly authorized by law
  • The crime is falsification of public documents even if falsification took place before the private document becomes part of the public records.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT (par. 3, art. 172)

  • ELEMENTS:
  1. Introducing in a judicial proceeding:
  2. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
  3. That the false document is embraced in art. 171 or in any subdivisions nos. 1 and 2 of art. 172.
  4. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding. (intent to cause damage not necessary)
  5. that the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
  6. That the false document is embraced in art. 171 or in any of subdivisions nos. 1 and 2 of art. 172.
  7. That he used such documents (not in judicial proceedings).
  8. That the use of the documents caused damage to another or at least was used with intent to cause such damage.
  9. Use in any other transaction
  • The user of the falsified document is deemed the author of falsification, if:
  1. the use is so closely connected in time with the falsification
  2. the user had the capacity of falsifying the document

Falsification of Private Documents

Falsification of Public/Official Documents

Prejudice to third party is an element of the offense.

Prejudice to third persons is immaterial, what is punished is the violation of public faith and perversion of truth which the document proclaims.

Article 173

FALSIFICATION OF WIRELESS, CABLE, TELEGRAPH, AND TELEPHONE MESSAGES, AND USE OF SAID FALSIFIED MESSAGES

  • Acts punishable:
  1. Uttering fictitious, wireless, telegraph or telephone message

Requisites:

  1. That the offender is an officer or employee of the government or an officer or employee of a private corporation, engaged in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable or telephone message.
  2. That the accused commits any of the following acts:

-       uttering fictitious wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message, or

-       falsifying wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message

  1. Falsifying wireless, telegraph or telephone message

Requisites:

  1. That the offender is an officer or employee of the government or an officer or employee of a private corporation, engaged in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable or telephone message.
  2. That the accused commits any of the following acts:

-       uttering fictitious wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message, or

-       falsifying wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message

  1. Using such falsified message

Requisites:

  1. That the accused knew that wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message was falsified by any of the person specified in the first paragraph of art. 173.
  2. That the accused used such falsified dispatch.
  3. That the use of the falsified dispatch resulted in the prejudice of a third party, or that the use thereof was with intent to cause such prejudice.
  • The public officer, to be liable must be engaged in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable and telegraph or telephone message

Article 174

FALSIFICATION OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATES, CERTIFCATES OF MERIT OR SERVICE AND THE LIKE:

  • Persons liable:
  1. Physician or surgeon who, in connection with the practice of his profession, issued a false certificate (note: such certificate must refer to the illness or injury of a person)
  2. Public officer who issued a false certificate of merit of service, good conduct or similar circumstances
  3. Private individual who falsified a certificate under (1) and (2)

Article 175

  • ELEMENTS OF USING FALSE CERTIFICATES:
  1. That a physician or surgeon has issued a false medical certificate, or a public officer has issued a false certificate of merit or service, good conduct, or similar circumstances, or a private person had falsified any of said certificates.
  2. That the offender knew that the certificate was false.
  3. That he used the same.

Article 176

MANUFACTURING AND POSSESSION OF INTRUMENTS OR IMPLEMENTS FOR FALSIFICATION:

  • Acts punishable:
  1. Making or introducing into the Philippines any stamps, dies or marks or other instruments or implements for counterfeiting or falsification
  2. Possessing with intent to use the instruments or implements for counterfeiting or falsification made in or introduced into the Philippines by another person
  • The implement confiscated need not form a complete set
  • Constructive possession is also punished

II. OTHER FALSITIES

Article 177

USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS:

  • 2 ways of committing the crime:
  1. By knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine gov’t or any foreign gov’t.
  2. By performing an act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Phil gov’t or foreign gov’t under the pretense of such official position, and without being lawfully entitled to do so.
  • In usurpation of authority: The mere act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself  is sufficient. Not necessary that he performs an act pertaining to a public officer.
  • In usurpation of official functions: It is essential that the offender should have performed an act pertaining to a person in authority
  • A public officer may also be an offender
  • The act performed without being lawfully entitled to do so must pertain:
  1. to the gov’t
  2. to any person in authority
  3. to any public office

Article 178

USING FICTITIOUS NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME

  • ELEMENTS (using fictitious name) :
  1. That the offender uses a name other than his real name.
  2. That he uses that fictitious name publicly.
  3. That the purpose of the offender is –
    1. To conceal a crime,
    2. To evade the execution of a judgment, or
    3. To cause damage to public interest. (ex. Signing fictitious name for a passport)
  • ELEMENTS (concealing true name):
  1. that the offender conceals –
  2. his true name, and
  3. all other personal circumstances.
    1. that the purpose is only to conceal his identity.

Use of Fictitious Name (178)

Concealing True Name (178)

Element of publicity must be present

Publicity not necessary

Purpose is to conceal a crime, to evade the execution of a judgement, or to cause damage

Purpose is to conceal identity

Article 179

  • ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL USE OF UNIFORM OR INSIGNIA:
  1. That the offender makes use of insignia, uniform or dress.
  2. That the insignia, uniform or dress pertains to an office not held by the offender or to a class of persons of which he is not a member.
  3. That said insignia, uniform or dress is used publicly and improperly.
  • an exact imitation of the dress or uniform is unnecessary

Article 180

  • ELEMENTS OF FALSE TESTIMONY AGAINST A DEFENDANT:
  1. That there be a criminal proceeding.
  2. That the offender testifies falsely under oath against the defendant therein.
  3. That the offender who gives false testimony knows that it is false.
  4. That the defendant against whom the false testimony is given is either acquitted or convinced in a final judgment (prescriptive period starts at this point)
  • Requires criminal intent, can’t be committed through negligence. Need not impute guilt upon the accused
  • The defendant must at least be sentenced to a correctional penalty or a fine or must have been acquitted
  • The witness who gave false testimony is liable even if the court did not consider his testimony
  • Penalty is dependent upon sentence imposed on the defendant

Article 181

FALSE TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT in a criminal case:

  • False testimony by negative statement is in favor of the defendant
  • False testimony need not in fact benefit the defendant
  • A statement of a mere opinion is not punishable
  • Conviction or acquittal is not necessary (final judgement is not necessary).  The false testimony need not influence the acquittal
  • A defendant who voluntarily goes up on the witness stand and falsely imputes the offense to another person the commission of the offense is liable under this article. If he merely denies the commission of the offense, he is not liable.
  • Basis of penalty: gravity of the felony charged against the defendant

Article 182

  • ELEMENTS OF FALSE TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES:
  1. That the testimony must be given in a civil case.
  2. That the testimony must relate to the issues presented in said case.
  3. That the testimony must be false.
  4. That the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false.
  5. That the testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the issues presented in the said case
  • Not applicable when testimony given in a special proceeding (in this case, the crime is perjury)
  • Basis of penalty: amount involved in the civil case

Article183

ELEMENTS OF FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN AFFIRMATION:

  1. That an accused made a statement under oath or made an affidavit upon a material matter.
  2. That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
  3. That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood, and
  4. That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law.
  • 2 ways of committing perjury:
  • Subornation of perjury: procures another to swear falsely. Solemn affirmation: refers to non-judicial proceedings and affidavits
  • A false affidavit to a criminal complaint may give rise to perjury
  • A matter is material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue
  • A “competent person authorized to administer an oath” means a person who has a right to inquire into the questions presented to him upon matters under his jurisdiction
  • There is no perjury through negligence or imprudence since the assertion of falsehood must be willful and deliberate
  • Even if there is no law requiring the statement to be made under oath, as long as it is made for a legal purpose, it is sufficient
  • Perjury is an offense which covers false oaths other than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings
  • False testimony before the justice of the peace during the P.I. may give rise to the crime of perjury because false testimony in judicial proceedings contemplates an actual trial where a judgment of conviction or acquittal is rendered
  • A person who knowingly and willfully procures another to swear falsely commits subornation of perjury and the witness suborned does testify under circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury.
  • The false testimony is not in a judicial proceeding
  1. by falsely testifying under oath
  2. by making a false statement

Article 184

  • ELEMENTS OF OFFERING FALSE TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE:

a       That the offender offered in evidence a false witness or false testimony.

b       That he knew the witness or the testimony was false.

c        That the offer was made in a judicial or official proceeding.

  • Article applies when the offender without inducing another, but knowing him to be a false witness, presented him and the latter testified falsely in a judicial or official proceeding
  • The false witness need not be convicted of false testimony.  The mere offer is sufficient.

III. FRAUDS

Article 185

  • ELEMENTS OF MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTION:

a     That there be a public auction.

b     That the accused solicited any gift or a promise from any of the bidders.

c      That such gifts or promise was the consideration for his refraining from taking part in that public auction.

d     That the accused had the intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing auctioned.

  • ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTING TO CAUSE BIDDERS TO STAY AWAY:

a     That there be a public auction.

b     That the accused attempted to cause the bidders to stay away from that public auction

c      That it was done by threats, gifts, promises, or any other artifice.

d     That the accused had the intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing auctioned.

Article 186

MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE:

  • Acts punished:
  1. Combination to prevent free competition in the market
  2. By entering into a contract or agreement or taking part in any conspiracy or combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce or prevent by artificial means free competition in the market (It is enough that initial steps are taken. It is not necessary that there be actual restraint of trade)
  3. Monopoly to restrain free competition in the market

- By monopolizing any merchandise or object of trade or commerce, by combining with any person or persons to monopolize said merchandise or object in order to alter the prices thereof by spreading false rumors or making use of any other artifice to restrain free competition in the market

  1. Manufacturer, producer or processor or importer combining, conspiring or agreeing with any person to make transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce or to increase the market price of the merchandise.
  • Person/s liable:
  • Crime is committed by:
  • The purpose is:
  • Also liable as principals:
  • Aggravated if items are:
  1. manufacturer
  2. producer
  3. processor
  4. importer
  5. combining
  6. conspiring
  7. agreeing with another person
  8. to make transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce
  9. to increase the market price of any merchandise or object of commerce manufactured, produced, processed, assembled or imported into the Phil
  10. corporation/association
  11. agent/representative
  12. director/manager – who willingly permitted or failed to prevent commission of above offense
  13. food substance
  14. motor fuel or lubricants
  15. goods of prime necessity

Article 187

  • ELEMENTS OF IMPORTATION AND DISPOSITION OF FALSELY MARKED ARTICLES OR MERCHANDISE MADE OF GOLD, SILVER, OR OTHER PRECIOUS METALS OR THEIR ALLOYS:

a     That the offender imports, sells or disposes of any of those articles or merchandise.

b     That the stamps, brands, or marks or those articles or merchandise fails to indicate the actual fineness or quality of said metals or alloys.

c      That the offender knows that the said stamp, brand, or mark fails to indicate the actual fineness or quality of the metals or alloys.

Article 188

SUBSTITUTING – ALTERING TRADE-MARK, TRADENAME, OR SERVICE MARK

  • Acts punishable:

a     By  (a) substituting the trade name (t/n) or trademark (t/m) of some other manufacturer or dealer or a colorable imitation thereof, for the t/n or t/m of the real manufacturer or dealer upon any article of commerce and (b) selling the same.

b     By selling or by offering for sale such article of commerce, knowing that the t/n or t/m has been fraudulently used

c      By using or substituting the service mark of some other person, or a colorable imitation of such marks, in the sale or advertising of services

d     By printing, lithographing or reproducing t/n, t/m or service mark of one person, or a colorable limitation thereof, to enable another person to fraudulently use the same, knowing the fraudulent purpose for which it is to be used.

Article 189

UNFAIR COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION OF TRADENAME, TRADEMARK SERVICE MARK, FRAUDULENT DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN, AND FALSE DESCRIPTION

  • Acts punished:

a     Unfair competition by selling his goods, giving them the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer

b     Fraudulent designation of origin; false description by (a) affixing to his goods or using in connection with his services a false designation of origin; or any false description or representation, and (b) selling such goods or services

c      Fraudulent registration by procuring fraudulently from the patent office the registration of t/m, t/m or service mark.

  • ELEMENTS:

a     That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer

b     That the general appearance is shown in the (a) goods themselves, or in the (b) wrapping of their packages, or in the (c) device or words therein, or in (d) any other feature of their appearance

c      That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose.

d     That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.

TITLE FIVE

CRIMES RELATED TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS (190-194)

THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972

(RA No. 6425, as amended)

 

I.          Acts Punishable:

  1. importation of prohibited drugs
  2. sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs
  3. maintenance of a den, dive or resort for prohibited drug users
  4. being employees or visitors of drug den
  5. manufacture of prohibited drugs
  6. possession or use
  7. cultivation of plants
  8. failure to comply with provisions relative to keeping of records of prescription
  9. unnecessary prescription
  10. possession of opium pipe and other paraphernalia
  11. Importation, sale, etc. of regulated drugs
  • Importation of prohibited/regulated drugs.
  • Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transaction of prohibited/regulated drugs.

Qualifying Circumstances – if the victim of the offense is a minor or should a prohibited/regulated drug involve in any offense under this section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein shall be imposed.

  • Maintenance of a den, dive, or resort for prohibited/regulated drug users.

Qualifying Circumstance – where a prohibited/regulated drug is administered, delivered, or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place, or should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of the person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed.

  • Manufacture of prohibited/regulated drugs.
  • Possession of prohibited/regulated drugs.

·         Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs.

a     Note: The land/portions thereof and/or greenhouses in which any of the said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he did not know of such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.

b     Qualifying Circumstance – if the land involved is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

·         Failure to keep records of prescription, sales, purchases, acquisitions and/or deliveries of prohibited/regulated drugs

Persons liable:

Pharmacist, Physician, Dentist, Veterinarian, Manufacturer, Wholesaler, Importer, Distributor, Dealer, Retailer

·         Unlawful prescription of prohibited/regulated drugs

·         Unnecessary prescription of prohibited/regulated drugs

Persons Liable: Physician or dentist who shall prescribe any prohibited/regulated drug for any person whose physical/physiological condition does not require the use of thereof.

·         Possession of opium pipe, equipment, apparatus or any paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or otherwise using opium or any other prohibited drug, shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself, injected or used a prohibited drug.

·         Attempt and conspiracy to commit the following offenses:

a     Importation of dangerous drugs

b     Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs

c      Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for prohibited drugs

d     Manufacture of dangerous drugs

e     Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs

  • Other persons liable:

a     If the violation of the Act is committed by a partnership, corporation, association or any judicial person, the partner, president, director, or manager who consents to or knowingly tolerates such violation shall be held criminally liable as co-principal.

b     Partner, president, director, manager, officer or stockholder, who knowingly authorizes, tolerates, or consents to the use of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft as an instrument in the importation, sale, delivery, distribution or transportation of dangerous drugs, or to the use of their equipment, machines or other instruments in the manufacture of any dangerous drugs, if such vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment, or other instrument, is owned or under the control and supervision of the partnership, corporation, association or judicial entity to which they are affiliated.

c      Government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of “planting” any dangerous drugs in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter.

II.         For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Act, all school heads, supervisors and teachers shall be deemed to be persons in authority and, as such, are vested with the power to apprehend, arrest, or cause the apprehension or arrest of any person who shall violate any of the said provision.

  1. NOTE: They shall be considered as persons in authority id they are in the school or within its immediate vicinity, or beyond such immediate vicinity of they are in attendance in any school or class function in their official capacity as school heads, supervisors or teachers.
  2. Any teacher or school employee who discovers or finds that any person in the school or within its immediate vicinity is violating this Act shall have the duty to report the violation to the school head or supervisor who shall, in turn, report the matter to the proper authorities. Failure to report in either case shall, after hearing, constitute sufficient cause for disciplinary action. (Sec. 28)
  3. Rules:
  4. Voluntary submission of a drug dependent to confinement, treatment and rehabilitation by the drug dependent himself or through his parent, guardian or relative within the 4thcivil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in a center and compliance with such conditions therefor as the Dangerous Drugs Board may prescribe shall exempt from criminal liability for possession or use of the prohibited/regulated drug.
  5. Should the drug dependent escape from the center, he may submit himself for confinement within 1 week from the date of his escape, of his parent guardian or relative may, within the same period surrender him for confinement.
  6. Upon application of the Board, the Court shall issue an order for recommitment if the drug dependent does not resubmit himself for confinement or if he is not surrendered for recommitment.
  7. If, subsequent to such recommitment, he should escape again, he shall no longer be exempt from criminal liability for the use or possession of any dangerous drug.
  8. If a person charged with an offense is found by the fiscal or by the Court at any stage of the proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the fiscal or court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit records of the case to the Board.
  9. After his rehabilitation, he shall be prosecuted for such violation. In case of conviction, the judgement shall, if the accused is certified by the treatment and rehabilitation center to have maintained good behavior, indicate that he shall be given full credit for the period he was confined in the center.

NOTE: When the offense is possession or use of dangerous drugs and the accused is not a recidivist, the penalty thereof shall be deemed to have been served in the center upon his release therefrom.

  1. The period of prescription of the offense charged shall not run during the time that the respondent/accused is under detention or confinement in a center.
  2. Requisites of suspension of sentence for first offense in a minor:
  3. If accused is a minor (under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense but not more than 21 years of age when the judgement should have been promulgated.
  4. He has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act or of the RPC or placed on probation.
  • Sentence shall be deferred and the accused shall be placed on probation under the supervision of the Board.
  • In case of violation of conditions of pardon, court shall pronounce judgement of conviction and he shall serve sentence.
  • If accused did not violate conditions of probation, case shall be dismissed upon expiration of the designated period.
  • Notes:

a     Cultivation of plants – Sec 9 – land, portions of land, greenhouse on which any of the plants is cultivated – confiscated and escheated to the State. UNLESS: owner can prove that he had no knowledge of the cultivation despite due diligence

b     If land is part of the public domain – maximum penalty imposed

c      Possession of opium pipe and other paraphernalia – prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered himself, used prohibited drugs

d     Drug penalties of Reclusion Perpetua to Death or a fine of Php 500,000 to 10M apply when:

Opium                         40 grams up

Morphine                  40 grams up

Shabu                         200 grams up

Heroin                        40 grams up

Indian hemp             750 grams up

MJ resin                      50 grams up

Cocaine                        40 grams up

Other drugs                Quantity far beyond therapeutic requirement

(if quantity is less than prescribed – penalty is PC to RP depending upon the quantity)

e     RA 7659 – PD 1619 – Possession and Use of Volatile Substances

  1. mere attempt to sell, import – already a crime under Article 6
  2. conspiracy to sell, deliver, import – already a crime under Article 8

f       Buy Bust Operation – no law or rule to require policemen to adopt a uniform way of identifying BUY MONEY (P v. Abedes)

g     Absence of ultraviolet power is not fatal in the prosecution

h     Transportation/importation of MJ – immaterial whether there may or may not be a distinction for the MJ

i       Distinguish Entrapment and Instigation:

  1. If prosecution can prove the crime without presenting the informer or asset – not necessary because their testimonies are merely corroborative. Poseur buyer – it depends on whether the prosecution can prove the crime without their testimonies (P v. Rosalinda Ramos)
  2. Under the RA, special aggravating circumstance if a crime has been committed while the accused was high on drugs (P v. Anthony Belgar)
  3. Delivery or Sale of Prohibited Drugs – the accused must be aware that what he is selling or delivering was prohibited drug. But the moment the fact of sale or delivery is proved by prosecution, the burden to prove that the accused is not aware that drugs are prohibited falls on the defense (P v. Aranda)
  4. P v. Angelito Manalo– burden of proving the authority to possess shabu is a matter of defense
  5. P v.Hilario Moscaling– court may take judicial notice of the word “shabu”
  6. Criminal liabilities of a policeman who sold the drugs confiscated from a pusher: violation of RA 6425 and malversation under RPC.

j       Planting evidence – to implicate another

k      Buy Bust Operation – form of entrapment (P v. Alberto) – not necessary to have prior police surveillance (P v. Carlos Franca)

l       Possession – constructive or actual – not necessary to adduce the marked money as evidence (P v. Romeo Macara)

m    Separate crimes – sale/possession of MT found in his possession after he was frisked but he can’t be convicted for possession of MJ that he sold

n     If victim is minor or drug is proximate cause of death – max penalty is imposed under Sec 4, 5, 15, 15-a

  1. If imposable penalty: RP to death – no plea bargaining
  2. If offender: government official, employees, officers or found guilty of planting evidences – same penalty
  3. First offense of a minor – suspension of sentence
  • under 18 at time of commission but not more than 21 at time when judgment was promulgated
  • found guilty of possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs
  • not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act or the RPC
  • not been placed on probation
  • defer sentence, place on probation for 6 months to 1 year
  • violation of probation – pronounce sentence – convict and serve sentence
  • no violation – discharge him and dismiss the proceeding
  • if minor is drug dependent – commit to a center for treatment and rehabilitation

TITLE SIX

I. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS

GAMBLING (195-99 repealed by PDs 449, 483 and 1602 as amended)

  1. Illegal cockfighting (PD 449)
  2. Betting, game-fixing or point shaving and machinations in sports contests (PD 438)
  3. Illegal gambling

PENALIZING BETTING, GAME-FIXING OR POINT-SHAVING AND

MACHINATIONS IN SPORTS CONTESTS

PD 483

  • Acts Punishable:
  1. Betting: Betting money or any object or article of value of representative value upon the result of any game, races and other sports contests.
  2. Game-fixing: any arrangement, combination, scheme or agreement by which the result of any game, races, or sports contests shall be predicated and/or known other than on the basis of the honest playing skill or ability of the players or participants.
  3. Point-shaving: any such arrangement combination, scheme or agreement by which the skill or ability of any player or participant in a fame, races, or sports contests to make points of scores shall be limited deliberately in order to influence the result thereof in favor of one or other team, player or participant.
  4. Game Machination: any other fraudulent, deceitful, unfair or dishonest means, method, manner or practice employed for the purpose of influencing the result of any game, races or sports contest.

COCKFIGHTING LAW OF 1974

PD 449

  1. Scope – This law shall govern the establishment, operation, maintenance and ownership of cockpits.
  2. Rules:
    1. Only Filipino citizens not otherwise inhibited by existing laws shall be allowed to own, manage and operated cockpits.
    2. Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality with a population of 100,000 or less.
    3. Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in the Zoning Law or ordinance.
    4. When allowed:
      1. Cockfighting shall be allowed only in licensed cockpits during Sundays and legal holidays and during local fiestas for not more than 3 days; or
      2. During provincial, city or municipal, agricultural, commercial or industrial fair, carnival or exposition for a similar period of 3 days upon resolution of the province, city or municipality where such fair, carnival or exposition is to be held, subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representative.

Limitations:

a)    No cockfighting on the occasion of such fair, carnival or exposition shall be allowed within the month of the local fiesta or for more than 2 occasions a year in the same city of municipality.

b)    No cockfighting shall be held on December 30, June 12,November 30, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Election Day and during registration days for such election/referendum.

  1. If the purpose is for the entertainment of foreign dignitaries or for tourists, or for returning balikbayans, or for the support of national fund-raising campaigns for charitable purposes as may be authorized by the Office of the President upon resolution of a provincial board, city or municipal council, in licensed cockpits or in playgrounds or parks.

Limitations: This privilege shall be extended for only one time, for a period not exceeding 3 days, within a year to a province, city or municipality.

  1. No gambling of any kind shall be permitted on the premises of the cockpit or place of cockfighting during cockfights.
  2. City or municipal mayors are authorized to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits.

II. OFFENSES AGAINST DECENCY AND GOOD CUSTOMS

Article 200

  • ELEMENTS OF GRAVE SCANDAL:
  1. Offender performs an act
  2. Act is highly scandalous as offending against decency or good customs
  3. Highly scandalous conduct does not expressly fall within any other article of the RPC
  4. Committed in a public place or within the public knowledge or view. (The public view is not required, it is sufficient if in public place.  For public knowledge, it may occur even in a private place; the number of people who sees it is not material).
  • Grave scandal: consists of acts which are offensive to decency and good customs. They are committed publicly and thus, give rise to public scandal to persons who have accidentally witnessed the acts
  • Decency: means properly observing the requirements of modesty, good taste etc
  • Customs: refers to established usage, social conventions carried on by tradition and enforced by social disapproval in case of violation
  • If the acts complained of are punishable under another provision of the RPC, Art 200 is not applicable
  • The essence of grave scandal is publicity and that the acts committed are not only contrary to morals and good customs but must likewise be of such character as to cause public scandal to those witnessing it.

Article 201

IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS:

  • Persons liable:
  1. Those who publicly expound or proclaim doctrines that are contrary to public morals
  2. Authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form
  3. Editors publishing such obscene literature
  4. Owners or operators of establishments selling obscene literature
  5. Those who exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows ion theaters, fairs, cinemas or any other place
  6. Those who sell, distribute, or exhibit prints, engraving, sculptures or literature which are offensive to morals
  • Morals: implies conformity to generally accepted standards of goodness or rightness in conduct or character
  • Test of obscenity: whether the matter has a tendency to deprave or corrupt the minds of those who are open to immoral influences. A matter can also be considered obscene if it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as indecency.
  • However, Art 201 enumerates what are considered as obscene literature or immoral or indecent plays, scenes or acts:
  • Mere nudity in paintings and pictures is not obscene
  • Pictures w/ a slight degree of obscenity having no artistic value and intended for commercial purposes fall within this article
  • Publicity is an essential element
  1. those w/c glorify criminals or condone crimes
  2. those w/c serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography
  3. those w/c offend against any race or religion
  4. those w/c tend to abet the traffic in and the use of prohibited drugs
  5. those that are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts

 

Article 202

VAGRANTS AND PROSTITUTES:

  • Who are considered vagrants:
  1. Those who have no apparent means of subsistence and who have the physical ability to work yet neglect to apply themselves to some useful calling
  2. Persons found loitering around public and semi-public places without visible means of support
  3. Persons tramping or wandering around the country or the streets with no visible means of support
  4. Idle or dissolute persons lodging in houses of ill-fame
  5. Ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes (may include even the rich)
  6. Persons found loitering in inhabited or uninhabited places belonging to others, without any lawful or justifiable reason provided the act does not fall within any other article of the RPC

If fenced and with prohibition of entry

Trespass to dwelling

If fenced and entered to hunt/fish

Attempted theft

If not fenced and with no prohibition of entry

Vagrancy

  • Who are considered prostitutes – refer to women who habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money or profit (if a man indulges in the same conduct: vagrancy)

TITLE SEVEN

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 203

  • WHO ARE PUBLIC OFFICERS:
  1. Takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government, or
  2. Performs public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official in the gov’t or any of its branches
  • Notes:
  1. Public officer must derive his authority from:
  2. direct provision of law
  3. popular election
  4. appointment by competent authority
  5. Public officers: embraces every public servant from the lowest to the highest rank
  6. A government laborer is not a public officer. However, temporary performance by a laborer of public functions makes him a public officer
  7. Misfeasance: means improper performance of an act which might be properly be performed
  8. Malfeasance: means performance of an act which ought not to be done
  9. Nonfeasance: means omission of an act which ought to be done

MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE

Malfeasance

Doing of an act which a public officer should not have done

Misfeasance

Improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do

Nonfeasance

Failure of an agent to perform his undertaking for the principal

  • ELEMENTS OF KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGMENT:
  1. Offender is a judge
  2. Renders a judgment in the case submitted to him for judgment
  3. Judgment is unjust
  4. Knowledge that the decision is unjust
  • Notes:
  1. Judgment: is a final consideration and determination by a court of competent jurisdiction of the issues submitted to it in an action or proceeding
  2. Unjust judgment: one which is contrary to law, or not supported by the evidence, or both
  3. An unjust judgment may result from:
  4. error (with bad faith)
  5. ill-will or revenge
  6. bribery
    1. There must be evidence that the decision rendered is unjust. It is not presumed
    2. Abuse of discretion or mere error of judgment cannot likewise serve as basis for rendering an unjust judgment in the absence of proof or even an allegation of bad faith (motive or improper consideration).

Article 205

  • ELEMENTS OF JUDGMENT RENDERED THROUGH NEGLIGENCE:
  1. Offender  is a judge
  2. Renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision
  3. Judgment is manifestly unjust
  4. Due to inexcusable negligence or ignorance
  • Manifestly unjust judgment: one that is so contrary to law that even a person having meager knowledge of the law cannot doubt the injustice

Article 206

  • ELEMENTS OF UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER:
  1. That the offender is a judge.
  2. That he performs any of the following acts:
    1. knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree, or
    2. renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
  • Interlocutory order: one issued by the court deciding a collateral or incidental matter. It is not a final determination of the issues of the action or proceeding

Article 207

  • ELEMENTS OF MALICIOUS DELAY IN THE  ADMINISTRATION OR JUSTICE:
  1. That the offender is a judge.
  2. That there is a proceeding in his court.
  3. That he delays the administration of justice.
  4. That the delay is malicious, that is, the delay is caused by the judge with deliberate intent to inflict damage on either party in the case.
  • Mere delay without malice is not punishable

Article 208

  • ELEMENTS OF DERELICTION OF DUTY IN THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES:
  1. That the offender is a public officer or officer of the law who has a duty to cause the prosecution of, or to prosecute offenses.
  2. That there is dereliction of the duties of his office, that is, knowing the commission of the crime, he does not cause (a) the prosecution of the criminal (People vs. Rosales, G.R. no. 42648) or (b) knowing that a crime is about to be committed he tolerates its commission (if gift/promise is a consideration for his conduct: direct bribery)
  3. That the offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator of the law.
  • PREVARICACION: negligence and tolerance in the prosecution of an offense
  • There must be a duty on the part of the public officer to prosecute or move for the prosecution of the offender. Note however, that a fiscal is under no compulsion to file an information based upon a complaint if he is not convinced that the evidence before him does not warrant filing an action in court
  • The crime must be proved first before an officer can be convicted of dereliction of duty
  • A public officer who harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of an offender, when it is his duty to prosecute him is liable as principal in the crime of dereliction of duty in the prosecution of offenses. He is not an accessory
  • Article not applicable to revenue officers

Article 209

  • ELEMENTS OF BETRAYAL OF TRUST BY AN ATTORNEY OR SOLICITOR(NOT NECESSARILY A PUBLIC OFFICER ALTHOUGH ALL LAWYERS ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT):
  1. Causing damage to client (prejudice is essential) either
    1. by any malicious breach of professional duty, or
    2. by inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
    3. Revealing any of the secrets of his client learned by him in his professional capacity (damage not necessary)
    4. Undertaking the defense of the opposing party of the 1stclient and/or having received confidential information from the latter and without the latter’s consent (damage not necessary)

Article 210

  • ELEMENTS OF DIRECT BRIBERY:
  1. That the offender be a public officer within the scope of Art 203
  2. That the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another
  3. That such offer or promise be accepted or gift/present received by the public officer (mere agreement consummates the crime)
    1. with a view to committing some crime (delivery of consideration is not necessary) or
    2. in consideration of an execution if an act which does not constitute a crime, but the act must be unjust (delivery of consideration is necessary), or
    3. to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do
    4. That the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes be connected with the performance of his official duties
  • For purposes of this article, temporary performance of public functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public officer.  A private person may commit this crime only in the case in which custody of prisoners is entrusted to him
  • Applicable also to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other person performing public duties
  • Cannot be frustrated, only attempted or consummated.
  • Bribery exists when the gift is:
  • Actual receipt of the gift is not necessary. An accepted offer or promise of a gift is sufficient. However, if the offer is not accepted, only the person offering the gift is liable for attempted corruption of a public officer
  • The gift must have a value or capable of pecuniary estimation. It could be in the form of money, property or services
  • If the act required of the public officer amounts to a crime and he commits it, he shall be liable for the penalty corresponding to the crime
  • The third type of bribery and prevaricacion (art 208) are similar offenses, both consisting of omissions to do an act required to be performed. In direct bribery however, a gift or promise is given in consideration of the omission. This is not necessary in prevaricacion
  1. voluntarily offered by a private person
  2. solicited by the public officer and voluntarily delivered by the private person
  3. solicited by the public officer but the private person delivers it out of fear of the consequences should the public officer perform his functions (here the crime by giver is not corruption of public officials due to involuntariness).

Bribery (210)

Robbery (294)

When the victim has committed a crime and gives money/gift to avoid arrest or prosecution.

When the victim did not commit a crime and he is intimidated with arrest and/or prosecution to deprive him of his personal property.

Victim parts with his money or property voluntarily.

Victim is deprived of his money or property by force or intimidation.

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

RA 3019

  • Persons Liable:
  1. Any public officer who shall perform any of the following acts:
  2. Any person having family or close personal relation with any public official who shall capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, or material, or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request, or contact with the government in which such public official has to intervene (Sec. 4)
  3. Any person who shall knowingly induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses under (A). (Sec. 4)
  4. Spouse or any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the 3rdcivil degree, of the president of the Philippines, the vice-president, the president of the Senate, or speaker of the house of Representatives, who shall intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business transaction, contract or application with the gov’t (Sec. 5).
  5. Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
  6. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
  7. Directly, or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner of capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the held given or to be given.
  8. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.
  9. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.  This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
  10. Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest of giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
  11. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
  12. Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or take part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the constitution or by any law from having any interest.
  13. Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel, or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
  14. Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege, or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege, or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
  15. Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

This prohibition shall not apply to:

  1. Any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the gov’t along the same line of business;
  2. Any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office;
  3. Any application filed by him, the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official(s) concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law;
  4. Any act lawfully performed an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
  5. Any member of congress, during the term for which he has been elected, who shall acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which shall be directly and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by Congress during his term.
  6. Any public officer who shall fail to file a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities within 30 days after assuming office and thereafter on or before the 15thday of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office (Sec. 7).

II. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal due to unexplained Wealth (Sec. 8)

  • If a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income.
  • Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
  • Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-official character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income.

III. Competent court: All prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan (Sec. 10).

IV. Prescription of offenses: all offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in 15 years (Sec. 11).

V. Exceptions: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude of friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this act (Sec. 14).

Article 211

  • ELEMENTS OF INDIRECT BRIBERY:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he accepts gifts.
  3. That the said gifts are offered to him by reason of his office.
  • The gift is given  in anticipation of future favor from the public officer
  • There must be clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift offered and consider the property as his own for that moment. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to convict the officer
  • There is no attempted or frustrated indirect bribery
  • The principal distinction between direct and indirect bribery is that in the former, the officer agrees to perform or refrain from doing an act in consideration of the gift or promise. In the latter case, it is not necessary that the officer do any act. It is sufficient that he accepts the gift offered by reason of his office
  • Public officers receiving gifts and private persons giving gifts on any occasion, including Christmas are liable under PD 46.
  • The criminal penalty or imprisonment is distinct from the administrative penalty of suspension from the service

 

Article 211-A

  • ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED BRIBERY
  1. Public officer entrusted with law enforcement
  2. Refrains from arresting/prosecuting offender for crime punishable byreclusion perpetuaand/or death
  3. (if lower penalty than stated above, the crime is direct bribery)
  4. In consideration of any offer, promise or gift

Article 212

  • ELEMENTS OF CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS:
  1. That the offender makes offers or promises or gives gifts or present to a public officer.
  2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents given to a public officer, under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery
  • The offender is the giver of the gift or the offeror of the promise. The act may or may not be accomplished
  • Under PD 749, givers of bribes and other gifts as well as accomplices in bribery and other graft cases are immune from prosecution under the following circumstances:
  1. information refers to consummated violations
  2. necessity of the information or testimony
  3. the information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State
  4. information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points
  5. informant has been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
  • See the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act

II. FRAUDS AND ILLEGAL EXACTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS

 

Article 213

  • ELEMENTS OF FRAUDS AGAINST PUBLIC TREASURY: (par. 1)
  1. That the offender be a public officer.
  2. That he should have taken advantage of his office, that is, he intervened in the transaction in his official capacity.
  3. That he entered into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or made use of any other scheme with regard to (a) furnishing supplies (b) the making of contracts, or (c) the adjustment or settlement of account relating to a public property or funds.
  4. That the accused had intent to defraud the government.
  • Notes:
  1. The public officer must act in his official capacity
  2. The felony is consummated by merely entering into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or by merely making use of any scheme to defraud the Government
  • ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS:
  1. The offender is a public officer entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts.
  2. He is guilty of any of the following acts or omissions:
    1. demanding, directly or indirectly the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law, or
    2. failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially, or
    3. Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law.
  • Notes:
  1. Mere demand of a larger or different amount is sufficient to consummate the crime. The essence is the improper collection (damage to gov’t is not required)
  2. If sums are received without demanding the same, a felony under this article is not committed.  However, if the sum is given as a sort of gift or gratification, the crime is indirect bribery
  3. When there is deceit in demanding larger fees, the crime committed is estafa
  4. May be complexed with malversation
  5. Officers and employees of the BIR or Customs are not covered by the article
  6. The NIRC of Administrative Code is the applicable law

Article 214

  • ELEMENTS OF OTHER FRAUDS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
  3. That he commits any of the frauds or deceits enumerated in art. 315 and 316. (estafa; swindling)
  • Note: RTC has jurisdiction over the offense because the principal penalty is disqualification

Article 215

  • ELEMENTS OF PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS:
  1. That the offender is an appointive public officer.
  2. That he becomes interested, directly or indirectly, in any transaction of exchange or speculation.
  3. That the transaction takes place within the territory subject to his jurisdiction.
  4. That he becomes interested in the transaction during his incumbency.
  • Notes:
  1. Examples of transactions of exchange or speculation are: buying and selling stocks, commodities, land etc wherein one hopes to take advantage of an expected rise or fall in price
  2. Purchasing of stocks or shares in a company is simple investment and not a violation of the article. However, regularly buying securities for resale is speculation

Article 216

POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED INTERESTS BY A PUBLIC OFFICER :

  • Who are liable:
  1. Public officer – in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene.
  2. Experts, arbitrators and private accountants – in any contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in the approval, distribution or adjudication of which they had acted.
  3. Guardians and executors – with respect to property belonging to their wards or the estate.
  • Notes:
  1. Actual fraud is not necessary.
  2. Act is punished because of the possibility that fraud may be committed or that the officer may place his own interest above that of the Government or party which he represents

AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER

RA 7080

  1. Definition ofIll-gotten wealth:

Any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

  1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
  2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
  3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
  4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting, directly or indirectly, any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation, including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking.
  5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations, and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
  6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage or prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
  1. Persons Liable:
    1. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates and subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates, or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described under (I) in the aggregate amount or total value of at least 50 million pesos, shall be guilty of the crime of plunder (as amended by RA 7659).
    2. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of plunder.
  2. Jurisdiction: All prosecutions under this At shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
  3. Rule of Evidence:

For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme and conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

  1. Prescription of Crime:

The crime of plunder shall prescribe in 20 years.  However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

III. MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY

 

Article 217

  • ELEMENTS COMMON TO ALL ACTS MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY :
  1. That the offender be a public officer (or private person if entrusted with public funds or connived with public officers)
  2. That he had the custody or control of funds or property (if not accountable for the funds, theft or qualified theft)
  3. That those funds or property were public funds or property (even if private funds if attached, seized, deposited or commingled with public funds)
  4. That he:
    1. Appropriated the funds or property
    2. Took or misappropriated them
    3. Consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted any other person to take such public funds or property. (it is not necessary that the offender profited thereby. His being remiss in the duty of safekeeping public funds violates the trust reposed)
  • Malversation is otherwise called embezzlement
  • It can be committed either with malice or through negligence or imprudence
  • In determining whether the offender is a public officer, what is controlling is the nature of his office and not the designation
  • The funds or property must be received in an official capacity. Otherwise, the crime committed is estafa
  • When a public officer has official custody or the duty to collect or receive funds due the government, or the obligation to account for them, his misappropriation of the same constitutes malversation
  • A public officer who has qualified charge of gov’t property without authority to part with its physical possession upon order of an immediate superior, he cannot be held liable under this article
  • Private individuals can also be held liable for malversation under 2 circumstances:
  1. when they are in conspiracy with public officers; and
  2. when they have charge of national, provincial or municipal funds, revenues or property in any capacity
  • In malversation through negligence, the negligence of the accountable public officer must be positively and clearly shown to be inexcusable, approximating fraud or malice
  • The measure of negligence to be observed is the standard of care commensurate with the occasion
  • When malversation is not committed through negligence, lack of criminal intent or good faith is a defense
  • The failure of a public officer to have any duly forthcoming public funds or property upon demand, by any authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. However, if at the very moment when the shortage is discovered, the accountable officer is notified, and he immediately pays the amount from his pocket, the presumption does not arise
  • Returning the embezzled funds is not exempting, it is only mitigating
  • There is also no malversation when the accountable officer is obliged to go out of his office and borrow the amount corresponding to the shortage and later, the missing amount is found in an unaccustomed place
  • A person whose negligence made possible the commission of malversation by another can be held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation
  • Demand as well as damage to the government are not necessary elements

Malversation (217)

Estafa with Abuse of Confidence (315)

Funds or property usually public

Funds/property are always private

Offender is usually a public officer who is accountable for the public funds/property

Offender is a private individual or even a public officer who is not accountable for public funds/property

Crime is committed by approaching, taking, or misappropriating/consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take the public funds/property

Crime is committed by misappropriating, converting, or denying having received money, goods or other personal property

Article 218

  • ELEMENTS OF FAILURE OF ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER TO RENDER ACCOUNTS :
  1. That the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom.
  2. That he must be an accountable officer for public funds property.
  3. That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the commission on audit, or to a provincial auditor.
  4. That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.
  • Note: Demand and misappropriation are not necessary

Article 219

  • ELEMENTS OF FAILURE OF A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICER TO RENDER ACCOUNTS BEFORE LEAVING THE COUNTRY :
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property.
  3. That he must have unlawfully left (or be on the point of leaving) the Philippines without securing from the Commission on Audit a certificate showing that his accounts have been finally settled.
  • Note: The act of leaving the Philippines must be unauthorized or not permitted by law

Article 220

  • ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY(technical malversation):
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That there is public fund or property under his administration.
  3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance (without this, it is simple malversation even if applied to other public purpose).
  4. That he applies the same to a public use other than for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
  • To distinguish this article with Art 217, just remember that in illegal use of public funds or property, the offender does not derive any personal gain, the funds are merely devoted to some other public use
  • Absence of damage is only a mitigating circumstance

Article 221

  • ELEMENTS OF FAILURE TO MAKE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
  1. Offender has gov’t funds or property in his possession
  2. He is under obligation to either:
    1. make payment from such funds
    2. to deliver property in his custody or administration when ordered by competent authority
    3. He maliciously fails or refuses to do so
  • Note: Penalty is based on value of funds/property to be delivered

Article 222

  • PERSONS WHO MAY BE HELD LIABLE UNDER ARTS 217 TO 221
  1. Private individual who, in any capacity, have charge of any national, provincial or municipal funds, revenue, or property
  2. Administrator or depositary of funds or property that has been attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if owned by a private individual
  • Sheriffs and receivers fall under the term “administrator”
  • A judicial administrator in charge of settling the estate of the deceased is not covered by the article

IV. INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 223

  • ELEMENTS OF CONNIVING WITH OR CONSENTING TO EVASION
  1. That the offender is a public officer (on duty).
  2. That he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment.
  3. That such prisoner escaped from his custody
  4. That he was in connivance with the prisoner in the latter’s escape
  • Detention prisoner: refers to a person in legal custody, arrested for and charged with some crime or public offense
  • The release of a detention prisoner who could not be delivered to judicial authorities within the time fixed by law is not infidelity in the custody of a prisoner. Neither is mere leniency or laxity in the performance of duty constitutive of infidelity
  • There is real and actual evasion of service of sentence when the custodian permits the prisoner to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment

Article 224

  • ELEMENTS OF EVASION THROUGH NEGLIGENCE:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment.
  3. That such prisoner escapes through his negligence.
  4. Penalty based on nature of imprisonment
  • The article punishes a definite laxity which amounts to deliberate non-performance of a duty
  • The fact that the public officer recaptured the prisoner who had escaped from his custody does not afford complete exculpation
  • The liability of an escaping prisoner:
  1. if he is a prisoner by final judgment, he is liable for evasion of service (art 157)
  2. if he is a detention prisoner, he does not incur criminal liability (unless cooperating with the offender).

Article 225

  • ELEMENTS OF ESCAPES OF PRISONERS UNDER THE CUSTODY OF A PERSON NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER :
  1. That the offender is a private person (note: must be on duty)
  2. That the conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person under arrest is confined to him.
  3. That the prisoner or person under arrest escapes.
  4. That the offender consents to the escape of the prisoner or person under arrest, or that the escape takes place through his negligence
  • Note: This article is not applicable if a private person made the arrest and he consented to the escape of the person he arrested

Article 226

  • ELEMENTS OF REMOVAL, CONCEALMENT, OR DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Infidelity in custody of documents:
  1. That the offender be a public officer.
  2. That he abstracts, destroys or conceals a document or papers.
  3. That the said document or paper should have been entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office.
  4. That damage, whether serious or not, to a third party or to the public interest should have been caused.
  • The document must be complete and one by which a right could be established or an obligation could be extinguished
  • Books, periodicals, pamphlets etc are not documents
  • “Papers” would include checks, promissory notes and paper money
  • A post office official who retained the mail without forwarding the letters to their destination is guilty of infidelity in the custody of papers
  • Removal of a document or paper must be for an illicit purpose. There is illicit purpose when the intention of the offender is to:
  1. tamper with it
  2. to profit by it
  3. to commit any act constituting a breech of trust in the official thereof
  • Removal is consummated upon removal or secreting away of the document from its usual place. It is immaterial whether or not the illicit purpose of the offender has been accomplished
  • Infidelity in the custody of documents through destruction or concealment does not require proof of an illicit purpose
  • Delivering the document to the wrong party is infidelity in the custody thereof
  • The damage may either be great or small
  • The offender must be in custody of such documents

Article 227

  • ELEMENTS  OF  OFFICER BREAKING SEAL :
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he is charged with the custody of papers or property.
  3. That these papers or property are sealed by proper authority.
  4. That he breaks the seals or permits them to be broken.
  • It is the breaking of the seals and not the opening of a closed envelope which is punished
  • Damage or intent to cause damage is not necessary; damage is presumed

Article 228

  • ELEMENTS OF OPENING OF CLOSED DOCUMENTS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That any closed papers, documents, or objects are entrusted to his custody.
  3. That he opens or permits to be opened said closed papers, documents or objects.
  4. That he does not have proper authority.
  • Note: Damage also not necessary

Article 229

REVELATION OF SECRET BY AN OFFICER:

  • ELEMENTS OF PAR.1: BY REASON OF HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he knows of a secret by reason of his official capacity.
  3. That he reveals such secret without authority or justifiable reasons.
  4. That damage, great or small, be caused to the public interest.
  5. (damage is essential)
  • Notes:
  1. Secret must affect public interest
  2. Secrets of a private individual is not included
  3. Espionage for the benefit of another State is not contemplated by the article. If regarding military secrets or secrets affecting state security, the crime may be espionage.
  • ELEMENTS OF PAR 2 – DELIVERING WRONGFULLY PAPERS OR COPIES OF PAPERS OF WHICH HE MAY HAVE CHARGE AND WHICH SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he has charge of papers.
  3. That those papers should not be published.
  4. That he delivers those papers or copies thereof to a third person.
  5. That the delivery is wrongful.
  6. That damage be caused to public interest.
  • Notes:
  1. “Charge”: means custody or control. If he is merely entrusted with the papers and not with the custody thereof, he is not liable under this article
  2. If the papers contain secrets which should not be published, and the public officer having charge thereof removes and delivers them wrongfully to a third person, the crime is revelation of secrets. On the other hand, if the papers do not contain secrets, their removal for an illicit purpose is infidelity in the custody of documents
  3. Damage is essential to the act committed

Article 230

  • ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICER REVEALING SECRETS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL:
  1. That the offender is a public officer
  2. That he knows of the secret of a private individual by reason of his office.
  3. That he reveals such secrets without authority or justification reason.
  • Revelation to one person is sufficient
  • If the offender is an attorney, he is properly liable under Art 209 (betrayal of trust by an attorney)
  • Damage to private individual is not necessary

V. OTHER OFFENSES OR IRREGULARITIES BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 231

  • ELEMENTS OF OPEN DISOBEDIENCE:
  1. That the offender is a judicial or executive officer.
  2. That there is a judgment, decision or order of superior authority.
  3. That such judgment, decision or order was made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the superior authority and issued with all the legal formalities.
  4. that the offender without any legal justification openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision or under which he is duty bound to obey.
  • Note: Judgment should have been rendered in a hearing and issued within proper jurisdiction with all legal solemnities required

Article 232

  • ELEMENTS OF DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER OF SUPERIOR OFFICER WHEN SAID ORDER WAS SUSPENDED BY INFERIOR OFFICER:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That an order is issued by his superior for execution.
  3. That he has for any reason suspended the execution of such order.
  4. That his superior disapproves the suspension of the execution of the order.
  5. That the offender disobeys his superior despite the disapproval of the suspension.
  • Note: A public officer is not liable if the order of the superior is illegal

Article 233

  • ELEMENTS OF REFUSAL OF ASSISTANCE:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That a competent authority demands from the offender that he lend his cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public service.
  3. That the offender fails to do so maliciously.
  • Involves a request from one public officer to another
  • Damage to the public interest or third party is essential
  • Demand is necessary

Article 234

  • ELEMENTS OF REFUSAL TO DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE:
  1. That the offender is elected by popular election to a public office.
  2. That he refuses to be sworn in or discharge the duties of said office.
  3. That there is no legal motive for such refusal to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
  • Note: Even if the person did not run for the office on his own will as the Constitution provides that every citizen may be required to render service

Article 235

  • ELEMENTS OF MALTREATMENT OF PRISONERS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
  2. That he has under charge a prisoner or detention prisoner (otherwise the crime is physical injuries)
  3. That he maltreats such prisoner in either of the following manners:
    1. by overdoing himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge either –
  • by the imposition of punishments not authorized by the regulations, or
  • by inflicting such punishments (those authorized) in a cruel and humiliating manner, or
  1. by maltreating such prisoner to extort a confession or to obtain some information from the prisoner.
  • The public officer must have actual charge of the prisoner in order to be held liable
  • To be considered a detention prisoner, the person arrested must be placed in jail even for just a short while
  • Offender may also be held liable for physical injuries or damage caused

 

Article 236

  • ELEMENTS OF ANTICIPATION OF DUTIES OF A PUBLIC OFFICE:
  1. That the offender is entitled to hold a public office or employment, either by election or appointment.
  2. That the law requires that he should first be sworn in and/or should first give a bond.
  3. That he assumes the performance of the duties and powers of such office.
  4. That he has not taken his oath of office and./or given the bond required by law.

 

Article 237

  • ELEMENTS OF PROLONGING PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES AND POWERS:
  1. That the offender is holding a public office.
  2. That the period provided by law, regulations or special provisions for holding such office has already expired.
  3. That he continues to exercise the duties and powers of such office.
  • Note: The article contemplates officers who have been suspended, separated or declared over-aged or dismissed

 

Article 238

  • ELEMENTS OF ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE OR POSITION :
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he formally resigns from his position.
  3. That his resignation has not yet been accepted.
  4. That he abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.
  • There must be formal or written resignation
  • The offense is qualified if the purpose behind the abandonment is to evade the discharge of duties consisting of preventing, prosecuting or punishing any of the crimes against national security. The penalty is higher. This involves the following crimes:
  1. treason
  2. conspiracy and proposal to commit conspiracy
  3. misprision of treason
  4. espionage
  5. inciting to war or giving motives to reprisals
  6. violation of neutrality
  7. correspondence with hostile country
  8. flight to enemy country
  9. piracy and mutiny on the high seas
  10. rebellion
  11. conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
  12. disloyalty to public officers
  13. inciting to rebellion
  14. sedition
  15. conspiracy to commit sedition
  16. inciting to sedition

Abandonment of Office or Position (238)

Dereliction of Duty (208)

There is actual abandonment through resignation to evade the discharge of duties.

Public officer does not abandon his office but merely fails to prosecute a violation of the law.

 

Article 239

  • ELEMENTS OF USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS:
  1. That the offender is an executive or judicial officer.
  2. That he (a.) makes general rules or regulations beyond the scope of his authority or (b.) attempts to repeal a law or (c.) suspends the execution thereof.

Article 240

  • ELEMENTS OF USURPATION OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS:
  1. That the offender is a  judge.
  2. That he (a.) assumes a power pertaining to the executive authorities, or (b.) obstructs executive authorities in the lawful exercise of their powers.
  • Note: Legislative officers are not liable for usurpation of executive functions

Article 241

  • ELEMENTS OF USURPATION OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS:
  1. That the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government.
  2. That he (a.) assumes judicial powers, or (b.) obstruct the execution of any order decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
  • Note: A mayor is guilty under this article when he investigates a case while a justice of the peace is in the municipality

Article 242

  • ELEMENTS OF DISOBEYING REQUEST FOR DISQUALIFICATION:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That a proceeding is pending before such public officer.
  3. That there is a question brought before the proper authority regarding his jurisdiction, which is not yet decided.
  4. That he has been lawfully required to refrain from continuing the proceeding.
  5. That he continues the proceeding.

 

Article 243

  • ELEMENTS OF ADDRESSING ORDERS OR REQUESTS BY EXECUTIVE OFFICER TO ANY JUDICIAL AUTHORITY:
  1. That the offender is an executive officer.
  2. That the addresses any order or suggestion to any judicial authority.
  3. That the order or suggestion relates to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice.
  • Note: Legislative or judicial officers are not liable under this article

Article 244

  • ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENTS:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he nominates or appoints a person to a public office.
  3. That  such person lacks the legal qualification therefor.
  4. That the offender knows that his nominee or appointee lacks the qualification at the time he made the nomination or appointment.
  • Recommending, knowing that the person recommended is not qualified is not a crime
  • There must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed to a public office

Article 245

  • ELEMENTS OF ABUSES AGAINST CHASTITY:
  1. That the offender is a public officer.
  2. That he solicits or makes immoral or indecent advances to a woman.
  3. That such woman must be –
    1. interested in matters pending before the offender for decision, or with respect to which he is required to submit a report to or consult with a superior officer, or
    2. under the custody of the offender who is a warden or other public officer directly charged with care and custody of prisoners or person under arrest, or
    3. the wife, daughter, sister or relative within the same degree by affinity of the person in the custody of the offender
  • The mother of the person in the custody of the public officer is not included
  • Solicit: means to propose earnestly and persistently something unchaste and immoral to a woman
  • The advances must be immoral or indecent
  • The crime is consummated by mere proposal
  • Proof of solicitation is not necessary when there is sexual intercourse

TITLE EIGHT

I. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

DESTRUCTION OF LIFE

A. ELEMENTS OF PARRICIDE: (246)

  1. That a person is killed.
  2. That the deceased is killed by the accused.
  3. That the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

Notes:

  1. The relationship of the offender with the victim is the essential element of the felony
  2. Parents and children are not included in the term “ascendants” or “descendants”
  3. The other ascendant or descendant must be legitimate. On the other hand, the father, mother or child may be legitimate or illegitimate
  4. The child should not be less than 3 days old. Otherwise, the offense is infanticide
  5. Relationship must be alleged
  6. A stranger who cooperates in committing parricide is liable for murder or homicide
  7. Even if the offender did not know that the person he had killed is his son, he is still liable for parricide because the law does not require knowledge of the relationship

B.  DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Requisites:

  1. A legally married person or parent surprises his spouse or daughter (the latter must be under 18 and living with them) in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person
  2. He/she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter
  3. He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

Notes:

  1. Article does not define or penalize a felony
  2. Not necessary that the parent be legitimate
  3. Article applies only when the daughter is single
  4. Surprise: means to come upon suddenly or unexpectedly
  5. Art 247 is applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act sexual intercourse with another person. However, it is enough that circumstances reasonably show that the carnal act is being committed or has been committed
  6. Sexual intercourse does not include preparatory acts
  7. Immediately thereafter: means that the discovery, escape, pursuit and the killing must all form parts of one continuous act
  8. The killing must be the direct by-product of the rage of the accused
  9. No criminal liability is incurred when less serious or slight physical injuries are inflicted. Moreover, in case third persons caught in the crossfire suffer physical injuries, the accused is not liable. The principle that one is liable for the consequences of his felonious act is not applicable because he is not committing a felony

C. ELEMENTS  OF MURDER: (248)

  1. That a person was killed.
  2. That the accused killed him.
  3. That the killing was attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances
    1. with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid or armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity
    2. in consideration of price, reward or promise
    3. by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of airship, by means of motor vehicles or with the use of any other means involving great waste or ruin
    4. on occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public calamity
    5. with evident premeditation
    6. with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse
  4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

Notes:

  1. The victim must be killed in order to consummate the offense. Otherwise, it would be attempted or frustrated murder
  2. Murder will exist with only one of the circumstances. The other circumstances are absorbed or included in one qualifying circumstance. They cannot be considered as generic aggravating circumstances
  3. Any of the qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information. Otherwise, they will only be considered as generic aggravating circumstances
  4. Treachery and premeditation are inherent in murder with the use of poison.

D. ELEMENTS OF HOMICIDE: (249)

  1. That a person was killed.
  2. That the accused killed him without any justifying circumstances.
  3. That the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed.
  4. That the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.

Notes:

  1. Intent to kill is conclusively presumed when death resulted. Hence, evidence of intent to kill is required only in attempted or frustrated homicide
  2. There is no crime of frustrated homicide through negligence
  3. When the wounds that caused death were inflicted by 2 different persons, even if they were not in conspiracy, each one of them is guilty of homicide
  4. In all crimes against persons in which the death of the victim is an element, there must be satisfactory evidence of (1) the fact of death and (2) the identity of the victim

E. PENALTY FOR FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER OR HOMICIDE (250)

F. ELEMENTS OF DEATH IN A TUMULTOUS AFFRAY: (251)

  1. That there be several persons.
  2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally.
  3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner.
  4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray.
  5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased.
  6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.

Notes:

  1. Tumultuous affray exists hen at least 4 persons take part in it
  2. When there are 2 identified groups of men who assaulted each other, there is no tumultuous affray
  3. Persons liable are:
    1. person/s who inflicted serious physical injuries
    2. if it is not known who inflicted serious physical injuries on the deceased, all persons who used violence upon the person of the victim.

G. ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED IN A TUMULTOUS AFFRAY: (252)

  1. that there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article.
  2. That a participant or some participants thereof suffer serious physical injuries or physical injuries of a less serious nature only.
  3. that the person responsible therefor cannot be identified.
  4. That all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the offended party are known.

H.GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE: (253)

  • Acts punishable:
  1. Assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is consummated or not
  2. Lending his assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of doing the killing himself.
  • Notes:
  1. A person who attempts to commit suicide is not criminally liable
  2. A pregnant woman who tried to commit suicide by means of poison but instead of dying, the fetus in her womb was expelled, is not liable for abortion
  3. Assistance to suicide is different from mercy-killing. Euthanasia/mk is the practice of painlessly putting to death a person suffering from some incurable disease. In this case, the person does not want to die. A doctor who resorts to euthanasia may be held liable for murder
  4. Penalty is mitigated if suicide is not successful.

I. ELEMENTS OF DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS: (254)

  1. that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person.
  2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person.
  • Notes:
  1. The offender must shoot at another with any firearm without intention of killing him. If the firearm is not discharged at a person, the act is not punished under this article
  2. A discharge towards the house of the victim is not discharge of firearm. On the other hand, firing a gun against the house of the offended party at random, not knowing in what part of the house the people were, it is only alarm under art 155.
  3. Usually, the purpose of the offender is only to intimidate or frighten the offended party
  4. Intent to kill is negated by the fact that the distance between the victim and the offender is 200 yards
  5. A person can be held liable for discharge even if the gun was not pointed at the offended party when it fired for as long as it was initially aimed at or against the offended party.

J. ELEMENTS OF INFANTICIDE: (255)

  1. That a child was killed.
  2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
  3. That the accused killed the said child.

Notes:

  1. When the offender is the father, mother or legitimate ascendant, he shall suffer the penalty prescribed for parricide. If the offender is any other person, the penalty is that for murder. In either case, the proper qualification for the offense is infanticide
  2. When infanticide is committed by the mother or maternal grandmother in order to conceal the dishonor, such fact is only mitigating
  3. The delinquent mother who claims that she committed the offense to conceal the dishonor must be of good reputation. Hence, if she is a prostitute, she is not entitled to a lesser penalty because she has no honor to conceal
  4. There is no infanticide when the child was born dead, or although born alive it could not sustain an independent life when it was killed.

K. ELEMENTS OF INTENTIONAL ABORTION: (256)

  1. That there is a pregnant woman.
  2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman.
  3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any other act of the accused, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
  4. That the abortion is intended.

L. ELEMENTS OF UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION: (257)

  1. That there is a pregnant woman.
  2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
  3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
  4. That as a result of the violence that fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.

Notes:

  1. Unintentional abortion can also be committed through negligence
    1. The accused can only be held liable if he knew that the woman was pregnant
    2. If there is no intention to cause abortion and neither was violence exerted, arts 256 and 257 does not apply.

M. ELEMENTS  OF ABORTION PRACTICED BY THE WOMAN HERSELF OR BY HER PARENTS: (258)

  1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
  2. That the abortion is intended.
  3. That the abortion is caused by –
    1. the pregnant woman herself
    2. any other person, with her consent, or
    3. any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her dishonor.

Notes:

  1. Liability of the pregnant woman is mitigated if the purpose is to conceal her dishonor. However, there is no litigation for the parents of the pregnant women even if their purpose is to conceal their daughter’s dishonor
  2. In infanticide, parents can avail of the mitigating circumstance of concealing the dishonor of their daughter. This is not so for art 258

N. ELEMENTS OF ABORTION PRACTICED BY A PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE AND DISPENSING OF ABORTIVES: (259)

  1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
  2. That the abortion is intended.
  3. That the offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes or assists in causing the abortion.
  4. That said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific knowledge or skill.

Notes:

  1. It is not necessary that the pharmacist knew that the abortive would be used to cause abortion. What is punished is the act of dispensing an abortive without the proper prescription. It is not necessary that the abortive be actually used
  2. If the pharmacist knew that the abortive would be used to cause abortion and abortion results, he is liable as an accomplice

O. RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICIPANTS IN A DUEL: (260)

Acts punished:

  1. Killing one’s adversary in a duel
  2. Inflicting upon the adversary serious physical injuries
  3. Making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted

Persons liable:

  1. Principals – person who killed or inflicted physical injuries upon his adversary, or both combatants in any other cases
  2. Accomplices – as seconds

Notes:

  1. Duel: a formal or regular combat previously concerted between 2 parties in the presence of 2 or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who make the selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight
  2. If death results, the penalty is the same as that for homicide

P. CHALLENGING TO A DUEL: (261)

Acts punishable:

  1. Challenging another to a duel
  2. Inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel
  3. Scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel

Persons liable:

  1. Challenger
  2. Instigators

II. PHYSICAL INJURIES

  1. MUTILATION: (262)

Kinds of Mutilation

  1. Intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction
  2. Intentionally making another mutilation, i.e. lopping, clipping off any part of the body of the offended party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to deprive him of that part of the body

Elements:

  1. There be a castration i.e. mutilation of organs necessary for generation
  2. Mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately

Notes:

  1. In the first kind of mutilation, the castration must be made purposely. Otherwise, it will be considered as mutilation of the second kind
  2. Mayhem: refers to any other intentional mutilation
  3. SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES: (263)

How Committed

  1. Wounding
  2. Beating
  3. Assaulting
  4. Administering injurious substances

What are serious physical injuries:

  1. Injured person becomes insane, imbecile, impotent or blind
  2. Injured person –
    1. loses the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, loses an eye, a hand, foot, arm or leg
    2. loses the use of any such member
    3. becomes incapacitated for the work in which he had been habitually engaged
  3. Injured person –
    1. becomes deformed
    2. loses any other member of his body
    3. loses the use thereof
    4. becomes ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he had been habitually engaged in for more than 90 days
      1. Injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days (but not more than 90 days)

Notes:

  1. Serious physical injuries may be committed through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence
  2. There must be no intent to kill
  3. Impotent should include inability to copulate and sterility
  4. Blindness requires lost of vision in both eyes. Mere weakness in vision is not contemplated
  5. Loss of power to hear must involve both ears. Otherwise, it will be considered as serious physical injuries under par 3
  6. Loss of use of hand or incapacity of usual work in par 2 must be permanent
  7. Par 2 refers to principal members of the body. Par 3 on the other hand, covers any other member which is not a principal part of the body. In this respect, a front tooth is considered as a member of the body, other than a principal member
  8. Deformity: means physical ugliness, permanent and definite abnormality. Not curable by natural means or by nature. It must be conspicuous and visible. Thus, if the scar is usually covered by a dress, it would not be conspicuous and visible
  9. The loss of 3 incisors is a visible deformity. Loss of one incisor is not. However, loss of one tooth which impaired appearance is a deformity

10. Deformity by loss of teeth refers to injury which cannot be impaired by the action of the nature

11. Loss of both outer ears constitutes deformity and also loss of the power to hear. Meanwhile, loss of the lobule of the ear is only a deformity

12. Loss of the index and middle fingers is either a deformity or loss of a member, not a principal one of his body or use of the same

13. Loss of the power to hear in the right ear is considered as merely loss of use of some other part of the body

14. If the injury would require medical attendance for more than 30 days, the illness of the offended party may be considered as lasting more than 30 days. The fact that there was medical attendance for that period of time shows that the injuries were not cured for that length of time

15. Under par 4, all that is required is illness or incapacity, not medical attendance

16. In determining incapacity, the injured party must have an avocation at the time of the injury. Work: includes studies or preparation for a profession

17. When the category of the offense of serious physical injuries depends on the period of the illness or incapacity for labor, there must be evidence of the length of that period. Otherwise, the offense will only be considered  as slight physical injuries

18. There is no incapacity if the injured party could still engage in his work although less effectively than before

19. Serious physical injuries is qualified when the crime is committed against the same persons enumerated in the article on parricide or when it is attended by any of the circumstances defining the crime of murder. However, serious physical injuries resulting from excessive chastisement by parents is not qualified serious physical injuries

  1. ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTERING INJURIOUS SUBSTANCES OR BEVERAGES: (264)
    1. That the offender inflicted upon another person any serious physical injury
    2. That it was done knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind of credulity
    3. He had no intent to kill

Notes:

  1. It is frustrated murder when there is intent to kill
  2. Administering means introducing into the body the substance, thus throwing of the acid in the face is not contemplated.
  3. ELEMENTS OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES: (265)
    1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for 10 days or more (but not more than 30 days), or needs medical attendance for the same period of time
    2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding articles

Notes:

  1. Circumstances qualifying the offense:
    1. when there is manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person
    2. when there are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense
    3. when the victim is either the offender’s parents, ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers
    4. when the victim is a person of rank or person in authority, provided the crime is not direct assault
    5. It falls under this article even if there was no incapacity but the medical treatment was for 13 days
  2. SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES: (266)

3 Kinds:

  1. That which incapacitated the offended party for labor from 1-9 days or required medical attendance during the same period
  2. That which did not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work or which did not require medical attendance (ex. Black-eye)
  3. Ill-treatment of another by deed without causing any injury (ex. slapping but without causing dishonor)
  4. RAPE (ART 355)

The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (RA 8353) now classified the crime of rape as Crime Against Persons incorporated into Title 8 of the RPC to be known as Chapter 3

Elements: Rape is committed

  1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
    1. through force, threat or intimidation
    2. when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
    3. by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority
    4. when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present
    5. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in par 1 hereof, shall commit an ac of sexual assault by inserting
      1. his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
      2. any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person

Rape committed under par 1 is punishable by:

  1. reclusion perpetua
  2. reclusion perpetuato DEATH when
    1. victim became insane by reason or on the occasion of rape
    2. the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof
  3. DEATH when
    1. homicide is committed
    2. victim under 18 years and offender is:
      1. parent
      2. ascendant
      3. step-parent
      4. guardian
      5. relative by consanguinity or affinity with the 3rdcivil degree or
      6. common law spouse of parent of victim
    3. under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or penal institution
    4. committed in full view of the spouse,parent or any of the children or other relatives within the 3rddegree of consanguinity
    5. victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime
    6. a child below 7 years old
    7. offender knows he is afflicted with HIVor AIDS or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus is transmitted to the victim
    8. offender; member of the AFP, or para-military units thereof, or the PNP, or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime
    9. victim suffered permanent physical mutilation or disability
    10. the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime; and
    11. when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap or the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime

Rape committed under par 2 is punishable by:

  1. prision mayor
  2. prision mayor to reclusion temporal
    1. use of deadly weapon or
    2. by two or more persons
  3. reclusion temporal– when the victim has become insane
  4. reclusion temporal to reclusion pepetua– rape is attempted and homicide is committed
  5. reclusion perpetua– homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of rape
  6. reclusion temporal– committed with any of the 10 aggravating circumstances mentioned above

Notes:

  1. The underscored words are the amendments provided by RA 8353
  2. Dividing age in rape:
    1. less than 7 yrs old, mandatory death
    2. less than 12 yrs old, statutory rape
    3. less than 18 yrs old and there is relationship (e.g. parent etc); mandatory death

TITLE NINE

I.      CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

 A.   ELEMENTS OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION: (267)

    1. Offender is a private individual
    2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty
    3. The act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal
    4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present (becomes serious)
      1. that the he kidnapping/detention lasts for more than 3 days
      2. that it is committed simulating public authority
      3. that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made, or
      4. that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor (except if parent is the offender), female or a public officer

Note: When death penalty is imposed:

  1. if kidnapping is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom either from the victim or from any other person even if none of the aforementioned are present in the commission of the offense (even if none of the circumstances are present)
  2. when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts

B.   ELEMENTS OF SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION: (268)

    1. Offender is a private person
    2. He kidnaps or detains another or in any other maner deprives him pof his liberty / furnished place for the perpetuation of the crime
    3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal
    4. That the crime is committed without the attendant of any of the circumstances enumerated in Art 267

Note: Privileged mitigating circumstances:

If the offender:

  1. voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained within 3 days from the commencement of the detention
  2. without having attained the purpose intended and
  3. before the institution of criminal proceedings against him

C.   ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL ARREST: (269)

  1. That the offender arrests or detains another person
  2. That the purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper authorities
    1. That the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no reasonable ground therefor

Notes:

  1. Offender is any person, so either a public officer or private individual
  2. Refers to warrantless arrests
  3. In art 125, the detention is for some legal ground while here, the detention is not authorized by law
  4. In art 125, the crime pertains to failure to deliver the person to the proper judicial authority within the prescribed period while here, the arrest is not authorized by law

D.   ELEMENTS OF KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR: (270)

    1. That the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether over or under 7 but less than 18 yrs old)
    2. That he deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents

E.    ELEMENTS OF INDUCING A MINOR TO ABANDON HIS HOME: (271)

    1. That the minor (whether over or under 7) is living in the home of his parents or guardians or the person entrusted with his custody
    2. That the offender induces a minor to abandon such home

Notes:

  1. Inducement must be actual, committed with criminal intent and determined by a will to cause damage
  2. Minor should not leave his home of his own free will
  3. Mitigating if by father or mother

F. ELEMENTS OF SLAVERY: (272)

  1. That the offender purchases. Sells, kidnaps or detains a human being.
  2. That the purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being.

Note: Qualifying circumstance – if the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to some immoral traffic (prostitution), the penalty is higher

G. ELEMENTS OF EXPLOITION OF CHILD LABOR: (273)

  1. That the offender retains a minor in his service.
  2. That it is against the will of the minor.
  3. That it is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor.

H.   ELEMENTS OF SERVICES RENDERED UNDER COMPULSION IN PAYMENT OF DEBT: (274)

  1. That the offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household servant or farm laborer.
  2. That it is against the debtor’s will.
  3. That the purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt.

II. CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY

A.   ABANDONMENT OF PERSON IN DANGER AND ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S OWN VICTIM: (275)

Acts punishable:

  1. By failing to render assistance to any person whom the offender finds in an inhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense

Elements:

  1. That place is not inhabited.
  2. The accused found there a person wounded or in danger of dying.
  3. The accused can render assistance without detriment to himself.
    1. The accused fails to render assistance.
  1. By failing to help or render assistance to another whom the offender has accidentally wounded or injured
  2. By failing to deliver a child, under 7 whom the offender has found abandoned, to the authorities or to his family, or by failing to take him to a safe place.

B. ELEMENTS OF ABANDONING A MINOR: (276)

  1. That the offender has the custody of a child.
  2. That the child is under seven years of age.
  3. That he abandons such child.
  4. That he has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned.

Notes:

  1. Conscious, deliberate, permanent, unless punishable by a more serious offense
  2. Qualifying circumstances:
    1. when the death of the minor resulted from such abandonment
    2. if the life of the minor was in danger because of the abandonment

C.   ELEMENTS OF ABANDONMENT OF MINOR BY PERSON ENTRUSTED WITH HIS CUSTODY; INDIFFERENCE OF PARENTS: (277)

Acts punished:

  1. By delivering a minor to a public institution or other persons w/o consent of the one who entrusted such minor to the care of the offender or, in the absence of that one, without the consent of the proper authorities

Elements:

  1. That the offender has charged of the rearing or education of a minor.
  2. That he delivers said minor to a public institution or other persons.
  3. That the one who entrusted such child to the offender has not consented to such act, or if the one who entrusted such child to the offender is absent; the proper authorities have not consented to it.
  4. By neglecting his (offender’s) children by not giving them education which their station in life requires and financial condition permits

Elements:

  1. That the offender is a parent.
  2. That he neglects his children by not giving them education.
  3. That his station in life requires such education and his financial condition permits it.

D.   ELEMENTS OF EXPLOITATION OF MINORS: (278)

Acts punished:

  1. By causing any boy or girl under 16 to perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength or contortion, the offender being any person
  2. By employing children under 16 who are not the children or descendants of the offender in exhibitions of acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker, diver, or wild-animal tamer or circus manager or engaged in a similar calling
  3. By employing any descendant under 12 in dangerous exhibitions enumerated in the next preceding paragraph, the offender being engaged in any of said callings
  4. By delivering a child under 16 gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in par 2 or to any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being an ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of such child
  5. By inducing any child under 16 to abandon the home of its ascendants; guardians, curators or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned in par 2 or to accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being any person

Note: Qualifying Circumstance – if the delivery of the child to any person following any of the callings of acrobat, rope-walker, diver or wild-animal trainer or circus manager or to any habitual vagrant of beggar is made in consideration of any price, compensation or promise, the penalty is higher.

E.   ADDITIONAL PENALTIES FOR OTHER OFFENSES: (279)

F. ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS TO DWELLING: (280)

  1. That the offender is a private person.
  2. That he enters the dwelling of another.
  3. That such entrance is against the latter’s will.

Notes:

  1. Qualifying circumstance: if the offense is committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty is higher
  2. There must be an opposition to the entry of the accused
  3. Implied prohibition is present considering the situation – late at night and everyone’s asleep or entrance was made through the window
  4. Prohibition is not necessary when violence or intimidation is employed by the offender
  5. When there is no overt act of the crime intended to be committed, this is the crime
  6. May be committed even by the owner (as against the actual occupant)
  7. Not applicable to:
  8. entrance is for the purpose of preventing harm to himself, the occupants or a third person
  9. purpose is to render some service to humanity or justice
  10. place is a café, tavern etc while open

8. Medina case: when the accused entered the dwelling through the window, he had no intent to kill any person inside, but the intention to kill came to his mind when he was being arrested by the occupants thereof, the crime of trespass to dwelling is a separate and distinct offense from frustrated homicide

G. ELEMENTS OF OTHER FORMS OF TRESPASS: (281)

  1. That the offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of another.
  2. That the entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited.
  3. That the prohibition to enter be manifest.
  4. That the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof.

H.   GRAVE THREATS WHERE OFFENDER ATTAINED HIS PURPOSE: (282)

Acts punishable:

  1. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime and demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful and the offender (Note: threat is with condition)

Elements:

  1. That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the latter’s person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter’s family, of any wrong.
  2. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
  3. That there is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed, even though not unlawful.
  4. That the offender attains his purpose.
  5. By making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose
  6. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the threat not being subject to a condition (Note: threat is without condition)

Elements:

  1. That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the latter’s person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter’s family, of any wrong.
  2. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
  3. That the threat is not subject to a condition

Notes:

  1. Aggravating circumstances: if made in writing or thru a middleman
  2. Frustrated – if not received by the person being threatened
  3. Art 284 bond from good behavior may be imposed (only in these offenses)

I.   ELEMENTS OF LIGHT THREATS: (283)

  1. That the offender makes a threat to commit a wrong.
  2. That the wrong does not constitute a crime.
  3. That there is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even though not unlawful
  4. That the offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his purpose

Art 284 bond from good behavior may be imposed Notes:

  1. (only in these offenses)
  2. The wrong does not amount to a crime

J.  BOND FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR: (284)

K.  ELEMENTS OF OTHER LIGHT THREATS: (285)

  1. Person shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw weapon in a quarrel unless in self-defense.
  2. In the heat of anger, person orally threatens another with some harm constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in the threat. Subsequent acts did not persist.
  3. Person orally threatens another with harm not constituting a felony.

L.  ELEMENTS OF GRAVE COERCIONS: (286)

  1. That a person prevented another from doing something OR not to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
  2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, of force as would produce intimidation and control the will.
  3. That the person that restrained the will and liberty by another had not the authority of law or the right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint shall not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

M.  ELEMENTS OF LIGHT COERCIONS: (287)

  1. That the offender must be a creditor.
  2. That he seizes anything belonging to his debtor.
  3. That the seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence or a display of material force producing intimidation;
  4. That the purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment of the debt.

N.  ELEMENTS OF OTHER SIMILAR COERCIONS: (288)

ELEMENTS OF NO. 1

  1. That the offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or corporation.
  2. That he or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees.
  3. That he forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase merchandise or commodities of any kind from his or from said firm or corporation.

ELEMENTS OF NO. 2

  1. That the offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him by means of tokens or objects.
  2. That those tokens or objects are other than the legal tender currency to the Philippines.
  3. That such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid by means of tokens or objects.

O. ELEMENTS OF FORMATION, MAINTENANCE, AND PROHIBITION OF COMBINATION OF CAPITAL OR LABOR THROUGH VIOLENCE OR THREATS: (289)

  1. That the offender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work
  2. That the purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or labor, strike of laborers or lockout of employees.

III. DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS

A. ELEMENTS OF DISCOVERING SECRETS THROUGH SEIZURE OF CORRESPONDENCE: (290)

  1. That the offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the exercise of his official function,
  2. That he seizes the papers or letters of another.
  3. That the purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person.
  4. That offender is informed of the contents or the papers or letters seized.

Notes:

  1. Not applicable to parents with respect to minor children
  2. Contents need not be secret but purpose prevails
  3. Circumstances qualifying the offense: when the offender reveals contents of such papers or letters of another to a 3rdperson, the penalty is higher

B. ELEMENTS OF REVEALING SECRETS WITH ABUSE OF OFFICE: (291)

  1. That the offender is a manager, employee or servant.
  2. That he learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity.
  3. That he reveals such secrets.

C. ELEMENTS OF REVELATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS: (292)

  1. That the offender is a person in charge, employee or workman of a manufacturing or industrial establishment.
  2. That the manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the industry which the offender has learned.
  3. That the offender reveals such secrets.
  4. That the prejudice is caused to the owner.

TITLE TEN

I. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

A. ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY IN GENERAL: (293)

  1. That there be personal property belonging to another.
  2. That there is unlawful taking of that property.
  3. That the taking must be with intent to gain, and
  4. That there is violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon anything.

Notes:

  1. Belonging to another – person from whom property was taken need not be the owner, legal possession is sufficient
  2. Name of the real owner is not essential so long as the personal property taken does not belong to the accused except if crime is robbery with homicide
  3. Taking of personal property – must be unlawful; if given in trust – estafa
  4. As to robbery with violence or intimidation – from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing even if offender has had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete
  5. As to robbery with force upon things – thing must be taken out of the building
  6. Intent to gain – presumed from unlawful taking
  7. Taking must not be under the claim of title or ownership
  8. When there’s no intent to gain but there is violence in the taking – grave coercion
  9. Violence or intimidation must be against the person of the offended party, not upon the thing

10. General rule: violence or intimidation must be present before the “taking” is complete

11. Except: when violence results in – homicide, rape, intentional mutilation or any of the serious physical injuries in par 1 and 2 of art 263, the taking of the property is robbery complexed with any of these crimes under art 294, even if taking is already complete when violence was used by the offender

12. Use of force upon things – entrance to the building by means described in arts 299 and 302 (offender must enter)

13. When both violence or intimidation and force upon things concur – it is robbery with violence

Robbery with violence

Grave threats

Grave coercion

Intent to gain

No intent to gain

None

Immediate harm

Intimidation; promises some future harm or injury

Intimidation (effect) is immediate and offended party is compelled to do something against his will (w/n right or wrong)

Robbery

Bribery

X didn’t commit crime but is intimidated to deprive him of his property

X has committed a crime and gives money as way to avoid arrest or prosecution

Deprived of Php thru force or intimidation

Giving of Php is in one sense voluntary

Neither

Transaction is voluntary and mutual

Ex. defendant demands payment of P2.00 with threats of arrest and prosecution, therefore, robbery because (a) intent to gain and (b) immediate harm

 

A.   ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSON: (294)

Acts punished as robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons

By reason or on occasion of the robbery, the following are committed:

  1. homicide
  2. robbery accompanied with rape or intentional mutilation, SPI – insane, imbecile, impotent or blind
  3. SPI – lost the use of speech, hear, smell, eye, hand, foot, arm, leg, use of any such member, incapacitated for work habitually engaged in
  4. Violence/intimidation shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the crime or when in the cause of its execution – SPI/deformity, or shall have lost any part of the body or the use thereof or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work for > 90 days; > 30 days
  5. Any kind of robbery with less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries

Notes:

  1. special complex crimes (specific penalties prescribed)
    1. robbery with homicide – if original design is robbery and homicide is committed – robbery with homicide even though homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable time. If original design is not robbery but robbery was committed after homicide as an afterthought – 2 separate offenses. Still robbery with homicide – if the person killed was an innocent bystander and not the person robbed and if death supervened by mere accident.
    2. robbery with rape – intent to commit robbery must precede rape. Prosecution of the crime need not be by offended party – fiscal can sign the information. When rape and homicide co-exist, rape should be considered as aggravating only and the crime is still robbery with homicide
    3. robbery with intimidation – acts done by the accused which by their own nature or by reason of the circumstances inspire fear in the person against whom they are directed
    4. qualifying circumstances in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, if any of the offenses defined in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Art 294 is committed:
      1. in an uninhabited place or
      2. by a band or
      3. by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or
      4. by entering the passenger’s compartments in a train, or in any manner taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or
      5. on a street, road, highway or alley and the intimidation is made with the use of firearms, the offender shall be punished by the max period of the proper penalties prescribed in art 294

B.   QUALIFIED ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION (295)

Notes:

  1. Must be alleged in the information
  2. Can’t be offset by generic mitigating
  3. Art 295 will not apply to: robbery w/ homicide, rape or SPI under par 1 of art 263

C.   ROBBERY BY A band: (296)

notes:

  1. More than 3 armed malefactors
  2. Liability for the acts of the other members of the band
  3. Conspiracy to commit robbery with homicide – even if less than 4 armed men
  4. Conspiracy to commit robbery only but homicide was committed also on the occasion thereof – all members of the band are liable for robbery with homicide
  5. Conspiracy is presumed when 4 or more armed persons committed robbery
  6. Unless the others attempted to prevent the assault – guilty of robbery by band only
  7. he was a member of the band
  8. he was present at the commission of a robbery by that band
  9. other members of the band committed an assault
  10. he did not attempt to prevent the assault

D.   ATTEMPTED OR FRUSTRATED ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE: (297)

Notes:

  1. Whether robbery is attempted or frustrated, penalty is the same
  2. Where offense committed is attempted or frustrated robbery with serious physical injuries – article 48 is applicable

E. ELEMENTS OF EXECUTION OF DEEDS BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION: (298)

  1. That the offender has intent to defraud another.
  2. That the offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public instrument or document.
  3. That the compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.

F. ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY IN AN INHABITED HOUSE OR PUBLIC BUILDING OR EDIFICE DEVOTED TO WORSHIP: (299)

  1. That the offender entered (a) an inhabited house, or (b) public buildings, or (c) edifice devoted to religious worship.
  2. That the entrance was effected by any of the following means:
    1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.
    2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.
    3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools or.
    4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
    5. That once inside the building, the offender took personal property belonging to another with intent to gain.

Notes:

  1. Includes dependencies (stairways, hallways, etc.)
  2. Inhabited house – any shelter, ship or vessel constituting the dwelling of one or more person even though temporarily absent – dependencies, courts, corals, barns, etc.
  3. NOT INCLUDED – ORCHARD, LANDS FOR CULTIVATION.
  4. Important for robbery by use of force upon things, it is necessary that offender enters the building or where object may be found. NO ENTRY, NO ROBBERY
  5. Entrance is necessary – mere insertion of hand is not enough (whole body); not to get out but to enter – therefore, evidence to such effect is necessary
  6. P v. Lamahang– intent to rob being present is necessary
  7. Place: house or building; not car
  8. Public building – every building owned, rented or used by the government (though owned by private persons) though temporarily vacant
  9. Not robbery – passing through open door but getting out of a window

10. Outside door must be broken, smashed. Theft – if lock is merely removed or door was merely pushed

11. False keys – genuine keys stolen from the owner or any keys other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock

12. Picklocks – specially made, adopted for commission of robbery

13. Key – stolen not by force, otherwise, it’s robbery by violence and intimidation against persons

14. False key – used in opening house and not furniture inside, otherwise, theft (for latter to be robbery., must be broken and not just opened)

15. Gen. Rule: outside door. Exception: inside door in a separate dwelling

16. E.g. pretending to be police to be able to enter (not pretending after entrance)

G. ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY WITH FORCE UPON SUBDIVISION (B) OR ART. 299

  1. That the offender is inside a dwelling house, public building, or edifice devoted to religious worship, regardless of the circumstances under which he entered it
  2. That the offender takes personal property belonging to another with intent to gain, under any of the following circumstances.
    1. by the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle, or
    2. by taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery.

Notes:

  1. Entrance ( no matter how done)
  2. Offender may be servants or guests
  3. Destruction of keyhole of cabinet is robbery here
  4. When sealed box is taken out for the purpose of breaking it, no need to open – already consummated robbery
  5. Estafa – if box is in the custody of acc
  6. Theft – if box found outside and forced open

H. ROBBERY IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND: (300)

I.      WHAT IS AN UNINHABITED HOUSE, PUBLIC BUILDING OR BUILDING DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND THEIR DEPENDENCIES: (301)

Notes:

  1. dependencies – are all interior courts, corrals, warehouses, granaries or enclosed places:
  2. contiguous to the building
  3. having an interior entrance connected therewith
  4. which form part of the whole

2. Garage – must have 3 requirements. Exception: orchards/lands

J. ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE OR IN A PRIVATE BUILDING: (302)

  1. That the offender entered an uninhabited place or a building which was not a dwelling house, not a public building, or not an edifice devoted to religious worship.
  2. that any of the following circumstances was present:
  3. That with intent to gain the offender took therefrom personal property belonging to another.
  4. That entrance was effected through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.
  5. A wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window was broken.
  6. The entrance was effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
  7. A door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle  was broken or
  8. A closed or sealed receptacle was removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.

Notes:

  1. Second kind of robbery with force upon things
  2. Uninhabited place – is an uninhabited building (habitable, not any of the 3 places mentioned)
  3. warehouse, freight car, store. Exception: pigsty
  4. Same manner as 299 except that was entered into was an uninhabited place or a building other than the 3 mentioned in 299. Exception: does not include use of fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority
  5. Breaking of padlock (but not door) is only theft
  6. False keys – genuine keys stolen from the owner or any other keys other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock forcibly opened

K. ROBBERY OF CEREALS, FRUITS OR FIRE WOOD IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE OR PRIVATE BUILDING: (303)

L. ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF PICKLOCKS OR SIMILAR TOOLS: (304)

  1. That the offender has in his possession picklocks or similar tools.
  2. That such picklocks or similar tools are specially adopted to the commission of robbery.
  3. That the offender does not have lawful cause for such possession.

Note: Actual use of the same is not necessary

M. ELEMENTS OF FALSE KEYS: (305)

  1. Picklocks, etc.
  2. Genuine key stolen from owner.
  3. Any key other than those intended by owner for use in the lock forcibly opened by the offender

Notes:

  1. Possession of false keys here not punishable
  2. If key was entrusted and used to steal, not robbery (not stolen)

II. BRIGANDAGE

A. BRIGANDAGE: (306)

Brigands – more than three armed persons forming a band

Purpose:

a.   Robbery in highway

  1. Kidnapping for extortion or ransom.
    1. Any other purpose to be obtained by means of force and violence.

Presumption of Brigandage:

  1. if members of lawless band and possession of unlicensed firearms (any of them)
  2. possession of any kind of arms (not just firearm)

BRIGANDAGE

ROBBERY IN BAND

Purposes are given

Only to commit robbery, not necessarily in hi-way

Mere formation of a band for the above purpose

If the purpose is to commit a part robbery

 

Necessary to prove that band actually committed robbery

B.  ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING A BAND OF BRIGANDS: (307)

  1. That there is a band of brigands.
  2. That the offender knows the band to be of brigands.
  3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
  4. he in any manner aids, abets or protects such band if brigands, or
  5. he gives them information of the movements of the police or other peace officers of the government or
  6. He acquires or receives the property taken by such brigands.

Notes:

  1. PD 532 – brigandage. Seizure of any person for: (a) ransom; (b) extortion or other unlawful purpose; (c) taking away of property by violence or intimidation or force upon things or other unlawful means
  2. Committed by any person
  3. On any Phil hi-way

III. THEFT

A. ELEMENTS OF THEFT: (308)

  1. That there be taking of personal property.
  2. That said property belongs to another.
  3. That the taking be done with intent to gain.
  4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner.
  5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

Persons liable:

  1. Those who

a)    with intent to gain

b)    but without violence against or intimidation of persons not force upon things

c)    take

d)    personal property

e)    of another

f)     without the latter’s consent

  1. Those who

a)    having found lost property

b)    fail to deliver the same to local authorities or its owner

Notes:

  1. Retention of money/property found is theft. Retention is failure to return (intent to gain)
  2. Knowledge of owner is not required, knowledge of loss is enough
  3. Finder in law is liable
  4. Those who

a)    after having maliciously damaged the property of another

b)    remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by them

Note: Killing of cattle of another which destroyed his property and getting meat for himself

  1. Those who

a)    enter an enclosed estate or a field where

b)    trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and, without the consent of its owner

c)    hunts or fish upon the same or gather fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products

Notes:

  1. Theft is consummated when offender is able to place the thing taken under his control and in such a situation as he could disclose of it at once (though no opportunity to dispose) i.e, the control test
  2. P v. Dino– applies only in theft of bulky goods (meaning there has to be capacity to dispose of the things). Otherwise, P v. Espiritu – full possession is enough
  3. Servant using car without permission deemed qualified theft though use was temporary
  4. Reyes says: there must be some character of permanency in depriving owner of the use of the object and making himself the owner, therefore must exclude “joyride”
  5. Theft: if after custody (only material possession) of object was given to the accused, it is actually taken by him (no intent to return) e.g. felonious conversion. But it is estafa if juridical possession is transferred e.g., by contract of bailment
  6. Includes electricity and gas
    1. inspector misreads meter to earn
    2. one using a jumper
  7. Selling share of co-partner is not theft
  8. Salary must be delivered first to employee; prior to this, taking of Php is theft
  9. If offender claims property as his own (in good faith) – not theft (though later found to be untrue. If in bad faith – theft)

10. Gain is not just Php – satisfaction, use, pleasure desired, any benefit (e.g. joyride)

11. Actual gain is not necessary (intent to gain necessary)

12. Allege lack of consent in info is important

B. ELEMENTS OF HUNTING, FISHING OR GATHERING FRUITS, ETC. IN ENCLOSED ESTATE

(PAR. NO.3, ART. 308)

  1. That there is an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another;
  2. That the offender enters the same.
  3. That the offender hunts or fishes upon the same or gathers fruits, cereals or other forest or farm products, and
  4. That the hunting or fishing or gathering of products is without the consent of the owner.

Note: Fish not in fishpond, otherwise, qualified

C.PENALTIES FOR QUALIFIED THEFT; (309)

D. ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT: (310)

  1. Committed by domestic servant, or
  2. With grave abuse of confidence, or
  3. Property stolen is:
    1. motor vehicle
    2. mail matter
    3. large cattle
    4. coconut from plantation
    5. fish from fishpond or fishery, or
    6. On occasion of calamities and civil disturbance.

Notes:

  1. “grave abuse” – high degree of confidence e.g. guests
  2. no confidence, not qualified theft
  3. theft – material possession’ estafa – juridical possession
  4. qualified: if done by one who has access to place where stolen property is kept e.g., guards, tellers
  5. novation theory applies only if there’s a relation
  6. industrial partner is not liable for QT (estafa)
  7. when accused considered the deed of sale as sham (modus) and he had intent to gain, his absconding is QT
  8. see carnapping law: RA 6539
  9. motor vehicle in kabit system sold to another-theft.  Motor vehicle not used as PU in kabit system but under K of lease-estafa
  10.  mail matter – private mail to be QT, Not postmaster – Art. 226

11. theft of large cattle

E. ELEMENTS OF THEFT OF PROPERTY OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY AND NATIONAL MUSEUM: (311)

IV. USURPATION

A. ELEMENTS OF OCCUPATION OF REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN PROPERTY: (312)

  1. That the offender takes possession of any real property or usurps any real rights in property.
  2. That the real property or real rights belong to another.
  3. That violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in occupying real property or usurpation real rights in property.
  4. That there is intent to gain.

B. ELEMENTS OF ALTERING BOUNDARIES OR LANDMARKS: (313)

  1. That there be boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or estates, or any other marks intended to designate the boundaries of the same.
  2. That the offender alters said boundary marks.

V. CULPABLE INSOLVENCY

A. ELEMENTS OF FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCY: (314) (culpable insolvency)

  1. That the offender is a debtor; that is, he was obligations due and payable.
  2. That he absconds with his property.
  3. That there be prejudice to his creditors.

VI. SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS

A.   ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA IN GENERAL: (315)

  1. That the accused defrauded another (a.) by abuse of confidence, or (b) or means of deceit and
  2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person

B. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA WITH UNFAITHFULNESS: (315)

  1. That the offender has an onerous obligation to deliver something of value.
  2. That he alters its substance, quantity, or quality.
  3. That damage or prejudice is caused to another.

C. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE UNDER SUBDIVISION NO.1 PAR. (B), OF ART.315

  1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same.
  2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or dental on his part of such receipt.
  3. that such misappropriation or conversion or dental is to the prejudice of another and
  4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

D. 2ND ELEMENT OF ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE UNDER PARAGRAPH (B), SUBDIVISION N0.1, ART. 315 = 3 WAYS OF COMMITTING:

  1. By misappropriating the thing received.
  2. By converting the thing received.
  3. By denying that the thing was received.

Notes:

  1. Unfaithful or Abuse of Confidence

a. by altering the substance

b. existing obligation to deliver – even if it is not a subject of lawful commerce

c. thing delivered has not been fully or partially paid for – not estafa

  1. no agreement as to quality – No estafa if delivery is unsatisfactory
  1. By misappropriating and converting
  2. thing is received by offender under transactions transferring juridical possession, not ownership
  3. under PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) – failure to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by TR – Estafa
  4. same thing received must be returned otherwise estafa; sale on credit by agency when it was to be sold for cash – estafa
  5. Estafa – not affected by Novation of Contract because it is a public offense
  6. Novation must take place before criminal liability was incurred or perhaps prior to the filing of the criminal information in court by state prosecutors
  7. Misappropriating– to take something for one’s own benefit

g.  Converting – act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it was one’s own; thing has been devoted for a purpose or use different from that agreed upon

  1. There must be prejudice to another – not necessary that offender should obtain gain
  2. When in the prosecution for malversation the public officer is acquitted, the private individual allegedly in conspiracy with him may be held liable for estafa
  3. Partners – No estafa of money or property received for the partnership when the business is commercial and profits accrued.  BUT if property is received for specific purpose and is misappropriated – estafa!
  4. Failure to account after the DEMAND is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation
  5. DEMAND is not a condition precedent to existence of estafa when misappropriation may be established by other proof
  6. In theft, upon delivery of the thing to the offender, the owner expects an immediate return of the ting to him – otherwise, Estafa
  7. Servant, domestic or employee who misappropriates a thing he received from his master is NOT guilty of estafa but of qualified theft

Estafa with Abuse of Confidence

Malversation

Offenders are entrusted with funds or property and are continuing offenses

offenders are entrusted with funds or property and are continuing offenses

Funds: always private

Funds: public funds or property

Offender: private individual, or public officer not accountable

Offender:  public officer accountable for public funds

Committed by misappropriating, converting, denying having received money

Committed  by appropriating, taking,

misappropriating

E. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF THE SIGNATURE IN BLANK: (315)

  1. That the paper with the signature of the offended party be in blank.
  2. That the offended party should have delivered it to offender.
  3. That above the signature of the offended party a document is written by the offender without authority to do so.
  4. That the document so written creates a liability of, or causes damage to, the offended party or any third person.

Note: If the paper with signature in blank was stolen – Falsification if by making it appear that he participated in a transaction when in fact he did not so participate.

F. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA BY MEANS OF DECEIT: (315)

  1. that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
  2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
  3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
  4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Notes:

  1. False pretenses or fraudulent acts – executed prior to or simultaneouslywith delivery of the thing by the complainant
  2. There must be evidence that the pretense of the accused that he possesses power/influence is false.

G. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA BY POSTDATING A CHECK OR ISSUING A CHECK IN PAYMENT OF AN OBLIGATION: (315)

  1. That the offender postdated a check, or issued a check in payment of an obligation.
  2. That such postdatig or issuing a check was done when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

Notes:

  1. good faith is a defense. ( VS. VILLAPANDO, 56 PHIL.31)
  2. dishonor from lack of funds to prima facie evidence of deceit or failure to make good within three days after notice of.
  3. No funds in the bank or his funds are not sufficient
  4. If check was issued in payment of pre-existing debt – no estafa
  5. Offender must be able to obtain something from the offended party by means of the check he issues and delivers
  6. If postdating a check issued as mere guarantee/promissory note – no estafa.

H. ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE DEFINED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1: BP 22

  1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
  2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
  3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check  knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.
  4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been

dishonored for the same reason had not the drawee, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Note: Failure to make good within 5 banking days prima facie evidence of knowledge of  lack and insufficiency

I. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE DEFINED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1: BP 22

  1. That a person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check.
  2. That he fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within

a period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon.

  1. That the check is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Note: Failure to make good within 5 banking days prima facie evididence of knowledge of lack and insufficiency

J. BY OBTAINING FOOD OR CREDIT AT HOTELS, INNS, RESTAURANTS ETC.

K. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA BY INDUCING ANOTHER TO SIGN ANY DOCUMENTS: (315)

  1. That the offender induced the offended party to sign a document.
  2. That deceit be employed to make him sign the document.
  3. That the offended party personally signed the document.
  4. That prejudice be caused.

Note: If offended party willingly signed the document and there was deceit as to the character or contents of the document – falsification; but where the accused made representation to mislead the complainants as to the character of the documents – estafa

L. ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA BY REMOVING, CONCEALING OR DESTROYING DOCUMENTS: (315)

  1. That there be court records, office files, documents or any other papers.
  2. That the offender removed, concealed or destroyed any of them.
  3. That the offender had intent to defraud another.

Note: No intent to defraud – destroying or removal = malicious mischief

M. DAMAGE OR PREJUDICE CAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION: (315) (second element of any form of estafa)

THE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE OR PREJUDICE MAY CONSIST OF THE FF.:

  1. The offender party being deprived of his money or property, as a result of the defraudation.
  2. Disturbance in property right or
  3. Temporary prejudice.

N. ELEMENTS OF SWINDLING (PAR.1) BY CONVEYING, SELLING, ENCUMBERING, OR MORTGAGING ANY REAL PROPERTY, PRETENDING TO BE THE OWNER OF THE SAME: (316)

  1. That the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building.
  2. That the offender who is not the owner of said property represented that he is the owner thereof.
  3. That the offender should have executed an act of ownership (selling, leasing, encumbering or mortgaging the real property).
  4. That the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.

ESTAFA

INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DOCUMENTS

Private individual was entrusted

Public officer entrusted

Intent to defraud

No intent to defraud

O. ELEMENTS OF SWINDLING (PAR. 2) BY DISPOSING OF REAL PROPERTY AS FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCE, ALTHOUGH SUCH ENCUMBRANCE BE NOT RECORDED: (316)

  1. that the thing disposed of be real property.
  2. That the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not.
  3. That there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from encumbrance.
  4. That the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.

P. ELEMENTS OF SWINDLING (PAR.3) BY WRONGFULLY TAKING BY THE OWNER HIS PERSONAL FROM ITS LAWFUL POSSESSOR: (316)

  1. That the offender is the owner of personal property.
  2. That said personal property is in the lawful possession of another.
  3. That the offender wrongfully takes it from its lawful possessor.
  4. That prejudice is thereby caused to the possessor or third person.

Q. ELEMENTS OF SWINDLING (PAR. 6) BY SELLING, MORTGAGING OR ENCUMBERING REAL PROPERTY OR PROPERTIES WITH WHICH THE OFFENDER GUARANTEED THE FULFILLMENT OF HIS OBLIGATION AS SURETY: (316)

  1. That the offender is a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil  action.
  2. That he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation with his real property or properties.
  3. That he sells, mortgages, or, in any other manner encumbers said real property.
  4. That such sale, mortage or encumbrance is (a) without express authority from the court, or (b) made before the cancellation of his bond, or (c) before being relieved from the obligation contracted by him.

R. ELEMENTS OF SWINDLING A MINOR: (317)

  1. That the offender takes advantage of the inexperience or emotions or feelings of a minor.
  2. That he induces such minor (a) ro assume an obligation, or (b) to give release, or (c) to execute a transfer of any property right.
  3. That the consideration is (a) some loan of money (b) credit or (c) other personal property.
  4. That the transaction is to the detriment of such minor.

S. ELEMENTS OF OTHER DECEITS: (318)

  1. not mentioned above;
  2. interpretation of dreams, forecast, future-telling for profit or gain.

VII. CHATTEL MORTGAGE

A. ELEMENTS OF SELLING OR PLEDGING PERSONAL PROPERTY ALREADY PLEDGED: (319)

  1. That personal property is already pledged under the terms of the chattel mortgage law.
  2. That the offender, who is the mortgagee of such property, sells or pledges the same or any part thereof.
  3. That there is no consent of the mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record thereof in the office of the register of deeds.

B. ELEMENTS OF KNOWINGLY REMOVING MORTGAGED PERSONAL PROPERTY: (319)

  1. that personal property is mortgaged under the chattel mortage law.
  2. That the offender knows that such property is so mortaged.
  3. That he removes such mortgaged personal to any province or city other than the one in which it was located at the time of the execution of the mortgage.
  4. that the removal is permanent.
  5. That there is no written consent of the mortgagee or his executors, administration or assigns to such removal.

VIII. ARSON AND OTHER CRIMES INVOLVING DESTRUCTIONS

(Note: PD 1613 expressly repealed or amended Arts 320-326, but PD 1744 revived Art 320)

A.   ELEMENTS OF ARSONS OF PROPERTY OF SMALL VALUES

  1. That an uninhabited hut, storehouse, barn, shed or any other property is burned
  2. That the value of the property burned does not exceed 25 pesos
  3. That the burning was done at a time or under circumstances which clearly exclude all danger of the fire spreading

B.   ELEMENTS OF CRIME INVOLVING DESTRUCTION

  1. That the offender causes destruction of the property
  2. That the destruction was done by means of:
  3. explosion
  4. discharge of electric current
  5. inundation
  6. sinking or stranding of a vessel
  7. damaging the engine of the vessel
  8. taking up rails from the railway track
  9. destroying telegraph wires and posts or those of any other system
  10. other similar effective means of destruction

C.   ELEMENTS OF BURNING ONE’S PROPERTY AS A MEANS TO COMMIT ARSON

  1. That the offender set fire to or destroyed his own property
  2. That the purpose of the offender in doing so was to commit arson or to cause a great destruction
  3. That the property belonging to another was burned or destroyed

D.   ELEMENTS OF ARSON

  1. That the property burned is the exclusive property of the offender
  2. That (a) the purpose of the offender is burning it is to defraud or cause damage to another or (b) prejudice is actually caused, or (c) the thing burned is a building in an inhabited place

IX. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

A. ELEMENTS OF MALICIOUS MISCHIEF: (326)

  1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another.
  2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction.
  3. That the act damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.

Notes:

  1. Malicious mischief – willful damaging of another’s property for the sake of causing damage due to hate, revenge or other evil motive
  2. No negligence
  3. Killing the cow as revenge
  4. If no malice – only civil liability
  5. Damage is also diminution in value
  6. But after damaging the thing, he used it = theft
  7. Damage is not incident of a crime (breaking windows in robbery)

B. SPECIAL CASES OF MALICIOUS MISCHIEF: (328)

  1. Obstruct performance of public functions.
  2. Using poisonous or corrosive substances.
  3. Spreading infection or contagious among cattle.
  4. Damage to property of national museum or library, archive, registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing ised in common by the public.

Note: Qualified malicious mischief – no uprising or sedition (#1)

C. ELEMENTS OF OTHER MISCHIEF: (329)

  1. Not included in 328
  2. scattering human excrement
  3. killing of cow as an act of revenge

D. ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE AND OBSTIVATION TO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION: (330)

Notes:

  1. done by damaging railways, telegraph, telephone lines, electric wires, traction cables, signal system of railways
  2. removing rails from tracks is destruction (art 324)
  3. not applicable when telegraph/phone lines don’t pertain to railways (example: for transmission of electric power/light)
  4. people killed as a result:
  5. circumstance qualifying the offense if the damage shall result in any derailment of cars, collision or other accident – a higher penalty shall be imposed
  6. murder – if derailment is means of intent to kill
  7. none – art 48

E. ELEMENTS OF DESTROYING OR DAMAGING STATUES, PUBLIC MONUMENTS OR PAINTINGS: (331)

F. ELEMENTS OF EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY: (332)

Persons exempt from criminal liability:

  1. Spouse, ascendants and descendants or relatives by affinity in the same line
  2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property w/c belonged to the deceased spouse before the same passed into the possession of another
  3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together

Offenses involved in the exemption:

  1. Theft
  2. Swindling
  3. Malicious mischief

Notes:

  1. Exemption is based on family relations
  2. Parties to the crime not related to the offended party still remains criminally liable
  3. Persons exempt include:
    1. stepfather/mother (ascendants by affinity)
    2. adopted children (descendants)
    3. concubine/paramour (spouse)
    4. common law spouse (propert is part of their earnings)

TITLE ELEVEN

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

A. ELEMENTS OF ADULTERY: (333)

  1. That the woman is married (even if marriage subsequently declared void)
  2. That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.
  3. That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourses, he must know her to be married.

Notes:

  1. mitigated if wife was abandoned without justification by the offended spouse (man is not entitled to this mitigating circumstance)
  2. attempted: caught disrobing a lover

B. ELEMENTS OF CONCUBINAGE: (334)

  1. That the man must be married.
  2. That he committed any of the following acts:
    1. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling.
    2. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman who is not his wife.
    3. Cohabiting with her in any other place.
  3. That as regards the woman she must know him to be married.

Note: “Scandal” consists in any reprehensible word/deed that offends public conscience, redounds to the detriment of the feelings of honest persons and gives occasions to the neighbor’s spiritual damage and ruin

C. ELEMENTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS: (336)

  1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
  2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
    1. by using force or intimidation, or
    2. when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
    3. when the offended party is under 12 years of age.
  3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.

D. ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED SEDUCTION OF A VIRGIN: (337)

Two classes of qualified seduction:

  1. Seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 years of age by certain persons, such as a person in authority, priest, teachers etc and
  2. Seduction of a sister by her brother or descendant by her ascendant, regardless of her age or reputation (incestuous seduction)

Elements:

  1. That the offended party is a virgin, which is  (presumed if she unmarried and of good reputation.)
  2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.
  3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.
  4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the offender ( person entrusted with education or custody of victim; person in public authority, priest; servant)

Persons liable:

  1. Those who abuse their authority:
    1. persons in public authority
    2. guardian
    3. teacher
    4. person who, in any capacity, is entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced
  2. Those who abused the confidence reposed in them:
    1. priest
    2. house servant
    3. domestic
  3. Those who abused their relationship:
    1. brother who seduced his sister
    2. ascendant who seduced his descendant

E. ELEMENTS OF SIMPLE SEDUCTION: (338)

  1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18 years of age.
  2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow.
  3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.
  4. That it is committed by means of deceit.

Note: common form is unconditional promise to marry

F. ELEMENTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY: (339)

  1. that the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness.
  2. That the acts are committed upon a woman who is virgin or single or widow of good reputation, under 18 years of age but over 12 years, or a sister or descendant regardless of her reputation or age.
  3. that the offender accomplishes the acts by abuse of authority, confidence, relationship, or deceit.

G. ELEMENTS OF CORRUPTION OF MINORS: (340)

Act punishable: By promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of persons underage to satisfy the lust of another

H. ELEMENTS OF WHITE SLAVE TRADE: (341)

Acts penalized

1. Engaging in the business of prostitution

2. Profiting by prostitution

3. Enlisting the servicxe of women for the purpose of prostitution

I. ELEMENTS OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION: (342)

  1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation.
  2. That the abduction is against her will.
  3. That the abduction is with lewd designs.

Note: Sexual intercourse is NOT necessary

Crimes against chastity where age and reputation of victim are immaterial: rape, acts of lasciviousness, qualified seduction of sister/descendant, forcible abduction.

J. ELEMENTS OF CONSENTED ABDUCTION: (343)

  1. That the offended party must be a virgin.
  2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.
  3. That  the taking away of the offended party must  be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender.
  4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

K. PROSECUTION OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (344)

  1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by the offended spouse
  2. Seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by:
  3. offended party
  4. by her parents
  5. grandparents
  6. guardians in the order in which they are named above

Note: Marriage of the offender with the offended party extinguishes the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. This applies as well to the accomplices, accessories-after-the-fact. But marriages must be in good faith. This rule does not apply in case of multiple rape.

L. Civil liability of persons guilty of rape, seduction or abduction (345)

  1. To idemnify the offended women
  2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so
  3. In every case to support the offspring

M. LIABILITY OF ASCENDANTS, OTHER PERSONS ENTRUSTED WITH CUSTODY OF OFFENDED PARTY WHO BY ABUSE OF AUTHORITY OR CONFIDENCE SHALL COOPERATE AS ACCOMPLIES: (346)

TITLE TWELVE

CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

 

A.   SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER, AND CONCEALMENT OR ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD: (347)

Acts Punished:

1. Simulation of births

2. Substitution of one child for another

3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with the intent to cause such child to lose its civil status

Requisites:

  1. The child must be legitimate
  2. The offender conceals or abandons such child
  3. The offender has the intent to cause the child to lose its civil status

Elements of Simulation of Birth:

  1. Child is baptized or registered in the Registry of birth as hers
  2. Child loses its real status and acquiires a new one
  3. Actor’s purpose was to cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation

B.   USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS: (348)

Notes:

  1. Committed by a person who represents himself as another and assumes the filiation or rights pertaining to such person
  2. There must be criminal intent to enjoy the civil rights of another by the offender knowing he is not entitled thereto
  3. Committed by asuming the filiation, or the parental or conjugal rights of another
  4. Circumstances qualifying the offense: penalty is heavier when the purpose of the impersonation is to defraud the offended party or hios heirs.

C. ELEMENTS OF BIGAMY: (349)

  1. That the offender has been legally married.
  2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the civil code.
  3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
  4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Notes:

  1. The crime does not fall within the category of private crimes that can be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party
  2. A simulated marriage is not marriage at all and can be used as a defense for bigamy
  3. There must be a summary proceeding to declare the absent spouse presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage
  4. Failure to exercise due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of the 1stwife is bigamy through reckless imprudence
  5. A judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage void ab initio is now required
  6. One convicted for bigamy may be prosecuted for concubinage as both are distinct offenses
  7. One who vouches that there is no legal impediment knowing that one of the parties is already married is an accomplice.

D. ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS: (350)

  1. That the offender contracted marriage.
  2. That he knew at the time that
    1. the requirement of the law were not complied with, or
    2. The marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.

Note: Circumstance qualifying the offense: if either of the contracting parties obtains the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud.

E. ELEMENTS OF PREMATURE MARRIAGE: (351)

Acts punished:

  1. A widow who within 301 days from death of husband, got married or before her delivery, if she was pregnant at the time of his death
  2. A woman whose marriage having been dissolved or annulled, married before her delivery or within 301 days after the legal separation.

F. ELEMENTS OF PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY: (352)

Act punished: performance of any illegal marriage ceremony by a priest or minister of any religious denomination or sect or by civil authorities

TITLE THIRTEEN

CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

A. ELEMENTS OF LIBEL DEFAMATION: (353)

  1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances.
  2. That the imputation must be made publicly.
  3. That it must be malicious.
  4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead.
  5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.

Notes:

  1. Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, commission, condition, status or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead
  2. Kinds of malice: (a) malice in law; (b) malice in fact
  3. Malice is presumed to exist in injurious publications
  4. Publication is the communication of the defamatory matter to some third person/s
  5. Person libeled must be identified. But the publication need not refer by name to the libeled party. If not named it must be shown that the description of the person referred to in the defamatory publication was sufficiently clear so that at least a 3rdperson would have identified the plaintiff.
  6. There are as many crimes as there are persons defamed.
  7. To presume publication there must be a reasonable probability that the alleged a libelous matter was thereby exposed to be read or seen by 3rd

Criterion to determine whether statements are defamatory

1) words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person against who they are uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hole the person up to public ridicule(US v O’Connel)

2 )construed not only as to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and apparent object of the writer.(P v Encarnacion)

Libel

Perjury

-false accusation need not be made under oath

-false accusation is made under oath

Newsweek v IAC

Newsweek portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners. Plaintiffs are associations of sugarcane planters. HELD: Dismissed. To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be identifiable. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons are not actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for victim to be identifiable. An action for libel allegedly directed against a group of sugar planters cannot be done by resort to filing a class suit as each victim has his specific reputation to protect. In this case, each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community.

A.   REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY: (354)

Kinds of privileged communication

  1. Absolutely privileged – not actionable even if the actor has acted in bad faith
  2. Qualifiedly privileged – those which although containing defamatory imputations could not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith

General Rule:

Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown

Exception:

  1. private communication in performance of legal, moral or social duty

Requisites:

  1. that the person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication or at least he had an interest to be upheld
  2. that the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty on the matter
  3. that the statements in the communication are made in good faith without malice in fact
  4. fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments and remarks

Requisites:

  1. that the publication of a report of an official proceeding is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer
  2. that it is made in good faith
  3. that it is made without any comments or remarks

Santos v CA

HELD: No malice, he simply furnished the readers with the info that a complaint has been filed against the brokerage firm and reproduced the pleading verbatim with no embellishments.

B.   LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITING OR SIMILAR MEANS: (355)

Note: Enumerates the means by which libel may be committed: writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio phonograph, painting, theatrical or cinematographic exhibitions or any similar means

C.   THREATENING TO PUBLISH LIBEL AND OFFER TO PREVENT SUCH PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION: (356)

Note: Clearly, just a case of blackmail-any unlawful extortion of money by threats of accusation and exposure

-possible in light threats Art 283 and in threat to publish Art 356.

D. ELEMENTS OF PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS: (357)

  1. That the offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine.
  2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another.
  3. That such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person.

Note:

Even though made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned.

Lacsa v IAC

Lacsa found that Marquez was not a proprietary member of PCA thus not qualified to be president. He wrote to the BOD and to Marquez. He caused to publish the second letter. HELD: Letter is not privileged communication. To be classified as such it must be free from malice. Granting that the letter was privileged communication, written out of a duty of an officer towards the members, such character was lost when it was published.

E. ELEMENTS OF ORAL DEFAMATION/SLANDER: (358)

  1. action of a serious and insulting nature (Grave slander)
  2. light insult or defamation – not serious in nature (simple slander)

Factors that determine gravity of the offense:

a) expressions used

b) personal relations of the accused and the offended party

c) circumstances surrounding the case

Notes:

Words uttered in the heat of anger constitute light oral defamation (P v Doronilla)

If the utterances were made publicly and were heard by many people and the accused at the same time levelled his finger at the complainant, oral defamation is committed (P v Salleque)

F. ELEMENTS OF SLANDER BY DEED: (359)

  1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor.
  2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons.
  3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.

Notes:

a. Seriousness depends on the social standing of offended party, the circumstances surrounding the act, the occasion, etc.

b. The acts of slapping and boxing the woman, a teacher, in the presence of many people has put her to dishonor, contempt and ridicule. (P v Costa)

P v Motita

Accused held a mirror between the legs of complainant to reflect her private parts. The crowd laughed. Guilty of slander by deed.

Distinctions:

a. Unjust Vexation-irritation or annoyance/anything that annoys or irritates without justification.

b. Slander by Deed-irritation or annoyance + attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt.

c. Acts of lasciviousness-irritation or annoyance + any of 3 circumstance provided in Art335 of RPC on rape

i. use of force or intimidation

ii.deprivation of reason or rendering the offended unconscious

offended party under 12 yrs of age+lewd designs

PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL (360)

1) Who are liable

a.  person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of any      defamation in writing or similar means(par.1)

b.   author or editor of a book or pamphlet

c. editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial publication(par.2)

d. owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent and all other persons who in any way participate in or have connection with its publication (US v Ortiz)

2) Venue of criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation:

a. where the libelous article is printed and 1st published OR

b. where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense

3) Where one of the offended parties is a public officer:

a. if his office is in the City of Manila

- RTC of Manila OR

- city/province where the article is printed and 1st published

b. Otherwise

- RTC of the city/province where he held office at the time of offense  OR

- where the article is 1st published

4) Where one of the offended parties is a private individual:

- RTC of province/city where he actually resides at the time of the crime

- where article was printed or 1st published

Note: Offended party must file complaint for defamation imputing a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio (e.g. adultery, concubinage, rape, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness)

Soriano v IAC

The Philippines follows the multiple publication rule which means that every time the same written matter is communicated, such communication is considered a distinct and separate publication of libel.

PROOF OF THE TRUTH (361)

Admissible when:

a. the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended party is a private individual or a public officer

b. the offended party is a government employee, even if the act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime provided it is related to the discharge of his official duties

Requisites for Acquittal:

a. it appears that the matter charged as libelous is TRUE (for situations 1 and 2 above)

b. it was published with good motives and for a justifiable end (for situation 1 only)

Notes: The proof of the truth of the accusation cannot be made to rest upon mere hearsay, rumors, or suspicion. It must rest upon positive direct evidence, upon which a definite finding may be made by the court (US v Sotto)

LIBELOUS REMARKS (362)

Libelous remarks or comments on privileged matters (under Art. 354) if made with malice in fact will not exempt the author and editor.

*This article is a limitation to the defense of privileged communication.

ELEMENTS OF INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSON: (363)

  1. That the offender performs an act.
  2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime.
  3. That such act does not constitute perjury.

Two  Kinds:

a. making a statement which is

i. defamatory or

ii. perjurious (if made under oath and is false)

b. planting evidence

Note: article is limited to planting evidence and the like

 

INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR (364)

How committed:

-by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of another person

Notes:

a. Intriguing against honor refers to any scheme or plot designed to blemish the reputation of another or of such trickery or secret plot.

b. Committed by saying to others an unattributable thing, if said to the person himself it is slander.

RA4200 The Anti-WireTapping Act

Acts punished:

1) any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word

a) taps any wire of cable OR

b) uses any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or walkie talkie or tape recorder

2) any person, whether or not a participant in the above-mentioned acts:

a) knowingly possesses any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record or copies thereof of any communication or spoken word

b) replays the same for any other person

c)communicates the contents thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person

Notes:

a. Peace officer is exempt if acts done under lawful order of the court. You can only use the recording for the case for which it was validly requested.

b. Information obtained in violation of the Act is inadmissible in evidence in any hearing or investigation.

c. Gaanan v IAC

An extension phone is not one of those prohibited under RA 4200. There must be either a physical interruption through the wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or record the spoken words. The extension phone was not installed for such purpose.

ELEMENTS OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE: (365)

  1. That the offender does or fails to do an act.
  2. That the doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary.
  3. That it be without malice.
  4. That material damage results.
  5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration
    1. his employment or occupation
    2. degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
    3. other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

ELEMENTS OF SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE: (365)

  1. That there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender.
  2. That the damage impending to be caused in not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.

Notes:

1) Art.64 on mitigating and aggravating circumstances not applicable.

2) Failure to lend on the spot assistance to victim of his negligence:penalty next higher in degree.

3) Abandoning usually punishable under Art 275, if charged under Art365 is only qualifying and if not alleged cannot even be an aggravating circumstance.

4) Contributory negligence—not a defense, only mitigating

Last clear chance doctrine -

The contributory negligence of the injured party will no t defeat the action if it be shown that the accused might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party

Emergency rule-

An automobile driver, who, by the negligence of another, is suddenly placed in an emergency and compelled to act instantly to avoid a collision or injury is not guilty of negligence if he makes a choice which a person of ordinary prudence placed in such a position might make even though he did not make the wisest choice.

P v Cano

Negligence is a quasi-offense. What is punished is not the effect of the negligence but the recklessness of the accused.

P v Carillo

13 yr old girl dies 3 days after surgery due to an overdose of Nubain which triggered a heart attack that caused brain damage. HELD: Guilty of simple negligence resulting to homicide. Carillo was the anesthesiologist, he and his co-accused failed to monitor and provide close patient care, to inform the parents of the child’s true condition, to prove that they exercised necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence to prevent the condition.

Buearano v CA

Conviction of the accused in the charge of slight and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence constitutes double jeopardy to the charge of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence.

 

Criminal Law Book 1

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Criminal Law Book 1 Articles 1 – 10

Criminal Law – A branch of municipal law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment.

Limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws (ON)

1.         Must be general in application.

2.         Must not partake of the nature of an ex post facto law.

3.         Must not partake of the nature of a bill of attainder.

4.         Must not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines.

Characteristics of Criminal Law:

  1. General– the law is binding to all persons who reside in the Philippines
  2. Territorial– the law is binding to all crimes committed within the National Territory of the Philippines

Exception to Territorial Application: Instances enumerated under Article 2.

3.   Prospective – the law does not have any retroactive effect.

Exception to Prospective Application: when new statute is favorable to the accused.

Effect of repeal of penal law to liability of offender

Total or absolute, or partial or relative repeal. — As to the effect of repeal of penal law to the liability of offender, qualify your answer by saying whether the repeal is absolute or total or whether the repeal is partial or relative only.

repeal is absolute or total when the crime punished under the repealed law has been decriminalized by the repeal.  Because of the repeal, the act or omission which used to be a crime is no longer a crime. An example is Republic Act No. 7363, which decriminalized subversion.

repeal is partial or relative when the crime punished under the repealed law continues to be a crime inspite of the repeal.  This means that the repeal merely modified the conditions affecting the crime under the repealed law.  The modification may be prejudicial or beneficial to the offender.  Hence, the following rule:

Consequences if repeal of penal law is total or absolute

(1)           If a case is pending in court involving the violation of the repealed law, the same shall be dismissed, even though the accused may be a habitual delinquent.

(2)           If a case is already decided and the accused is already serving sentence by final judgment, if the convict is not a habitual delinquent, then he will be entitled to a release unless there is a reservation clause in the penal law that it will not apply to those serving sentence at the time of the repeal.  But if there is no reservation, those who are not habitual delinquents even if they are already serving their sentence will receive the benefit of the repealing law.  They are entitled to release.

If they are not discharged from confinement, a petition for habeas corpus should be filed to test the legality of their continued confinement in jail.

If the convict, on the other hand, is a habitual delinquent, he will continue serving the sentence in spite of the fact that the law under which he was convicted has already been absolutely repealed.  This is so because penal laws should be given retroactive application to favor only those who are not habitual delinquents. 

Consequences if repeal of penal law is partial or relative

(1)           If a case is pending in court involving the violation of the repealed law, and the repealing law is more favorable to the accused, it shall be the one applied to him.  So whether he is a habitual delinquent or not, if the case is still pending in court, the repealing law will be the one to apply unless there is a saving clause in the repealing law that it shall not apply to pending causes of action.

(2)           If a case is already decided and the accused is already serving sentence by final judgment, even if the repealing law is partial or relative, the crime still remains to be a crime.  Those who are not habitual delinquents will benefit on the effect of that repeal, so that if the repeal is more lenient to them, it will be the repealing law that will henceforth apply to them.

Under Article 22, even if the offender is already convicted and serving sentence, a law which is beneficial shall be applied to him unless he is a habitual delinquent in accordance with Rule 5 of Article 62.

Consequences if repeal of penal law is express or implied

(1)           If a penal law is impliedly repealed, the subsequent repeal of the repealing law will revive the original law.  So the act or omission which was punished as a crime under the original law will be revived and the same shall again be crimes although during the implied repeal they may not be punishable.                 

(2)           If the repeal is express, the repeal of the repealing law will not revive the first law, so the act or omission will no longer be penalized.

These effects of repeal do not apply to self-repealing laws or those which have automatic termination.   An example is the Rent Control Law which is revived by Congress every two years.

Theories of Criminal Law

  1. Classical Theory– Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil and therefore more stress is placed upon the result of the felonious act than upon the criminal himself.
  2. Positivist Theory– Man is subdued occasionally by a strange and morbid phenomenon which conditions him to do wrong in spite of or contrary to his volition.

Eclectic or Mixed Philosophy

This combines both positivist and classical thinking.  Crimes that are economic and social and nature should be dealt with in a positivist manner; thus, the law is more compassionate.  Heinous crimes should be dealt with in a classical manner; thus, capital punishmen

BASIC MAXIMS IN CRIMINAL LAW

Doctrine of Pro Reo

Whenever a penal law is to be construed or applied and the law admits of two interpretations – one lenient to the offender and one strict to the offender – that interpretation which is lenient or favorable to the offender will be adopted.

Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege

There is no crime when there is no law punishing the same.  This is true to civil law countries, but not to common law countries.

Because of this maxim, there is no common law crime in the Philippines.  No matter how wrongful, evil or bad the act is, if there is no law defining the act, the same is not considered a crime.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

The act cannot be criminal where the mind is not criminal.  This is true to a felony characterized by dolo, but not a felony resulting from culpa.  This maxim is not an absolute one because it is not applied to culpable felonies, or those that result from negligence.

Utilitarian Theory or Protective Theory

The primary purpose of the punishment under criminal law is the protection of society from actual and potential wrongdoers.  The courts, therefore, in exacting retribution for the wronged society, should direct the punishment to potential or actual wrongdoers, since criminal law is directed against acts and omissions which the society does not approve.  Consistent with this theory, the mala prohibita principle which punishes an offense regardless of malice or criminal intent, should not be utilized to apply the full harshness of the special law. 

Sources of Criminal Law

  1. The Revised Penal Code
  2. Special Penal Laws – Acts enacted of the Philippine Legislature punishing offenses or omissions.

Construction of Penal Laws

  1. Criminal Statutes are liberally construed in favor of the offender. This means that no person shall be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute.
  2. The original text in which a penal law is approved in case of a conflict with an official translation.
  3. Interpretation by analogy has no place in criminal law

MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

Violations of the Revised Penal Code are referred to as malum in se, which literally means, that the act is inherently evil or bad or per se wrongful.  On the other hand, violations of special laws are generally referred to as malum prohibitum.

Note, however, that not all violations of special laws are mala prohibita.  While intentional felonies are always mala in se, it does not follow that prohibited acts done in violation of special laws are always mala prohibita.  Even if the crime is punished under a special law, if the act punished is one which is inherently wrong, the same is malum in se, and, therefore, good faith and the lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless it is the product of criminal negligence or culpa.

Likewise when the special laws requires that the punished act be committed knowingly and willfully, criminal intent is required to be proved before criminal liability may arise.

When the act penalized is not inherently wrong, it is wrong only because a law punishes the same.

Distinction between crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code and crimes punished under special laws

1.             As to moral trait of the offender

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the moral trait of the offender is considered. This is why liability would only arise when there is dolo or culpa in the commission of the punishable act.

In crimes punished under special laws, the moral trait of the offender is not considered; it is enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily done.

2.             As to use of good faith as defense

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a valid defense; unless the crime is the result of culpa

In crimes punished under special laws, good faith is not a defense

3.             As to degree of accomplishment of the crime

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the degree of accomplishment of the crime is taken into account in punishing the offender; thus, there are attempted, frustrated, and consummated stages in the commission of the crime.

In crimes punished under special laws, the act gives rise to a crime only when it is consummated; there are no attempted or frustrated stages, unless the special law expressly penalize the mere attempt or frustration of the crime.

4.             As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are taken into account in imposing the penalty since the moral trait of the offender is considered.

In crimes punished under special laws, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not taken into account in imposing the penalty.

5.             As to degree of participation

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, when there is more than one offender, the degree of participation of each in the commission of the crime is taken into account in imposing the penalty; thus, offenders are classified as principal, accomplice and accessory.

In crimes punished under special laws, the degree of participation of the offenders is not considered.  All who perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized to the same extent.  There is no principal or accomplice or accessory to consider.

Test to determine if violation of special law is malum prohibitum or malum in se

Analyze the violation:  Is it wrong because there is a law prohibiting it or punishing it as such?  If you remove the law, will the act still be wrong?

If the wording of the law punishing the crime uses the word “willfully”, then malice must be proven.  Where malice is a factor, good faith is a defense.

In violation of special law, the act constituting the crime is a prohibited act.  Therefore culpa is not a basis of liability, unless the special law punishes an omission.

When given a problem, take note if the crime is a violation of the Revised Penal Code or a special law.

Art. 1.  This Code shall take effect on January 1, 1932.

Art. 2.  Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago including its atmosphere, its interior waters and Maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1.  Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

2.  Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3.  Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;

4.  While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or (Some of these crimes are bribery, fraud against national treasury, malversation of public funds or property, and illegal use of public funds; e.g., A judge who accepts a bribe while in Japan.)

 5.  Should commit any crimes against the national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. (These crimes include treason, espionage, piracy, mutiny, and violation of neutrality)

  • Rules as to crimes committed aboard foreign merchant vessels:
  1. French Rule– Such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the safety of the state is endangered.
  2. English Rule– Such crimes are triable in that country, unless they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management thereof. (This is applicable in the Philippines)

two situations where the foreign country may not apply its criminal law even if a crime was committed on board a vessel within its territorial waters and these are:

(1)           When the crime is committed in a war vessel of a foreign country, because war vessels are part of the sovereignty of the country to whose naval force they belong;

(2)           When the foreign country in whose territorial waters the crime was committed adopts the French Rule, which applies only to merchant vessels, except when the crime committed affects the national security or public order of such foreign country.

  • Requirements of “an offense committed while on a Philippine Ship or Airship
  1. Registered with the Philippine Bureau of Customs
  2. Ship must be in the high seas or the airship must be in international airspace.

Under international law rule, a vessel which is not registered in accordance with the laws of any country is considered a pirate vessel and piracy is a crime against humanity in general, such that wherever the pirates may go, they can be prosecuted.   

US v. Bull

A crime which occurred on board of a foreign vessel, which began when the ship was in a foreign territory and continued when it entered into Philippine waters, is considered a continuing crime. Hence within the jurisdiction of the local courts.

As a general rule, the Revised Penal Code governs only when the crime committed pertains to the exercise of the public official’s functions, those having to do with the discharge of their duties in a foreign country.  The functions contemplated are those, which are, under the law, to be performed by the public officer in the Foreign Service of the Philippine government in a foreign country.

 

Exception:  The Revised Penal Code governs if the crime was committed within the Philippine Embassy or within the embassy grounds in a foreign country.  This is because embassy grounds are considered an extension of sovereignty.

Paragraph 5 of Article 2, use the phrase “as defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.”

This is a very important part of the exception, because Title I of Book 2 (crimes against national security) does not include rebellion. 

Art 3.  Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies.

  • Acts – an overt or external act
  • Omission– failure to perform a duty required by law. Example of an omission: failure to render assistance to anyone who is in danger of dying or is in an uninhabited place or is wounded – abandonment.
  • Felonies– acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code
  • Crime - acts and omissions punishable by any law

What requisites must concur before a felony may be committed?

There must be (1) an act or omission; (2) punishable by the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa.

  • How felonies are committed:
  1. by means of deceit (dolo)– There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.

Requisites:

  1. freedom
  2. intelligence
  3. intent

Examples: murder, treason, and robbery

Criminal intent is not necessary in these cases:

(1)           When the crime is the product of culpa or negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill;

(2)           When the crime is a prohibited act under a special law or what is called malum prohibitum.

In criminal law, intent is categorized into two:

(1)           General criminal intent; and

(2)           Specific criminal intent. 

General criminal intent is presumed from the mere doing of a wrong act.  This does not require proof.  The burden is upon the wrong doer to prove that he acted without such criminal intent. 

Specific criminal intent is not presumed because it is an ingredient or element of a crime, like intent to kill in the crimes of attempted or frustrated homicide/parricide/murder.  The prosecution has the burden of proving the same.

Distinction between intent and discernment

Intent is the determination to do a certain thing, an aim or purpose of the mind.  It is the design to resolve or determination by which a person acts.

On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to tell right from wrong.  It relates to the moral significance that a person ascribes to his act and relates to the intelligence as an element of dolo, distinct from intent. 

Distinction between intent and motive

Intent is demonstrated by the use of a particular means to bring about a desired result – it is not a state of mind or a reason for committing a crime.

On the other hand, motive implies motion.  It is the moving power which impels one to do an act.  When there is motive in the commission of a crime, it always comes before the intent.  But a crime may be committed without motive. 

If the crime is intentional, it cannot be committed without intent.  Intent is manifested by the instrument used by the offender.  The specific criminal intent becomes material if the crime is to be distinguished from the attempted or frustrated stage.

  1. by means of fault  (culpa)– There is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
  2. Imprudence– deficiency of action; e.g. A was driving a truck along a road.  He hit B because it was raining – reckless imprudence.
  3. Negligence -deficiency of perception; failure to foresee impending danger, usually involves lack of foresight
  4. Requisites:
    1. Freedom
    2. Intelligence
    3. Imprudence, negligence, lack of skill or foresight
    4. Lack of intent

The concept of criminal negligence is the inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform an act.  If the danger impending from that situation is clearly manifest, you have a case of reckless imprudence.  But if the danger that would result from such imprudence is not clear, not manifest nor immediate you have only a case of simple negligence.

  • Mistake of fact– is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to another.  He is not criminally liable.

a. Requisites:

  1. that the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be;
  2. intention of the accused is lawful;
  3. mistake must be without fault of carelessness.

 Example:  United States v. Ah Chong.

Ah Chong being afraid of bad elements, locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by somebody who was trying to open the door.  He asked the identity of the person, but he did not receive a response.  Fearing that this intruder was a robber, he leaped out of bed and said that he will kill the intruder should he attempt to enter.  At that moment, the chair struck him.  Believing that he was attacked, he seized a knife and fatally wounded the intruder.

Mistake of fact would be relevant only when the felony would have been intentional or through dolo, but not when the felony is a result of culpa.  When the felony is a product of culpa, do not discuss mistake of fact. 

Art. 4.  Criminal liability shall be incurred:

            1.  By any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Article 4, paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of the resulting felony. It must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the felonious act.

  • Causes which produce a different result:
  1. Mistake in identity of the victim– injuring one person who is mistaken for another (this is a complex crime under Art. 48) e.g., A intended to shoot B, but he instead shot C because he (A) mistook C for B.

         In error in personae, the intended victim was not at the scene of the crime.  It was the actual victim upon whom the blow was directed, but he was not really the intended victim. 

How does error in personae affect criminal liability of the offender?

Error in personae is mitigating if the crime committed is different from that which was intended.  If the crime committed is the same as that which was intended, error in personae does not affect the criminal liability of the offender.

In mistake of identity, if the crime committed was the same as the crime intended, but on a different victim, error in persona does not affect the criminal liability of the offender.  But if the crime committed was different from the crime intended, Article 49 will apply and the penalty for the lesser crime will be applied.  In a way, mistake in identity is a mitigating circumstance where Article 49 applies.  Where the crime intended is more serious than the crime committed, the error in persona is not a mitigating circumstance

  1. Mistake in blow– hitting somebody other than the target due to lack of skill or fortuitous instances (this is a complex crime under Art. 48) e.g., B and C were walking together.  A wanted to shoot B, but he instead injured C.

         In aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else.  In aberratio ictus, the intended victim as well as the actual victim are both at the scene of the crime.

     aberratio ictus, generally gives rise to a complex crime.   This being so, the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed in the maximum period.

  1. Injurious result is greater than that intended – causing injury graver than intended or expected (this is a mitigating circumstance due to lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Art. 13) e.g., A wanted to injure B.  However, B died.

         praeter intentionem is mitigating, particularly covered by paragraph 3 of Article 13.  In order however, that the situation may qualify as praeter intentionem, there must be a notable disparity between the means employed and the resulting felony

  • In all these instances the offender can still be held criminally liable, since he is motivated by criminal intent.

Requisites:

  1. the felony was intentionally committed
  2. the felony is the proximate cause of the wrong done
  • Doctrine of Proximate Cause– such adequate and efficient cause as, in the natural order of events, and under the particular circumstances surrounding the case, which would necessarily produce the event.

Requisites:

  1. the direct, natural, and logical cause
  2. produces the injury or damage
  3. unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause
  4. without which the result would not have occurred
  • Proximate Cause is negated by:
  1. Active force, distinct act, or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused, which serves as a sufficient intervening cause.
  2. Resulting injury or damage is due to the intentional act of the victim.

      proximate cause does not require that the offender needs to actually touch the body of the offended party. It is enough that the offender generated in the mind of the offended party the belief that made him risk himself.

  • Requisite for Presumption blow was cause of the death– Where there has been an injury inflicted sufficient to produce death followed by the demise of the person, the presumption arises that the injury was the cause of the death. Provided:
  1. victim was in normal health
  2. death ensued within a reasonable time

       The one who caused the proximate cause is the one liable.  The one who caused the immediate cause is also liable, but merely contributory or sometimes totally not liable.

2.  By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

  • Requisites:(IMPOSSIBLE CRIME)
  1. Act would have been an offense against persons or property
  2. Act is not an actual violation of another provision of the Code or of a special penal law
  3. There was criminal intent
  4. Accomplishment was inherently impossible; or inadequate or ineffectual means were employed.
  • Notes:
  1. Offender must believe that he can consummate the intended crime, a man stabbing another who he knew was already dead cannot be liable for an impossible crime.
  2. The law intends to punish the criminal intent.
  3. There is no attempted or frustrated impossible crime.
  • Felonies against persons: parricide, murder, homicide, infanticide, physical injuries, etc.
  • Felonies against property:robbery, theft, usurpation, swindling, etc.
  • Inherent impossibility: A thought that B was just sleeping.  B was already dead.  A shot B.  A is liable.  If A knew that B is dead and he still shot him, then A is not liable.

When we say inherent impossibility, this means that under any and all circumstances, the crime could not have materialized.  If the crime could have materialized under a different set of facts, employing the same mean or the same act, it is not an impossible crime; it would be an attempted felony.

  • Employment of inadequate means: A used poison to kill B.  However, B survived because A used small quantities of poison – frustrated murder.
  • Ineffectual means: A aimed his gun at B.  When he fired the gun, no bullet came out because the gun was empty.  A is liable.

          Whenever you are confronted with a problem where the facts suggest that an impossible crime was committed, be careful about the question asked.  If the question asked is: “Is an impossible crime committed?”, then you judge that question on the basis of  the facts.  If really the facts constitute an impossible crime, then you suggest than an impossible crime is committed, then you state the reason for the inherent impossibility.

          If the question asked is “Is he liable for an impossible crime?”, this is a catching question.  Even though the facts constitute an impossible crime, if the act done by the offender constitutes some other crimes under the Revised Penal Code, he will not be liable for an impossible crime.  He will be prosecuted for the crime constituted so far by the act done by him.

          this idea of an impossible crime is a one of last resort, just to teach the offender a lesson because of his criminal perversity.  If he could be taught of the same lesson by charging him with some other crime constituted by his act, then that will be the proper way.  If you want to play safe, you state there that although an impossible crime is constituted, yet it is a principle of criminal law that he will only be penalized for an impossible crime if he cannot be punished under some other provision of the Revised Penal Code.

Art 5.  Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made subject of legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

           When a person is charged in court, and the court finds that there is no law applicable, the court will acquit the accused and the judge will give his opinion that the said act should be punished.

  • Paragraph 2 does not apply to crimes punishable by special law, including profiteering, and illegal possession of firearms or drugs.  There can be no executive clemency for these crimes.

Art. 6.  Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

  • Development of a crime
  1. Internal acts – intent and plans; usually not punishable
  2. External acts
    1. Preparatory Acts – acts tending toward the crime
    2. Acts of Execution – acts directly connected the crime

Stages of Commission of a Crime

Attempt

Frustrated

Consummated

·         Overt acts of execution are started

·         Not all acts of execution are present

·         Due to reasons other than the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator

·         All acts of execution are present

·         Crime sought to be committed is not achieved

·         Due to intervening causes independent of the will of the perpetrator

·         All the acts of execution are present

·         The result sought is achieved

   
  • Stages of a Crime does not apply in:
  1. Offenses punishable by Special Penal Laws, unless the otherwise is provided for.
  2. Formal crimes (e.g., slander, adultery, etc.)
  3. Impossible Crimes
  4. Crimes consummated by mere attempt. Examples:attempt to flee to an enemy country, treason, corruption of minors.
  5. Felonies by omission
  6. Crimes committed by mere agreement. Examples: betting in sports (endings in basketball), corruption of public officers.

Desistance

        Desistance on the part of the offender negates criminal liability in the attempted stage.  Desistance is true only in the attempted stage of the felony.  If under the definition of the felony, the act done is already in the frustrated stage, no amount of desistance will negate criminal liability.

         The spontaneous desistance of the offender negates only the attempted stage but not necessarily all criminal liability.  Even though there was desistance on the part of the offender, if the desistance was made when acts done by him already resulted to a felony, that offender will still be criminally liable for the felony brought about his act

           In deciding whether a felony is attempted or frustrated or consummated, there are three criteria involved:

(1)           The manner of committing the crime;

(2)           The elements of the crime; and

(3)           The nature of the crime itself.

  • Applications:
  1. A put poison in B’s food.  B threw away his food.  A is liable – attempted murder.[1]
  2. A stole B’s car, but he returned it.  A is liable – (consummated) theft.
  3. A aimed his gun at B.  C held A’s hand and prevented him from shooting B – attempted murder.
  4. A inflicted a mortal wound on B.  B managed to survive – frustrated murder.
  5. A intended to kill B by shooting him.  A missed – attempted murder.
  6. A doused B’s house with kerosene.  But before he could light the match, he was caught –attempted arson.
  7. A cause a blaze, but did not burn the house of B – frustrated arson.
  8. B’s house was set on fire by A – (consummated) arson.
  9. A tried to rape B.  B managed to escape.  There was no penetration – attempted rape.
  10. A got hold of B’s painting.  A was caught before he could leave B’s house – frustrated robbery.[2]

           The attempted stage is said to be within the subjective phase of execution of a felony.  On the subjective phase, it is that point in time when the offender begins the commission of an overt act until that point where he loses control of the commission of the crime already.  If he has reached that point where he can no longer control the ensuing consequence, the crime has already passed the subjective phase and, therefore, it is no longer attempted.  The moment the execution of the crime has already gone to that point where the felony should follow as a consequence, it is either already frustrated or consummated.  If the felony does not follow as a consequence, it is already frustrated.  If the felony follows as a consequence, it is consummated.

        although the offender may not have done the act to bring about the felony as a consequence, if he could have continued committing those acts but he himself did not proceed because he believed that he had done enough to consummate the crime, Supreme Court said the subjective phase has passed

NOTES ON ARSON;

         The weight of the authority is that the crime of arson cannot be committed in the frustrated stage.  The reason is because we can hardly determine whether the offender has performed all the acts of execution that would result in arson, as a consequence, unless a part of the premises has started to burn.  On the other hand, the moment a particle or a molecule of the premises has blackened, in law, arson is consummated.  This is because consummated arson does not require that the whole of the premises be burned.  It is enough that any part of the premises, no matter how small, has begun to burn.

ESTAFA VS. THEFT

         In estafa, the offender receives the property; he does not take it.  But in receiving the property, the recipient may be committing theft, not estafa, if what was transferred to him was only the physical or material possession of the object.  It can only be estafa if what was transferred to him is not only material or physical possession but juridical possession as well.

          When you are discussing estafa, do not talk about intent to gain.  In the same manner that when you are discussing the crime of theft, do not talk of damage.

Nature of the crime itself

          In crimes involving the taking of human life – parricide, homicide, and murder – in the definition of the frustrated stage, it is indispensable that the victim be mortally wounded.  Under the definition of the frustrated stage, to consider the offender as having performed all the acts of execution, the acts already done by him must produce or be capable of producing a felony as a consequence. The general rule is that there must be a fatal injury inflicted, because it is only then that death will follow.

         If the wound is not mortal, the crime is only attempted.  The reason is that the wound inflicted is not capable of bringing about the desired felony of parricide, murder or homicide as a consequence; it cannot be said that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce parricide, homicide or murder as a result. 

         An exception to the general rule is the so-called subjective phase.  The Supreme Court has decided cases which applied the subjective standard that when the offender himself believed that he had performed all the acts of execution, even though no mortal wound was inflicted, the act is already in the frustrated stage.

         The common notion is that when there is conspiracy involved, the participants are punished as principals.  This notion is no longer absolute.  In the case of People v. Nierra,the Supreme Court ruled that even though there was conspiracy, if a co-conspirator merely cooperated in the commission of the crime with insignificant or minimal acts, such that even without his cooperation, the crime could be carried out as well, such co-conspirator should be punished as an accomplice only.

Art. 7.  Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated with the exception of those committed against persons or property.

  • Examples of light felonies: slight physical injuries; theft; alteration of boundary marks;  malicious mischief; and intriguing against honor.
  • In commission of crimes against properties and persons, every stage of execution is punishable but only the principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies, accessories are not.

Art. 8.  Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefore.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or persons.

  • Conspiracy is punishable in the following cases: treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, and monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
  • Conspiracy to commit a crime is not to be confused with conspiracy as a means of committing a crime. In both cases there is an agreement but mere conspiracy to commit a crime is not punished EXCEPT in treason, rebellion, or sedition. Even then, if the treason is actually committed, the conspiracy will be considered as a means of committing it and the accused will all be charged for treason and not for conspiracy to commit treason.

Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit a Crime

 

Conspiracy

Proposal

Elements

·         Agreement among 2 or more persons to commit a crime

·         They decide to commit it

·         A person has decided to commit a crime

·         He proposes its commission to another

 

Crimes

1.      Conspiracy to commit sedition

2.      Conspiracy to commit rebellion

3.      Conspiracy to commit treason

4.      Proposal to commit treason

5.      Proposal to commit rebellion

 
  • Mere conspiracy in combination in restraint of trade (Art. 186), and brigandage (Art. 306).

Two ways for conspiracy to exist:

(1)           There is an agreement.

(2)           The participants acted in concert or simultaneously which is indicative of a meeting of the minds towards a common criminal goal or criminal objective.  When several offenders act in a synchronized, coordinated manner, the fact that their acts complimented each other is indicative of the meeting of the minds.  There is an implied agreement.

Two kinds of conspiracy:

(1)           Conspiracy as a crime; and

(2)           Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability

         When conspiracy itself is a crime, no overt act is necessary to bring about the criminal liability.  The mere conspiracy is the crime itself.  This is only true when the law expressly punishes the mere conspiracy; otherwise, the conspiracy does not bring about the commission of the crime because conspiracy is not an overt act but a mere preparatory act.  Treason, rebellion, sedition, and coup d’etat are the only crimes where the conspiracy and proposal to commit to them are punishable.

         When the conspiracy is only a basis of incurring criminal liability, there must be an overt act done before the co-conspirators become criminally liable. For as long as none of the conspirators has committed an overt act, there is no crime yet.  But when one of them commits any overt act, all of them shall be held liable, unless a co-conspirator was absent from the scene of the crime or he showed up, but he tried to prevent the commission of the crime.

         As a general rule, if there has been a conspiracy to commit a crime in a particular place, anyone who did not appear shall be presumed to have desisted.  The exception to this is if such person who did not  appear was the mastermind.

        For as long as none of the conspirators has committed an overt act, there is no crime yet.  But when one of them commits any overt act, all of them shall be held liable, unless a co-conspirator was absent from the scene of the crime or he showed up, but he tried to prevent the commission of the crime

        As a general rule, if there has been a conspiracy to commit a crime in a particular place, anyone who did not appear shall be presumed to have desisted.  The exception to this is if such person who did not  appear was the mastermind.

       When the conspiracy itself is a crime, this cannot be inferred or deduced because there is no overt act.  All that there is the agreement.  On the other hand, if the co-conspirator or any of them would execute an overt act, the crime would no longer be the conspiracy but the overt act itself.

        conspiracy as a crime, must have a clear and convincing evidence of its existence.  Every crime must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. it must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, not by conjectures or speculations.

       When the conspiracy is just a basis of incurring criminal liability, however, the same may be deduced or inferred from the acts of several offenders in carrying out the commission of the crime.  The existence of a conspiracy may be reasonably inferred from the acts of the offenders when such acts disclose or show a common pursuit of the criminal objective.

         mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or at least, agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute a conspiracy. There must be an intentional participation in the crime with a view to further the common felonious objective.

        When several persons who do not know each other simultaneously attack the victim, the act of one is the act of all, regardless of the degree of injury inflicted by any one of them.  All will be liable for the consequences.  A conspiracy is possible even when participants are not known to each other.  Do not think that participants are always known to each other.

        Conspiracy is a matter of substance which must be alleged in the information, otherwise, the court will not consider the same.

        Proposal is true only up to the point where the party to whom the proposal was made has not yet accepted the proposal.  Once the proposal was accepted, a conspiracy arises.  Proposal is unilateral, one party makes a proposition to the other; conspiracy is bilateral, it requires two parties.

 SEDITION;    

Proposal to commit sedition is not a crime.  But if Union B accepts the proposal, there will be conspiracy to commit sedition which is a crime under the Revised Penal Code.

Composite crimes

          Composite crimes are crimes which, in substance, consist of more than one crime but in the eyes of the law, there is only one crime.  For example, the crimes of robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, robbery with physical injuries.   

          In case the crime committed is a composite crime, the conspirator will be liable for all the acts committed during the commission of the crime agreed upon.  This is because, in the eyes of the law, all those acts done in pursuance of the crime agreed upon are acts which constitute a single crime.

          As a general rule, when there is conspiracy, the rule is that the act of one is the act of all. This principle applies only to the crime agreed upon. 

         The exception is if any of the co-conspirator would commit a crime not agreed upon.  This happens when the crime agreed upon and the crime committed by one of the co-conspirators are distinct crimes. 

         Exception to the exception:  In acts constituting a single indivisible offense, even though the co-conspirator performed different acts bringing about the composite crime, all will be liable for such crime.  They can only evade responsibility for any other crime outside of that agreed upon if it is proved that the particular conspirator had tried to prevent the commission of such other act.

Art.  9.  Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of this Code.

Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned article.

Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which he penalty ofarresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both is provided.

  • Capital punishment – death penalty.
  • Penalties (imprisonment): Grave – six years and one day to reclusion perpetua(life);  Less grave – one month and one day to six years;  Light – arresto menor(one day to 30 days).

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES

This question was asked in the bar examination: How do you classify felonies or how are felonies classified?

What the examiner had in mind was Articles 3, 6 and 9.  Do not write the classification of felonies under Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code.  That was not what the examiner had in mind because the question does not require the candidate to classify but also to define.  Therefore, the examiner was after the classifications under Articles 3, 6 and 9.

Felonies are classified as follows:

(1)                 According to the manner of their commission

Under Article 3, they are classified as, intentional felonies or those committed with deliberate intent; and culpable felonies or those resulting from negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

(2)                 According to the stages of their execution

Under Article 6., felonies are classified as attempted felony when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance; frustrated felony when the offender commences the commission of a felony as a consequence but which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the perpetrator; and, consummated felony when all the elements necessary for its execution are present.

(3)                 According to their gravity

Under Article 9, felonies are classified as grave felonies or those to which attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive; less grave felonies or those to which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period was correccional; and light felonies or those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty is arresto menor.

Why is it necessary to determine whether the crime is grave, less grave or light? 

To determine whether these felonies can be complexed or not, and to determine the prescription of the crime and the prescription of the penalty.  In other words, these are felonies classified according to their gravity, stages and the penalty attached to them.  Take note that when the Revised Penal Code speaks of grave and less grave felonies, the definition makes a reference specifically to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.  Do not omit the phrase “In accordance with Article 25” because there is also a classification of penalties under Article 26 that was not applied.

If the penalty is fine and exactly P200.00, it is only considered a light felony under Article 9.

If the fine is imposed as an alternative penalty or as a single penalty, the fine of P200.00 is considered a correctional penalty under Article 26.

If the penalty is exactly P200.00, apply Article 26.  It is considered as correctional penalty and it prescribes in 10 years.  If the offender is apprehended at any time within ten years, he can be made to suffer the fine.

This classification of felony according to gravity is important with respect to the question of prescription of crimes.

In the case of light felonies, crimes prescribe in two months.   If the crime is correctional, it prescribes in ten years, except arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years.

Art. 10.  Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.  This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

  • For Special Laws: Penalties should be imprisonment, and not reclusion perpetua, etc.
  • Offenses that are attempted or frustrated are not punishable, unless otherwise stated.
  • Plea of guilty is not mitigating for offenses punishable by special laws.
  • No minimum, medium, and maximum periods for penalties.
  • No penalty for an accessory or accomplice, unless otherwise stated.

 

  • Provisions of RPC applicable to special laws:
  1. 16 Participation of Accomplices
  2. 22 Retroactivity of Penal laws if favorable to the accused
  3. 45 Confiscation of instruments used in the crime

SUPPLETORY APPLICATION OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

In Article  10,  there is a reservation “provision of the Revised Penal Code may be applied suppletorily to special laws”.  You will only apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code as a supplement to the special law, or simply correlate the violated special law, if needed to avoid an injustice.  If no justice would result, do not give suppletorily application of the Revised Penal Code  to that of special law.

For example,  a special law punishes a certain act as a crime.  The special law is silent as to the civil liability of one who violates the same.  Here is a person who violated the special law and he was prosecuted.  His violation caused damage or injury to a private party.  May the court pronounce that he is civilly liable to the offended party, considering that the special law is silent on this point?  Yes, because Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code may be given suppletory application to prevent an injustice from being done to the offended party.  Article 100 states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.  That article shall be applied suppletory to avoid an injustice that would be caused to the private offended party, if he would not be indemnified for the damages or injuries sustained by him.

In People v. Rodriguez, it was held that the use of arms is an element of rebellion, so a rebel cannot be further prosecuted for possession of firearms.  A violation of a special law can never absorb a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, because violations of the Revised Penal Code are more serious than a violation of a special law.  But a crime in the Revised Penal Code can absorb a crime punishable by a special law if it is a necessary ingredient of the crime in the Revised Penal Code

In the crime of sedition, the use of firearms is not an ingredient of the crime.  Hence, two prosecutions can be had: (1) sedition; and (2) illegal possession of firearms.

But do not think that when a crime is punished outside of the Revised Penal Code, it is already a special law.  For example, the crime of cattle-rustling is not a mala prohibitum but a modification of the crime theft of large cattle.  So Presidential Decree No. 533, punishing cattle-rustling, is not a special law.  It can absorb the crime of murder.  If in the course of cattle rustling, murder was committed, the offender cannot be prosecuted for murder.  Murder would be a qualifying circumstance in the crime of qualified cattle rustling.  This was the ruling in People v. Martinada.

The amendments of Presidential Decree No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) by Republic Act No. 7659, which adopted the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, means that mitigating and aggravating circumstances can now be considered in imposing penalties.  Presidential Decree No. 6425 does not expressly prohibit the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code.  The stages of the commission of felonies will also apply since suppletory application is now allowed.

Circumstances affecting criminal liability

There are five circumstances affecting criminal liability:

(1)                 Justifying circumstances;

(2)                 Exempting circumstances;

(3)                 Mitigating circumstances;

(4)                 Aggravating circumstances; and

(5)                 Alternative circumstances.

There are two others which are found elsewhere in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

(1)                 Absolutory cause; and

(2)                 Extenuating circumstances.

In justifying and exempting circumstances, there is no criminal liability. When an accused invokes them, he in effect admits the commission of a crime but tries to avoid the liability thereof.  The burden is upon him to establish beyond reasonable doubt the required conditions to justify or exempt his acts from criminal liability.  What is shifted is only the burden of evidence, not the burden of proof.

Justifying circumstances contemplate intentional acts and, hence, are incompatible with dolo.  Exempting circumstances may be invoked in culpable felonies.

Absolutory cause

The effect of this is to absolve the offender from criminal liability, although not from civil liability.  It has the same effect as an exempting circumstance, but you do not call it as such in order not to confuse it with the circumstances under Article 12.

Article 20 provides that the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the exception of accessories who profited themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

Then, Article 89 provides how criminal liability is extinguished:

Death of the convict as to the personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished if death occurs before final judgment;

Service of the sentence;

Amnesty;

Absolute pardon;

Prescription of the crime;

Prescription of the penalty; and

Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Article 344.

 

Under Article 247, a legally married person who kills or inflicts physical injuries upon his or her spouse whom he surprised having sexual intercourse with his or her paramour or mistress in not criminally liable.

Under Article 219, discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence of the ward by their guardian is not penalized.

Under Article 332, in the case of theft, swindling and malicious mischief, there is no criminal liability but only civil liability, when the offender and the offended party are related as spouse, ascendant, descendant, brother and sister-in-law living together or where in case the widowed spouse and the property involved is that of the deceased spouse, before such property had passed on to the possession of third parties. 

Under Article 344, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action.

Absolutory cause has the effect of an exempting circumstance and they are predicated on lack of voluntariness like instigation.  Instigation is associated with criminal intent. Do not consider culpa in connection with instigation. If the crime is culpable, do not talk of instigation. In instigation, the crime is committed with dolo. It is confused with entrapment.

Entrapment is not an absolutory cause.  Entrapment does not exempt the offender or mitigate his criminal liability.  But instigation absolves the offender from criminal liability because in instigation, the offender simply acts as a tool of the law enforcers and, therefore, he is acting without criminal intent because without the instigation, he would not have done the criminal act which he did upon instigation of the law enforcers.

Difference between instigation and entrapment

In instigation, the criminal plan or design exists in the mind of the law enforcer with whom the person instigated cooperated so it is said that the person instigated is acting only as a mere instrument or tool of the law enforcer in the performance of his duties.

 On the other hand, in entrapment, a criminal design is already in the mind of the person entrapped. It did not emanate from the mind of the law enforcer entrapping him. Entrapment involves only ways and means which are laid down or resorted to facilitate the apprehension of the culprit.

The element which makes instigation an absolutory cause is the lack of criminal intent as an element of voluntariness.

If the instigator is a law enforcer, the person instigated cannot be criminally liable, because it is the law enforcer who planted that criminal mind in him to commit the crime, without which he would not have been a criminal.  If the instigator is not a law enforcer, both will be criminally liable, you cannot have a case of instigation.  In instigation, the private citizen only cooperates with the law enforcer to a point when the private citizen upon instigation of the law enforcer incriminates himself.  It would be contrary to public policy to prosecute a citizen who only cooperated with the law enforcer.  The private citizen believes that he is a law enforcer and that is why when the law enforcer tells him, he believes that it is a civil duty to cooperate.

If the person instigated does not know that the person is instigating him is a law enforcer or he knows him to be not a law enforcer, this is not a case of instigation.  This is a case of inducement, both will be criminally liable.

In entrapment, the person entrapped should not know that the person trying to entrap him was a law enforcer.  The idea is incompatible with each other because in entrapment, the person entrapped is actually committing a crime.  The officer who entrapped him only lays down ways and means to have evidence of the commission of the crime, but even without those ways and means, the person entrapped is actually engaged in a violation of the law.

Instigation absolves the person instigated from criminal liability. This is based on the rule that a person cannot be a criminal if his mind is not criminal.  On the other hand, entrapment is not an absolutory cause.  It is not even mitigating.

In case of somnambulism or one who acts while sleeping, the person involved is definitely acting without freedom and without sufficient intelligence, because he is asleep.  He is moving like a robot, unaware of what he is doing.  So the element of voluntariness which is necessary in dolo and culpa is not present.  Somnambulism is an absolutory cause.  If element of voluntariness is absent, there is no criminal liability, although there is civil liability, and if the circumstance is not among those enumerated in Article 12, refer to the circumstance as an absolutory cause.

Mistake of fact is an absolutory cause.  The offender is acting without criminal intent.  So in mistake of fact, it is necessary that had the facts been true as the accused believed them to be, this act is justified.  If not, there is criminal liability, because there is no mistake of fact anymore.  The offender must believe he is performing a lawful act.

 

Extenuating circumstances

The effect of this is to mitigate the criminal liability of the offender.  In other words, this has the same effect as mitigating circumstances, only you do not call it mitigating because this is not found in Article 13.

 

Illustrations:

An unwed mother killed her child in order to conceal a dishonor.  The concealment of dishonor is an extenuating circumstance insofar as the unwed mother or the maternal grandparents is concerned, but not insofar as the father of the child is concerned.  Mother killing her new born child to conceal her dishonor, penalty is lowered by two degrees.  Since there is a material lowering of the penalty or mitigating the penalty, this is an extenuating circumstance.

The concealment of honor by mother in the crime of infanticide is an extenuating circumstance but not in the case of parricide when the age of the victim is three days old and above.

In the crime of adultery on the part of a married woman abandoned by her husband,  at the time she was abandoned by her husband, is it necessary for her to seek the company of another man.  Abandonment by the husband does not justify the act of the woman. It only extenuates or reduces criminal liability.  When the effect of the circumstance is to lower the penalty there is an extenuating circumstance.

A kleptomaniac is one who cannot resist the temptation of stealing things which appeal to his desire.  This is not exempting.  One who is a kleptomaniac and who would steal objects of his desire is criminally liable.  But he would be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance analogous to paragraph 9 of Article 13, that of suffering from an illness which diminishes the exercise of his will power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his act.  So this is an extenuating circumstance.  The effect is to mitigate the criminal liability.

Distinctions between justifying circumstances and exempting circumstances

In justifying circumstances –

(1)                 The circumstance affects the act, not the actor;

(2)                 The act complained of is considered to have been done within the bounds of law; hence, it is legitimate and lawful in the eyes of the law;

(3)                 Since the act is considered lawful, there is no crime, and because there is no crime, there is no criminal;

(4)                 Since there is no crime or criminal, there is no criminal liability as well as civil liability.

In exempting circumstances –

(1)                 The circumstances affect the actor, not the act;

(2)                 The act complained of is actually wrongful, but the actor acted without voluntariness.  He is a mere tool or instrument of the crime;

(3)                 Since the act complained of is actually wrongful, there is a crime.  But because the actor acted without voluntariness, there is absence of dolo or culpa.  There is no criminal;

(4)                 Since there is a crime committed but there is no criminal, there is civil liability for the wrong done.  But there is no criminal liability.  However, in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 12, there is neither criminal nor civil liability.

When you apply for justifying or exempting circumstances, it is confession and avoidance and burden of proof shifts to the accused and he can no longer rely on weakness of prosecution’s evidence.

                [1]The difference between murder and homicide will be discussed in Criminal Law II.  These crimes are found in Articles 248 and 249, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.

                [2] The difference between theft and robbery will be discussed in Criminal Law II.  These crimes are found in Title Ten, Chapters  One and Three, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.

Art.  11:  Justifying Circumstances – those wherein the acts of the actor are in accordance with law, hence, he is justified.  There is no criminal and civil liability because there is no crime.

  • Self-defense
  1. Reason for lawfulness of self-defense: because it would be impossible for the State to protect all its citizens.  Also a person cannot just give up his rights without any resistance being offered.
  2. Rights included in self-defense:

1.  Defense of person

2.  Defense of rights protected by law

  1. Defense of property:

a.  The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has a right to exclude any person from the enjoyment or disposal thereof.  For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (Art. 429, New Civil Code)

b.    defense of chastity

  1. Elements:
  2. Unlawful Aggression- is a physical act manifesting danger to life or limb; it is either actual or imminent.
    1. Actual/real aggression – Real aggression presupposes an act positively strong, showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor, which is not merely threatening or intimidating attitude, but a material attack.  There must be real danger to life a personal safety.
    2. Imminent unlawful aggression – it is an attack that is impending or on the point of happening.  It must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary.  The intimidating attitude must be offensive and positively strong.
    3. Where there is an agreement to fight, there is no unlawful aggression.  Each of the protagonists is at once assailant and assaulted, and neither can invoke the right of self-defense, because aggression which is an incident in the fight is bound to arise from one or the other of the combatants. Exception:  Where the attack is made in violation of the conditions agreed upon, there may be unlawful aggression.
    4. Unlawful aggression in self-defense, to be justifying, must exist at the time the defense is made.  It may no longer exist if the aggressor runs away after the attack or he has manifested a refusal to continue fighting.  If the person attacked allowed some time to elapse after he suffered the injury before hitting back, his act of hitting back would not constitute self-defense, but revenge.
  • A light push on the head with the hand is not unlawful aggression, but a slap on the face is, because his dignity is in danger.
  • A police officer exceeding his authority may become an unlawful aggressor.
  • The nature, character, location, and extent of the wound may belie claim of self-defense.

               2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

a.    Requisites:

  • Means were used to prevent or repel
  • Means must be necessary and there is no other way to prevent or repel it
  • Means must be reasonable – depending on the circumstances, but generally proportionate to the force of the aggressor.
  1. The rule here is to stand your ground when in the right which may invoked when the defender is unlawfully assaulted and the aggressor is armed with a weapon.
  2. The rule is more liberal when the accused is a peace officer who, unlike a private person, cannot run away.
  3. The reasonable necessity of the means employed to put up the defense.
  • The gauge of reasonable necessity is the instinct of self-preservation, i.e. a person did not use his rational mind to pick a means of defense but acted out of self-preservation, using the nearest or only means available to defend himself, even if such means be disproportionately advantageous as compared with the means of violence employed by the aggressor.
  • Reasonableness of the means depends on the nature and the quality of the weapon used, physical condition, character, size and other circumstances.

3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

  1. When no provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself.
  2. When even if provocation was given by the person defending himself, such was not sufficient to cause violent aggression on the part of the attacker, i.e. the amount of provocation was not sufficient to stir the aggressor into the acts which led the accused to defend himself.
  3. When even if the provocation were sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself.
  4. When even if provocation was given by the person defending himself, the attack was not proximate or immediate to the act of provocation.
  5. Sufficient means proportionate to the damage caused by the act, and adequate to stir one to its commission.
  6. Kinds of Self-Defense
    1. Self-defense of chastity– to be entitled to complete self-defense of chastity, there must be an attempt to rape, mere imminence thereof will suffice.
    2. Defense of property– an attack on the property must be coupled with an attack on the person of the owner, or of one entrusted with the care of such property.
    3. Self-defense in libel– physical assault may be justified when the libel is aimed at a person’s good name, and while the libel is in progress, one libel deserves another.

*Burden of proof – on the accused (sufficient, clear and convincing evidence; must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution).

  • Defense of Relative

A. Elements:

  1. unlawful aggression
  2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
  3. in case provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making the defense had no part in such provocation.

B. Relatives entitled to the defense:

  1. spouse
  2. ascendants
  3. descendants
  4. legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters
  5. relatives by affinity in the same degree
  6. relatives by consanguinity within the 4th civil degree.
  • The third element need not take place.  The relative defended may even be the original aggressor.  All that is required to justify the act of the relative defending is that he takes no part in such provocation.
  • General opinion is to the effect that all relatives mentioned must be legitimate, except in cases of brothers and sisters who, by relatives by nature, may be illegitimate.
  • The unlawful aggression may depend on the honest belief of the person making the defense.
  • Defense of Stranger

A. Elements

  1. unlawful aggression
  2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
  3. the person defending  be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
  4. A relative not included in defense of relative is included in defense of stranger.
  5. Be not induced by evil motive means that even an enemy of the aggressor who comes to the defense of a stranger may invoke this justifying circumstances so long as he is not induced by a motive that is evil.
  • State of Necessity
  1. 11, Par. a provides:

Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present:

First.  That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

            Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and

            Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

  1. A state of necessity exists when there is a clash between unequal rights, the lesser right giving way to the greater right.  Aside from the 3 requisites stated in the law, it should also be added that the necessity must not be due to the negligence or violation of any law by the actor.
  2. The person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which may have been received.  This is the only justifying circumstance which provides for the payment of civil indemnity.  Under the other justifying circumstances, no civil liability attaches.  The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which law one is liable
  • Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of a Right or Office
  1. Elements:
  2. that the accused acted in the performance of a duty, or in the lawful exercise  of a right or office;
  3. that the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty, or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
  4. A police officer is justified in shooting and killing a criminal who refuses to stop when ordered to do so, and after such officer fired warning shots in the air.
  • shooting an offender who refused to surrender is justified, but not a thief who refused  to be arrested.
  1. The accused must prove that he was duly appointed to the position he claimed he was discharging at the time of the commission of the offense.  It must be made to appear not only that the injury caused or the offense committed was done in the fulfillment of a duty, or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, but that the offense committed was a necessary consequence of such fulfillment of duty, or lawful exercise of a right or office.
  2. A mere security guard has no authority or duty to fire at a thief, resulting in the latter’s death.
  • Obedience to a Superior Order
  1. Elements:
  2. there is an order;
  3. the order is for a legal purpose;
  4. the means used to carry out said order is lawful.
  5. The subordinate who is made to comply with the order is the party which may avail of this circumstance.  The officer giving the order may not invoke this.
  6. The subordinate’s good faith is material here.  If he obeyed an order in good faith, not being aware of its illegality, he is not liable.  However, the order must not be patently illegal.  If the order is patently illegal this circumstance cannot be validly invoked.
  7. The reason for this justifying circumstance is the subordinate’s mistake of fact in good faith.
  8. Even if the order be patently illegal, the subordinate may yet be able to invoke the exempting circumstances of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

  • Exempting circumstances (non-imputability) are those ground for exemption from punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the crime of any of the conditions which make the act voluntary, or negligent.
  • Basis: The exemption from punishment is based on the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
  • A person who acts WITHOUT MALICE (without intelligence, freedom of action or intent) or WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE (without intelligence, freedom of action or fault) is NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE or is EXEMPT FROM PUNISHMENT.
  • There is a crime committed but no criminal liability arises from it because of the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act.
  • Burden of proof: Any of the circumstances is a matter of defense and must be proved by the defendant to the satisfaction of the court.

Art. 12.   CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.  The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1.  An imbecile or insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

  • When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement on one of the hospital or asylums established for persons thus afflicted. He shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
  • Requisites:
  1. Offender is an imbecile
  2. Offender was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
  • IMBECILITY OR INSANITY
  • Animbecileis exempt in all cases from criminal liability.  The insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid interval.  In the latter, loss of consciousness of ones acts and not merely abnormality of mental faculties will qualify ones acts as those of an insane.
  • Procedure:  court is to order the confinement of such persons in the hospitals or asylums established. Such persons will not be permitted to leave without permission from the court.  The court, on the other hand, has no power to order such permission without first obtaining the opinion of the DOH that such persons may be released without danger.
  • Presumption is always in favor of sanity.  The defense has the burden to prove that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.  For the ascertainment such mental condition of the accused, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind during a reasonable period both before and after that time.  Circumstantial evidence which is clear and convincing will suffice.  An examination of the outward acts will help reveal the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person and if such acts conform to those of people of sound mind.
  • Insanity at the time of the commission of the crime and not that at the time of the trial will exempt one from criminal liability.  In case of insanity at the time of the trial, there will be a suspension of the trial until the mental capacity of the accused is restored to afford him a fair trial.
  • Evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. Without such evidence, the accused is presumed to be sane when he committed the crime.  Continuance of insanity which is occasional or intermittent in nature will not be presumed.  Insanity at another time must be proved to exist at the time of the commission of the crime.  A person is also presumed to have committed a crime in one of the lucid intervals.  Continuance of insanity will only be presumed in cases wherein the accused has been adjudged insane or has been committed to a hospital or an asylum for the insane.
  • Instances of Insanity:
  • Reyes:  Feeblemindedness is not imbecility because the offender can distinguish right from wrong.  An imbecile and an insane to be exempted must not be able to distinguish right from wrong.
  • Relova:  Feeblemindedness is imbecility.
  • Crimes committed while in a dream, by a somnambulist are embraced in the plea of  insanity.  Hypnotism, however, is a debatable issue.
  • Crime committed while suffering from malignant malaria is characterized by insanity at times thus such person is not criminally liable.
  1. Basis:  complete absence of intelligence, and element of voluntariness.
  2. Definition : An imbecile is one who while advanced in age has a mental development comparable to that of children between 2 and 7 years of age.  An insane is one who acts with complete deprivation of intelligence/reason or without the least discernment or with total deprivation of freedom of the will.
  3. Dementia praecox is covered by the term insanity because homicidal attack is common in such form of psychosis.  It is characterized by delusions that he is being  interfered with sexually, or that his property is being taken, thus the person has no control over his acts.
  4. Kleptomania or presence of abnormal, persistent impulse or tendency to steal, to be considered   exempting, will still have to be investigated by competent  psychiatrist to determine if the unlawful act is due to the irresistible impulse produced by his mental defect,  thus loss of will-power.  If such mental defect only diminishes the exercise of his willpower and did not deprive him of the consciousness of his acts, it is only mitigating.
  5. Epilepsy which is a chronic nervous disease characterized by convulsive motions of the muscles and loss of consciousness may be covered by the term insanity.  However, it must be shown that commission of the offense is during one of those epileptic attacks.

2.  A person under nine years of age.

  • MINORITY
  • Under nine years to be construed nine years or less.  Such was inferred from the next subsequent paragraph which does not totally exempt those over nine years of age if he acted with discernment.
  • Presumptions of incapability of committing  a crime is absolute.
  • Age is computed up to the time of the commission of the crime.  Age can be established by the testimonies of families and relatives.
  • Senility or second childhood is only mitigating.
  • 4 periods of the life of a human being:
  1. Requisite: Offender is under 9 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. There is absolute criminal irresponsibility in the case of a minor under 9-years of age.
  2. Basis:  complete absence of intelligence.

Age

Criminal Responsibility

9 years and below

Absolute irresponsibility

Between 9 and 15 years old

Conditional responsibility

Without discernment – no liability  With Discernment – mitigated liability

Between 15 and 18 years old

Mitigated responsibility

Between 18 and 70 years old

Full responsibility

Over 70 years old

Mitigated responsibilit

3.         A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of this Code.

When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said article 80.

  • QUALIFIED MINORITY: Basis:  complete absence of intelligence
  • Such minor over 9 years and under 15 years of age must have acted without discernment to be exempted from criminal liability.  If with discernment, he is criminally liable.
  • Presumption is always that such minor has acted without discernment.  The prosecution is burdened to prove if otherwise.
  • Discernment means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.  Such is shown by: (1) manner the crime was committed (i.e. commission of the crime during nighttime to avoid detection; taking the loot to another town to avoid discovery), or (2) the conduct of the offender after its commission (i.e. elation of satisfaction upon the commission of his criminal act as shown by the accused cursing at the victim).
  • Facts or particular facts concerning personal appearance which lead officers or the court to believe that his age was as stated by said officer or court should be stated in the record.
  • If such minor is adjudged to be criminally liable, he is charged to the custody of his family, otherwise, to the care of some institution or person mentioned in article 80.  This is because of the court’s presupposition that the minor committed the crime without discernment.
  • Allegation of “with intent to kill” in the information is sufficient allegation of discernment as such conveys the idea that he knew what would be the consequences of his unlawful act.  Thus is the case wherein the information alleges that the accused, with intent to kill, willfully, criminally and feloniously pushed a child of 8 1/2 years of age into a deep place. It was held that the requirement that there should be an allegation that she acted with discernment should be deemed amply met.

4.         Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

  • ACCIDENT: Basis: lack of negligence and intent.
  • Elements:
  • Discharge of a firearm in a thickly populated place in the City of Manila being prohibited by Art.  155 of the RPC is not a performance of a lawful act when such led to the accidental hitting and wounding of 2 persons.
  • Drawing a weapon/gun in the course of self-defense even if such fired and seriously injured the assailant is a lawful act and can be considered as done with due care since it could not have been done in any other manner.
  • With the fact duly established by the prosecution that the appellant was guilty of negligence, this exempting circumstance cannot be applied because application presupposes that there is no fault or negligence on the part of the person performing the lawful act.
  • Accident happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
  • The accused, who, while hunting saw wild chickens and fired a shot can be considered to be in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm when such short recoiled and accidentally wounded  another.  Such was established because the deceased was not in the direction at which the accused fired his gun.
  • The chauffeur, who while driving on the proper side of the road at a moderate speed and with due diligence, suddenly and unexpectedly saw a man in front of his vehicle coming from the sidewalk and crossing the street without any warning that he would do so, in effect being run over by the said chauffeur, was held not criminally liable, it being by mere accident.
  1. A person is performing a lawful act
  2. Exercise of due dare
  3. He causes injury to another by mere accident
  4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

5.         Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.

  • IRRESISTIBLE FORCE: Basis:  complete absence of freedom, an element of voluntariness
  • Elements:
  • Force, to be irresistible, must produce such an effect on an individual that despite of his resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a crime.  It compels his member to act and his mind to obey.  It must act upon him from the outside and by a third person.
  • Baculi, who was accused but not a member of a band which murdered some American school teachers and was seen and compelled by the leaders of the band to bury the bodies, was not criminally liable as accessory for concealing the body of the crime.  Baculi acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
  • Irresistible force can never consist in an impulse or passion, or obfuscation.  It must consist of an extraneous force coming from a third person.
  1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force
  2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
  3. That the physical force must  come from a third person

6.         Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

  • UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR: Basis:  complete absence of freedom
  • Elements
  1. that the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater than, or at least equal to that w/c he is required to commit
  2. that it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.
  • Duress, to be a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. It should not be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear.
  • Threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
  • Duress is the use of violence or physical force.
  • There is uncontrollable fear is when the offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a crime, while irresistible force is when the offender uses violence or physical force to compel another person to commit a crime.
  • “an act done by me against my will is not my act”

7.         Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.

  • LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE: Basis: acts without intent, the third condition of voluntariness in intentional felony
  • Elements:
  1. That an act is required by law to be done
  2. That a person fails to perform such act
  3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable cause
  • Examples of lawful cause:
  • To be an EXEMPTING circumstance – INTENT IS WANTING
  • INTENT – presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence
  • Distinction between justifying and exempting circumstance:
  1. Priest can’t be compelled to reveal what was confessed to him
  2. No available transportation – officer not liable for arbitrary detention
  3. Mother who was overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility, leaving child to die – not liable for infanticide
  4. Exempting – there is a crime but there is no criminal. Act is not justified but the actor is not criminally liable.

General Rule: There is civil liability

Exception: Par 4 (causing an injury by mere accident) and Par 7 (lawful cause)

b.  Justifying – person does not transgress the law, does not commit any crime because there is nothing unlawful in the act as well as the intention of the actor.

Distinction between Exempting and Justifying Circumstances

 

Exempting Circumstance

Justifying Circumstance

Existence of a crime

There is a crime but there is no criminal, the actor is exempted from liability of his act

There is no crime, the act is justified

  • Absolutory Causes – are those where the act committed is a crime but for some reason of public policy and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed.
  • Exempting and Justifying Circumstances are absolutory causes.
  • Other examples of absolutory causes:

1)      Art 6 – spontaneous desistance

2)      Art 20 – accessories exempt from criminal liability

3)      Art 19 par 1 – profiting one’s self or assisting offenders to profit by the effects of the crime

  • Instigation v. Entrapment

INSTIGATION

ENTRAPMENT

Instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes co-principal

The ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.

Accused will be acquitted

NOT a bar to accused’s prosecution and conviction

Absolutory cause

NOT an absolutory cause

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

  • Definition – Those circumstance which reduce the penalty of a crime
  • Effect – Reduces the penalty of the crime but does not erase criminal liability nor change the nature of the crime
  • Kinds of Mitigating Circumstance:
 

Privileged Mitigating

Ordinary Mitigating

Offset by any aggravating circumstance

Cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance

Can be offset by a generic aggravating circumstance

Effect on the penalty

Has the effect of imposing the penalty by 1 or 2 degrees than that provided by law

If not offset,  has the effect of imposing the penalty in the minimum period

Kinds

Minority, Incomplete Self-defense, two or more mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance (has the effect of lowering the penalty by one degree)

Those circumstances enumerated in paragraph 1 to 10 of Article 13

Article  13.

1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant

  • Justifying circumstances
  1. Self-defense/defense of relative/defense of stranger– unlawful aggression must be present for Art 13 to be applicable. Other 2 elements not necessary. If 2 requisites are present – considered a privileged mitigating circumstance.

Example: Juan makes fun of Pedro. Pedro gets pissed off, gets a knife and tries to stab Juan. Juan grabs his own knife and kills Pedro. Incomplete self-defense because although there was unlawful aggression and reasonable means to repel was taken, there was sufficient provocation on the part of Juan. But since 2 elements are present, it considered as privileged mitigating.

b.  State of Necessity (par 4) avoidance of greater evil or injury; if any of the last 2 requisites is absent, there’s only an ordinary Mitigating Circumstance.

Example: While driving his car, Juan sees Pedro carelessly crossing the street. Juan swerves to avoid him, thus hitting a motorbike with 2 passengers, killing them instantly. Not all requisites to justify act were present because harm done to avoid injury is greater. Considered as mitigating.

c. Performance of Duty (par 5)

Example: Juan is supposed to arrest Pedro. He thus goes to Pedro’s hideout. Juan sees a man asleep. Thinking it was Pedro, Juan shot him. Juan may have acted in the performance of his duty but the crime was not a necessary consequence thereof. Considered as mitigating.

  • Exempting circumstance

a. Minority over 9 and under 15 – if minor acted with discernment, considered mitigating

Example: 13 year old stole goods at nighttime. Acted with discernment as shown by the manner in which the act was committed.

b.  Causing injury by mere accident – if 2nd requisite (due care) and 1st part of 4threquisite (without fault – thus negligence only) are ABSENT, considered as mitigating because the penalty is lower than that provided for intentional felony.

Example: Police officer tries to stop a fight between Juan and Pedro by firing his gun in the air. Bullet ricocheted and killed Petra. Officer willfully discharged his gun but was unmindful of the fact that area was populated.     

        c. Uncontrollable fear – only one requisite present, considered mitigating

Example: Under threat that their farm will be burned, Pedro and Juan took turns guarding it at night. Pedro fired in the air when a person in the shadows refused to reveal his identity. Juan was awakened and shot the unidentified person. Turned out to be a neighbor looking for is pet. Juan may have acted under the influence of fear but such fear was not entirely uncontrollable. Considered mitigating

2. That the offender is under 18 years of age or over 70 years. In the case of a minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art 192 of PD 903

  • Applicable to:

a. Offender over 9, under 15 who acted with discernment

b. Offender over 15, under 18

c. Offender over 70 years

  • Age of accused which should be determined as his age at the date of commission of crime, not date of trial
  • Various Ages and their Legal Effects

a. under 9 – exemptive circumstance

b. over 9, below 15 – exemptive; except if acted with discernment

c. minor delinquent under 18 – sentence may be suspended (PD 603)

d. under 18 – privileged mitigating circumstance

e. 18 and above – full criminal responsibility

f.  70 and above – mitigating circumstance; no imposition of death penalty; execution g. of death sentence if already imposed is suspended and commuted.

3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (praeter intentionam)

  • Can be used only when the facts prove to show that there is anotable and evident disproportion between means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences
  • Intention: as an internal act, is judged by the proportion of the means employed to the evil produced by the act, and also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body.
  • Judge by considering (1) the weapon used, (2) the injury inflicted and (3) the attitude of mind when the accuser attacked the other.

Example: Pedro stabbed Tomas on the arm. Tomas did not have the wound treated, so he died from loss of blood.

  • Not applicable when offender employed brute force

Example: Rapist choked victim. Brute force of choking contradicts claim that he had no intention to kill the girl.

  • Art 13, par 3 addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act, not to his intention during the planning stage.
  • In crimes against persons – if victim does not die, the absence of the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries. It is not considered as mitigating. Mitigating only when the victim dies.

Example: As part of fun-making, Juan merely intended to burn Pedro’s clothes. Pedro received minor burns. Juan is charged with physical injuries. Had Pedro died, Juan would be entitled to the mitigating circumstance.

  • Not applicable to felonies by negligence. Why? In felonies through negligence, the offender acts without intent. The intent in intentional felonies is replaced by negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies. There is no intent on the part of the offender which may be considered as diminished.
  • Basis of par 3: intent, an element of voluntariness in intentional felony, is diminished

4. That the sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.

  • Provocation – any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone.
  • Basis: diminution of intelligence and intent
  • Requisites:

a. Provocation must be sufficient.

1. Sufficient – adequate enough to excite a person to commit the wrong and must      accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.

2. Sufficiency depends on:

  • the act constituting the provocation
  • the social standing of the person provoked
  • time and place provocation took place

3. Example: Juan likes to hit and curse his servant. His servant thus killed him.  There’s mitigating circumstance because of sufficient provocation.

4.  When it was the defendant who sought the deceased, the challenge to fight by the deceased is NOT sufficient provocation.

b. It must originate from the offended party

1. Why? Law says the provocation is “on the part of the offended party”

2. Example: Tomas’ mother insulted Petra. Petra kills Tomas because of the insults. No Mitigating Circumstance because it was the mother who insulted her, not Tomas.

3. Provocation by  the  deceased  in  the first  stage  of  the fight  is not  Mitigating

Circumstance when the accused killed him after he had fled because the deceased from the moment he fled did not give any provocation for the accused to pursue and attack him.

c. Provocation must be immediate to the act., i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked

  1. Why? If there was an interval of time, the conduct of the offended party could not have excited the accused to the commission of the crime, he having had time to regain his reason and to exercise self-control.
  2. Threat should not be offensive and positively strong because if it was, the threat to inflict real injury is an unlawful aggression which may give rise to self-defense and thus no longer a Mitigating Circumstance

5.  That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree.

        1. Requisites:

  • there’s a grave offense done to the one committing the felony etc.
  • that the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense.

2. Lapse of time is allowed between the vindication and the one doing the offense (proximate time, not just immediately after)

3. Example: Juan caught his wife and his friend in a compromising situation. Juan kills his friend the next day – still considered proximate.

PROVOCATION

VINDICATION

Made directly only to the person committing the felony

Grave offense may be also against the offender’s relatives mentioned by law

Cause that brought about the provocation need not be a grave offense

Offended party must have done a grave offense to the offender or his relatives

Necessary that provocation or threat immediately preceded the act. No time interval

May be proximate. Time interval allowed

  • More lenient in vindication because offense concerns the honor of the person. Such is more worthy of consideration than mere spite against the one giving the provocation or threat.
  • Vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation can’t be counted separately and independently

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation

  • Passion and obfuscation is mitigating: when there are causes naturally producing in a person powerful excitement, he loses his reason and self-control. Thereby dismissing the exercise of his will power.
  • PASSION AND OBFUSCATION are Mitigating Circumstances only when the same arise from lawful sentiments (not Mitigating Circumstance when done in the spirit of revenge or lawlessness)
  • Requisites for Passion & Obfuscation

a. The offender acted on impulse powerful enough to produce passion or obfuscation

b. That the act was committed not in the spirit of lawlessness or revenge

c. The act must come from lawful sentiments

  • Act which gave rise to passion and obfuscation

a. That there be an act, both unlawful and unjust

b. The act be sufficient to produce a condition of mind

c. That the act was proximate to the criminal act

d. The victim must be the one who caused the passion or obfuscation

  • Example: Juan saw Tomas hitting his (Juan) son. Juan stabbed Tomas. Juan is entitled to Mitigating Circumstance of P&O as his actuation arose from a natural instinct that impels a father to rush to the rescue of his son.
  • The exercise of a right or a fulfillment of a duty is not the proper source of P&O.

Example: A policeman arrested Juan as he was making a public disturbance on the streets. Juan’s anger and indignation resulting from the arrest can’t be considered passionate obfuscation because the policeman was doing a lawful act.

  • The act must be sufficient to produce a condition of mind. If the cause of the loss of self-control was trivial and slight, the obfuscation is not mitigating.

Example: Juan’s boss punched him for not going to work he other day. Cause is slight.

  • There could have been no Mitigating Circumstance of P&O when more than 24 hours elapsed between the alleged insult and the commission of the felony, or several hours have passed between the cause of the P&O and the commission of the crime, or at least ½ hours intervened between the previous fight and subsequent killing of deceased by accused.
  • Not mitigating if relationship is illegitimate
  • The passion or obfuscation will be considered even if it is based only on the honest belief of the offender, even if facts turn out to prove that his beliefs were wrong.
  • Passion and obfuscation cannot co-exist with treachery since the means that the offender has had time to ponder his course of action.
  • PASSION AND OBFUSCATION arising from one and the same cause should be treated as only one mitigating circumstance
  • Vindication of grave offense can’t co-exist w/ PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

IRRESITIBLE FORCE

Mitigating

Exempting

No physical force needed

Requires physical force

From the offender himself

Must come from a 3rd person

Must come from lawful sentiments

Unlawful

PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

PROVOCATION

Produced by an impulse which may be caused by provocation

Comes from injured party

Offense, which engenders perturbation of mind, need not be immediate. It is only required that the influence thereof lasts until the crime is committed

Must immediately precede the commission of the crime

Effect is loss of reason and self-control on the part of the offender

Same

7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.

  • 2 Mitigating Circumstances present:

a)      voluntarily surrendered

b)      voluntarily confessed his guilt

  • If both are present, considered as 2 independent mitigating circumstances. Mitigate penalty to a greater extent
  • Requisites of voluntary surrender:

a)      offender not actually arrested

b)      offender surrendered to a person in authority or the latter’s agent

c)      surrender was voluntary

  • Surrender must be spontaneous – shows his interest to surrender unconditionally to the authorities
  • Spontaneous – emphasizes the idea of inner impulse, acting without external stimulus. The conduct of the accused, not his intention alone, after the commission of the offense, determines the spontaneity of the surrender.

Example: Surrendered after 5 years, not spontaneous anymore.

Example: Surrendered after talking to town councilor. Not V.S. because there’s an external stimulus

  • Conduct must indicate a desire to own the responsibility
  • Not mitigating when warrant already served. Surrender may be considered mitigating if warrant not served or returned unserved because accused can’t be located.
  • Surrender of person required. Not just of weapon.
  • Person in authority – one directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court/government/corporation/board/commission. Barrio captain/chairman included.
  • Agent of person in authority – person who by direct provision of law, or be election, or by appointment by competent authority is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.
  • RPC does not make distinction among the various moments when surrender may occur.
  • Surrender must be by reason of the commission of the crime for which defendant is charged
  • Requisites for plea of guilty

a)      offender spontaneously confessed his guilt

b)      confession of guilt was made in open court (competent court)

c)      confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution

  • plea made after arraignment and after trial has begun does not entitle accused to have plea considered as Mitigating Circumstance
  • plea in the RTC in a case appealed from the MTC is not mitigating  – must make plea at the first opportunity
  • plea during the preliminary investigation is no plea at all
  • even if during arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty, he is entitled to Mitigating Circumstance as long as withdraws his plea of not guilty to the charge before the fiscal could present his evidence
  • plea to a lesser charge is not Mitigating Circumstance because to be voluntary plea of guilty, must be to the offense charged
  • plea to the offense charged in the amended info, lesser than that charged in the original info, is Mitigating Circumstance
  • present Rules of Court require that even if accused pleaded guilty to a capital offense, its mandatory for court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, Mitigating Circumstance

8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering from some physical defect w/c thus restricts his means of action, defense or communication w/ his fellow beings.

  • Basis: one suffering from physical defect which restricts him does not have complete freedom of action and therefore, there is diminution of that element of voluntariness.
  • No distinction between educated and uneducated deaf-mute or blind persons
  • The physical defect of the offender should restrict his means of action, defense or communication with fellow beings,  this has been extended to cover cripples, armless people even stutterers.
  • The circumstance assumes that with their physical defect, the offenders do not have a complete freedom of action therefore diminishing the element of voluntariness in the commission of a crime.

9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender w/o depriving him of consciousness of his acts.

  • Basis: diminution of intelligence and intent
  • Requisites:

a)      illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power

b)      such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts

  • when the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may be an exempting circumstance
  • deceased mind, not amounting to insanity, may give place to mitigation

10. And any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above-mentioned

  • Examples of “any other circumstance”:

a)      defendant who is 60 years old with failing eyesight is similar to a case of one over 70 years old

b)      outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom is analogous to vindication of grave offense

c)      impulse of jealous feeling, similar to PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

d)      voluntary restitution of property, similar to voluntary surrender

e)      extreme poverty, similar to incomplete justification based on state of necessity

  • NOT analogous:

a)      killing wrong person

b)      not resisting arrest not the same as voluntary surrender

c)      running amuck is not mitigating

  • MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE which arise from:

a)      moral attributes of the offender

Example: Juan and Tomas killed Pedro. Juan acted w/ PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. Only Juan will be entitled to Mitigating Circumstance

      b)   private relations with the offended party

Example: Juan stole his brother’s watch. Juan sold it to Pedro, who knew it was stolen. The circumstance of relation arose from private relation of Juan and the brother. Does not mitigate Pedro.

      c)   other personal cause

Example: Minor, acting with discernment robbed Juan. Pedro, passing by, helped the minor. Circumstance of minority, mitigates liability of minor only.

  • Shall serve to mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories to whom the circumstances are attendant.
  • Circumstances which are neither exempting nor mitigating

a)      mistake in the blow

b)      mistake in the identity of the victim

c)      entrapment of the accused

d)      accused is over 18 years old

e)      performance of a righteous action

Example: Juan saved the lives of 99 people but caused the death of the last person, he is still criminally liable

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

  • Definition – Those circumstance which raise the penalty for a crime without exceeding the maximum applicable to that crime.
  • Basis: The greater perversity of the offense as shown by:

a)      the motivating power behind the act

b)      the place where the act was committed

c)      the means and ways used

d)      the time

e)      the personal circumstance of the offender

f)       the personal circumstance of the victim

  • Kinds:

a)      Generic – generally applicable to all crimes

b)      Specific – apply only to specific crimes (ignominy – for chastity crimes; treachery – for persons crimes)

c)      Qualifying – those that change the nature of the crime (evident premeditation – becomes murder)

d)      Inherent – necessarily accompanies the commission of the crime (evident premeditation in theft, estafa)

QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

Gives the proper and exclusive name, places the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specifically prescribed by law

Increase penalty to the maximum, without exceeding limit prescribed by law

Can’t be offset by Mitigating Circumstance

May be compensated by Mitigating Circumstance

Must be alleged in the information. Integral part of the offense

Need not be alleged. May be proved over the objection of the defense. Qualifying if not alleged will make it generic

  • Aggravating Circumstances which DO NOT have the effect of increasing the penalty:

1)      which themselves constitute a crime specifically punishable by law or which are included in the law defining a crime and prescribing the penalty thereof

Example: breaking a window to get inside the house and rob it

2)      aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof

Example: evident premeditation inherent in theft, robbery, estafa, adultery and concubinage

  • Aggravating circumstances are not presumed. Must be proved as fully as the crime itself in order to increase the penalty.

Art 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:

  1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position
  • Requisites:
  1. The offender is a public officer
  2. The commission of the crime would not have been possible without the powers, resources and influence of the office he holds.
  • Essential – Public officer used the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as the means by which he realized his purpose.
  • Failure in official is tantamount to abusing of office
  • Wearing of uniform is immaterial – what matters is the proof that he indeed took advantage of his position
  1. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities
  • Requisites:
  1. The offender knows that a public authority is present
  2. The public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions
  3. The public authority is not the victim of the crime
  4. The public authority’s presence did not prevent the criminal act
  • Example: Juan and Pedro are quarrelling and the municipal mayor, upon passing by, attempts to stop them. Notwithstanding the intervention and the presence of the mayor, Juan and Pedro continue to quarrel until Juan succeeds in killing Pedro.
  • Person in authority – public authority who is directly vested with jurisdiction, has the power to govern and execute the laws
  • Examples of Persons in Authority
  1. Governor
  2. Mayor
  3. Barangay captain
  4. Councilors
  5. Government agents
  6. Chief of Police
  • Rule not applicable when committed in the presence of a mere agent.
  • Agent – subordinate public officer charged with the maintenance of public order and protection and security of life and property

Example: barrio vice lieutenant, barrio councilman

  1. That the act be committed:

(1)   with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his (a) rank, (b) age, (c) sex or

(2)   that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.

  • circumstances (rank, age, sex) may be taken into accountonly in crimes against persons or honor,it cannot be invoked in crimes against property
  • Rank – refers to a high social position or standing by which to determine one’s pay and emoluments in any scale of comparison within a position
  • Age – the circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in case where the victim is of tender age as well as of old age
  • Sex – refers to the female sex, not to the male sex; not applicable when
  1. The offender acted w/ PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
  2. there exists a relation between the offender and the victim (but in cases of divorce decrees where there is a direct bearing on their child, it is applicable)
  3. the condition of being a woman is indispensable in the commission of the crime (Ex. Parricide, rape, abduction)
  • Requisite of disregard to rank, age, or sex
  1. Crimes must be against the victim’s person or his honor
  2. There is deliberate intent to offend or insult the respect due to the victim’s rank, age, or sex
  • Disregard to rank, age, or sex is absorbed by treachery or abuse of strength
  • Dwelling – must be a building or structure exclusively used for rest and comfort (combination house and store not included)
  1. may be temporary as in the case of guests in a house or bedspacers
  2. basis for this is the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode
  • dwelling includes dependencies, the foot of the staircase and the enclosure under the house
  • Elements of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
  1. Crime occurred in the dwelling of the victim
  2. No provocation on the part of the victim
  • Requisites for Provocation: ALL MUST CONCUR
  1. given by the owner of the dwelling
  2. sufficient
  3. immediate to the commission of the crime

When dwelling may and may not be considered

When it may be considered

When it may not be considered

·         although the offender fired the shot from outside the house, as long as his victim was inside

·         even if the killing took place outside the dwelling, so long as the commission began inside the dwelling

·         when adultery is committed in the dwelling of the husband, even if it is also the dwelling of the wife, it is still aggravating because she and her paramour committed a grave offense to the head of the house

·         In robbery with violence against persons, robbery with homicide, abduction, or illegal detention

·         If the offended party has given provocation

·         If both the offender and the offended party are occupants of the same dwelling

·         In robbery with force upon things, it is inherent

 

4. That the act be committed with (1) abuse of confidence or (2) obvious ungratefulness

Requisites of Abuse of Confidence

Requisite of Obvious Ungratefulness

a)      Offended party has trusted the offender

b)      Offender abused such trust

c)      Abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime

a)      ungratefulness must be obvious, that is, there must be something which the offender should owe the victim a debt of gratitude for

Note: robbery or theft committed by a visitor in the house of the offended party is aggravated by obvious ungratefulness

  • Example: A jealous lover, already determined to kill his sweetheart, invited her for a ride and during that ride, he stabbed her
  • Abuse of confidence is inherent in:
  1. malversation
  2. qualified theft
  3. estafa by conversion
  4. misappropriation
  5. qualified seduction

5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in his presence, or when public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.

  • Requirements of the aggravating circumstance of public office:
  • A polling precinct is a public office during election day
  • Nature of public office should be taken into account, like a police station which is on duty 24 hrs. a day
  • place of the commission of the felony (par 5): if it is Malacañang palace or a church is aggravating, regardless of whether State or official; functions are being held.
  • as regards other places where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, there must be some performance of public functions
  • the offender must have intention to commit a crime when he entered the place
  • Requisites for aggravating circumstances for place of worship:
  1. The crime occurred in the public office
  2. Public authorities are actually performing their public duties
  3. The crime occurred in a place dedicated to the worship of God regardless of religion
  4. Offender must have decided to commit the crime when he entered the place of worship

When Paragraph 2 and 5 of Article 14 are applicable

Committed in the presence of the Chief Executive, in the Presidential Palace or a place of worship(Par. 5, Art. 14)

Committed in contempt of Public Authority

(Par. 2, Art 14)

Public authorities are performing of their duties when the crime is committed

Same

When crime is committed in the public office, the officer must be performing his duties, except in the Presidential Palace

Outside the office (still performing duty)

Public authority may be the offended party

Public authority is not be the offended party

6a. That the crime be committed (1) in the nighttime, or (2) in an uninhabited place (3) by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.

  • Nighttime, Uninhabited Place or By a Bang Aggravating when:
    • Impunity – means to prevent the accused’s being recognized or to secure himself against detection or punishment
  • Nighttime begins at the end of dusk and ending at dawn; from sunset to sunrise
  • Uninhabited Place – one where there are no houses at all, a place at a considerable distance from town, where the houses are scattered at a great distance from each other
  1. it facilitated the commission of the crime
  2. especially sought for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity
  3. when the offender took the advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity
  4. commission of the crime must have began and accomplished at nighttime
  5. commission of the crime must begin and be accomplished in the nighttime
  6. when the place of the crime is illuminated by light, nighttime is not aggravating
  7. absorbed by Treachery

Requisites:

  1. The place facilitated the commission or omission of the crime
  2. Deliberately sought and not incidental to the commission or omission of the crime
  3. Taken advantage of for the purpose of impunity
  • what should be considered here is whether in the place of the commission of the offense, there was a reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help

6b. – Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.

  • Requisites:
  • if one of the four-armed malefactors is a principal by inducement, they do not form a band because it is undoubtedly connoted that he had no direct participation,
  • Band is inherent in robbery committed in band and brigandage
  • It is not considered in the crime of rape
  • It has been applied in treason and in robbery with homicide
  1. Facilitated the commission of the crime
  2. Deliberately sought
  3. Taken advantage of for the purposes of impunity
  4. There must be four or more armed men

7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune

  • Requisites:
  1. Committed when there is a calamity or misfortune
  2. Conflagration
  3. Shipwreck
  4. Epidemic
  5. Offender took advantage of the state of confusion or chaotic condition from such misfortune
  • Basis: Commission of the crime adds to the suffering by taking advantage of the misfortune.
  • based on time
  • offender must take advantage of the calamity or misfortune

Distinction between Paragraphs 7 and 12 of Article 14

Committed during a calamity or misfortune

Committed with the use of wasteful means

Crime is committed DURING any of the calamities

Crime is committed BY using fire, inundation, explosion or other wasteful means

8. That the crime be committed with the aid of (1) armed men or (2) persons who insure or afford impunity

  • based on the means and ways
  • Requisites:
  • Exceptions:
  1. that armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly
  2. that the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed
  3. when both the attacking party and the party attacked were equally armed
  4. not present when the accused as well as those who cooperated with him in the commission of the crime acted under the same plan and for the same purpose.
  5. Casual presence, or when the offender did not avail himself of any of their aid nor did not knowingly count upon their assistance in the commission of the crime

WITH THE AID OF ARMED MEN

BY A BAND

Present even if one of the offenders merely relied on their aid. Actual aid is not necessary

Requires more than 3 armed malefactors who all acted together in the commission of an offense

  • if there are more than 3 armed men, aid of armed men is absorbed in the employment of a band.

9. That the accused is a recidivist

  • Recidivist – one who at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the RPC
  • Basis: Greater perversity of the offender as shown by his inclination to commit crimes
  • Requisites:
  • What is controlling is the time of the trial, not the time of the commission of the offense. At the time of the trial means from the arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court.
  • When does judgment become final? (Rules of Court)
  • Example of Crimes embraced in the Same title of the RPC
  • Q: The accused was prosecuted and tried for theft, robbery and estafa. Judgments were read on the same day. Is he a recidivist?
  1. offender is on trial for an offense
  2. he was previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
  3. that both the first and the second offenses are embraced in the same title of the RPC
  4. the offender is convicted of the new offense
  5. after the lapse of a period for perfecting an appeal
  6. when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served
  7. defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal
  8. the accused has applied for probation
  9. robbery and theft – title 10
  10. homicide and physical injuries – title 8

A: No. Because the judgment in any of the first two offenses was not yet final when he was tried for the third offense

  • Recidivism must be taken into account no matter how many years have intervened between the first and second felonies
  • Pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused was a recidivist, but amnesty extinguishes the penalty and its effects
  • To prove recidivism, it must be alleged in the information and with attached certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused
  • Exceptions: if the accused does not object and when he admits in his confession and on the witness stand.

10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty

  • Reiteracion or Habituality – it is essential that the offender be previously punished; that is, he has served sentence.
  • 10 speaks of penalty attached to the offense, not the penalty actually imposed

REITERACION

RECIDIVISM

Necessary that offender shall have served out his sentence for the first sentence

Enough that final judgment has been rendered in the first offense

Previous and subsequent offenses must not be embraced in the same title of the Code

Same title

Not always an aggravating circumstance

Always aggravating

  • 4 Forms of Repetition
  • Habitual Delinquency – when a person within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
  • Quasi-Recidivism – any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony
  1. Recidivism – generic
  2. Reiteracion or Habituality – generic
  3. Multiple recidivism or Habitual delinquency – extraordinary aggravating
  4. Quasi-Recidivism – special aggravating

11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise.

  • Requisites:
  1. At least 2 principals

1. The principal by inducement

2. The principal by direct participation

  1. the price, reward, or promise should be previous to and in consideration of the commission of the criminal act
  • Applicable to both principals.

12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding a vessel or intentional damage thereto, or derailment of a locomotive, or by use of any other artifice involving great waste or ruin.

  • Requisite: The wasteful means were used by the offender to accomplish a criminal purpose

13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation

  • Essence of premeditation: the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment
  • Requisites:
  • Conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation
  • When victim is different from that intended, premeditation is not aggravating. Although it is not necessary that there is a plan to kill a particular person for premeditation to exist (e.g. plan to kill first 2 persons one meets, general attack on a village…for as long as it was planned)
  • The premeditation must be based upon external facts, and must be evident, not merely suspected indicating deliberate planning
  • Evident premeditation is inherent in robbery, adultery, theft, estafa, falsification, and etc.
  1. the time when the offender determined to commit the crime
  2. an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination
  3. a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will

14. That (1) craft, (2) fraud, or (3) disguise be employed

  • Craft – involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the accused.

It is employed as a scheme in the execution of the crime (e.g. accused pretended to be members of the constabulary, accused in order to perpetrate rape, used chocolates containing drugs)

  • Fraud –involves insidious words or machinations used to induce victim to act in a manner which would enable the offender to carry out his design.
  • as distinguished from craft which involves acts done in order not to arouse the suspicion of the victim, fraud involves a direct inducement through entrapping or beguiling language or machinations
  • Disguise – resorting to any device to conceal identity. Purpose of concealing identity is a must.

Distinction between Craft, Fraud, and Disguise

Craft

Fraud

Disguise

Involves the use of intellectual trickery and cunning to arouse suspicion of the victim

Involves the use of direct inducement by insidious words or machinations

Involves the use of devise to conceal identity

  • Requisite: The offender must have actually taken advantage of craft, fraud, or disguise to facilitate the commission of the crime.
  • Inherent in: estafa and falsification.

15. That (1) advantage be taken of superior strength, or (2) means be employed to weaken the defense

  • To purposely use excessive force out of the proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.
  • Requisite of Means to Weaken Defense
  • To weaken the defense – illustrated in the case where one struggling with another suddenly throws a cloak over the head of his opponent and while in the said situation, he wounds or kills him. Other means of weakening the defense would be intoxication or disabling thru the senses (casting dirt of sand upon another’s eyes)
  1. Superiority may arise from aggressor’s sex, weapon or number as compared to that of the victim (e.g. accused attacked an unarmed girl with a knife; 3 men stabbed to death the female victim).
  2. No advantage of superior strength when one who attacks is overcome with passion and obfuscation or when quarrel arose unexpectedly and the fatal blow was struck while victim and accused were struggling.
  3. by a band : circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what is taken into account is not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed but their relative physical might vis-à-vis the offended party
  4. Means were purposely sought to weaken the defense of the victim to resist the assault
  5. The means used must not totally eliminate possible defense of the victim, otherwise it will fall under treachery

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia)

  • TREACHERY: when the offender commits any of the crime against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
  • Requisites:
  • Treachery – can’t be considered when there is no evidence that the accused, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit to crime, or there is no proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection.
  • Examples: victim asleep, half-awake or just awakened, victim grappling or being held, stacks from behind
  • But treachery may exist even if attack is face-to-face – as long as victim was not given any chance to prepare defense
  1. that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in the position to defend himself
  2. that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him
  3. does not exist if the accused gave the deceased chance to prepare or there was warning given or that it was preceded by a heated argument
  4. there is always treachery in the killing of child
  5. generally characterized by the deliberate and sudden and unexpected attack of the victim from behind, without any warning and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself

TREACHERY

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

MEANS EMPLOYED TO WEAKEN DEFENSE

Means, methods or forms are employed by the offender to make it impossible or hard for the offended party to put any sort of resistance

Offender does not employ means, methods or forms of attack, he only takes advantage of his superior strength

Means are employed but it only materially weakens the resisting power of the offended party

  • Where there is conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the offenders
  • Treachery absorbs abuse of strength, aid of armed men, by a band and means to weaken the defense

17. That the means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the acts

  • IGNOMINY – is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime

Applicable to crimes against chastity (rape included), less serious physical injuries, light or grave coercion and murder

  • Requisites:
  • Examples: accused embraced and kissed the offended party not out of lust but out of anger in front of many people, raped in front of the husband, raped successively by five men
  • tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating
  • Ignominy not present where the victim was already dead when such acts were committed against his body or person
  1. Crime must be against chastity, less serious physical injuries, light or grave coercion, and murder
  2. The circumstance made the crime more humiliating and shameful for the victim

18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry

  • Unlawful entry – when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose.  Meant to effect entrance and NOT exit.
  • Why aggravating? One who acts, not respecting the walls erected by men to guard their property and provide for their personal safety, shows greater perversity, a greater audacity and hence the law punishes him with more severity
  • Example: Rapist gains entrance thru the window
  • Inherent in: Trespass to dwelling, robbery with force upon things, and robbery with violence or intimidation against persons.

19. That as a means to the commission of the crime, a wall, roof, door or window be broken

  • Requisites:
  • Applicable only if such acts were done by the offender to effect entrance.
  • Breaking is lawful in the following instances:
  1. A wall, roof, window, or door was broken
  2. They were broken to effect entrance
  3. an officer in order to make an arrest may break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be;
  4. an officer if refused admittance may break open any door or window to execute the search warrant or liberate himself,

20. That the crime be committed (1) with the aid of persons under 15 years of age, or (2) by means of motor vehicles, airships or other similar means.

  • Reason for #1: to repress, so far as possible, the frequent practice resorted to by professional criminals to avail themselves of minors taking advantage of their responsibility (remember that minors are given leniency when they commit a crime)

Example: Juan instructed a 14-year old to climb up the fence and open the gate for him so that he may rob the house

  • Reason for #2: to counteract the great facilities found by modern criminals in said means to commit crime and flee and abscond once the same is committed. Necessary that the motor vehicle be an important tool to the consummation of the crime (bicycles not included)

Example: Juan and Pedro, in committing theft, used a truck to haul the appliances from the mansion.

21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission

 

  • Cruelty: when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. Cruelty cannot be presumed nor merely inferred from the body of the deceased. Has to be proven.
  1. mere plurality of words do not show cruelty
  2. no cruelty when the other wrong was done after the victim was dead
  • Requisites:
  1. that the injury caused be deliberately increased by causing other wrong
  2. that the other wrong be unnecessary for the execution of the purpose of the offender

IGNOMINY

CRUELTY

Moral suffering – subjected to humiliation

Physical suffering

Art 15. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.

            The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

  • Alternative Circumstances – those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission.
  • They are:
  1. relationship – taken into consideration when offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender
  2. intoxication – mitigating when the offender has committed a felony in the state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the said felony. Aggravating if habitual or intentional
  3. degree of instruction and education of the offender

RELATIONSHIP

Mitigating Circumstance

Aggravating Circumstance

In crimes against property (robbery, usurpation, fraudulent insolvency, arson)

 In crimes against persons – in cases where the offender, or when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level, as killing a brother, adopted brother or half-brother.

Always aggravating in crimes against chastity.

Exception: Art 332 of CC – no criminal liability, civil liability only for the crimes of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses, ascendants, descendants or relatives by affinity (also brothers, sisters, brothers-in-law or sisters-in-law if living together). It becomes an EXEMPTING circumstance.

 
  • Relationship neither mitigating nor aggravating when relationship is an element of the offense.

Example: parricide, adultery, concubinage.

INTOXICATION

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

a)      if intoxication is not habitual

b)      if intoxication is not subsequent to the plan to commit a felony

a)      if intoxication is habitual – such habit must be actual and confirmed

b)      if its intentional (subsequent to the plan to commit a felony)

  • Must show that he has taken such quantity so as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control
  • A habitual drunkard is given to inebriety or the excessive use of intoxicating drinks.
  • Habitual drunkenness must be shown to be an actual and confirmed habit of the offender, but not necessarily of daily occurrence.

DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

Low degree of instruction education or the lack of it. Because he does not fully realize the consequences of his criminal act. Not just mere illiteracy but lack of intelligence.

High degree of instruction and education – offender avails himself of his learning in committing the offense.

  • Determined by: the court must consider the circumstance of lack of instruction
  • Exceptions (not mitigating):
  1. crimes against property
  2. crimes against chastity (rape included)
  3. crime of treason

Art 16.  Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:

1.   Principals.

2. Accomplices.

3. Accessories.

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

      1.   Principals

      2.   Accomplices.

  • Accessories – not liable for light felonies because the individual prejudice is so small that penal sanction is not necessary
  • Only natural persons can be criminals as only they can act with malice or negligence and can be subsequently deprived of liberty. Juridical persons are liable under special laws.
  • Manager of a partnership is liable even if there is no evidence of his direct participation in the crime.
  • Corporations may be the injured party
  • General Rule: Corpses and animals have no rights that may be injured.
  • Exception: defamation of the dead is punishable when it blackens the memory of one who is dead.

Art 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:

  1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
  2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
  3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

Principals by Direct Participation

Requisites for 2 or more to be principals by direct participation:

  1. participated in the criminal resolution (conspiracy)
  2. carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end
  • Conspiracy –  Is unity of purpose and intention.

Establishment of Conspiracy

  1. proven by overt act
  2. Not mere knowledge or approval
  3. It is not necessary that there be formal agreement.
  4. Must prove beyond reasonable doubt
  5. Conspiracy is implied when the accused had a common purpose and were united in execution.
  6. Unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime may be shown in the following cases:
    1. Spontaneous agreement at the moment of the commission of the crime
    2. Active Cooperation by all the offenders in the perpetration of the crime
    3. Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common criminal intent
    4. Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and lending moral support thereto.
    5. While conspiracy may be implied from the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, it is nevertheless a rule that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence.
  • Conspirator not liable for the crimes of the other which is not the object of the conspiracy or is not a logical or necessary consequence thereof
  • Multiple rape – each rapist is liable for another’s crime because each cooperated in the commission of the rapes perpetrated by the others
  • Exception: in the crime of murder with treachery – all the offenders must at least know that there will be treachery in executing the crime or cooperate therein.

Example: Juan and Pedro conspired to kill Tomas without the previous plan of treachery. In the crime scene, Juan used treachery in the presence of Pedro and Pedro knew such. Both are liable for murder. But if Pedro stayed by the gate while Juan alone killed Tomas with treachery, so that Pedro didn’t know how it was carried out, Juan is liable for murder while Pedro for homicide.

  • No such thing as conspiracy to commit an offense through negligence. However, special laws may make one a co-principal. Example: Under the Pure Food and Drug Act,a storeowner is liable for the act of his employees of selling adulterated coffee, although he didn’t know that coffee was being sold.
  • Conspiracy is negatived by the acquittal of co-defendant.
  • That the culprits “carried out the plan and personally took part in the execution, by acts which directly tended to the same end”:
  1. The principals by direct participation must be at the scene of the crime, personally taking part, although he was not present in the scene of the crime, he is equally liable as a principal by direct participation.
  2. One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a principal direct participation.
  • If the second element is missing, those who did not participate in the commission of the acts of execution cannot be held criminally liable, unless the crime agreed to be committed is treason, sedition, or rebellion.

Principals by Induction

a.    “Those who directly force or induce others to commit it”

  1. Principal by induction liable only when principal by direct participation committed the act induced
  2. Requisites:
  3. inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime
  4. such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor

d. Forms of Inducements

  1. By Price, reward or promise
  2. By irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
  3. Commander has the intention of procuring the commission of the crime
  4. Commander has ascendancy or influence
  5. Words used be so direct, so efficacious, so powerful
  6. Command be uttered prior to the commission
  7. Executor had no personal reason
  8. Imprudent advice does not constitute sufficient inducement
  9. Requisites for words of command to be considered inducement:
  10. Words uttered in the heat of anger and in the nature of the command that had to be obeyed do not make one an inductor.

INDUCTOR

PROPOSES TO COMMIT A FELONY

Induce others

Same

Liable only when the crime is executed

Punishable at once when proposes to commit rebellion or treason. The person to whom one proposed should not commit the crime, otherwise the latter becomes an inductor

Covers any crime

Covers only treason and rebelli

 Effects of Acquittal of Principal by direct participation on liability of principal by inducement

  1. Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of the co-defendant.
  2. One can not be held guilty of instigating the commission of the crime without first showing that the crime has been actually committed by another. But if the one charged as principal by direct participation be acquitted because he acted without criminal intent or malice, it is not a ground for the acquittal of the principal by inducement.

Principals by Indispensable Cooperation

  1. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished”
  2. Requisites:
  3. Participation in the criminal resolution
  4. Cooperation through another act (includes negligence)
  • *there is collective criminal responsibility when the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. The penalty is the same for all.
  • there is individual criminal responsibility when there is no conspiracy.

Art. 18.           Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

  • Requisites:
  • Examples: a) Juan was choking Pedro. Then Tomas ran up and hit Pedro with a bamboo stick. Juan continued to choke Pedro until he was dead. Tomas is only an accomplice because the fatal blow came from Juan. b) Lending a dagger to a killer, knowing the latter’s purpose.
  • An accomplice has knowledge of the criminal design of the principal and all he does is concur with his purpose.
  • There must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charges as accomplice
  • In homicide or murder, the accomplice must not have inflicted the mortal wound.
  1. there be a community of design (principal originates the design, accomplice only concurs)
  2. he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous acts, intending to give material and moral aid (cooperation must be knowingly done, it must also be necessary and not indispensable
  3. There be a relation between the acts of the principal and the alleged accomplice

Art. 19.           Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

  • Example of Par 1: person received and used property from another, knowing it was stolen
  • Example of Par 2: placing a weapon in the hand of the dead who was unlawfully killed to plant evidence, or burying the deceased who was killed by the principals
  • Example of Par 3: a) public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions, b) private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime – guilty of treason, parricide, murder or an attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of some crime.
  • General Rule: Principal acquitted, Accessory also acquitted
  • Exception: when the crime was in fact committed but the principal is covered by exempting circumstances.

Example: Minor stole a ring and Juan, knowing it was stolen, bought it. Minor is exempt. Juan liable as accessory

  • Trial of accessory may proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal because the criminal responsibilities are distinct from each other
  • Liability of the accessory – the responsibility of the accessory is subordinate to that of a principal in a crime because the accessory’s  participation therein is subsequent to its commission, and his guilt is directly related to the principal. If the principal was acquitted by an exempting circumstance the accessory may still be held liable.
  • Difference of accessory from principal and accomplice:
  1. Accessory does not take direct part or cooperate in, or induce the commission of the crime
  2. Accessory does not cooperate in the commission of the offense by acts either prior thereto or simultaneous therewith
  3. Participation of the accessory in all cases always takes place after the commission of the crime
  4. Takes part in the crime through his knowledge of the commission of the offense.

Art. 20.           Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.

  • Basis: Ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one’s name which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned.
  • Nephew and Niece not included
  • Accessory not exempt when helped a relative-principal by profiting from the effects of the crime, or assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the crime.
  • Only accessories covered by par 2 and 3 are exempted.
  • Public officer who helped his guilty brother escape does not incur criminal liability as ties of blood constitutes a more powerful incentive than the call of duty.
  • PENALTY – suffering inflicted by the State for the transgression of a law.
  • 3 fold purpose:
  • Juridical Conditions of Penalty
  1. retribution or expiation – penalty commensurate with the gravity of the offense
  2. correction or reformation – rules which regulate the execution of penalties consisting of deprivation of liberty
  3. social defense – inflexible severity to recidivists and habitual delinquents

a. Must be productive of suffering – limited by the integrity of human personality

b. Must be proportionate to the crime

c. Must be personal – imposed only upon the criminal

d. Must be legal – according to a judgment of fact and law

e. Must be equal – applies to everyone regardless of the circumstance

f.  Must be correctional – to rehabilitate the offender

Art. 21.            Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

  • Guarantees that no act of a citizen will be considered criminal unless the State has made it so by law and provided a penalty
  • Except:  When the penalty is favorable to the criminal

Art. 22.            Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

  • General Rule:Criminal laws are given prospective effects
  • Exception:Give retroactive effect when favorable to the accused.  Ex. Special law made the penalty less severe – but must refer to the same deed or omission penalized by the former statute
  • New law may provide that its provisions not to be applied to cases already filed in court at the time of the approval of such law.
  • The favorable retroactive effect of a new law may find the defendant in one of the 3 situations
  • Habitual criminal (person who within the pd of 10 years from date of release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener) is NOT entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the new favorable law.
  • Civil liabilities not covered by Art 22 because rights of offended persons are not within the gift of arbitrary disposal of the State.
  • But new law increasing civil liability cannot be given retroactive effect.
  • Retroactivity applicable also to special laws
  • The right to punish offenses committed under an old penal law is not extinguished if the offenses are still punished in the repealing penal law. However, if by re-enactment of the provisions of the former law, the repeal is by implication and there is a saving clause, criminal liability under the repealed law subsists.
  • No retroactive effect of penal laws as regards jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime.
  • Jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after trial.
  • When a law is ex post facto
  1. crime has been committed and the prosecution begins
  2. sentence has been passed but service has not begun
  3. sentence is being carried out.

a      Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act.

b      Aggravates the crime or makes it greater than it was when committed.

c      Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.

d      Alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the crime.

e      Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.

f       Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.

  • Bill of Attainder – a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.
  • Effect of change of Penal Law

a      With enactment of a penal law punishing the offense – the action is not dismissed. The penalty in the new law if favorable to the accused.

b      Without enactment of a penal law punishing the offense  – the previous offense is obliterated and the action is dismissed.

Art. 23.            Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.

  • Even if injured party already pardoned the offender – fiscal can still prosecute. Not even considered a ground for dismissal of the information. Exception: Art 344 – crimes of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness – pardon must be expressed.
  • Basis: crime is an offense against the State. Aggrieved party only a witness.
  • Only Chief Executive can pardon the offenders
  • Can’t compromise criminal liability, only civil liability – but it still shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty.
  • Offended party in the crimes of adultery and concubinage can’t institute criminal prosecution if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
  • Pardon in adultery and concubinage may be implied – continued inaction after learning of the offense. Must pardon both offenders.
  • The pardon afforded the offenders must come BEFORE the institution of the criminal proceedings. Complaint for any of the above-mentioned crimes in Art 344 will still be prosecuted by the court on the ground that the pardon (basis for the motion to dismiss) was given after the filing of the complaint.
  • The only act that extinguishes the penal action, after the institution of criminal action, is the marriage between the offender and the offended party
  • Pardon under Art 344 is only a bar to criminal prosecution. It DOES NOT extinguish criminal liability. It is not one of the causes that totally extinguish criminal liability in Art 89.
  • Civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver because personal injury may be repaired through indemnity anyway. State has no reason to insist on its payment.
  • Waiver must be express.

Art. 24.            Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. — The following shall not be considered as penalties:

1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.

2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes specified therein.

3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.

4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.

5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form.

  • Par 1 refers to the “accused persons” who are detained “by reason of insanity or imbecility” not an insane or imbecile who has not been arrested for a crime.
  • They are not considered penalties because they are not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Those in par 1, 3 and 4 are merely preventive measures before the conviction of offenders.
  • Commitment of a minor is not a penalty because it is not imposed by the court in a judgment. The imposition of the sentence in such a case is suspended.
  • Fines in par 4 are not imposed by the court because otherwise, they constitute a penalty.

Art. 25.            Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the following:

Scale

PRINCIPAL PENALTIES

Capital punishment:

            Death.

Afflictive penalties:

            Reclusion perpetua,

            Reclusion temporal,

            Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

            Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,

            Prision mayor.

Correctional penalties:

            Prision correccional,

            Arresto mayor,

            Suspension,

            Destierro.

Light penalties:

            Arresto menor,

            Public censure.

Penalties common to the three preceding classes:

            Fine, and

            Bond to keep the peace.

ACCESSORY PENALTIES

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,

Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the

            profession or calling.

Civil interdiction,

Indemnification,

Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,

Payment of costs.

  • Classification of penalties:

a      Principal  – art 25

b      Accessory – deemed included in the imposition of the principal penalties

  • According to divisibility (principal)

a      divisible – those that have fixed duration and are divisible into 3 periods

b      indivisible – no fixed duration (death, RP, perpetual or absolute disqualification)

  • According  to subject matter

a      corporal – death

b      deprivation of freedom – reclusion, prision, arresto

c      restriction of freedom – destierro

d      deprivation of rights – disqualification and suspension

e      pecuniary – fine

  • According to gravity

a      capital

b      afflictive

c      correccional

d      light

  • Public censure is a penalty, and being such, is not proper in acquittal. But a competent court, while acquitting an accused may, with unquestionable propriety express its disapproval or reprehension of those acts to avoid the impression that by acquitting the accused it approves or admires his conduct.
  • Permanent and temporary absolute and permanent and temporary special disqualification and suspension may be principal or accessory penalties because they are found in 2 general classes.

Art. 26.            When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.

  • Fines are imposed either as alternative (Art 144 punishing disturbance of proceedings with arresto mayor or fine from 200 pesos to 1000 pesos) or single (fine of 200 to 6000 pesos)
  • Penalty cannot be imposed in the alternative since it’s the duty of the court to indicate the penalty imposed definitely and positively. Thus, the court cannot sentence the guilty person in a manner as such as “to pay fine of 1000 pesos, or to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, and to pay the costs.”
  • If the fine imposed by the law for the felony is exactly 200 pesos, it is a light felony.
  • Fines:

a      Afflictive – over 6000

b      Correctional – 201 to 6000

c      Light – 200 and less

  • Note: The classification applies if the fine is imposed as a single or alternative penalty. Hence, it does not apply if the fine imposed together with another penalty.
  • Bond to keep the peace is by analogy:

a      Afflictive – over 6000

b      Correctional – 201 to 6000

c      Light – 200 and less

Distinction between classification of  Penalties in Art. 9 and Art. 26

Article 9

Article 26

Applicable in determining the prescriptive period of felonies

Applicable in determining the prescriptive period of penalties

DURATION AND EFFECT OF PENALTIES

Art. 27.            Reclusion perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.

Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of  prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of  prision correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months.

Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine.

  • 3 fold rule: the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than 3 times the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
  • the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall in no case exceed 40 years
  • Temporary disqualification and suspension, when imposed as accessory penalties, have different durations – they follow the duration of the principal penalty
  • Destierro is imposed in the following circumstances:

a      serious physical injuries or death under exceptional circumstances (spouse finding other spouse in pari delicto)

b      failure to give bond for good behavior ( a person making threat may be required to give bond not to molest the person threatened, if not destierro)

c      penalty for the concubine

d      in cases where the reduction of the penalty by one or more degrees results in destierro

  • Bond to keep the peace is not specifically provided as a penalty for any felony and therefore cannot be imposed by the court. It is required in Art 284 and not to be given in cases involving other crimes.
  • Summary:

a      Perpetual penalties – after 30 years, can be pardoned, except when he is unworthy of pardon by reason of his conduct and some other serious cause, it won’t exceed 40 years.

b      Reclusion Temporal – 12 yrs and 1 day to 20 yrs

c      Prision Mayor and temporary disqualification – 6 yrs and 1 day to 12 yrs; disqualification if accessory follows the duration of the principal penalty

d      Prision Correccional, suspension and destierro – 6 mos and 1 day to 12 yrs; disqualification if accessory follows the duration of the principal penalty

e      Arresto Mayor – 1 month and 1 day to 6 months

f       Arresto Menor – 1 day to 30 days

g      Bond to keep the peace – the period during which the bond shall be effective is discretionary to the court

Capital and Afflictive Penalties

 

Death

Reclusion Perpetua

Reclusion Temporal

Prison Mayor

Term of Imprison-ment

None

20 days and 1 day to 40 years

12 years and 1 day to 20 years

6 years and 1 day to 12 years

Accessory Penalties

None, unless pardoned:

-Perpetual absolute disqualification

-Civil interdiction for 30 years

-Civil Interdiction or during his sentence

-Perpetual absolute disqualification

-Civil Interdiction or during his sentence

-Perpetual absolute disqualification

-Temporary absolute disqualification

-Perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender suffers although pardoned

Correctional and Light Penalties

 

Prison Correctional

Arresto Mayor

Arresto Menor

Imprison-ment

6 months and 1 day to 6 years

1 month and 1 day to 6 months

1 day to 30 days

Accessory Penalties

-Suspension from public office

-Suspension from the right to follow a profession or calling

-Perpetual special disqualification on the right of suffrage

-Suspension of right to hold office

-Suspension of the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence

-Suspension of right to hold office

-Suspension of the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence

Art. 28.            Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final.

If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant commences to serve his sentence.

  • Director of Prisons/warden to compute based on Art 28:

a      When the offender is in prison – the duration of the temporary penalties (PAD, TAD, detention, suspension) is from the day on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.

b      When the offender is not in prison – the duration of the penalty in deprivation of liberty is from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty

c      The duration of the other penalties – the duration is from the day on which the offender commences to serve his sentence

  • Reason for rule (a) – because under Art 24, the arrest and temporary detention of the accused is not considered a penalty
  • if in custody, the accused appealed, the service of the sentence should commence from the date of the promulgation of the decision of the appellate court, not from the date of the judgment of the trial court was promulgated.
  • service of one in prison begins only on the day the judgment of conviction becomes final.
  • In cases if temporary penalties, if the offender is under detention, as when undergoing preventive imprisonment, rule (a) applies.
  • If not under detention (released on bail) rule (c) applies
  • Offender under preventive imprisonment, rule (c) applies not rule (a)
  • The offender is entitled to a deduction of full-time or 4/5 of the time of his detention.

Art. 29.            Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970).  cd i

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1988).

  • Accused undergoes preventive suspension if:

a      offense is non-bailable

b      bailable but can’t furnish bail

  • the full time or 4/5 of the time during which the offenders have undergone preventive suspension shall be deducted from the penalty imposed
  • preventive imprisonment must also be considered in perpetual penalties. Article does not make any distinction between temporal and perpetual penalties.
  • duration of RP is to be computed at 30 years, thus, even if the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment, he is entitled to the full time or 4/5 of the time of preventive suspension
  • Credit is given in the service of sentences “consisting of deprivation of liberty” (imprisonment and destierro). Thus, persons who had undergone preventive imprisonment but the offense is punishable by a fine only would not be given credit.
  • Destierro is considered a “deprivation of liberty”
  • If the penalty imposed is arresto menor to destierro, the accused who has been in prison for 30 days (arresto menor to 30 days) should be released because although the maximum penalty is destierro (6 mos 1 day to 6 yrs), the accused sentenced to such penalty does not serve it in prison.
  • Habitual Delinquents not entitled to the full time or 4/5 credit of time under preventive imprisonment since he is necessarily a recidivist or has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime.
  • Example: X who was arrested for serious physical injuries, detained for 1 year and went out on bail but was later on found guilty. He was consequently summoned for the execution of the sentence, but having failed to appear, X will not be credited in the service of his sentence for serious physical injuries w/ one year or 4/5 of one year preventive imprisonment.

Art. 30.            Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.

2.The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

  • The exclusion is a mere disqualification for protection and not for punishment – the withholding of a privilege, not a denial of a right.
  • Perpetual absolute disqualification is effective during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence.
  • Temporary absolute disqualification is effective during the term of sentence and is removed after the service of the same. Exception: (1) deprivation of the public office or employment; (2) loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
  • Effects of Perpetual and temporary absolute disqualification:

a      Deprivation of any public office or employment of offender

b      Deprivation of the right to vote in any election or to be voted upon

c      Loss of rights to retirement pay or pension

d      All these effects last during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence except as regards paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above in connection with Temporary Absolute Disqualification.

Art. 31.            Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32.            Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

  • Temporary disqualification if imposed is an accessory penalty, its duration is that of the principal penalty
  • Effects of Perpetual and Temporary Special Disqualification

a.  For public office, profession, or calling

  1. Deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected
  2. Disqualification for holding similar offices or employment during the period of disqualification

b. For the exercise of the right of suffrage

  1. Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected in an office.
  2. Cannot hold any public office during the period of disqualification.

Art. 33.            Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension.

  • Effects:

a      Disqualification from holding such office or the exercise of such profession or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

b      Cannot hold another office having similar functions during the period of suspension.

Art. 34.            Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

  • Effects:

a.  Deprivation of the following rights:

  1. Parental rights
  2. Guardianship over the ward
  3. Martial authority
  4. Right to manage property and to dispose of the same by acts inter vivos

b. Civil Interdiction is an accessory penalty to the following principal penalties

  1. If death penalty is commuted to life imprisonment
  2. Reclusion perpetua
  3. Reclusion temporal
  • He can dispose of such property by will or donation mortis causa

Art. 35.            Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking.

The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.

  • Bond to keep the peace is different from bail bond which is posted for the provisional release of a person arrested for or accused of a crime. Bond to keep the peace or for good behavior is imposed as a penalty in threats.

Art. 36.            Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

  • Pardon by the President does not restore the right to public office or suffrage except when both are expressly restored in the pardon. Nor does it exempt from civil liability/from payment of civil indemnity.
  • Limitations to President’s power to pardon:

a      can be exercised only after final judgment

b      does not extend to cases of impeachment

c      does not extinguish civil liability – only criminal liability

  • Pardon granted in general terms does not include accessory penalties.
  • Exceptions:
  • Pardon by the offended party – does not extinguish criminal liability, may include offended party waiving civil indemnity and it is done before the institution of the criminal prosecution and extended to both offenders.
  1. if the absolute pardon us granted after the term of imprisonment has expire, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. However, if the penalty is life imprisonment and after the service of 30 years, a pardon is granted, the pardon does not remove the accessory penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification
  2. if the facts and circumstances of the case show that the purpose of the President is to precisely restore the rights i.e., granting absolute pardon after election to a post (mayor) but before the date fixed by law for assuming office to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will.

Art. 37.            Cost. — What are included. — Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to schedule.

  • Costs include:
  • Costs (expenses of the litigation) are chargeable to the accused in vase of conviction.
  • In case of acquittal, the costs are de oficio, each party bearing is own expense
  • No costs allowed against the Republic of the Philippines until law provides the contrary
  1. fees
  2. indemnities in the course of judicial proceedings

Art. 38.            Pecuniary liabilities. — Order of payment. — In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:

1.         The reparation of the damage caused.

2.         Indemnification of consequential damages.

3.         The fine.

4.         The cost of the proceedings.

  • Applicable “in case property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities.” Hence, if the offender has insufficient or no property, there is no use for Art 38.
  • Order of payment is mandatory
  • Example:  Juan inflicted serious physical injuries against Pedro and took the latter’s watch and ring. He incurred 500 worth of hospital bills and failed to earn 300 worth of salary. Given that Juan only has 1000 pesos worth of property not exempt from execution, it shall be first applied to the payment of the watch and ring which cannot be returned as such is covered by “reparation of the damage caused” thus, no. 1 in the order of payment. The 500 and 300 are covered by “indemnification of the consequential damage” thus, no. 2 in the order of payment.

Art. 39.            Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969.)

  • There is no subsidiary penalty for non-payment of reparation, indemnification and costs in par 1, 2 and 4 of Art 38. It is only for fines.
  • Art 39 applies only when the convict has no property with which to meet the fine in par 3 of art 38. Thus, a convict who has property enough to meet the fine and not exempted from execution cannot choose to serve the subsidiary penalty instead of the payment of the fine.
  • Subsidiary imprisonment is not an accessory penalty. It is covered by Art 40-45 of this Code. Accessory penalties are deemed imposed even when not mentioned while subsidiary imprisonment must be expressly imposed.
  • Rules:

PENALTY IMPOSED

LENGTH OF SUBSIDIARY PENALTY

Prision correccional or arresto and fine

Not exceed 1/3 of term of sentence, in no case more than 1 year fraction or part of a day not counted.

Fine only

Not to exceed 6 months if prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, not to exceed 15 days if prosecuted for light felony

Higher than prision correccional

No subsidiary imprisonment

Not to be executed by confinement but of fixed duration

Same deprivations as those of the principal penalty under rules 1, 2 and 3 above

  • If financial circumstances improve, convict still to pay the fine even if he has suffered subsidiary personal liability.
  • the penalty imposed must be PC, AM, Am, suspension, destierro and fine only. – other than these (PM, RT, RP) court cannot impose subsidiary penalty.
  • Even if the penalty imposed is not higher than PC, if the accused is a habitual delinquent who deserves an additional penalty of 12 yrs and 1 day of RT, there is no subsidiary imprisonment.

Art. 40.            Death — Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 41.            Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. — Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 42.            Prision mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 43.            Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of  prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 44.            Arresto — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

  • Outline of accessory penalties inherent in principal penalties
  1. death – if not executed because of commutation or pardon
  2. perpetual absolute disqualification
  3. civil interdiction during 30 years (if not expressly remitted in the pardon)
  4. civil interdiction for life or during the sentence
  5. perpetual absolute disqualification (unless expressly remitted in the pardon)
  6. temporary absolute disqualification
  7. perpetual absolute disqualification from suffrage (unless expressly remitted in the pardon)
  8. suspension from public office, profession or calling
  9. perpetual special disqualification from suffrage if the duration of the imprisonment exceeds 18 months (unless expressly remitted in the pardon)
  10. RP and RT
  11. PM
  12. PC
  • The accessory penalties in Art 40-44 must be suffered by the offender, although pardoned as to the principal penalties. To be relieved of these penalties, they must be expressly remitted in the pardon.
  • No accessory penalty for destierro
  • Persons who served out the penalty may not have the right to exercise the right of suffrage. For a prisoner who has been sentenced to one year of imprisonment or more for any crime, absolute pardon restores to him his political rights. If the penalty is less than one year, disqualification does not attach except if the crime done was against property.
  • The nature of the crime is immaterial when the penalty imposed is one year imprisonment or more.
  • The accessory penalties are understood to be always imposed upon the offender by the mere fact that the law fixes a certain penalty for the crime. Whenever the courts impose a penalty which by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, it’s understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed.
  • the accessory penalties do not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the information is filed because they don’t modify or alter the nature of the penalty provided by law. What determines jurisdiction in criminal cases is the extent of the principal penalty w/c the law imposes of the crime charged.
  • the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months or a fine of not more than 4000 or both regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties.

Art. 45.            Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. — Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

  • every penalty imposed carries with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools used in the commission of the crime
  • proceeds and instruments/tools of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government
  • 3rdpersons’ (not liable for the offense) property is not subject to confiscation and forfeiture
  • property not subject of lawful commerce (whether it belongs to accused or 3rdperson) shall be destroyed.
  • can’t confiscate/forfeit unless there’s a criminal case filed and  tried, and accused is acquitted.
  • must indict 3rdperson to order confiscation of his property
  • instruments of the crime belonging to innocent 3rdperson may be recovered
  • confiscation can be ordered only if the property is submitted in evidence or placed at the disposal of the court
  • articles which are forfeited – when the order of forfeiture is already final, can’t be returned even in case of an acquittal
  • confiscation and acquittal are additional penalties. Where the penalty imposed did not include the confiscation of the goods involved, the confiscation & forfeiture of said goods would be an additional penalty and would amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed, thereby placing the accused in double jeopardy.
  • when the accused has appealed, confiscation and forfeiture not ordered by the trial court may be imposed by the appellate court
  • the government can’t appeal the modification of a sentence if the defendant did not appeal. But if the defendant appeals, it removes all bars to the review and correction of the penalty imposed by the court below, even if an increase thereof should be the result.

Art. 46.            Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.

Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.

  • The penalty prescribed by law in general terms shall be imposed:

a      upon the principals

b      for consummated felony

  • Exception: when the law fixes a penalty for the frustrated or attempted felony. Whenever it is believed that the penalty lower by one or two degrees corresponding to said acts of execution is not proportionate to the wrong done, the law fixes a distinct penalty for the principal in the frustrated or attempted felony.
  • The graduation of penalties refers to:

a      stages of execution (consummated, frustrated, attempted)

b      degree of the criminal participation of the offender (principal, accomplice, accessory)

  • the division of a divisible penalty (min, med, max) refers to the proper period of the penalty which should be imposed when aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend the commission of the crime.

Art. 47.            In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:

1.         When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.

2.         When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.

  • whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by 10 justices of the court. When 10 justices fail to reach a decision (as to the propriety of the imposition of  the death penalty), the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be imposed.
  • Death penalty not imposed in the ff cases:

a)    when the person is more than 70 years old at time RTC sentenced him

b)    when upon appeal or revision of the case by the SC, 10 justices are not unanimous in their voting

c)    when the offender is a minor under 18 yrs of age. Why? Because minority is always a mitigating circumstance

  • Justification for the death penalty: social defense and exemplarity. Not considered cruel and unusual because does not involve torture or lingering death.
  • Crimes where death penalty is imposed:

a)    treason

b)    certain acts of espionage under Commonwealth Act 616

c)    correspondence w/ hostile country when it contains notice or information and the intention of the offender is to aid the enemy

d)    qualified piracy

e)    certain violations of the Anti-subversion act

f)     parricide

g)    murder

h)    kidnapping and serious illegal detention

i)      robbery w/ homicide

j)      rape w/ homicide

k)    when death resulted from the commission of arson or other crime involving destruction

  • trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence, despite plea of guilty, when the crime charged is punished by death. A sentence of death is valid only if it is susceptible of a fair and reasonable examination by the court. This is impossible if no evidence of guilt was taken after a plea of guilty.

Art. 48.            Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

  • The 2 or more grave or less grave felonies must be the result of a single act, or an offense must be a  necessary means to commit the crime.
  • Complex crime– one crime only as there is only one criminal intent – only one information need be filed
  • 2 kinds of complex crimes:

a)    compound crime – single act constitutes 2 or more grave or less grave felonies

Requisites:

1)    that only one single act is committed by the offender

2)    that the single act produces

a)    2 or more grave felonies

b)    one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies

c)    2 or more less grave felonies

b)    complex crime proper – when an offense is a necessary means for committing another

Requisites:

1)    that at least 2 offenses are committed

2)    that one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other

3)    that both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute

  • No single act in the following cases:

a)    When 2 persons are killed one after the other, by different acts, although these 2 killings were the result of a single criminal impulse, the different acts must be considered as distinct crimes.

b)    When the acts are wholly different, not only in themselves, but also because they are directed against 2 different persons, as when one fires his gun twice in succession, killing one and injuring the other.

  • Light felonies produced by the same act should be treated and punished as separate offenses or may be absorbed by the grave felony.

Examples:

a) several light felonies resulting from one single act – not complex

Juan hit Pedro’s car, resulting in several light injuries and light felony of damage to property. No complex crime because the crime of slight physical injuries and damage to property are light felonies. There are as many crimes as there are persons injured w/ light physical injuries and as many penalties as there are light felonies committed, even though they are produced by a single act of the offender.

b) when the crime is committed by force or violence, slight physical injuries are absorbed.

  • Examples of complex crimes:

a)    Juan was a barangay captain who was killed while discharging his duty, the crime is a complex crime of homicide w/ assault upon a person of authority.

b)    Juan raped Petra, causing her physical injuries w/c required a month’s worth of medical attention. This is a complex crime of rape w/ less serious physical injuries. The injuries were necessary to the commission of the rape.

  • when in obedience to an order, several accused simultaneously shot many persons, without evidence how many each killed, there is only a single offense, there being a single criminal impulse.
  • when various acts are executed for the attainment of a single purpose w/c constitutes an offense, such acts must be considered only as one offense.

Example: Juan falsified 100 warehouse receipts from April to June which enabled him to swindle the bank of 100 million. There’s only one complex crime of estafa through multiple falsification of documents.

  • There is no complex crime of arson w/ homicide
  • Art 48 is applicable to crimes through negligence

Example: Juan lit a cigarette as he poured gas in the tank of his car in his garage. The gas caught fire and the house burned. His sister died and the maid suffered serious physical injuries. The crimes of arson, homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property constitute a complex crime. There is only one penalty but there are 3 civil liabilities.

  • No complex crime when one of the offenses is penalized by a special law
  • Example of complex crime proper (at least 2 crimes must be committed):

Kidnapping the victim to murder him in a secluded place – ransom wasn’t paid so victim was killed. Kidnapping was a necessary means to commit murder. But where the victim was taken from his home for the sole purpose of killing him and not for detaining him illegally or for the purpose of ransom, the crime is simple murder.

  • “Necessary means” does not mean “indispensable means”. Indispensable would mean it is an element of the crime. The crime can be committed by another mean. The means actually employed (another crime) was merely to facilitate and insure the consummation of the crime.
  • When in the definition of a felony, one offense is a means to commit the other, there is no complex crime.

Ex. Murder committed by means of fire. Murder can be qualified by the circumstance of fire so no complex crime even if Art 321 and 324 punishes arson. It’s plain and simple murder.

  • Not complex crime when trespass to dwelling is a direct means to commit a grave offense. Like rape, there is no complex crime of trespass to dwelling with rape. Trespass will be considered as aggravating (unlawful entry or breaking part of a dwelling)
  • No complex crime when one offense is committed to conceal another

Example: Juan set the school on fire after committing homicide. 2 crimes.

  • When the offender had in his possession the funds w/c he misappropriated, the falsification of a public or official document involving said funds is a separate offense. But when the offender had to falsify a public or official document to obtain possession of the funds w/c he misappropriated, the falsification is a necessary means to commit the malversation.
  • There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery or other common crimes. They are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion – absorbed already.
  • When 2 crimes produced by a single act are respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of 2 courts of different jurisdiction, the court of higher jurisdiction shall try the complex crime.

Example: Although the forcible abduction which was supposedly commenced in Manila was not proven, and although the rape which was proven was actually committed in Cavite, still the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to convict the accused of rape. The complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was charged in the complaint on the basis of which the case was tried.

  • 48 is intended to favor the culprit.
  • The penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. If the different crimes resulting from one single act are punished with the same penalty, the penalty for any one of them shall be imposed, the same to be applied in the maximum period. The same rule shall be observed when an offense is a necessary means to commit the other.
  • A complex crime of the second form may be committed by two persons.
  • But when one of the offenses, as a means to commit the other, was committed by one of the accused by reckless imprudence, the accused who committed the crime by reckless imprudence is liable for his acts only.

Example: Juan cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even assuming he had no intention to defraud Tomas if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits, Juan’s participation together w/ the participation of his co-defendants in the commission of the offense completed all the elements necessary for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through  falsification of documents.

  • When two felonies constituting a complex crime are punishable by imprisonment and fine, respectively, only the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed.
  • When a single act constitutes two grave or less grave or one grave and another less grave, and the penalty for one is imprisonment while that for the other is fine, the severity of the penalty for the more serious crime should not be judged by the classification of each of the penalties involved, but by the nature of the penalties.

Example: Even if the fine for damage to property through reckless imprudence is P40,000, an afflictive penalty, and the penalty for the physical injuries resulting from the same act is only 4 mos of arresto mayor, a correccional penalty may be imposed.

  • In the order of severity of the penalties, arresto mayor and arresto menor are considered more severe than destierro and arresto menor is higher in degree than destierro.
  • Fine is not included in the list of penalties in the order of severity and it is the last in the order.
  • Art 48 applies only to cases where the Code doesn’t provide a specific penalty for a complex crime.
  • Art 48 doesn’t apply when the law provides one single penalty for single complex crimes like the ff:

a)    robbery w/ homicide

b)    robbery w/ rape

c)    kidnapping w/ serious physical injuries

d)    rape w/ homicide

  • When a complex crime is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other.
  • Plurality of crimes – consists in the successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of w/c no conviction has yet been declared.
  • Kinds of plurality of crimes:

a)    formal or ideal – only one criminal liability

b)    real or material – there are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender, in such cases, the offender shall be punished for each and every offense that he committed.

Example: Juan stabbed Pedro, then Juan stabbed Tomas too. There are 2 committed as 2 acts were performed.

PLURALITY OF CRIMES

RECIDIVISM

No conviction of the crimes committed

There must be conviction by final judgment of the first prior offense

  • Formal/ideal plural crimes are divided into 3 groups: (a person committing multiple crimes is punished w/ one penalty in the ff cases)

a)    when the offender commits any of the complex crimes defined in art 48

b)    when the law specifically fixes a single penalty for 2 or more offenses committed: robbery w/ homicide, kidnapping w/ serious physical injuires

c)    when the offender commits continued crimes

  • Continued crimes – refers to a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed, so only one penalty shall be imposed.
  • Examples of continued crimes:

a)    a collector of a commercial firm misappropriates for his personal use several amounts collected by him from different persons. There is only one crime because the different and successive appropriations are but the different moments during which one criminal resolution arises.

b)    Juan stole 2 books belonging to 2 different persons. He commits only one crime because there is unity of thought in the criminal purpose of the offender.

  • A continued crime is not a complex crime as offender does not perform a single act but a series of acts. Therefore:

a)    penalty not to be imposed in the maximum

b)    no actual provision punishing a continued crime – it’s a principle applied in connection w/ 2 or more crimes committed w/ a single intention.

  • Continued crime is different from a transitory crime.  Transitory crime is “moving crime”.

Example: kidnapping someone for ransom and moving him to another venue. The offenders can be prosecuted and tried in either of the 2 areas.

REAL/MATERAIAL PLURALITY

CONTINUED CRIME

There is a series of acts performed by the offender

Same

Each act performed constitutes a separate crime because each act is generated by a criminal impulse

Different acts constitute only one crime because all of the acts performed arise from one criminal resolution.

Art. 49.            Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:

1.         If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2.         If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3.         The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

  • Art 49 has reference to the provision in the 1stpar of Art 4 which provides that criminal liability shall be incurred “by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended”
  • Art 49 applicable only in cases when there is a mistake in identity of the victim of the crime and the penalty for the crime committed is different from that for the crime intended to be committed.
  • Art 49 also has no application where a more serious consequence not intended by the offender befalls the same person.

Example: Juan only wanted to inflict a wound upon Pedro but because he lost control of his right arm, he killed Pedro. Art 49 not applicable.

ART 49

ART 48

Lesser penalty to be imposed in its maximum pd

Penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum pd

Notes:

  1. 49 has reference to Art. 4(1). It applies only when there is error in personae.
  2. In Art. 49 (Paragraphs 1 and 2) the lower penalty in its maximum period is always imposed.
  3. In Par. 3 the penalty for the attempted or frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. This rule is not necessary and may well be covered by Art. 48, in view of the fact that the same act also constitutes an attempt or a frustration of another crime.

Art. 50.            Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

Art. 51.            Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

Art. 52.            Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.

Art. 53.            Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.

Art. 54.            Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.

Art. 55.            Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated

crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.

Art. 56.            Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.

Art. 57.            Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted

crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.

Application of Article 50 to 57

Participation

Consummated

Frustrated

Attempted

Principal

Penalty imposed by law

1° less

2° less

Accomplice

1° less

2° less

3° less

Accessory

2° less

3° less

4° less

  • Notes:

Art 50-57 not applicable when the law specifically prescribes the penalty for the frustrated and attempted felony or that to be imposed upon the accomplices and accessories.

Degree – one whole penalty, one entire penalty or one unit of the penalties enumerated in the graduated scales provided for in Art 71

Period – one of 3 equal portions, min/med/max of a divisible penalty. A period of a divisible penalty when prescribed by the Code as a penalty for a felony, is in itself a degree.

Distinctions between Degree and Period

Degree

Period

Refers to the penalty imposable for a felony committed considering the stages of execution and the degree of participation of the offender

Refers to the duration of the penalty consisting of the maximum, medium, and minimum, after considering the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances

May refer to both divisible and indivisible penalties

Refers only to divisible penalties

  • The rules provided in Arts. 53, 55 and 57 do not apply if the felony is light because accessories are not liable for the same
  • Bases for imposition of the penalty under the RPC
  1. Stage of the commission of the crime
  2. Participation of the persons liable
  3. Presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances

Art. 58.            Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain

accessories. — Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.

  • Art is limited only to grave and less grave felonies since it is not possible to have accessories liable for light felonies. It is further limited to those whose participation in the crime is characterized by the misuse of public office or authority.

Example:   a)  A mayor aided in friend, a wanted criminal, in escaping

b)  A senator gives protection to his jueteng lord friend

  • Additional Penalties for Public Officers who are accessories
  1. Absolute perpetual disqualification, if the principal offender is guilty of a grave felony.
  2. Absolute temporary disqualification if the principal offender is guilty of less grave felony

Art. 59.            Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.

  • Basis for the imposition of proper penalty in impossible crimes: sopcial danger and degree of criminality shown by the offender.

Example: Juan fired a revolver at Pedro at the distance of 2 kilometers. This shoes stupidity rather than danger. Juan should not be punished as there is no social danger nor degree of criminality.

But if Juan was a convicted felon, act may be punished.

  • Article limited to those cases of grave and less grave felonies.

Art. 60.            Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.

  • 2 cases wherein the accomplice is punished w/ the same penalty imposed upon the principal

a)    ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who by abuse of authority or confidential relationship shall cooperate as accomplices in the crimes of rape, acts of lasciviousness, seduction, corruption of minors, white slave trade or abduction.

b)    one who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime of slight illegal detention.

  • Accessory punished as principal: Art 142 – punishes an accessory for knowingly concealed certain evil practices.
  • Cases when instead of a penalty 2 degrees lower, one degree for accessory:

a)    knowingly using counterfeited seal or forged signature or stamp of the President

b)    illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note

c)    using a falsified document

d)    using a falsified dispatch

Art. 61.            Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:

1.         When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.

2.         When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.

3.         When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.

4.         when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale. 

5.         When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.

  • The rules provided in this Art should also apply in determining the minimum of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL). It also applies in lowering the penalty by one or two degrees by reason of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance or when the penalty is divisible and there are two or more mitigating circumstances.

Graduated Scale in Art 71

  • Indivisible Penalties:

a)    Death

b)    Reclusion Perpetua

  • Divisible Penalties:

a)    Reclusion Temporal

b)    Prision Mayor

c)    Prision Correccional

d)    Arresto Mayor

e)    Destierro

f)     Arresto Menor

g)    Public Censure

h)    Fine

  • Rule No. 1:

When the penalty is single and indivisible (ex. RP), the penalty next lower shall be reclusion temporal.

  • Rule No. 2:

a) when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties

Ex. penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death, the next lower penalty is reclusion temporal

b) when the penalty is composed of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent

Ex. one divisible penalty is reclusion temporal. The penalty immediately following RT is prision mayor. 2 divisible penalties are prision correccional to prision mayor. The penalty immediately preceding the lesser of the penalties of prision correccional to prision mayor is arresto mayor.

  • Rule No. 3:

When the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties and the maximum period of a divisible penalty/ or when composed of one divisible penalty the maximum of one divisible penalty

Ex. penalty for murder is reclusion temporal to death. The point of reference will be on the proper divisible penalty which is reclusion temporal. Under the 3rd rule, the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal is composed of the medium and minimum periods of reclusion temporal and the maximum of prision mayor.

  • Rule No.4:

When the penalty is composed of several periods

Ex. the “several” periods contemplated in this rule correspond to different divisible penalties. A penalty of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period is an example of such. The penalty immediately following the minimum of the entire sentence, which is prision mayor medium, is prision mayor in its minimum and the 2 periods next following, which are prision correccional max and medium.

  • Rule No.5:

When the penalty has only 2 periods

Ex. Abduction punishable by prision correccional in its medium and minimum. The next penalty following is formed by 2 periods to be taken from the same penalty if possible or from the periods of the penalty numerically following the lesser of the penalties prescribed. The penalty next following prision correccional in its med and min shall be arresto mayor in its med and max.

  • Mitigating and Aggravating circumstances are first disregarded in the application of the rules for graduating penalties. It is only after the penalty next lower in degree is already determined that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be considered.

Art. 62.            Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

1.         Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

2.         The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

3.         Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.

4.         The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.

5.         Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects.

(a)        Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;

(b)       Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and

(c)        Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of  prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

  • Par 1: Aggravating circumstances are not to be taken into account when:

a)    they themselves constitute a crime

Ex. by “means of fire” – arson

b)    they are included by law in the definition of a crime

  • Par 2: Same rules applies when the aggravating circumstance is inherent in the crime
  • Par 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances arising from any of the ff affect only those to whom such circumstances are attendant:

a)    from the moral attributes of the offender

b)    from his private relations w/ the offended party

c)    from any other personal cause

  • Par 4: the circumstances w/c consist of the ff shall serve to aggravate and mitigate the liability only of those who had knowledge of them at the time of the commission of the offense

a)    material execution of the act

b)    means employed to accomplish the crime

  • Par 5: Habitual Delinquent is a person who within the period of 10 years from the date of his (last) release or last conviction of the crimes of:

a)    serious or less serious physical injuries

b)    robbery

c)    estafa

d)    falsification

is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time or oftener.

  • Ten year period to be computed from the time of last release or conviction
  • Subsequent crime must be committed after conviction of the former crime. Cases still pending are not to be taken into consideration.

HABITUAL DELINQUENCY

RECIDIVISM

Crimes to be committed are specified

Same title

W/ in 10 years

No time fixed by law

Must be found guilty 3rd time or oftener

Second conviction

Additional penalty is imposed

Is not offset by MC, increases penalty to maximum

  • Rulings on Habitual Delinquency:

a)    the law on habitual delinquency does not contemplate the exclusion from the computation of prior conviction those falling outside the 10 yr pd immediately preceding the crime for w/c the defendant is being tried

b)    ten yr pd is counted not from the date of commission of the subsequent offense but to the date of conviction thereof in relation to the date of his last release or last conviction

c)    when an offender has committed several crimes mentioned in the definition of habitual delinquent, without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others, he is not a habitual delinquent

d)    convictions on the same day or at about the same time are considered as one only (days, weeks..)

e)    crimes committed on the same date, although convictions on different dates are considered as one

f)     previous convictions are considered every time a new offense is committed

g)    commissions of those crimes need not be consummated

h)    habitual delinquency applies to accomplice and accessories as long as in the crimes specified

i)      a crime committed in the minority of the offender is not counted

j)      imposition of additional penalty is mandatory and constitutional

k)    modifying circumstances applicable to additional penalty

l)      habitual delinquency is not a crime, it is simply a fact or circumstance which if present gives rise to the imposition of additional penalty

m)  penalty for habitual delinquency is a real penalty that determines jurisdiction

n)    a habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist

  • o)    in imposing the additional penalty, recidivism is not aggravating. The additional penalty must be imposed in its minimum

p)    an offender can be a habitual delinquent w/o being a recidivist

Notes:

  • In no case shall be the total penalties imposed  upon the offender exceed 30 years
  • The law does not apply to crimes described in Art. 155
  • The imposition of the additional penalties on habitual delinquents are constitutional, it is simply a punishment on future crimes on account of the criminal propensities of the accused.
  • The imposition of such additional penalties are mandatory.
  • Habitual delinquency applies at any stage of the execution because subjectively, the offender reveals the same degree of depravity or perversity as the one who commits a consummated crime.
  • Habitual delinquency applies to all participants because it reveals persistence in them of the inclination to wrongdoing and of the perversity of character that led them to commit the previous crime.
  • Cases where the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances are not considered in the imposition of penalties.
  • Penalty that is single and indivisible
  • Felonies through negligence
  • Penalty is a fine
  • Penalty is prescribed by a special law

Art. 63.            Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1.         When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2.         When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3.         When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4.         When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

  • Art 63 applies only when the penalty prescribed by the Code is either one indivisible penalty or 2 indivisible penalties
  • When the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present
    • Exception: in cases of privileged mitigating circumstances
  • 4: the moral value rather than the numerical weight shall be taken into account
  • Rules for the application of indivisible penalties
    • Penalty is single and indivisible – applied regardless of the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
    • Penalty composed of two indivisible penalties
  1. One aggravating circumstance present – higher penalty
  2. One mitigating circumstance present – lower penalty
  3. Some mitigating circumstances present and no aggravating – lower penalty
  4. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstance are present – basis in number and importance

Art. 64.            Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1.         When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

2.         When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.

3.         When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.

4.         When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5.         When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

6.         Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.

7.         Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

  • Art 64 applies when the penalty has 3 periods because they are divisible. If the penalty is composed of 3 different penalties, each forms a period according to Art 77
  • Par 4: the mitigating circumstances must be ordinary, not privileged. The aggravating circumstances must be generic or specific, not qualifying or inherent.

Example: a qualifying circumstance (treachery) cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance (voluntary circumstance)

  • The court has discretion to impose the penalty within the limits fixed by law
  • Art 64 not applicable when the penalty is indivisible or prescribed by special law or a fine
  • Rules for the application of divisible penalties
    • No aggravating and no mitigating circumstances – medium period
    • One mitigating circumstance – minimum period
    • One aggravating circumstance – maximum period
    • Mitigating and aggravating circumstance o offset each other and according to relative weight
    • 2 or more mitigating without any aggravating circumstance – on degree lower

Art. 65.            Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.

COMPUTATIONS:

A. Example: Prision Mayor (6 yrs, 1 day to 12 yrs)

1)    subtract the minimum (disregard 1 day) from the maximum

12yrs – 6yrs = 6 yrs

2)    divide the difference by 3

6 yrs / 3 = 2 yrs

3)    use the minimum (6 yrs and 1 day) as the minimum of the minimum period. Then add the 2 yrs (disregarding the 1 day) to the minimum to get the maximum of the minimum

6 yrs (minimum of the minimum)

+          2 yrs (difference)

——————————————-

8 yrs (maximum of the minimum).

Therefore, minimum period of prision mayor; 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs

4)    use the maximum of the minimum period as the minimum of the medium period and add 1 day to distinguish from the minimum period. Then add 2 years to the minimum of the medium (disregarding the 1 day) to get the maximum of the medium period.

8 yrs (minimum of the medium)

+          2 yrs (difference)

——————————————-

10 yrs (maximum of the medium)

Therefore, medium period of prision mayor; 8 yrs 1 day to 10 yrs

5)    use the maximum of the medium period as the minimum of the maximum pd, add 1 day to distinguish it from the medium period. Then add 2 yrs to the minimum of the maximum pd (disregarding the 1 day) to get the maximum of the maximum period)

10 yrs (maximum of the medium)

+            2 yrs (difference)

———————————————-

12 yrs (maximum of the maximum)

Therefore, maximum period of prision mayor; 10 yrs 1 day to 12 yrs

  • Computation above applicable to all others except arresto mayor

B. Example: Prision Mayor minimum (6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs) only

1)    Subtract minimum from the maximum

8yrs – 6yrs = 2 yrs

2)    Divide the difference by 3

2yrs / 3 = 8 months

3)    Use the minimum of the given example as the minimum period. Then to get to get the maximum of the minimum, add the 8 months

6 yrs + 8 months = 6 yrs and 8 months

Therefore, minimum of prision mayor minimum; 6 yrs 1 day to 6 yrs 8 months

4)    Use the maximum of the minimum as the minimum of the medium period. Add 1 day to distinguish it from the maximum of the minimum. Add the 8 months and this becomes the maximum of the medium

6 yrs 8 months + 8 months = 7 yrs 4 months

Therefore, the medium period of prision mayor minimum; 6 yrs 8 mos 1 day to 7 yrs 4 mos

5)    Use the maximum of the medium as the minimum period of the maximum period and add 1 day to distinguish. Add the 8 months to get the maximum of this maximum

7 yrs 4 mos + 8 mos = 8 yrs

Therefore, maximum of prision mayor; 7 yrs 4 mos 1 day to 8 yrs

Art. 66.            Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

  • Court must consider the following in imposing the fine:

a)    mitigating and aggravating circumstances

b)    the wealth and means of the culprit

  • When the minimum of the fine is not fixed, the court shall have the discretion provided it does not exceed the amount authorized by law

Art. 67.            Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.

  • Requisites of Art 12 par 4

a)    act causing the injury must be lawful

b)    act performed w/ due care

c)    injury was caused by mere accident

d)    no fault or intention to cause injury

  • if these conditions are not all present, then the ff penalties shall be imposed:

a)    grave felony – arresto mayor max to prision correccional min

b)    less grave felony – arresto mayor min to arresto mayor med

Art. 68.            Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1.         Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2.         Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Notes:

  • 68 applies to such minor if his application for suspension of sentence is disapproved or if while in the reformatory institution he becomes incorrigible in which case he shall be returned to the court for the imposition of the proper penalty.
  • 68 provides for 2 privileged mitigating circumstances

If the act is attended by two or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty being divisible a minor over 15 but under 18 may still get a penalty two degrees lower.

  • under 15 but over 9 and has acted w/ discretion: 2 degrees lower
  • under 18 but over 15: 1 degree lower

Art. 69.            Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

  • Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable
    • 1 or 2 degrees lower if the majority of the conditions for justification or exemption in the cases provided in Arts. 11 and 12 are present.

Art. 70.            Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1.         Death,

2.         Reclusion perpetua,

3.         Reclusion temporal,

4.         Prision mayor,

5.         Prision correccional,

6.         Arresto mayor,

7.         Arresto menor,

8.         Destierro,

9.         Perpetual absolute disqualification,

10        Temporal absolute disqualification.

11.       Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling, and

12.       Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties ( pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended).

  • Maximum duration of the convict’s sentence: 3 times the most severe penalty
  • Max period shall not exceed 40 years
  • Subsidiary imprisonment – this shall be excluded in computing for the maximum duration

Example: Juan has 10 sentences of 6 months and 1 day each and a fine of 1000. He was not able to pay the fine. Therefore, he must serve subsidiary penalty after 18 months and 3 days in jail.

Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.

  • Guarantees that no act of a citizen will be considered criminal unless the State has made it so by law and provided a penalty
  • Except:  When the penalty is favorable to the criminal.

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

  • General Rule: Criminal laws are given prospective effects
  • Exception: Give retroactive effect when favorable to the accused.  Ex. Special law made the penalty less severe – but must refer to the same deed or omission penalized by the former statute
  • New law may provide that its provisions not to be applied to cases already filed in court at the time of the approval of such law.
  • The favorable retroactive effect of a new law may find the defendant in one of the 3 situations
  • Habitual criminal (person who within the pd of 10 years from date of release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener) is NOT entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the new favorable law.
  • Civil liabilities not covered by Art 22 because rights of offended persons are not within the gift of arbitrary disposal of the State.
  • But new law increasing civil liability cannot be given retroactive effect.
  • Retroactivity applicable also to special laws
  • The right to punish offenses committed under an old penal law is not extinguished if the offenses are still punished in the repealing penal law. However, if by re-enactment of the provisions of the former law, the repeal is by implication and there is a saving clause, criminal liability under the repealed law subsists.
  • No retroactive effect of penal laws as regards jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime.
  • Jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after trial.
  • When a law is ex post facto
  1. crime has been committed and the prosecution begins
  2. sentence has been passed but service has not begun
  3. sentence is being carried out.

a      Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act.

b      Aggravates the crime or makes it greater than it was when committed.

c      Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.

d      Alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the crime.

e      Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.

f       Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty.

  • Bill of Attainder – a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.
  • Effect of change of Penal Law

a      With enactment of a penal law punishing the offense – the action is not dismissed. The penalty in the new law if favorable to the accused.

b      Without enactment of a penal law punishing the offense  – the previous offense is obliterated and the action is dismissed.

Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.

  • Even if injured party already pardoned the offender – fiscal can still prosecute. Not even considered a ground for dismissal of the information. Exception: Art 344 – crimes of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness – pardon must be expressed.
  • Basis: crime is an offense against the State. Aggrieved party only a witness.
  • Only Chief Executive can pardon the offenders
  • Can’t compromise criminal liability, only civil liability – but it still shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty.
  • Offended party in the crimes of adultery and concubinage can’t institute criminal prosecution if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
  • Pardon in adultery and concubinage may be implied – continued inaction after learning of the offense. Must pardon both offenders.
  • The pardon afforded the offenders must come BEFORE the institution of the criminal proceedings. Complaint for any of the above-mentioned crimes in Art 344 will still be prosecuted by the court on the ground that the pardon (basis for the motion to dismiss) was given after the filing of the complaint.
  • The only act that extinguishes the penal action, after the institution of criminal action, is the marriage between the offender and the offended party
  • Pardon under Art 344 is only a bar to criminal prosecution. It DOES NOT extinguish criminal liability. It is not one of the causes that totally extinguish criminal liability in Art 89.
  • Civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver because personal injury may be repaired through indemnity anyway. State has no reason to insist on its payment.
  • Waiver must be express.

Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. — The following shall not be considered as penalties:

1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.

2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes specified therein.

3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.

4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their subordinates.

5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form.

  • Par 1 refers to the “accused persons” who are detained “by reason of insanity or imbecility” not an insane or imbecile who has not been arrested for a crime.
  • They are not considered penalties because they are not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Those in par 1, 3 and 4 are merely preventive measures before the conviction of offenders.
  • Commitment of a minor is not a penalty because it is not imposed by the court in a judgment. The imposition of the sentence in such a case is suspended.
  • Fines in par 4 are not imposed by the court because otherwise, they constitute a penalty

 

Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the following:

Scale

PRINCIPAL PENALTIES

Capital punishment:

                Death.

Afflictive penalties:

                Reclusion perpetua,

                Reclusion temporal,

                Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

                Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,

                Prision mayor.

Correctional penalties:

                Prision correccional,

                Arresto mayor,

                Suspension,

                Destierro.

Light penalties:

                Arresto menor,

                Public censure.

Penalties common to the three preceding classes:

                Fine, and

                Bond to keep the peace.

ACCESSORY PENALTIES

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,

Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for the profession or calling.

Civil interdiction,

Indemnification,

Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,

Payment of costs.

  • Classification of penalties:

a      Principal  – art 25

b      Accessory – deemed included in the imposition of the principal penalties

  • According to divisibility (principal)

a      divisible – those that have fixed duration and are divisible into 3 periods

b      indivisible – no fixed duration (death, RP, perpetual or absolute disqualification)

  • According  to subject matter

a      corporal – death

b      deprivation of freedom – reclusion, prision, arresto

c      restriction of freedom – destierro

d      deprivation of rights – disqualification and suspension

e      pecuniary – fine

  • According to gravity

a      capital

b      afflictive

c      correccional

d      light

  • Public censure is a penalty, and being such, is not proper in acquittal. But a competent court, while acquitting an accused may, with unquestionable propriety express its disapproval or reprehension of those acts to avoid the impression that by acquitting the accused it approves or admires his conduct.
  • Permanent and temporary absolute and permanent and temporary special disqualification and suspension may be principal or accessory penalties because they are found in 2 general classes.

Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. — A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.

  • Fines are imposed either as alternative (Art 144 punishing disturbance of proceedings with arresto mayor or fine from 200 pesos to 1000 pesos) or single (fine of 200 to 6000 pesos)
  • Penalty cannot be imposed in the alternative since it’s the duty of the court to indicate the penalty imposed definitely and positively. Thus, the court cannot sentence the guilty person in a manner as such as “to pay fine of 1000 pesos, or to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, and to pay the costs.”
  • If the fine imposed by the law for the felony is exactly 200 pesos, it is a light felony.
  • Fines:

a      Afflictive – over 6000

b      Correctional – 201 to 6000

c      Light – 200 and less

  • Note: The classification applies if the fine is imposed as a single or alternative penalty. Hence, it does not apply if the fine imposed together with another penalty.
  • Bond to keep the peace is by analogy:

a      Afflictive – over 6000

b      Correctional – 201 to 6000

c      Light – 200 and less

Distinction between classification of  Penalties in Art. 9 and Art. 26

Article 9

Article 26

Applicable in determining the prescriptive period of felonies

Applicable in determining the prescriptive period of penalties

DURATION AND EFFECT OF PENALTIES

Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — Any person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon.

Reclusion temporal. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of  prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. — The duration of the penalties of  prision correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months.

Arresto menor. — The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may determine.

  • 3 fold rule: the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than 3 times the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
  • the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall in no case exceed 40 years
  • Temporary disqualification and suspension, when imposed as accessory penalties, have different durations – they follow the duration of the principal penalty
  • Destierro is imposed in the following circumstances:

a      serious physical injuries or death under exceptional circumstances (spouse finding other spouse in pari delicto)

b      failure to give bond for good behavior ( a person making threat may be required to give bond not to molest the person threatened, if not destierro)

c      penalty for the concubine

d      in cases where the reduction of the penalty by one or more degrees results in destierro

  • Bond to keep the peace is not specifically provided as a penalty for any felony and therefore cannot be imposed by the court. It is required in Art 284 and not to be given in cases involving other crimes.
  • Summary:

a      Perpetual penalties – after 30 years, can be pardoned, except when he is unworthy of pardon by reason of his conduct and some other serious cause, it won’t exceed 40 years.

b      Reclusion Temporal – 12 yrs and 1 day to 20 yrs

c      Prision Mayor and temporary disqualification – 6 yrs and 1 day to 12 yrs; disqualification if accessory follows the duration of the principal penalty

d      Prision Correccional, suspension and destierro – 6 mos and 1 day to 12 yrs; disqualification if accessory follows the duration of the principal penalty

e      Arresto Mayor – 1 month and 1 day to 6 months

f       Arresto Menor – 1 day to 30 days

g      Bond to keep the peace – the period during which the bond shall be effective is discretionary to the court

Capital and Afflictive Penalties

 

Death

Reclusion Perpetua

Reclusion Temporal

Prison Mayor

Term of Imprison-ment

None

20 days and 1 day to 40 years

12 years and 1 day to 20 years

6 years and 1 day to 12 years

Accessory Penalties

None, unless pardoned:

-Perpetual absolute disqualification

-Civil interdiction for 30 years

-Civil Interdiction or during his sentence

-Perpetual absolute disqualification

-Civil Interdiction or during his sentence

-Perpetual absolute disqualification

-Temporary absolute disqualification

-Perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender suffers although pardoned

Correctional and Light Penalties

 

Prison Correctional

Arresto Mayor

Arresto Menor

Imprison-ment

6 months and 1 day to 6 years

1 month and 1 day to 6 months

1 day to 30 days

Accessory Penalties

-Suspension from public office

-Suspension from the right to follow a profession or calling

-Perpetual special disqualification on the right of suffrage

-Suspension of right to hold office

-Suspension of the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence

-Suspension of right to hold office

-Suspension of the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence

Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final.

If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant commences to serve his sentence.

  • Director of Prisons/warden to compute based on Art 28:

a      When the offender is in prison – the duration of the temporary penalties (PAD, TAD, detention, suspension) is from the day on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.

b      When the offender is not in prison – the duration of the penalty in deprivation of liberty is from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty

c      The duration of the other penalties – the duration is from the day on which the offender commences to serve his sentence

  • Reason for rule (a) – because under Art 24, the arrest and temporary detention of the accused is not considered a penalty
  • if in custody, the accused appealed, the service of the sentence should commence from the date of the promulgation of the decision of the appellate court, not from the date of the judgment of the trial court was promulgated.
  • service of one in prison begins only on the day the judgment of conviction becomes final.
  • In cases if temporary penalties, if the offender is under detention, as when undergoing preventive imprisonment, rule (a) applies.
  • If not under detention (released on bail) rule (c) applies
  • Offender under preventive imprisonment, rule (c) applies not rule (a)
  • The offender is entitled to a deduction of full-time or 4/5 of the time of his detention.

Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment. (As amended by Republic Act 6127, June 17, 1970).  cd i

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by E.O. No. 214, July 10, 1988).

  • Accused undergoes preventive suspension if:

a      offense is non-bailable

b      bailable but can’t furnish bail

  • the full time or 4/5 of the time during which the offenders have undergone preventive suspension shall be deducted from the penalty imposed
  • preventive imprisonment must also be considered in perpetual penalties. Article does not make any distinction between temporal and perpetual penalties.
  • duration of RP is to be computed at 30 years, thus, even if the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment, he is entitled to the full time or 4/5 of the time of preventive suspension
  • Credit is given in the service of sentences “consisting of deprivation of liberty” (imprisonment and destierro). Thus, persons who had undergone preventive imprisonment but the offense is punishable by a fine only would not be given credit.
  • Destierro is considered a “deprivation of liberty”
  • If the penalty imposed is arresto menor to destierro, the accused who has been in prison for 30 days (arresto menor to 30 days) should be released because although the maximum penalty is destierro (6 mos 1 day to 6 yrs), the accused sentenced to such penalty does not serve it in prison.
  • Habitual Delinquents not entitled to the full time or 4/5 credit of time under preventive imprisonment since he is necessarily a recidivist or has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime.
  • Example: X who was arrested for serious physical injuries, detained for 1 year and went out on bail but was later on found guilty. He was consequently summoned for the execution of the sentence, but having failed to appear, X will not be credited in the service of his sentence for serious physical injuries w/ one year or 4/5 of one year preventive imprisonment.

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election.

2.The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

  • The exclusion is a mere disqualification for protection and not for punishment – the withholding of a privilege, not a denial of a right.
  • Perpetual absolute disqualification is effective during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence.
  • Temporary absolute disqualification is effective during the term of sentence and is removed after the service of the same. Exception: (1) deprivation of the public office or employment; (2) loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
  • Effects of Perpetual and temporary absolute disqualification:

a      Deprivation of any public office or employment of offender

b      Deprivation of the right to vote in any election or to be voted upon

c      Loss of rights to retirement pay or pension

d      All these effects last during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence except as regards paragraphs 2 and 3 of the above in connection with Temporary Absolute Disqualification.

Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification.

Art. 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.

  • Temporary disqualification if imposed is an accessory penalty, its duration is that of the principal penalty
  • Effects of Perpetual and Temporary Special Disqualification

a.  For public office, profession, or calling

  1. Deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected
  2. Disqualification for holding similar offices or employment during the period of disqualification

b. For the exercise of the right of suffrage

  1. Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected in an office.
  2. Cannot hold any public office during the period of disqualification.

 

Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. — The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his suspension.

  • Effects:

a      Disqualification from holding such office or the exercise of such profession or right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

b      Cannot hold another office having similar functions during the period of suspension.

Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

  • Effects:

a.  Deprivation of the following rights:

  1. Parental rights
  2. Guardianship over the ward
  3. Martial authority
  4. Right to manage property and to dispose of the same by acts inter vivos

b. Civil Interdiction is an accessory penalty to the following principal penalties

  1. If death penalty is commuted to life imprisonment
  2. Reclusion perpetua
  3. Reclusion temporal
  • He can dispose of such property by will or donation mortis causa

Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking.

The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond.

Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light felony.

  • Bond to keep the peace is different from bail bond which is posted for the provisional release of a person arrested for or accused of a crime. Bond to keep the peace or for good behavior is imposed as a penalty in threats.

Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

  • Pardon by the President does not restore the right to public office or suffrage except when both are expressly restored in the pardon. Nor does it exempt from civil liability/from payment of civil indemnity.
  • Limitations to President’s power to pardon:

a      can be exercised only after final judgment

b      does not extend to cases of impeachment

c      does not extinguish civil liability – only criminal liability

  • Pardon granted in general terms does not include accessory penalties.
  • Exceptions:
  • Pardon by the offended party – does not extinguish criminal liability, may include offended party waiving civil indemnity and it is done before the institution of the criminal prosecution and extended to both offenders.
  1. if the absolute pardon us granted after the term of imprisonment has expire, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. However, if the penalty is life imprisonment and after the service of 30 years, a pardon is granted, the pardon does not remove the accessory penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification
  2. if the facts and circumstances of the case show that the purpose of the President is to precisely restore the rights i.e., granting absolute pardon after election to a post (mayor) but before the date fixed by law for assuming office to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will

Art. 37. Cost. — What are included. — Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to schedule.

  • Costs include:
  • Costs (expenses of the litigation) are chargeable to the accused in vase of conviction.
  • In case of acquittal, the costs are de oficio, each party bearing is own expense
  • No costs allowed against the Republic of the Philippines until law provides the contrary
  1. fees
  2. indemnities in the course of judicial proceedings

Art. 38. Pecuniary liabilities. — Order of payment. — In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:

1.            The reparation of the damage caused.

2.            Indemnification of consequential damages.

3.            The fine.

4.            The cost of the proceedings.

  • Applicable “in case property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities.” Hence, if the offender has insufficient or no property, there is no use for Art 38.
  • Order of payment is mandatory
  • Example:  Juan inflicted serious physical injuries against Pedro and took the latter’s watch and ring. He incurred 500 worth of hospital bills and failed to earn 300 worth of salary. Given that Juan only has 1000 pesos worth of property not exempt from execution, it shall be first applied to the payment of the watch and ring which cannot be returned as such is covered by “reparation of the damage caused” thus, no. 1 in the order of payment. The 500 and 300 are covered by “indemnification of the consequential damage” thus, no. 2 in the order of payment.

Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.

3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969.)

  • There is no subsidiary penalty for non-payment of reparation, indemnification and costs in par 1, 2 and 4 of Art 38. It is only for fines.
  • Art 39 applies only when the convict has no property with which to meet the fine in par 3 of art 38. Thus, a convict who has property enough to meet the fine and not exempted from execution cannot choose to serve the subsidiary penalty instead of the payment of the fine.
  • Subsidiary imprisonment is not an accessory penalty. It is covered by Art 40-45 of this Code. Accessory penalties are deemed imposed even when not mentioned while subsidiary imprisonment must be expressly imposed.
  • Rules:

PENALTY IMPOSED

LENGTH OF SUBSIDIARY PENALTY

Prision correccional or arresto and fine

Not exceed 1/3 of term of sentence, in no case more than 1 year fraction or part of a day not counted.

Fine only

Not to exceed 6 months if prosecuted for grave or less grave felony, not to exceed 15 days if prosecuted for light felony

Higher than prision correccional

No subsidiary imprisonment

Not to be executed by confinement but of fixed duration

Same deprivations as those of the principal penalty under rules 1, 2 and 3 above

  • If financial circumstances improve, convict still to pay the fine even if he has suffered subsidiary personal liability.
  • the penalty imposed must be PC, AM, Am, suspension, destierro and fine only. – other than these (PM, RT, RP) court cannot impose subsidiary penalty.
  • Even if the penalty imposed is not higher than PC, if the accused is a habitual delinquent who deserves an additional penalty of 12 yrs and 1 day of RT, there is no subsidiary imprisonment.

Art. 40. Death — Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. — Their accessory penalties. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

 

Art. 42. Prision mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

 

Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of  prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Art. 44. Arresto — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.

  • Outline of accessory penalties inherent in principal penalties
  1. death – if not executed because of commutation or pardon
  2. perpetual absolute disqualification
  3. civil interdiction during 30 years (if not expressly remitted in the pardon)
  4. civil interdiction for life or during the sentence
  5. perpetual absolute disqualification (unless expressly remitted in the pardon)
  6. temporary absolute disqualification
  7. perpetual absolute disqualification from suffrage (unless expressly remitted in the pardon)
  8. suspension from public office, profession or calling
  9. perpetual special disqualification from suffrage if the duration of the imprisonment exceeds 18 months (unless expressly remitted in the pardon)
  10. RP and RT
  11. PM
  12. PC
  • The accessory penalties in Art 40-44 must be suffered by the offender, although pardoned as to the principal penalties. To be relieved of these penalties, they must be expressly remitted in the pardon.
  • No accessory penalty for destierro
  • Persons who served out the penalty may not have the right to exercise the right of suffrage. For a prisoner who has been sentenced to one year of imprisonment or more for any crime, absolute pardon restores to him his political rights. If the penalty is less than one year, disqualification does not attach except if the crime done was against property.
  • The nature of the crime is immaterial when the penalty imposed is one year imprisonment or more.
  • The accessory penalties are understood to be always imposed upon the offender by the mere fact that the law fixes a certain penalty for the crime. Whenever the courts impose a penalty which by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, it’s understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed.
  • the accessory penalties do not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the information is filed because they don’t modify or alter the nature of the penalty provided by law. What determines jurisdiction in criminal cases is the extent of the principal penalty w/c the law imposes of the crime charged.
  • the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months or a fine of not more than 4000 or both regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties.

Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. — Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

  • every penalty imposed carries with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools used in the commission of the crime
  • proceeds and instruments/tools of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government
  • 3rdpersons’ (not liable for the offense) property is not subject to confiscation and forfeiture
  • property not subject of lawful commerce (whether it belongs to accused or 3rdperson) shall be destroyed.
  • can’t confiscate/forfeit unless there’s a criminal case filed and  tried, and accused is acquitted.
  • must indict 3rdperson to order confiscation of his property
  • instruments of the crime belonging to innocent 3rdperson may be recovered
  • confiscation can be ordered only if the property is submitted in evidence or placed at the disposal of the court
  • articles which are forfeited – when the order of forfeiture is already final, can’t be returned even in case of an acquittal
  • confiscation and acquittal are additional penalties. Where the penalty imposed did not include the confiscation of the goods involved, the confiscation & forfeiture of said goods would be an additional penalty and would amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed, thereby placing the accused in double jeopardy.
  • when the accused has appealed, confiscation and forfeiture not ordered by the trial court may be imposed by the appellate court
  • the government can’t appeal the modification of a sentence if the defendant did not appeal. But if the defendant appeals, it removes all bars to the review and correction of the penalty imposed by the court below, even if an increase thereof should be the result.

Art. 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. — The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.

Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.

  • The penalty prescribed by law in general terms shall be imposed:

a      upon the principals

b      for consummated felony

  • Exception: when the law fixes a penalty for the frustrated or attempted felony. Whenever it is believed that the penalty lower by one or two degrees corresponding to said acts of execution is not proportionate to the wrong done, the law fixes a distinct penalty for the principal in the frustrated or attempted felony.
  • The graduation of penalties refers to:

a      stages of execution (consummated, frustrated, attempted)

b      degree of the criminal participation of the offender (principal, accomplice, accessory)

  • the division of a divisible penalty (min, med, max) refers to the proper period of the penalty which should be imposed when aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend the commission of the crime.

Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the following cases:

1.            When the guilty person be more than seventy years of age.

2.            When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.

  • whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by 10 justices of the court. When 10 justices fail to reach a decision (as to the propriety of the imposition of  the death penalty), the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be imposed.
  • Death penalty not imposed in the ff cases:

a)      when the person is more than 70 years old at time RTC sentenced him

b)      when upon appeal or revision of the case by the SC, 10 justices are not unanimous in their voting

c)       when the offender is a minor under 18 yrs of age. Why? Because minority is always a mitigating circumstance

  • Justification for the death penalty: social defense and exemplarity. Not considered cruel and unusual because does not involve torture or lingering death.
  • Crimes where death penalty is imposed:

a)      treason

b)      certain acts of espionage under Commonwealth Act 616

c)       correspondence w/ hostile country when it contains notice or information and the intention of the offender is to aid the enemy

d)      qualified piracy

e)      certain violations of the Anti-subversion act

f)       parricide

g)      murder

h)      kidnapping and serious illegal detention

i)        robbery w/ homicide

j)        rape w/ homicide

k)      when death resulted from the commission of arson or other crime involving destruction

  • trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence, despite plea of guilty, when the crime charged is punished by death. A sentence of death is valid only if it is susceptible of a fair and reasonable examination by the court. This is impossible if no evidence of guilt was taken after a plea of guilty.

 

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

  • The 2 or more grave or less grave felonies must be the result of a single act, or an offense must be a  necessary means to commit the crime.
  • Complex crime – one crime only as there is only one criminal intent – only one information need be filed.
  • 2 kinds of complex crimes:

a)      compound crime – single act constitutes 2 or more grave or less grave felonies

Requisites:

1)      that only one single act is committed by the offender

2)      that the single act produces

a)      2 or more grave felonies

b)      one or more grave and one or more less grave felonies

c)       2 or more less grave felonies

b)      complex crime proper – when an offense is a necessary means for committing another

Requisites:

1)      that at least 2 offenses are committed

2)      that one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other

3)      that both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute

  • No single act in the following cases:

a)      When 2 persons are killed one after the other, by different acts, although these 2 killings were the result of a single criminal impulse, the different acts must be considered as distinct crimes.

b)      When the acts are wholly different, not only in themselves, but also because they are directed against 2 different persons, as when one fires his gun twice in succession, killing one and injuring the other.

  • Light felonies produced by the same act should be treated and punished as separate offenses or may be absorbed by the grave felony.

Examples:

a) several light felonies resulting from one single act – not complex

Juan hit Pedro’s car, resulting in several light injuries and light felony of damage to property. No complex crime because the crime of slight physical injuries and damage to property are light felonies. There are as many crimes as there are persons injured w/ light physical injuries and as many penalties as there are light felonies committed, even though they are produced by a single act of the offender.

b) when the crime is committed by force or violence, slight physical injuries are absorbed.

  • Examples of complex crimes:

a)      Juan was a barangay captain who was killed while discharging his duty, the crime is a complex crime of homicide w/ assault upon a person of authority.

b)      Juan raped Petra, causing her physical injuries w/c required a month’s worth of medical attention. This is a complex crime of rape w/ less serious physical injuries. The injuries were necessary to the commission of the rape.

  • when in obedience to an order, several accused simultaneously shot many persons, without evidence how many each killed, there is only a single offense, there being a single criminal impulse.
  • when various acts are executed for the attainment of a single purpose w/c constitutes an offense, such acts must be considered only as one offense.

Example: Juan falsified 100 warehouse receipts from April to June which enabled him to swindle the bank of 100 million. There’s only one complex crime of estafa through multiple falsification of documents.

  • There is no complex crime of arson w/ homicide
  • Art 48 is applicable to crimes through negligence

Example: Juan lit a cigarette as he poured gas in the tank of his car in his garage. The gas caught fire and the house burned. His sister died and the maid suffered serious physical injuries. The crimes of arson, homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property constitute a complex crime. There is only one penalty but there are 3 civil liabilities.

  • No complex crime when one of the offenses is penalized by a special law
  • Example of complex crime proper (at least 2 crimes must be committed):

Kidnapping the victim to murder him in a secluded place – ransom wasn’t paid so victim was killed. Kidnapping was a necessary means to commit murder. But where the victim was taken from his home for the sole purpose of killing him and not for detaining him illegally or for the purpose of ransom, the crime is simple murder.

  • “Necessary means” does not mean “indispensable means”. Indispensable would mean it is an element of the crime. The crime can be committed by another mean. The means actually employed (another crime) was merely to facilitate and insure the consummation of the crime.
  • When in the definition of a felony, one offense is a means to commit the other, there is no complex crime.

Ex. Murder committed by means of fire. Murder can be qualified by the circumstance of fire so no complex crime even if Art 321 and 324 punishes arson. It’s plain and simple murder.

  • Not complex crime when trespass to dwelling is a direct means to commit a grave offense. Like rape, there is no complex crime of trespass to dwelling with rape. Trespass will be considered as aggravating (unlawful entry or breaking part of a dwelling)
  • No complex crime when one offense is committed to conceal another

Example: Juan set the school on fire after committing homicide. 2 crimes.

  • When the offender had in his possession the funds w/c he misappropriated, the falsification of a public or official document involving said funds is a separate offense. But when the offender had to falsify a public or official document to obtain possession of the funds w/c he misappropriated, the falsification is a necessary means to commit the malversation.
  • There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery or other common crimes. They are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion – absorbed already.
  • When 2 crimes produced by a single act are respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of 2 courts of different jurisdiction, the court of higher jurisdiction shall try the complex crime.

Example: Although the forcible abduction which was supposedly commenced in Manila was not proven, and although the rape which was proven was actually committed in Cavite, still the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to convict the accused of rape. The complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was charged in the complaint on the basis of which the case was tried.

  • 48 is intended to favor the culprit.
  • The penalty for complex crime is the penalty for the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. If the different crimes resulting from one single act are punished with the same penalty, the penalty for any one of them shall be imposed, the same to be applied in the maximum period. The same rule shall be observed when an offense is a necessary means to commit the other.
  • A complex crime of the second form may be committed by two persons.
  • But when one of the offenses, as a means to commit the other, was committed by one of the accused by reckless imprudence, the accused who committed the crime by reckless imprudence is liable for his acts only.

Example: Juan cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even assuming he had no intention to defraud Tomas if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits, Juan’s participation together w/ the participation of his co-defendants in the commission of the offense completed all the elements necessary for the perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through  falsification of documents.

  • When two felonies constituting a complex crime are punishable by imprisonment and fine, respectively, only the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed.
  • When a single act constitutes two grave or less grave or one grave and another less grave, and the penalty for one is imprisonment while that for the other is fine, the severity of the penalty for the more serious crime should not be judged by the classification of each of the penalties involved, but by the nature of the penalties.

Example: Even if the fine for damage to property through reckless imprudence is P40,000, an afflictive penalty, and the penalty for the physical injuries resulting from the same act is only 4 mos of arresto mayor, a correccional penalty may be imposed.

  • In the order of severity of the penalties, arresto mayor and arresto menor are considered more severe than destierro and arresto menor is higher in degree than destierro.
  • Fine is not included in the list of penalties in the order of severity and it is the last in the order.
  • Art 48 applies only to cases where the Code doesn’t provide a specific penalty for a complex crime.
  • Art 48 doesn’t apply when the law provides one single penalty for single complex crimes like the ff:

a)      robbery w/ homicide

b)      robbery w/ rape

c)       kidnapping w/ serious physical injuries

d)      rape w/ homicide

  • When a complex crime is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other.
  • Plurality of crimes – consists in the successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of w/c no conviction has yet been declared.
  • Kinds of plurality of crimes:

a)      formal or ideal – only one criminal liability

b)      real or material – there are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender, in such cases, the offender shall be punished for each and every offense that he committed.

Example: Juan stabbed Pedro, then Juan stabbed Tomas too. There are 2 committed as 2 acts were performed.

PLURALITY OF CRIMES

RECIDIVISM

No conviction of the crimes committed

There must be conviction by final judgment of the first prior offense

  • Formal/ideal plural crimes are divided into 3 groups: (a person committing multiple crimes is punished w/ one penalty in the ff cases)

a)      when the offender commits any of the complex crimes defined in art 48

b)      when the law specifically fixes a single penalty for 2 or more offenses committed: robbery w/ homicide, kidnapping w/ serious physical injuires

c)       when the offender commits continued crimes

  • Continued crimes – refers to a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed, so only one penalty shall be imposed.
  • Examples of continued crimes:

a)      a collector of a commercial firm misappropriates for his personal use several amounts collected by him from different persons. There is only one crime because the different and successive appropriations are but the different moments during which one criminal resolution arises.

b)      Juan stole 2 books belonging to 2 different persons. He commits only one crime because there is unity of thought in the criminal purpose of the offender.

  • A continued crime is not a complex crime as offender does not perform a single act but a series of acts. Therefore:

a)      penalty not to be imposed in the maximum

b)      no actual provision punishing a continued crime – it’s a principle applied in connection w/ 2 or more crimes committed w/ a single intention.

  • Continued crime is different from a transitory crime.  Transitory crime is “moving crime”.

Example: kidnapping someone for ransom and moving him to another venue. The offenders can be prosecuted and tried in either of the 2 areas.

REAL/MATERAIAL PLURALITY

CONTINUED CRIME

There is a series of acts performed by the offender

Same

Each act performed constitutes a separate crime because each act is generated by a criminal impulse

Different acts constitute only one crime because all of the acts performed arise from one criminal resolution.

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:

1.            If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2.            If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3.            The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.

  • Art 49 has reference to the provision in the 1stpar of Art 4 which provides that criminal liability shall be incurred “by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended”
  • Art 49 applicable only in cases when there is a mistake in identity of the victim of the crime and the penalty for the crime committed is different from that for the crime intended to be committed.
  • Art 49 also has no application where a more serious consequence not intended by the offender befalls the same person.

Example: Juan only wanted to inflict a wound upon Pedro but because he lost control of his right arm, he killed Pedro. Art 49 not applicable.

ART 49

ART 48

Lesser penalty to be imposed in its maximum pd

Penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum pd

Notes:

  1. 49 has reference to Art. 4(1). It applies only when there is error in personae.
  2. In Art. 49 (Paragraphs 1 and 2) the lower penalty in its maximum period is always imposed.
  3. In Par. 3 the penalty for the attempted or frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. This rule is not necessary and may well be covered by Art. 48, in view of the fact that the same act also constitutes an attempt or a frustration of another crime.

Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.

Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated felony.

Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a consummated felony.

 

Art. 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.

 

Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated

crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated felony.

Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted

crime. — The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the felony.

 

Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted

crime. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.

Application of Article 50 to 57

Participation

Consummated

Frustrated

Attempted

Principal

Penalty imposed by law

1° less

2° less

Accomplice

1° less

2° less

3° less

Accessory

2° less

3° less

4° less

  • Notes:

Art 50-57 not applicable when the law specifically prescribes the penalty for the frustrated and attempted felony or that to be imposed upon the accomplices and accessories.

Degree – one whole penalty, one entire penalty or one unit of the penalties enumerated in the graduated scales provided for in Art 71

Period – one of 3 equal portions, min/med/max of a divisible penalty. A period of a divisible penalty when prescribed by the Code as a penalty for a felony, is in itself a degree.

Distinctions between Degree and Period

Degree

Period

Refers to the penalty imposable for a felony committed considering the stages of execution and the degree of participation of the offender

Refers to the duration of the penalty consisting of the maximum, medium, and minimum, after considering the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances

May refer to both divisible and indivisible penalties

Refers only to divisible penalty.

  • The rules provided in Arts. 53, 55 and 57 do not apply if the felony is light because accessories are not liable for the same
  • Bases for imposition of the penalty under the RPC
  1. Stage of the commission of the crime
  2. Participation of the persons liable
  3. Presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances

 

Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain

accessories. — Those accessories falling within the terms of paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.

  • Art is limited only to grave and less grave felonies since it is not possible to have accessories liable for light felonies. It is further limited to those whose participation in the crime is characterized by the misuse of public office or authority.

Example:     a)  A mayor aided in friend, a wanted criminal, in escaping

b)  A senator gives protection to his jueteng lord friend

  • Additional Penalties for Public Officers who are accessories
  1. Absolute perpetual disqualification, if the principal offender is guilty of a grave felony.
  2. Absolute temporary disqualification if the principal offender is guilty of less grave felony.

Art. 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. — When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.

  • Basis for the imposition of proper penalty in impossible crimes: sopcial danger and degree of criminality shown by the offender.

Example: Juan fired a revolver at Pedro at the distance of 2 kilometers. This shoes stupidity rather than danger. Juan should not be punished as there is no social danger nor degree of criminality.

But if Juan was a convicted felon, act may be punished.

  • Article limited to those cases of grave and less grave felonies.

Art. 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. — The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.

  • 2 cases wherein the accomplice is punished w/ the same penalty imposed upon the principal

a)      ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and any person who by abuse of authority or confidential relationship shall cooperate as accomplices in the crimes of rape, acts of lasciviousness, seduction, corruption of minors, white slave trade or abduction.

b)      one who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime of slight illegal detention.

  • Accessory punished as principal: Art 142 – punishes an accessory for knowingly concealed certain evil practices.
  • Cases when instead of a penalty 2 degrees lower, one degree for accessory:

a)      knowingly using counterfeited seal or forged signature or stamp of the President

b)      illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note

c)       using a falsified document

d)      using a falsified dispatch

Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:

1.            When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.

2.            When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.

3.            When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.

4.            when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale. 

5.            When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.

  • The rules provided in this Art should also apply in determining the minimum of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL). It also applies in lowering the penalty by one or two degrees by reason of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance or when the penalty is divisible and there are two or more mitigating circumstances.

Graduated Scale in Art 71

  • Indivisible Penalties:

a)      Death

b)      Reclusion Perpetua

  • Divisible Penalties:

a)      Reclusion Temporal

b)      Prision Mayor

c)       Prision Correccional

d)      Arresto Mayor

e)      Destierro

f)       Arresto Menor

g)      Public Censure

h)      Fine

  • Rule No. 1:

When the penalty is single and indivisible (ex. RP), the penalty next lower shall be reclusion temporal.

  • Rule No. 2:

a) when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties

Ex. penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death, the next lower penalty is reclusion temporal

b) when the penalty is composed of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent

Ex. one divisible penalty is reclusion temporal. The penalty immediately following RT is prision mayor. 2 divisible penalties are prision correccional to prision mayor. The penalty immediately preceding the lesser of the penalties of prision correccional to prision mayor is arresto mayor.

  • Rule No. 3:

When the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties and the maximum period of a divisible penalty/ or when composed of one divisible penalty the maximum of one divisible penalty

Ex. penalty for murder is reclusion temporal to death. The point of reference will be on the proper divisible penalty which is reclusion temporal. Under the 3rd rule, the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal is composed of the medium and minimum periods of reclusion temporal and the maximum of prision mayor.

  • Rule No.4:

When the penalty is composed of several periods

Ex. the “several” periods contemplated in this rule correspond to different divisible penalties. A penalty of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period is an example of such. The penalty immediately following the minimum of the entire sentence, which is prision mayor medium, is prision mayor in its minimum and the 2 periods next following, which are prision correccional max and medium.

  • Rule No.5:

When the penalty has only 2 periods

Ex. Abduction punishable by prision correccional in its medium and minimum. The next penalty following is formed by 2 periods to be taken from the same penalty if possible or from the periods of the penalty numerically following the lesser of the penalties prescribed. The penalty next following prision correccional in its med and min shall be arresto mayor in its med and max.

  • Mitigating and Aggravating circumstances are first disregarded in the application of the rules for graduating penalties. It is only after the penalty next lower in degree is already determined that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be considered.

Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. — Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

1.            Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

2.            The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

3.            Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.

4.            The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.

5.            Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects.

(a)          Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;

(b)          Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and

(c)           Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of  prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

  • Par 1: Aggravating circumstances are not to be taken into account when:

a)      they themselves constitute a crime

Ex. by “means of fire” – arson

b)      they are included by law in the definition of a crime

  • Par 2: Same rules applies when the aggravating circumstance is inherent in the crime
  • Par 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances arising from any of the ff affect only those to whom such circumstances are attendant:

a)      from the moral attributes of the offender

b)      from his private relations w/ the offended party

c)       from any other personal cause

  • Par 4: the circumstances w/c consist of the ff shall serve to aggravate and mitigate the liability only of those who had knowledge of them at the time of the commission of the offense

a)      material execution of the act

b)      means employed to accomplish the crime

  • Par 5: Habitual Delinquent is a person who within the period of 10 years from the date of his (last) release or last conviction of the crimes of:

a)      serious or less serious physical injuries

b)      robbery

c)       estafa

d)      falsification

is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time or oftener.

  • Ten year period to be computed from the time of last release or conviction
  • Subsequent crime must be committed after conviction of the former crime. Cases still pending are not to be taken into consideration.

HABITUAL DELINQUENCY

RECIDIVISM

Crimes to be committed are specified

Same title

W/ in 10 years

No time fixed by law

Must be found guilty 3rd time or oftener

Second conviction

Additional penalty is imposed

Is not offset by MC, increases penalty to maximum

  • Rulings on Habitual Delinquency:

a)      the law on habitual delinquency does not contemplate the exclusion from the computation of prior conviction those falling outside the 10 yr pd immediately preceding the crime for w/c the defendant is being tried

b)      ten yr pd is counted not from the date of commission of the subsequent offense but to the date of conviction thereof in relation to the date of his last release or last conviction

c)       when an offender has committed several crimes mentioned in the definition of habitual delinquent, without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others, he is not a habitual delinquent

d)      convictions on the same day or at about the same time are considered as one only (days, weeks..)

e)      crimes committed on the same date, although convictions on different dates are considered as one

f)       previous convictions are considered every time a new offense is committed

g)      commissions of those crimes need not be consummated

h)      habitual delinquency applies to accomplice and accessories as long as in the crimes specified

i)        a crime committed in the minority of the offender is not counted

j)        imposition of additional penalty is mandatory and constitutional

k)      modifying circumstances applicable to additional penalty

l)        habitual delinquency is not a crime, it is simply a fact or circumstance which if present gives rise to the imposition of additional penalty

m)    penalty for habitual delinquency is a real penalty that determines jurisdiction

n)      a habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist

  • o)      in imposing the additional penalty, recidivism is not aggravating. The additional penalty must be imposed in its minimum

p)      an offender can be a habitual delinquent w/o being a recidivist

Notes:

  • In no case shall be the total penalties imposed  upon the offender exceed 30 years
  • The law does not apply to crimes described in Art. 155
  • The imposition of the additional penalties on habitual delinquents are constitutional, it is simply a punishment on future crimes on account of the criminal propensities of the accused.
  • The imposition of such additional penalties are mandatory.
  • Habitual delinquency applies at any stage of the execution because subjectively, the offender reveals the same degree of depravity or perversity as the one who commits a consummated crime.
  • Habitual delinquency applies to all participants because it reveals persistence in them of the inclination to wrongdoing and of the perversity of character that led them to commit the previous crime.
  • Cases where the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances are not considered in the imposition of penalties.
  • Penalty that is single and indivisible
  • Felonies through negligence
  • Penalty is a fine
  • Penalty is prescribed by a special law

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1.            When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2.            When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3.            When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4.            When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

  • Art 63 applies only when the penalty prescribed by the Code is either one indivisible penalty or 2 indivisible penalties
  • When the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present
    • Exception: in cases of privileged mitigating circumstances
  • 4: the moral value rather than the numerical weight shall be taken into account
  • Rules for the application of indivisible penalties
    • Penalty is single and indivisible – applied regardless of the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
    • Penalty composed of two indivisible penalties
  1. One aggravating circumstance present – higher penalty
  2. One mitigating circumstance present – lower penalty
  3. Some mitigating circumstances present and no aggravating – lower penalty
  4. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstance are present – basis in number and importance

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1.            When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

2.            When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.

3.            When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.

4.            When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5.            When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

6.            Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.

7.            Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

  • Art 64 applies when the penalty has 3 periods because they are divisible. If the penalty is composed of 3 different penalties, each forms a period according to Art 77
  • Par 4: the mitigating circumstances must be ordinary, not privileged. The aggravating circumstances must be generic or specific, not qualifying or inherent.

Example: a qualifying circumstance (treachery) cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance (voluntary circumstance)

  • The court has discretion to impose the penalty within the limits fixed by law
  • Art 64 not applicable when the penalty is indivisible or prescribed by special law or a fine
  • Rules for the application of divisible penalties
    • No aggravating and no mitigating circumstances – medium period
    • One mitigating circumstance – minimum period
    • One aggravating circumstance – maximum period
    • Mitigating and aggravating circumstance o offset each other and according to relative weight
    • 2 or more mitigating without any aggravating circumstance – on degree lower

Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.

COMPUTATIONS:

A. Example: Prision Mayor (6 yrs, 1 day to 12 yrs)

1)      subtract the minimum (disregard 1 day) from the maximum

12yrs – 6yrs = 6 yrs

2)      divide the difference by 3

6 yrs / 3 = 2 yrs

3)      use the minimum (6 yrs and 1 day) as the minimum of the minimum period. Then add the 2 yrs (disregarding the 1 day) to the minimum to get the maximum of the minimum

6 yrs (minimum of the minimum)

+             2 yrs (difference)

——————————————-

8 yrs (maximum of the minimum).

Therefore, minimum period of prision mayor; 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs

4)      use the maximum of the minimum period as the minimum of the medium period and add 1 day to distinguish from the minimum period. Then add 2 years to the minimum of the medium (disregarding the 1 day) to get the maximum of the medium period.

8 yrs (minimum of the medium)

+             2 yrs (difference)

——————————————-

10 yrs (maximum of the medium)

Therefore, medium period of prision mayor; 8 yrs 1 day to 10 yrs

5)      use the maximum of the medium period as the minimum of the maximum pd, add 1 day to distinguish it from the medium period. Then add 2 yrs to the minimum of the maximum pd (disregarding the 1 day) to get the maximum of the maximum period)

10 yrs (maximum of the medium)

+               2 yrs (difference)

———————————————-

12 yrs (maximum of the maximum)

Therefore, maximum period of prision mayor; 10 yrs 1 day to 12 yrs

  • Computation above applicable to all others except arresto mayor

B. Example: Prision Mayor minimum (6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs) only

1)      Subtract minimum from the maximum

8yrs – 6yrs = 2 yrs

2)      Divide the difference by 3

2yrs / 3 = 8 months

3)      Use the minimum of the given example as the minimum period. Then to get to get the maximum of the minimum, add the 8 months

6 yrs + 8 months = 6 yrs and 8 months

Therefore, minimum of prision mayor minimum; 6 yrs 1 day to 6 yrs 8 months

4)      Use the maximum of the minimum as the minimum of the medium period. Add 1 day to distinguish it from the maximum of the minimum. Add the 8 months and this becomes the maximum of the medium

6 yrs 8 months + 8 months = 7 yrs 4 months

Therefore, the medium period of prision mayor minimum; 6 yrs 8 mos 1 day to 7 yrs 4 mos

5)      Use the maximum of the medium as the minimum period of the maximum period and add 1 day to distinguish. Add the 8 months to get the maximum of this maximum

7 yrs 4 mos + 8 mos = 8 yrs

Therefore, maximum of prision mayor; 7 yrs 4 mos 1 day to 8 yrs

Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

  • Court must consider the following in imposing the fine:

a)      mitigating and aggravating circumstances

b)      the wealth and means of the culprit

  • When the minimum of the fine is not fixed, the court shall have the discretion provided it does not exceed the amount authorized by law

Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are present.— When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if of a less grave felony.

  • Requisites of Art 12 par 4

a)      act causing the injury must be lawful

b)      act performed w/ due care

c)       injury was caused by mere accident

d)      no fault or intention to cause injury

  • if these conditions are not all present, then the ff penalties shall be imposed:

a)      grave felony – arresto mayor max to prision correccional min

b)      less grave felony – arresto mayor min to arresto mayor med

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1.            Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2.            Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Notes:

  • 68 applies to such minor if his application for suspension of sentence is disapproved or if while in the reformatory institution he becomes incorrigible in which case he shall be returned to the court for the imposition of the proper penalty.
  • 68 provides for 2 privileged mitigating circumstances

If the act is attended by two or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty being divisible a minor over 15 but under 18 may still get a penalty two degrees lower.

  • under 15 but over 9 and has acted w/ discretion: 2 degrees lower
  • under 18 but over 15: 1 degree lower

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.

  • Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable
    • 1 or 2 degrees lower if the majority of the conditions for justification or exemption in the cases provided in Arts. 11 and 12 are present.

Art. 70. Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1.            Death,

2.            Reclusion perpetua,

3.            Reclusion temporal,

4.            Prision mayor,

5.            Prision correccional,

6.            Arresto mayor,

7.            Arresto menor,

8.            Destierro,

9.            Perpetual absolute disqualification,

10           Temporal absolute disqualification.

11.          Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling, and

12.          Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties ( pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended).

  • Maximum duration of the convict’s sentence: 3 times the most severe penalty
  • Max period shall not exceed 40 years
  • Subsidiary imprisonment – this shall be excluded in computing for the maximum duration

Example: Juan has 10 sentences of 6 months and 1 day each and a fine of 1000. He was not able to pay the fine. Therefore, he must serve subsidiary penalty after 18 months and 3 days in jail.

Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty.

The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1

1.            Death,

2.            Reclusion perpetua,

3.            Reclusion temporal,

4.            Prision mayor,

5.            Prision correccional,

6.            Arresto mayor,

7.            Destierro,

8.            Arresto menor,

9.            Public censure,

10.          Fine.

SCALE NO. 2

1.            Perpetual absolute disqualification,

2.            Temporal absolute disqualification

3.            Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be

                voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling,

4.            Public censure,

5.            Fine.

 

Art. 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. — The civil liabilities of a person found guilty of two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following the chronological order of the dates of the judgments rendered against him, beginning with the first in order of time.

  • the penalties shall be satisfied according to the scale of Art 70

Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory

penalties. — Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.

  • subsidiary penalties are deemed imposed. However, the subsidiary imprisonment must be expressly stated in the decision.

Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specially designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the next higher penalty.

  • if the decision or law says higher than RP or 2 degrees than RT, then the penalty imposed is RP or RT as the case may be. Death must be designated by name. However, for the other penalties, this does not apply.

Example: the penalty for crime X is 2 degrees lower than RP. The penalty imposed is prision mayor.

Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. — Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum.

The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not consist of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.

  • To get the lower degree:
    • Max: reduce by one-fourth
    • Min: the same

Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. — The legal period of duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown in the following table:

Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.

Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.

  • if there are 3 distinct penalties; there shall be a minimum, a medium and a maximum

Example: Reclusion temporal max to death

Art. 78.                 When and how a penalty is to be executed. — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions in which the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be performed, the time of its performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.

The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into different departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.

  • Only penalty by final judgment can be executed. Judgment is final if the accused has not appealed within 15 days or he has expressly waived in writing that he will not appeal.
  • There could be no subsidiary liability if it was not expressly ordered in the judgment

Art. 79.                 Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. — When a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of article 12 being observed in the corresponding cases.

If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the convict is serving his sentence

  • Cases of insanity:

a)      after final sentence, suspend the sentence regarding the personal penalties

b)      if he recovers, the sentence is executed unless it has prescribed

c)       the payment of civil of pecuniary liabilities shall not be suspended

  • Art 80 (as amended by PD 603: Child and Youth Welfare Code)

a)      youthful offender – over 9 but under 18 at time of the commission of the offense

b)      a youthful offender held for examination or trial who cannot furnish bail will be committed to the DSWD/local rehab center or detention home

c)       judgment of the court shall not be pronounced but suspended except for the ff cases:

  1. those who previously enjoyed a suspension of sentence
  2. those convicted of death or life imprisonment
  3. those convicted for an offense by the military tribunals

d)      the DSWD may dismiss the case if the youth behaves properly

e)      the records of the proceeding shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed

f)       the civil liability of the youthful offender may be voluntary assumed by a relative or a friend

g)      the parent or guardian of the child is liable when he aids, abets or connives w/ the commission of the crime or does an act producing, promoting or contributing to the child’s being a juvenile delinquent.

h)      The penalties for the parent or guardian: Fine not exceeding 500 and/or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years

Art. 81.                 When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death sentence shall be executed with reference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.

If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the electrocution.

 

Art. 82.                 Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.

  • Designate a working day w/c shall not be communicated to the offender before the sunrise of said day. The execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least 8 hrs following such notification.
  • He can execute a will.

Art. 83.                 Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40.

  • Death sentence commuted to RP:

a)      woman, within 3 years, following the date of sentence

b)      woman, while pregnant

c)       person over 70 years old.

Art. 84.                 Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. — The execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize.

 

Art. 85.                 Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp.

 

Art. 86.                 Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor. — The penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.

 

Art. 87.                 Destierro. — Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places designated in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated.

  • Destierro shall be imposed in the ff cases:

a)      death or serious physical injuries is caused or are inflicted under exceptional circumstance

b)      person fails to give bond for god behavior

c)       concubine’s penalty for the crime of concubinage

d)      lowering the penalty by degrees

  • Execution of Distierro

a)      Convict shall not be permitted to enter the place designated in the sentence nor within the radius specified, which shall not be more than 250 and not less than 25 km from the place designated.

b)      If the convict enters the prohibited area, he commits evasion of sentence

Art. 88.                 Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to it.

  • Served where:
  • In the municipal jail
  • In the house of the offender, but under the surveillance of an officer of the law whenever the court so provides in the decision due to the health of the offender. But the reason is not satisfactory just because the offender is a respectable member of the community

 

Art. 89.                 How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

  • Extinguishment of criminal liability is a ground of motion to quash
  • Criminal liability whether before or after final judgment is extinguished upon death because it is a personal penalty
  • Pecuniary penalty is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgement.
  • The death of the offended party however does not extinguish criminal liability of the accused because it is a crime against the state.

(2) By service of the sentence

  • Crime is a debt, hence extinguished upon payment
  • Service does not extinguish civil liability
  • Amnesty – is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or general pardon. It wipes all traces and vestiges of the crime but does not extinguish civil liability.

(3) By absolute pardon

  • Pardon – an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted w/ the execution of laws, which exempts the individual from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime.

AMNESTY

PARDON

Extended to classes of persons who may be guilty of political offenses

Exercised individually by the president

Exercised even before trial or investigation

Exercised when one is convicted

Looks backward and abolishes the offense itself

Looks forward and relieves the offender of the consequences

Does not extinguish civil liability

Same

A public act that needs the declaration of the president with the concurrence of Congress

A private act of the president

Courts should take judicial notice

Must be pleaded and proved

(4)    By prescription of the crime

  • When the crime prescribes, the state loses the right to prosecute
  • Prescription of a crime – is the loss/forfeiture of the right of the state to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.

(5)    By prescription of the penalty

  • means the loss/forfeiture of the right of government to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time. Conditions: there must be final judgement and the period has elapsed.

(6)    By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Art 344 of this Code

Art. 90.                 Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19, 1966.)

  • In computing for the period, the first day is excluded and the last day included. Subject to leap years
  • When the last day of the prescriptive period falls on a Sunday or a legal holiday, the info can no longer be filed the ff day
  • Simple slander prescribes in 2 months and grave slander in 6 months
  • Since destierro is a correctional penalty, it prescribes in 10 years. Afflictive penalties, 15 years.
  • If compound penalty, basis will be the highest penalty
  • If fine is an alternative penalty (imposed together w/ a penalty lower than the fine), fine shall be the basis
  • Prescription begins to run from the discovery thereof. Interrupted when proceedings are instituted and shall begin to run again when the proceedings are dismissed.
  • If an accused fails to move to quash before pleading, he is deemed to have waived all objections.
  • Prescription does not take away the court’s jurisdiction but only absolves the defendant and acquits him.

Art. 91.                 Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

  • If there is nothing concealed (appears in a public document), the crime commences to run on the date of the commission
  • Period of prescription for crimes that is continuing never runs
  • Crime needs to be discovered by:

a)      offended party

b)      authorities

c)       their agents

  • If a person witnesses the crime but only tells the authorities 25 years later, prescription commences on the day the authorities were told.
  • What interrupts prescription?

a)      preliminary examination or investigation w/c is similar to judicial proceeding

b)      filing the proper complaint w/ the fiscal’s office and the prosecutor. Police not included.

c)       Filing complaint with the court that has proper jurisdiction

  • When the period commences to run again

a)      When the proceeding is terminated without the accused being convicted or acquitted

b)      When the proceeding is unjustifiably stopped for a reason not imputable to the offender

  • “when such proceedings terminate” – termination that is final; an unappealed conviction or acquittal
  • “unjustifiably stopped for any reason” – example: accused evades arrest, proceedings must be stopped
  • Art 91 applies to a special law when said law does not provide for the application but only provides for the period of prescription

Art. 92.                 When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

1.            Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2.            Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3.            Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;

4.            Light penalties, in one year.

  • Note that final sentence must be imposed
  • If a convict can avail of mitigating circumstances and the penalty is lowered, it is still the original penalty that is used as the basis for prescription. However, if the convict already serves a portion of his sentence and escapes after, the penalty that was imposed (not the original) shall be the basis for prescription
  • Fines less than 200 fall under light penalty. Those above are correccional.

Art. 93.                 Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.

  • Elements:

a)      penalty is final

b)      convict evaded the sentence

c)       convict has not given himself up

d)      penalty has prescribed because of lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence

  • Interruption of the period
    • If the defendant surrenders
    • If he is captured
    • If he should go into a foreign country with which the Philippines has no extradition treaty
    • If he should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription
    • Acceptance of a conditional pardon(People v. Puntilos)
  • If a government has an extradition treaty w/ the country to w/c a convict escaped and the crime is not included in the treaty, the running of the prescription is interrupted
  • Sentence evasion clearly starts the running of the prescription. It does not interrupt it. Acceptance of the conditional pardon interrupts the prescriptive period.
  • Rolito Go case: since he was captured, he is only supposed to serve the remainder of his sentence. Reason: during the period he escaped, his existence is one of fear and discomfort

Art. 94.                 Partial Extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1.            By conditional pardon;

2.            By commutation of the sentence; and

3.            For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is serving his sentence.

Conditional pardon – contract between the sovereign power of the executive and the convict

  • Convict shall not violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines
  • Violation of conditions:
    • Offender is re-arrested and re-incarcerated
    • Prosecution under Art. 159

Commutation – change in the decision of the court by the chief regarding the

(1)    degree of the penalty;

(2)    by decreasing the length of the imprisonment or fine

  • Commutation allowed when:

a)      person over 70 yrs old

b)      10 justices fail to reach a decision affirming the death penalty

  • Consent not necessary in commutation
  • Prisoner is also allowed special time allowance for loyalty w/c is 1/5 deduction of the period of his sentence.

Parole – consists in the suspension of the sentence of a convict after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, without granting pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended. In case his parole conditions are not observed, a convict may be returned to the custody and continue to serve his sentence without deducting the time that elapsed.

CONDITIONAL PARDON

PAROLE

Given after final judgement

Given after service of the minimum penalty

Granted by Chief Executive

Given by the Bd of Pardons and Parole

For violation, convict may not be prosecuted under 159

For violations, may be rearrested, convict serves remaining sentence

  • Good conduct allowance during confinement

Deduction for the term of sentence for good behavior

Art. 95.                 Obligation incurred by person granted conditional

pardon. — Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him.

  • Condition of pardon is limited to unserved portion of the sentence, unless an intention to extend it beyond the time is manifest

Art. 96.                 Effect of commutation of sentence. — The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.

 

Art. 97.                 Allowance for good conduct. — The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:

1.            During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior;

2.            During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior;

3.            During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4.            During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.

  • Allowance for good conduct not applicable when prisoner released under conditional pardon.
  • Good conduct time allowance is given in consideration of good conduct of prisoner while he is serving sentence.

Allowances for Good conduct per year

Years

Allowance

First 2 years

5 days per month of good behavior

3rd to 5th years

8 days per month of good behavior

Following years up to 10th year

10 days per month of good behavior

11th year and successive years

15 days per month of good behavior

Art. 98.                 Special time allowance for loyalty. — A deduction of one-fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in article 58 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe to in said article.

  • Special time allowance for loyalty of prisoners:
    • The article applies only to prisoners who escaped
    • deduction of 1/5 of the period of sentence of prisoner who having evaded the service of his sentence during the calamity or catastrophe mentioned in Art 158, gives himself up to the authorities w/in 48 hrs ff the issuance of the proclamation by the President announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe
    • deduction based on the original sentence and not on the unexpired portion
  • Art 158 provides for increased penalties:

- a convict who has evaded the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution on the occasion of disorder resulting from conflagration, earthquake or similar catastrophe or during mutiny in which he did not participate is liable to an increased penalty (1/5 of the time still remaining to be served – not to exceed  6 months), if he fails to give himself up to the authorities w/in 48 hrs ff the issuance of a proclamation by the President announcing the passing away of the calamity.

Art. 99.                 Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.

a) authority to  grant time allowance for good conduct is exclusively vested in the Dir (e.g. provincial warden cannot usurp Director’s authority)

b) it is not an automatic right and once granted, cannot be revoked by him

CIVIL LIABILITY

2 classes:

a) social injury – produced by disturbance and alarm w/c are the outcome of the offense

b) personal injury – caused by the victim who may have suffered damage, either to his person, property, honor or chastity

 

Art. 100.               Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

Basis:

obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of an act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law

Dual character of the crime as against:

a)      the state because of the disturbance of peace and order

b)      the private person injured unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages or there is no private person injured by the crime

Damage that may be recovered in criminal cases:

  • Crimes against persons, like crime of physical injuries – whatever he spent for treatment of wounds, doctor’s fees, medicines as well as salary or wages unearned
  • Moral Damages: seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution
  • Exemplary Damages: imposed when crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances

a)      If there is no damage caused by the commission of the crime, offender is not civilly liable

b)      Dismissal of the info or the crime action does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal does not carry with it the extinction of the civil one.

c)       When accused is acquitted on ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted

d)      Exemption from criminal liability in favor of an imbecile or insane person, and a person under 9 yrs, or over 9 but under 15 who acted w/ discernment and those acting under the impulse of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrolable fear of an equal or greater injury does not include exemption from civil liability.

e)      Acquittal in the crim action for negligence does not preclude the offended party from filing a civil action to recover damages, based on the theory that the act is quasi-delict

f)       When the court found the accused guilty of crim negligence but failed to enter judgement of civil liability, the private prosecutor has a right to appeal for the purposes of the civil liability of the accused. The appellate court may remand the case to the trial court for the latter to include in its judgement the civil liability of the accused

g)      Before expiration of the 15-day of for appealing, the trial court can amend the judgement of conviction by adding a provision for the civil liability of the accused, even if the convict has started serving the sentence.

h)      An independent civil action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case provided the right is reserved. Reservation is necessary in the ff cases:

  1. any of the cases referred to in Art 32 (perpetual or temporary disqualification for exercise of the right of suffrage)
  2. defamation, fraud and physical injury (bodily injury and not the crime of physical injury)
  3. civil action is against a member of a city or municipal  police force for refusing or failing to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property
  4. in an action for damage arising from fault or negligence and there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties (quasi-delict)

i)        Prejudicial Question – one w/c arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

  • For the principle to apply, it is essential that there be 2 cases involved, a civil and a criminal case. Prejudicial questions may be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed.
  • An independent civil action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided that the right is reserved
  • Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgement that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist

Art. 101.               Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First.  In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second.  In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third.  In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

General Rule: exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability

Exception: no civil liability in par 4 and 7of art 12. Par 1,2,3,5 and 6 are NOT exempt from civil liability although exempt from criminal liability

Who are civilly liable for:

a. acts of insane or minor exempt from criminal liability

  1. primarily devolve upon perosns having legal authority or control over him, if at fault or negligent (except if proven that they acted w/o fault or w/ due diligence)
  2. if no fault or negligence, or even w/ fault but is insolvent and there are no persons having legal authority over them, the property of the insane, minor or imbecile not exempt from execution shall be held liable.
  3. over 15 but under 18 w. discernment

1. civil code says parent (dad then mom)_

2. guardians

3. minors own property where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed

*final release of a child based on good conduct does not remove his civil liability for damages.

  1. persons acting under an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
    1. persons using violence or causing the fear are primarily liable
    2. if there are none, those doing the act
  2. no civil liability in justifying circumstances EXCEPT: par 4 of Art 11, the one benefited by the act is civilly liable.
  3. civil liability in case of state of necessity

Those who benefited by the act and court shall determine the proportionate amount for which each shall be liable. If the government or majority of the inhabitants are liable, such will be determined by special laws or regulations.

Art. 102.               Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.

Elements of Par 1:

  1. That the innkeeper of the establishment or his employee committed a violation of municipal ordinance or some general or special police regulation
  2. A crime is committed in such establishment
  3. Person criminally liable is insolvent
  • when all these are present, the innkeeper and the like are subsidiarily liable

Elements of Par 2:

  1. guests notified in advance the innkeeper of the deposit of such goods w/in the inn
  2. guests followed the directions of the innkeeper w/ respect to the care and vigilance over the such goods

3.  such goods of the guest lodging therein were taken by robbery w/ force upon things or theft

  • When all these are present, the innkeeper is subsidiarily liable
  • No civil liability in case of robbery w/ violence against or intimidation of person, unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees
  • Actual deposit of the things of the guest to the innkeeper is not necessary, it is enough that they were within the inn.

Art. 103.               Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next

preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Elements

  1. employer, teacher, person or corporation is engaged in any kind of industry

Industry – any department or branch of art, occupation or business; especially one w/c employs so much labor and capital is a distinct branch of trade

  1. any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices of employees commits a felony while in the discharge of his duties
  2. the said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability
  • Hospitals are not engaged in industry; hence nit subsidiarily liable for acts of nurses
  • Private persons w/o business or industry, not subsidiarilly liable

 

Art. 104.               What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:

1.            Restitution;

2.            Reparation of the damage caused;

3.            Indemnification for consequential damages.

  • First remedy granted by law is no. 1, in case this is not possible no. 2.
  • In either case, no. 3 may be required
  • Restitution – in theft, the culprit is duty bound to return the property stolen
  • Reparation – in case of inability to return the property stolen, the culprit must pay the value of the property stolen.
  • In case of physical injuries, the reparation of the damage cause would consist in the payment of hospital bills and doctor’s fees to the offended party
  • Indemnification – the lost of salary or earnings

CIVIL LIABILITIES

PECUNIARY LIABILITIES

Includes reparation and indemnification

Same

Includes restitution (return property taken), nothing to pay in terms of money

No restitution as the liabilities are to paid out of the property of the offender

No fines and costs of proceedings

Includes fines and costs of proceedings

Art. 105.               Restitution. — How made. — The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.

The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to him.

This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.

  • The convict cannot by way of restitution, give to the offended party a similar thing of the same amount, kind or species and quality. The very thing should be returned.
  • If the property stolen while in the possession of the third party suffers deterioration due to his fault, the court will assess the amount of the deterioration and, in addition to the return of the property, the culprit will be ordered to pay such amount
  • General Rule: the owner of the property illegally taken by the offender can recover it from whomsoever is in possession thereof. Thus, even if the property stolen was acquired by a 3rdperson by purchase w/o knowing that it has been stolen, such property will be returned to the owner.
  • If the thing is acquired by a person knowing that it was stolen, then he is an accessory and therefore criminally liable
  • The third party who acquired the stolen property may be reimbursed w/ the price paid therefor if it be acquired at (a) a public sale and (b) in good faith
  • Circumstances which bar an action for recovery:
  1. Torrens title
  2. When sale is authorized
  • When the liability to return a thing arises from a contract, not from a criminal act, the court cannot order its return in the criminal case.
  • Restitution may be ordered, even if accused is acquitted, provided the offense is proved and it is shown that the thing belongs to someone else
  • When crime is not against property, no restitution or reparation of the thing can be done
  • Payment of salary of an employee during the period of suspension cannot, as a general rule, be properly decreed by the court in a judgement of acquittal. It devolves upon the head of the department concerned
  • The court has authority to order the reinstatement of the accused acquitted of a crime punishable by the penalty of perpetual or temporary disqualification

 

Art. 106.               Reparation. — How made. — The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.

Notes:

  • Reparation will be ordered by the court if restitution is not possible
  • Reparation shall be

a)    the price of the thing

b)    its sentimental value

  • If there is no evidence as to the value of the thing unrecovered, reparation cannot be made
  • Payment by the insurance company does not relive the offender of his obligation to repair the damage caused
  • The damages shall be limited to those caused by the crime
  • Accused is liable for the damages caused as a result of the destruction of the property after the crime was committed either because it was lost or destroyed by the accused himself or that of any other person or as a result of any other cause or causes

 

Art. 107.               Indemnification — What is included. — Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.

  • Indemnity refers to crimes against persons; reparation to crimes against property
  • Indemnity for medical services still unpaid may be recovered
  • Contributory negligence on the part of the offended party reduces the civil liability of the offender
  • The civil liability may be increased only if it will not required an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on w/c it is based
  • The amount of damages for death shall be at least 50,000, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
  • In addition:
  1. payment for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased
  2. if the deceased was obliged to give support, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the defendant
  3. the spouse, illegitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand for moral damages.
  • Moral damages may be recovered in the ff:
  1. physical injuries
  2. seduction, abduction, rape
  3. adultery, concubinage
  4. illegal or arbitrary detention
  5. illegal search
  6. libel, slander, defamation
  7. malicious prosecution
  • Exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the court will decide whether they should be adjudicated.

 

Art. 108.               Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential damages and actions to demand the same — Upon whom it devolves. — The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.

The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured.

  • The heirs of the person liable has no obligation if restoration is not possible and the deceased left no property
  • Civil liability is possible only when the offender dies after final judgement.
  • If the death of the offender took place before any final judgement of conviction was rendered against him, the action for restitution must necessarily be dismissed.

 

Art. 109.               Share of each person civilly liable. — If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond.

In case of insolvency of the accomplices, the principal shall be subsidiarily liable for their share of the indemnity and in case of the insolvency of the principal, the accomplices shall be subsidiarily liable, jointly and severally liable, for the indemnity due from said principal

Art. 110.               Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony — Preference in payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.

The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.

Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective shares.

  • Example: an indemnity of 100,000 has been sentenced, 50,000 will go to the principal and 20,000 to the accomplice
  • Subsidiary liability will be enforced on:
  1. first, against the property of the principal
  2. second, against that of the accomplice
  3. third, against that of the accessories

Art. 111.               Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. — Any person who has participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation.

Notes:

  1. This refers to a person who has participated gratuitously in the commission of a felony and he is bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation
  2. The third person must be innocent of the commission of the crime otherwise he would be liable as an accessory and this article will apply

Art. 112.               Extinction of civil liability. — Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.

  • Civil liability is extinguished by:
  1. payment or performance
  2. loss of the thing due
  3. condonation or remission of the debt
  4. confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor
  5. compensation
  6. novation
  • Other causes of extinguishment of obligations such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition and prescription are governed elsewhere in this code
  • Civil liability may arise from
  1. Crime – RPC
  2. Breach of contract – CC
  3. Tortious act – CC
  • The civil liability from any of these is extinguished by the same causes enumerated above
  • The accused shall still be liable for the payment of the thing stolen even if it is lost or destroyed

Art. 113.               Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.

Notes:

  • Unless extinguished, civil liability subsists even if the offender has served sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights or has served the same, due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of the sentence or any other reason.
  • Under the law as amended, even if the subsidiary imprisonment is served for non-payment of fines, this pecuniary liability of the defendant is not extinguished.
  • while amnesty wipes out all traces and vestiges of the crime, it does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence
  • probation affects only the criminal aspect of the crime.