Need for specificity in information and the importance of proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
G.R. No. 201147. September 21, 2022
Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Freddie Sernadilla
D E C I S I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
Case Summary
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Freddie Sernadilla for one count of rape and acquitted him of two counts of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610. The rape conviction stemmed from Sernadilla's sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, AAA, who was a member of his church. The Court found that Sernadilla employed intimidation due to his moral ascendancy over AAA.
Key Facts
Rape Conviction: Sernadilla was convicted of raping AAA, a 14-year-old girl, in October 2004.
Child Abuse Charges: Sernadilla was also charged with two counts of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 for sexual intercourse with AAA when she was 15 and 16 years old.
Defense: Sernadilla claimed a "sweetheart" relationship with AAA, arguing that the sexual acts were consensual.
Trial Court and CA: Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Sernadilla guilty, with the trial court convicting him of rape and child abuse, and the CA affirming the conviction with modifications.
Issues
Rape Conviction: Whether Sernadilla's actions constituted rape due to the presence of intimidation.
Child Abuse Charges: Whether Sernadilla's actions constituted child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610.
Defense of Consent: Whether AAA's consent to sexual intercourse negates Sernadilla's criminal liability.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that:
Rape Conviction: Sernadilla's actions constituted rape due to the presence of intimidation, given his moral ascendancy over AAA.
Acquittal on Child Abuse Charges: Sernadilla was acquitted of child abuse charges due to the prosecution's failure to allege the elements of the offense in the information.
Consent: The Court emphasized that consent is not a defense in cases of rape or child abuse when the victim is a minor.
Significance
This case highlights the importance of protecting minors from sexual abuse and the nuances of consent in such cases. The Supreme Court's decision underscores the need for specificity in informations and the importance of proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The ruling also reinforces the principle that moral ascendancy can constitute intimidation in cases of rape.
NOTE:
At the time the crime was committed, the crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A and relative to the subject indictments is committed:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
x x x x
The first element is undisputed as the accused-appellant himself admitted that he had carnal knowledge of AAA. The second element is particularly contentious.
In order to establish the element of force and intimidation, the prosecution must prove:
a) a complete absence of voluntariness on the part of the victim; and
b) that the accused actually employed force and intimidation upon the victim to achieve his end.
In rape, force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. Proof of resistance is not necessary; the victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force and intimidation employed upon her. It being enough that it is of such nature as to wield the victim to submit to the accused's desires.
Intimidation includes the moral kind such as the fear caused when threatened with a knife or pistol, or when words employed are of such nature as would incite anxiety or distress leaving the victim without any choice but to surrender. As this Court held in Nacario v. People, "[i]ntimidation is a state of mind, which cannot, with absolutely certainty, be discerned. Whether a person has been intimidated can only be inferred from the simultaneous or subsequent acts of the person subjected thereto." It involves largely an appreciation of the state of mind of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. Hence, rather than the appellate courts which relies only on the cold and mute pages of the records which do not graphically convey emotion, the assessment of the trial court must be given binding finality in this respect.
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is especially true in rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no other person but the victim and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are merely faced with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before them, the trial judge comes face to face with the rape victim herself on the witness stand. He personally observes her conduct and demeanor while responding to the questions propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as those from the defense counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the chance to pose clarificatory questions to said victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as to the issue of her credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court.
Settled is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance." In this case, none of these compelling reasons exists. Thus, We affirm the conclusion of the trial court, which was adopted by the CA, that the accused-appellant employed intimidation in order to have carnal knowledge of AAA in Criminal Case No. 3600; and that the same element is absent in Criminal Case Nos. 3596 and 3599.
While the term "force and intimidation" was not specifically mentioned in the Information, We find that its presence has been sufficiently alleged with the statement that the accused-appellant is a Pastor of the church to which AAA is a member, as this depicts the ascendancy which the former wields over the latter. The test in determining whether the information validly charges the offense is whether material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. As the objective is to enable the accused to adequately prepare for his defense. Thus, it is more important to aver the ultimate facts rather than employ the technical term employed by the law alone.
In October 2004, AAA was merely 14 years old while the accused-appellant was about 34 years old. In addition, the accused-appellant is a pastor of the religious organization of which AAA and her family are members and as such exerts moral ascendancy over the victim, which then satisfies the element of force and intimidation. To be sure, jurisprudence instructs that even the victim's failure to tenaciously resist the accused-appellant does not ipso facto indicate voluntariness. In rape, intimidation is viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. As in the circumstances of the case at bar, the difference in age– the accused-appellant being more than double the age of AAA, taken together with his position by virtue of which he wields moral ascendancy and influence over AAA, it is an inevitable conclusion that the element of intimidation is present.
The accused-appellant's defense anchored on the "sweetheart theory" deserves scant consideration. Jurisprudence instructs that "sweetheart theory" in rape is not credible when it is based on the bare testimony of the accused as the same is self-serving. The theory needs strong corroboration in that even the testimony of a relative will not suffice. A sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be substantiated by evidence of the romantic relationship such as love letters, memento or pictures. This is glaringly lacking here despite the accused-appellant's submission that he and AAA have been in a relationship for at least two (2) years. The testimonies offered by the defense to prove such romantic relationship are insufficient, inasmuch as they do not directly attest to its existence but only relate to the interaction of AAA and accused-appellant. What they narrated to have witnessed are equivocal acts not necessarily indicative of a romantic relationship. The same holds true with the photographs submitted.
At any rate, even lacking the same propositions and assuming further as true the accused-appellant's submission that he and AAA are sweethearts, the existence of such relationship is not tantamount to consent. Proof of romantic relationship does not necessarily indicate consent nor negate the absence of consent to the sexual encounter. As the Court previously ruled, "a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will. Love is not a license for lust."
In all three (3) charges, the accused-appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA. In the first event which happened in October 2004, the RTC and the CA correctly found the presence of force and intimidation based on the testimony of AAA, that she tried to resist but was threatened by the accused-appellant that he would kill her. Thus, the accused-appellant prevailed in satisfying his lust. To be sure, the degree of force and resistance is relative, depending on the circumstances of each case and on the physical capabilities of each party. As aforestated, force and violence need not be overpowering or irresistible. It suffices that it brings about the desired result. Insofar as Criminal Case No. 3600 therefore, the accused-appellant should be convicted of rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In accordance with jurisprudence, the accused-appellant must also pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, set at P75,000 each, and subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 3596 and 3599, the RTC and the CA both concluded that there is dearth of evidence to prove "that the carnal knowledge was done against the will and consent of complainant." In these two (2) instances, AAA was led to have sexual intercourse with the accused-appellant who gave her monetary allowances and other material support. Proceeding from these, the RTC and the CA concluded that in the absence of element of force and intimidation, sexual intercourse with a minor even if done with consent is still punishable as Child Abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
As in the earlier case, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the factual finding of the lower court that evidence is insufficient to establish that sexual congress between the accused-appellant and AAA on October 28, 2005 and on February 9, 2006 were attended by force and intimidation. In both of these instances nonetheless, AAA was still a minor, she was 15 years old during the second incident, and 16 in the later occurrence.
Before an accused can be held criminally liable under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the following requisites must be present:
1) offender is a man;
2) he indulges in sexual intercourse with a female exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse, who is 12 years old or below 18 or above 18 under special circumstances; and
3) coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group is employed against the child.
In the landmark case of People v. Tulagan, the Court explained that in rape involving a minor who is under 12 years old or is demented consent is immaterial as the law presumes the victim's incapacity to discern good and evil;
[c]onsent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 under special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove that the said victim engaged in sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. (Emphasis in the original)
Simply, sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years of age or is demented is always statutory rape and the accused-appellant will be prosecuted under paragraph 19(d), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. Meanwhile, if the victim is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited to prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to the sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," the crime could not be Rape under RPC as there is consent. Rather, the offender should be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610. However, when the victim consented to the sexual intercourse, and no consideration, coercion or influence is involved, no crime is committed; except where "force, threat, or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral authority" and in instances which fall as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple seduction under Article 338 of the RPC.
In this case, the remaining charges against the accused-appellant merely stated that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against the latter's will and consent. It was proven during trial that AAA submitted to the carnal desires of the accused-appellant on account of his inducement, enticement, or coercion, in the form of monetary support; thus establishing the offense of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. We note however that the element of "inducement, enticement, or coercion" was not alleged in the Information, thus violating the accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. It follows therefore that acquittal must ensue in Criminal Case Nos. 3596 and 3599.
In Villarba v. CA, the Court reiterated and explained the rule requiring that an Information must state all the material elements of the offense in relation to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him– an Information must state the acts or omissions that constitute the offense, which must be "described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged." Factual allegations constitutive of the offense are substantial matters and an accused's right to question a conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be waived. Therefore, even if the prosecution satisfies the burden of proof, but if the offense is not charged or necessarily included m the information, conviction cannot ensue.
In this case, while the elements of the offense of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 were proven during trial, it cannot be said nonetheless that the accused-appellant was given sufficient opportunity to defend himself in this respect as the Information failed to state the elements of such offense in the Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 3596 and 3599. Accordingly, he must be acquitted of these charges.
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